Brown or white? : a history of the Fiji sugar industry, 1873-1973 by Moynagh, Michael
BROWN OR WHITE? A HISTORY OF THE FIJI SUGAR INDUSTRY, 
1873 - 1973 
by 
Michael Moynagh 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in the Australian 
National University 
Canberra May 1978 
J ' 1 • . "< • " i , i ' . 1 
' ^ J ' ' ' 
- . 
- J « t r - A "' - 1' 
This thesis is based on my own research, 
except where otherwise acknowledged 
I 













II The Beginnings 
III The Plantation System, 1880-1914 
IV Indian Settlement, 1884-1912 
V Crisis and Change, 1912-23 
VI The Smallfarm System, 1924-39 
VII CSR's Hegemony Under Attack - the 1940s 
VIII The Eve Commission, 1961 














For nearly one hundred years the sugar industry has been central to 
the Fiji economy, and has been dominated by the Colonial Sugar Refining 
Co. Ltd (CSR). After Cession in 1874, government sought to attract capital 
to the colony, and CSR responded because it needed raw sugar for its 
refineries in Australia and New Zealand. The company had originally hoped 
that its mills would be supplied with cane mainly from outside growers, 
but initially it was disappointed. Income from cane was too low to attract 
Fijians, while many of the early settlers were unable to make profits from 
cane and had to leave Fiji. However, during and after the 1890s better 
cultivation methods increased the returns from cane. European contractors 
supplied the mills and CSR began to lease its estates to plantation over-
seers. The process of leasing was accelerated after 1905, so that by 1914 
most of the cane was grown by Europeans. This enabled CSR to obtain 
supplies more cheaply than if it had grown all the cane itself, and it 
increased the industry's influence with government. 
The import of Indian indentured labour from 1879 provided cheap labour 
for plantations. After serving their indentures, immigrants settled in the 
vicinity of plantations under conditions designed to encourage them to seek 
wage employment for parts of the year. In certain respects, these con-
ditions impeded the development of Indian agriculture. In 1916 India 
halted the supply of indentured labour. There was immediate upward 
pressure on wages which CSR - in effect supported by government - tried to 
resist. This led to strikes in 1920 by labourers on eastern Viti Levu, 
and in the following year by cane growers on western Viti Levu. The 
industry was saved from collapse by the introduction of government sub-
sidies and the transition to cane production by Indian growers. In the 
1920s and '30s CSR, which had become the sole miller of sugar in Fiji, 
tried to protect the smallfarm system from forces which might otherwise 
have produced demands by growers for an increase in the price of cane. 
The interests of CSR and farmers were in fundamental conflict. Follow-
ing population growth and war-time inflation, in 1943 growers refused to 
harvest their cane unless the price was increased. The strike was defeated 
and an inquiry subsequently held by Professor C.Y. Shephard. But CSR 
prevented the implementation of those proposals of Shephard which would 
have entailed government intervention in the industry. In 1950 the cane 
price was increased, though the company could have afforded to do this 
before then. Nine years later CSR tried to revise the cane contract in 
ways that would have been to the disadvantage of growers. A strike by 
farmers followed, after which Sir Malcolm Eve was asked to conduct an 
inquiry. His findings were designed to strengthen CSR's position in the 
industry. In 1969 Lord Denning arbitrated in another dispute between 
growers and CSR, and his report was so favourable to farmers that the 
company withdrew from Fiji in 1973. 
The thesis argues that though the industry has brought some economic 
gains to Fiji, in a variety of ways it has also impeded the country's 
economic development. It was found that George Beckford's model of 
plantation enterprise was largely applicable to the case of CSR in Fiji. 
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FIJI IN 1914. 
CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
FOR nearly 100 years sugar has been the mainstay of Fiji's economy. It 
has accounted for over - usually well over - half the total exports each 
year. It has provided direct employment for large numbers of people -
about 30% of the economically active population outside subsistence agri-
culture in 1966, to which must be added the indirect effects on employment. 
Between 1950 and 1965 sugar represented on average one fifth of gross 
2 
domestic product each year. The industry has played a central part in 
shaping the history of Fiji. The size of the Indian population today, 
and the resultant competition between Fijians and Indians for political 
and economic gains, stems from the introduction before 1916 of indentured 
labour to work on sugar plantations and in the mills. 
Not only has sugar been of immense importance to Fiji. Its 
historical development contains features of singular interest to those 
outside the country. No other sugar industry in the world has nearly all 
its cane grown by such a large number of small growers - now numbering 
over 16,000. Nor can there be many which for almost their whole history 
have been so dominated by one company, the Australian based CSR Ltd, 
formerly known as the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. From 1924 to 1973 
it was the sole miller of sugar in Fiji, buying cane from (mostly) Indian 
small farmers, processing it into raw sugar and exporting it for refining 
overseas. Before 1924 it organized the cultivation of cane on estates, 
and of the six mills in the colony after 1902 it owned the four largest. 
The company has a remarkably complete set of records dating from the 
1880s when it started in Fiji. Together with official and other sources, 
they provide insight into the effects of private enterprise on the economy 
of a less developed country. The question of who benefited from the sugar 
industry - white capital or brown labour - will form an important part of 
this study. 
Another question will be the extent to which the industry has 
I 
1 Census report for 1966, C.P. 9/1968. 
2 DP 7: Fiji's Seventh Development Plan, 1976-1980, 1 
contributed to Fiji's economic development - defined as the growth of real 
per capita incomes of the mass of the population. By world standards Fiji 
is not poor. Gross domestic product per head of the population is higher 
than that of nearly all the African and Asian countries. Yet it is lower 
than several other members of the Tliird World like Singapore, and is far 
3 
below that of the developed nations. Fiji is a small country, physically 
isolated from the main centres of world trade. The land area totals about 
7,000 square miles, mostly steep and mountainous. 87% of the land and 
over 90% of the population is concentrated on the two largest islands of 
Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. The population is over half a million, of which 
the Indian component is the largest, followed quite closely by the Fijians; 
Chinese, Europeans and other ethnic groups comprise under 10% of the total. 
Population trends since 1881 are shown in Table 1:1. The subsistence 
TABLE 1:1 
Component populations, 1881 to 1976 
Year Fij ian Indian Other Total 
1881 114,748 588 12,150 127,486 
1891 105,800 7,468 7,912 121,180 
1901 94,397 17,105 8,622 120,124 
1911 87,096 40,286 12,159 139,541 
1921 84,475 60,634 12,157 157,266 
1936 97,651 85,002 15,726 198,379 
1946 118,070 120,414 21,154 259,638 
1956 148,134 169,403 28,200 345,737 
1966 202,176 240,960 33,591 476,727 
1976 259,932 292,896 35,240 588,068 
Sources: Census report ; for 1966; preliminary • figures f 
the 1976 census, Bureau of Statistics, Suva. 
sector, which is mainly Fijian, is still an important part of tlie economy, 
4 
accounting for an estimated 9.4% of GDP in 1975. 
The monetary sector depends heavily on the international economy. 
Despite an increasing amount of import substitution, the import bill has 
represented a steadily rising proportion of GDP. From 39% in 1950 it rose 
to 50% in the mid-1960s and to 73% in 197A.^ Much of the increase is due 
to the import of investment goods. Yet food imports are still important. 
3 International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics (1977). 
4 DP 7, 15. 
5 Ibid., 2. 
represcnLing about: 25% of all ImporLs by value in 1973, and about 45% of 
total visible exports. This import dependence has forced government to 
give priority to boosting the earnings of foreign exchange. Apart from 
sugar, vdiich accounted for 66.9% of visible exports in 1973 and provides 
employment mainly for Indians, the other princii)al ex()orts arc coconut 
products (11.7% of the 1973 total) and gold (also 11.7%), both of which 
employ mostly Fijians. Since the 1960s receipts from tourism have been 
important, and in 1973 comprised 32.7% of total foreign exchange earnings.^ 
Because these activities have been developed largely as the result of 
overseas investment, foreign controlled firms dominate important sectors 
of the economy, though the sugar mills were acquired by government in 1973. 
The country's dependence on overseas trade and foreign capital 
has involved an historical alliance between private capital, government 
and Fijian chiefs. Wlien the islands were ceded to Britain in 1874, the 
colonial administration was faced with the task of maintaining political 
control. Without a large armed force at its immediate disposal, govern-
ment had to rule with the consent of the chiefs. This required compromise, 
including a willingness by government to limit the spread of plantation 
enterprise which was seen by the chiefs as a threat to Fijian interests. 
The alienation of native lands was checked, and Fijians were discouraged 
from working on plantations. Yet at the same time, though reluctantly, 
government had to encourage private enterprise, not least so as to raise 
revenue to pay for the administration. A large part of the best land in 
the colony was made available to planters because a government commission 
confirmed the alienation of about half of what had been sold to Europeans 
before Cession, while at times officials encouraged Fijians to lease 
other areas. On this basis, capitalists were encouraged to invest in the 
colony. Much later, when Indians became storekeepers, set up import/ 
export firms and so on, Indian businessmen would join hands with overseas 
capital. 
The result was an identity of interest between capital, govern-
ment and chiefs which was to last throughout the subsequent history of the 
islands. Each party depended on the others. Business needed chiefly 
support for the existing order, thereby ensuring political stability which 
'The Trade Report for the Year 1973', P.P. 21/1974. 
was a prerequisite for trade; it also relied on government for other forms 
of assistance where needed. To maintain political order government 
required the support of the chiefs, and the inflow of private capital which 
would lead to economic growth and increase public revenue. The Fijians 
wanted government to protect them against the expansive tendencies of 
private enterprise and later the Indians; yet those who could lease land 
also benefited from the receipt of rents following the development of 
commercial agriculture. Of course within the alliance there were tensions, 
particularly between business and the chiefs. Especially at the beginning, 
neither party fully realized the extent to which their interests coincided. 
There was competition, too, for factors of production, notably land, and 
to some degree over the share of the returns from agriculture obtained 
through rent. Even within the business community there were differences. 
The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd wanted to maximise its returns by 
paying as low wages or as low a price for cane as it could; but since 
recipients then would have had less to spend on consumer goods, this was 
against the interests of merchants. There were also disputes between the 
company and government over what share of the profits from sugar each 
should obtain, and over some of the methods used by the company to make 
profits. Yet whatever the differences, and to contemporaries they often 
loomed large, each party in the alliance depended on the tacit support of 
the others. Though they might jostle among themselves for a short term 
advantage, none dared threaten the long term existence of the alliance 
itself. 
Against the alliance were the economic interests of the Fijian 
commoners and the bulk of the Indian population. Among Fijians wealth 
was, and still is, concentrated in the hands of the chiefs who are 
entitled to a large proportion of the income from rents - 30% since the 
Second World War - and who can extract labour services from those under 
their authority. Though the commoners benefit from the distribution of 
the chiefs' wealth, in terms of its ownership the interests of the two 
parties differ. The support of Apolosi Nawai's short-lived Viti Company, 
founded during the First World War with the aim of reducing European 
economic influence over the Fijians, highlighted the conflict of interest 
that has also existed between the commoners and European owners of 
capital.^ Interests have differed, too, between the Indians - whether as 
indentured labourers or smallfarmers - who have wanted to secure a larger 
share of the proceeds from sugar, and plantation and mill owners whose 
concern has been to resist such demands. The contradictions between 
capital, chiefs and government on the one side and commoners, Indian 
labourers and Indian smallfarmers on the other have been superimposed by 
ethnic, religious and personal differences. These have often bitterly 
divided the Indian community. Further, Indian smallfarmers frequently 
tend to feel that their interests are threatened more by Fijians, 
especially over land tenure, than by private capital, while commoners and 
chiefs have united to protect themselves against the Indians. Neverthe-
less, the basic economic contradictions still remain. 
The principal links forged by Fiji with the international 
economy have been through the sugar industry. The small size of the 
country's domestic market means that sugar has had to be produced almost 
entirely for export. At first it was sold mainly to New Zealand and 
Australia, but by 191A the volume going to Australia was relatively small 
while Canada had become the second most important market after New Zealand, 
In the late 1920s Britain replaced New Zealand as the principal outlet, 
with Canada still in second place. This has remained the position since 
World War II, though significant quantities have also been shipped to 
New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and the United States. Apart from a 
brief period at the end of the last century molasses, an important by-
product of sugar milling, has been sold to Australia where it has been 
used in the manufacture of industrial alcohol. The volume of Fiji's 
exports are minute in terms of the world sugar trade, so that she has 
been unable to influence the price significantly. Demand in high income 
countries, to which most of Fiji's sugar is sold, tends to be relatively 
inelastic to changes in income, while the expansion of beet production in 
the nineteenth century and the more recent development of artificial 
sweeteners means that substitutes for cane sugar have become readily 
available. This limits the scope for increasing the price. 
For an account of Apolosi and the Viti Company see Timothy 
J. Macnaught, 'Mainstream to Millpond? The Fijian Political 
Experience 1897-19A0', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (A.N.U., 1975), 
202-36. 
Produced largely for sale on domestic markets, the bulk of world 
sugar output - both beet and cane - does not enter international trade. 
Of the proportion which does, about half since the 1930s has been marketed 
under special arrangements and at prices which have diverged from the 
g 
world free price. The latter is the price of that small percentage of 
world sugar production which is sold on the international market at prices 
freely determined by supply and demand. Because this is essentially a 
residual market, prices have tended to fluctuate widely. High prices have 
encouraged new suppliers to enter the market, and this has a long term 
depressive effect on price since the large amount of capital required for 
sugar production, and the specificity of capital to the particular crop, 
makes supply comparatively unresponsive to a fall in price. When prices 
have dropped, governments have frequently subsidised industries which 
otherwise would have been uncompetitive. Up to 1939 Fiji sold sugar at 
prices related to the world free price, though she benefited from prefer-
ential tariffs on imperial sugar introduced by Canada before World War 1 
and by Britain in 1919. During the 1940s all Fiji's crop was purchased 
by the British Ministry of Food at prices which were remunerative to the 
higher cost West Indian suppliers, but subsequently under the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement (1950-74) and the Lome Convention which superseded it, 
only part of Fiji's crop (about 60% on average) has been sold at prices 
unrelated to the world free price. Though these negotiated prices have 
generally been higher than the world price, they have been fixed mainly 
with consumer interests in mind and in the knowledge that very high prices 
would encourage the production of substitutes. The rest of Fiji's sugar 
has been sold mostly in preferential markets where the price has been 
based on the world free price plus the value of the tariff. Clearly, 
returns from sugar have depended very much on price movements beyond the 
country's control. 
For Fiji to compete on the world market sizeable quantities of 
capital have been required. Early entrepreneurs in the colony had to 
provide not only mills, plantation equipment and so on, but also infra-
structure in the form of roads, tramlines, power supplies, etc. Since 
the late nineteenth century the world's chief exporters of sugar have 
8 During the Second World War the proportion was well over half. 
generally favoured large, capital intensive mills so as to take advantage 
of technical innovations and economies of scale. Nowadays, except in a 
few countries like India, a mill with a capacity to produce 20,000 tons 
of raw sugar a season would be considered small. In simplest terms, a 
sugar mill breaks up cane stalks, squeezes out sweet juice and recovers 
the sucrose as crystals of raw sugar containing about 98% sucrose. Though 
this can be done in very small and technically unsophisticated mills, the 
quality of sugar tends to be lower and returns on investment less than if 
sugar is produced in larger mills. An efficient transport system is 
particularly important for sugar production. Since cane begins to lose 
its sucrose content immediately after harvesting, it is essential that the 
crop be taken quickly from the field to the factory. This means that cane 
should be grown as close to the mill as possible. But in Fiji the topo-
graphy of the land has caused sugar to be cultivated at greater distances 
from the mills than, say, in Queensland. This in turn has resulted in a 
larger expenditure per ton of sugar on the transport system than is usual 
in most sugar countries. On a per ton of sugar basis, Fiji's tramline 
system is reputed to be the most extensive in the world. With raw sugar 
requiring larger quantities of capital than other food industries except 
perhaps tea, and in the absence of substantial savings within the economy, 
the capital to develop sugar production in Fiji has had to come from abroad. 
The Fiji industry has also depended on a big labour force, for 
despite the introduction of tractors since the Second World War the 
cultivation of cane in Fiji is a labour intensive process. The demand for 
labour peaks at certain times of the year according to the crop cycle. As 
soon as the weather is right between February and April of each year, 
within a week or two the land is ploughed and cane planted, the crop being 
reaped the following year. Harvesting lasts from June/July to December/ 
January, and is performed by gangs of cutters working on a co-operative 
basis. After harvesting the cane stools remain and from these grow new 
shoots, known as ratoons, which can be harvested the next season. Till 
the late 1950s it was usual for the same stool to produce ratoons for one 
or two years before being ploughed out, the land being fallowed till new 
plants were sowed. With the introduction of better varieties, though, 
'multiple' ratooning is now common, ratoons often being grown for eight 
years or more. This reduces the amount of labour needed for planting. 
At times of peak labour demand it is essential for the miller to ensure. 
where possible, tlie minimum competition for labour, so as to prevent the 
crop being neglected and wage increases pushing up the cost of cane. The 
larger the crop and the higher the sugar content of cane, which partly 
depends on good cultivation work and proper harvesting, the lower will be 
the unit costs of milling. Through meclianisation, it miglit have been 
possible for the industry to have developed on lines which would have 
greatly reduced the demand for labour. But in Fiji there was little 
incentive to do this. Although the supply of Fijians and Pacific Island 
labour was limited, Indians were made available under a system of indenture 
which lasted till 1916. The labour shortage which followed the end of 
indenture was solved not by extensive mechanisation, but by encouraging 
Indian smallfarmers to grow cane. Historically, then, the industry has 
depended on overseas markets, overseas capital and, up to 1916, on over-
seas labour. 
The history of the industry can be divided into three phases. 
The first, the European planter phase, lasted from about 1870 to 1916. 
During this period the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. acquired its dominant 
position in the industry, building the Nausori, Rarawai, Labasa and 
Lautoka mills. Of the other mills in the colony, only two - at Penang and 
Navua - survived the fall in raw sugar prices in the 1880s and '90s. Cane 
was grown either by European planters for sale to the mills, or by the 
mill-owners themselves. In the 1890s the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. 
began to lease its estates to overseers of the company, and after 1905 
the process of leasing was accelerated so that by 1916 the bulk of the 
company's cane was obtained from European planters. Estates were worked 
mostly by Indian indentured labourers, who after serving their indentures 
began to settle on the land, often as cane farmers. The second phase 
started in 1916, when the end of the indenture system put upward pressure 
on wage rates. In 1920 efforts by employers to prevent a sharp and 
permanent rise in wages resulted in a strike by labourers on the south-
east of Viti Levu. The following year there was a strike by Indian cane 
growers on the west of the same island. The shortage of labour was solved 
by settling Indians on land formerly cultivated as estates, so that they 
would grow cane on plots averaging about ten acres each. By 1939 nearly 
all the cane was produced by smallfarmers, and the Colonial Sugar Refining 
Co. had become the sole miller in Fiji, having purchased the Penang mill; 
the one at Navua had closed in 1922. The third phase lasted from about 
1940 to 1973. It was a period of intermittent conflict between growers 
and the company. There was a strike in 19A3 followed by an inquiry into 
the industry by Professor C.Y. Shephard. Another strike occurred in 1960, 
after which there was a commission of inquiry headed by Sir Malcolm 
Trustam Eve. A third dispute in 1969 did not result in a strike, but the 
arbitrator. Lord Denning, found mostly in favour of the growers, leading 
the company to withdraw on the grounds that it could no longer operate 
profitably in Fiji. 
A traditional account of all this would stress the benefits to 
Fiji from the development of the sugar industry. It would highlight, for 
example, the gains from the supply of capital and skills, the earnings of 
foreign exchange and the general stimulus to economic activity provided by 
the industry. Negative contributions to economic development might be 
attributed to the Colonial Sugar Refining Co.'s monopsonic position in 
the economy, which enabled the company to keep down wages and the price 
of cane and so limited the spread effects of its activities. Following 
9 
writers like P.T. Bauer and B.S. Yamey, the account might stress the need 
to attract further private investment so that with other firms competing 
in the labour market the effects of monopsony could be reduced. The 
role of trade unions in raising wage levels might be stressed. Such an 
approach might also suggest ways - perhaps through government intervention 
in which the benefits of sugar production might have been increased. 
But experience has shown that gains from international trade to 
developing countries are less than was once supposed. A whole host of 
writers has tried to explain why this should be so.^^ Among them are a 
number from the Commonwealth Caribbean, notably Lloyd Best and George 
9 P.T. Bauer and B.S. Yamey, The Economics of the Under-Developed 
Countries, 79-81. See also H. Myint, The Economics of the 
Developing Countries. 
10 For an introduction to the literature on development economics 
see H.C. Brookfield, Interdependent Development. 
10 
Beckford.^^ Their analysis focuses on the 'plantation economy', where 
the plantation form of production is dominant and which is seen as a 
special case of export-led growth under expansive capitalism. Besides 
sale for export and the combination of large numbers of unskilled labour 
with as few skilled managers, etc. as possible, especially in the twentieth 
century plantations have been characterised by foreign ownership, usually 
of a corporate nature, and by a relatively high degree of vertical 
integration. The operation of plantation companies is taken as the key 
variable influencing the political, social and economic history of 
plantation societies. 
Beckford allows that companies make a substantial contribution 
to income growth through their development of social and overhead infra-
structure, their expansion of production, their contribution to technology 
and their demonstration effect on peasants, many of whom turn to cash 
crops formerly produced on plantations alone. Yet he emphasizes that the 
very nature of plantation enterprise limits its development impact. The 
vertical integration, say, of plantations, mills, shipping and final 
processing enables one firm to make profits at every stage. Although in 
one way this increases a company's risks because capital is tied more to 
a particular crop than if it was spread over several commodities, in 
another way risks are reduced since the refiner, for example, no longer 
depends on other firms for the supply, or transport, of raw sugar. One 
of the results of vertical integration, though, is that forward and back-
ward linkages are enclosed largely within the firm, so limiting their 
spread effects in the plantation economy. Much of the spread occurs in 
the metropole where the bulk of the value is added to the final product. 
The size of investment in a particular crop imposes structural rigidities 
on the plantation society. Because of the large quantity of capital tied 
up in, say, sugar, it is difficult to switch to another more remunerative 
crop if a change in the market occurs. This capital specificity restricts 
11 Lloyd Best, 'A model of pure plantation economy'. Social and 
Economic Studies, 17 (1968), 283-326; George L. Beckford, 'The 
Economics of Agricultural Resource Use and Development in 
Plantation Economies', Social and Economic Studies, 18 (1969), 
321-47; George L. Beckford, Persistent Poverty: Underemployment 
in Plantation Economies of the Third l^orld. For a criticism of 
their views see Denis M. Benn, 'The Theory of Plantation Economy 
and Society: A Methodological Critique', Journal of Commonwealth 
S Comparative Politics, XII (1974), 249-60. 
11 
the potential for structural change in less developed countries. 
Beckford notes, too, that plantation enterprise is frequently 
associated with the underutilization of land. The firm often holds for 
speculative purposes more land than it needs for its immediate use, so 
preventing the land being used for alternative crops. It may actively 
discourage the diversification of agriculture to minimise competition for 
labour. The need to keep down labour costs so as to maximise profits 
is seen as a specially important characteristic of plantation companies, 
for whom labour is frequently the largest single item of cost. The 
dominant position in the labour market of one or several companies, which 
is usually the case in plantation economies, enables employers to keep 
wages below the level which might have prevailed had there been greater 
competition; but to a great extent this has been counteracted by trade 
unions. The import of cheap labour in many instances has had a profound 
effect on the demographic composition of plantation societies. Usually 
there is tension between the descendants of immigrants and other ethnic 
groups, and this impedes economic development since the instability which 
results (or the prospect of instability) deters investment. The unequal 
distribution of wealth which derives from low wages and from the high 
salaries of those from the metropole limits the size of the domestic 
market for goods produced locally. Accustomed to overseas products, 
those on high incomes tend to import many of their supplies, while the 
market among those on low incomes is relatively small. Consequently, 
plantation economies become heavily dependent on imports and many have 
only recently begun to produce import substitutes themselves. To the 
leakage of earnings abroad through the purchase of imports must be added 
the repatriation of profits. Normally a firm will reinvest its profits 
in processing facilities located in the metropole, or it will invest in 
other less developed countries so as to reduce its dependence on one 
geographical area. Or else it will diversify into new products. Thus 
most of its profits are not available for investment in, so as to 
stimulate, the economy where they were earned. Finally, it is argued 
that gains from exports are limited because over long periods the terms 
of trade tend to move against primary producers. In the long run improved 
productivity may not benefit the producer since technological advances are 
likely to be adopted by others, thereby increasing total supply which, 
12 
all things being equal, will reduce the price. The demand for many 
commodities produced in developing countries is restricted by its in-
elasticity to income changes in high income countries. 
In these ways, then, Beckford claims that the development effect 
of plantation enterprise is limited. There is little that firms can do 
about this. To survive they have to act in an economically rational way -
that is, they have to maximise profits - and this has the unavoidable 
result of reducing the benefits they can bring to less developed economies. 
This study cannot examine in detail all aspects of the Beckford model as 
it applies to the Fiji sugar industry. Nor does it seek to provide a 
total explanation of the present state of economic development in the 
country. Other factors like the role of copra plaiitations and merchant 
capital, the small size of the population and the attitude of Fijians to 
the cash economy would need to be considered. This account will concentrate 
on the history of the sugar industry, and will conclude by using Beckford's 




The cotton boom 
PLANTATION agriculture first flourished in Fiji during the cotton boom of 
the late 1860s. The American Civil War disrupted the world's main supply 
of cotton, so that the price rose and Fiji's output grew. Planters 
favoured the Sea Island variety which was used by French factories in the 
manufacture of certain classes of silk.^ They settled initially in Lau, 
Taveuni, south Vanua Levu and the mouth of the Rewa river, but later 
2 further up the Rewa and along other major rivers in Viti Levu. In districts 
scarcely touched by European settlement land could be bought cheaply, in 
exchange for goods of relatively small value to settlers, but as the number 
3 
of Europeans increased from 400 in 1866 to 2000 in 1870 there was a rise 
in the value of land in settled areas. Though Fijians were employed at 
first, plantations were increasingly worked by labour imported from other 
Pacific islands and found to be more reliable, if more expensive.^ Capital 
was provided by 'beachcomber speculators'^ who self-financed many of their 
land purchases in the early 1860s, by those like the Ryder brothers who 
arrived with substantial means and could partly finance themselves, and 
above all by creditors like F. & W. Hennings who liberally financed the 
1 R.A. Derrick, A History of Fiji, 197. 
2 For an account of European settlement in the 1860s and early '70s 
see John M.R. Young, 'Frontier Society in Fiji, 1858-1873', un-
published Ph.D. thesis (Adelaide 1968). 
3 Peter France, The Charter of the Land: custom and colonization in 
Fiji, 38. 
4 Prices were said to have risen from between two and five shillings 
an acre in 1866 to from 17s to 20s in 1969. France, 47. Unless 
otherwise stated, hereafter all values will be expressed in Fiji 
currency and all weights in long tons. 
5 Young, 317-8. 
6 Ibid., 106. 
7 The British Consular Report for 1869 noted that a number of recent 
settlers had come with £2000 to £3000. Quoted by Evelyn Stokes, 
'The Fiji cotton boom in the sixties', ^ew Zealand Journal of 
History, 2 (1968), 169. 
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many Europeans who had little or no wealth. The llennings, in turn, were 
in debt till 1867 to J.C. Godeffroy & Son of Hamburg and Apia, and there-
Q after to the Sydney firm of Rabone, Feez & Co. 
The result was that a portion of the profits from cotton was 
remitted abroad as interest. Others also benefited - those engaged in the 
labour trade for example, or those hired as overseers while their employers 
9 
stayed in Levuka, the then commercial and social centre of Fiji. Most 
planters, too, relied on others to do their ginning for them and to 
transport their crops to one of the entrepots in the group for export, via 
Sydney or Auckland, to Europe. The crop was handled many times in the 
process, each stage yielding its profit, so that transport accounted for 
an estimated 16% of its final v a l u e , S o many were involved that it was 
difficult for individuals to make large profits quickly. A visitor to 
Fiji in 1872, Richard Philp, could find only two planters who had made a 
profit from cotton - Rupert Ryder of Mango island and Peckham of Taveuni. 
Planters lived on credit, spending much of it on consumer imports, notably 
12 
drink. Thus few savings were made to provide an income for settlers and 
the means to develop alternative crops, should the boom cease. 
And the boom did end in 1870, when the Franco-Prussian war dis-
located the French market for cotton and caused a fall in the London 13 
(sterling) price from 4s 4d a pound in 1869 to Is 4d in late 1870. 
Planters, their land mortgaged, were unable to meet their debts while 
their mortgagees, with debts secured, found their security incapable of 
earning the amounts owed. Though F. & W. Hennings had filed fourteen 
suits for the recovery of debts by October 1873, some of their debtors had 
already left Fiji^"^ while others were expected to make the most of the 
8 See Deryck Scarr, 'Creditors and the House of Hennings: an elegy 
from the social and economic history of Fiji', Journal of Pacific 
History, 1 (1972), 104-23. 
9 Stokes, 175. 
10 Young, 285 
11 Stokes, 174-5. 
12 Young, 289. 
13 Derrick, 197. 
14 Deryck Scarr, I, The Very Bayonet, 210. 
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lands in their possession.^^ Few planters lived more than a hand to mouth 
existence. They pinned their hopes on new crops like copra, sugar, coffee, 
cinchona among others, and to a lesser extent on livestock.^^ Thus cotton 
monoculture gave way to diversified, experimental agriculture and the 
appearance of wealth, for many, to the reality of poverty. 
Among the new crops sugar was thought to offer the best prospect 
of commercial success. An attempt to produce sugar on Wakaya Island in 
1862 had been a financial failure,^^ and with the subsequent rise in cotton 
prices there had been little incentive to try again with a crop whose 
capital costs were higher than for cotton because machinery had to be 
provided to crush the cane. But after the slump in cotton prices many 
settlers turned to sugar. The offer, by the Cakobau government in December 
18 
1871, of a £500 reward for 'the first and best crop' of twenty tons of 
sugar from canes planted before January 1873 may have been some inducement, 
though there is no record of anyone having won the prize. More important 
was evidence that cane could be grown very easily in Fiji, and without much 19 
expertise. It grew wild and was used by Fijians on their hures as thatch. 
At the end of 1872 the Fiji Times reported that 'large tracts of land are 
being put under cane', and 'a highly remunerative return may be expected 
from the i n d u s t r y ' . S i x years later John Home, the Director of Botanical 
Gardens in Mauritius confirmed what settlers had already discovered - that 21 good cane land could be found in almost all parts of the group. By the 
end of the decade it was hoped that sugar would become a major, if not the 
22 
principal, export of Fiji. There was good reason for believing this 
might happen. Not only did cane grow well, but there was also an expanding 
15 Scarr, 'Creditors and the House of Hennings', 107. 
16 For an account of experiments with these crops see R. Gerard 
Ward, 'Land use and land alienation in Fiji to 1885', Journal 
of Fadfio History, 4 (1969), 3-25. 
17 J.C. Potts, 'The Sugar Industry in Fiji. Its Beginnings and 
Developments', Transactions S Froaeedings of the Fiji Soc^ety, 
7 (1958-9), 108-9. 
18 Fiji Times, 13 Dec. 1871. 
19 John Home, Remarks on the Agricultural Prospects of Fiji, 3. 
20 Fiji Times, 21 Dec. 1872. 
21 Home, 4. 
22 Fiji Planting and Commercial Directory, 1879. A handbook of Fiji. 
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market for sugar in Australia, where in 1878 the average per capita con-
sumption of raw sugar ranged from 71.31 lbs in South Australia to 92.13 lbs 
in Queensland. The average for all Australia was the highest in the world, 
16 lbs a head greater than in England, the next highest; this was partly 
due to the custom of giving rations, which always included sugar, as part 
23 
payment of wages. Australia imported a significant portion of her sugar 
requirements, and continued to do so till the First World War. There was 
also, of course, a growing market in New Zealand, which has traditionally 
imported sugar in preference to developing a domestic beet industry. 
Planters hoped to sell sugar in these markets as well as in Fiji. 
2 A Following a 'mania' of planting, as the Fiji Times described it, by 
September 1874 there were reports of 592 acres of cane being grown on 
25 
eighteen plantations on the Rewa. As a major area of settlement the Rewa 
remained a centre of cane cultivation in following years, though cane was 
also gro\^m in Navua, Sigatoka, Tavua and Ra in Viti Levu, in Savu Savu and 2 6 
Taveuni as well as in other parts of the group. The great problem for 
planters was to find mills to crush their cane. In December 1874 a mill 




excluding the cost of transporting it to Fiji. A mill of around perhaps. 
four times this capacity would have cost £15,000 two years later.' 
Settlers lacked the capital to erect either a few large mills or plenty 
of smaller ones. Nor with their lands mortgaged, did they have the 
security on which to obtain loans. The result was a shortage of crushing 
capacity throughout the 1870s. It is impossible to list accurately the 
number of mills in operation and their size, as some were too small ever 
to be recorded. The Fiji Times mentions a mill being opened in Suva by 
Brewer and Joske in 1872, and this was probably the first to be built in 
the 1870s. By the end of 1874 there were at least three in operation, a 
23 Harry T. Easterby, The Queensland Sugar Industry. An Historical 
Review, 8. 
24 Fiji Times, 11 Sept. 1872. 
25 Ibid., 5 Sept. 1874. 
26 Potts, 110-21. 
27 Fiji Times, 26 Dec. 1874. 
28 Ibid., 28 Aug. 1876. 
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29 year later six and by the end of 1878 perhaps ten. Several, like the one 
at Suva, crushed for only a couple of years or less. All were tiny -
planters could afford no more. One of the larger mills, built by D. Water-
son in 1878 on his Koroqaqa plantation by the Rewa, had a capacity of only 
30 
twelve to fifteen tons of sugar per week, crushing ten hours a day. Their 
small capacity meant that mills had to crush all the year round, so that 
cane had to be cut when its density of juice, and hence yields of sugar, 
were at their lowest. Moreover, 
Wlien cut in March, or April, the ratoon canes are made to grow 
in cold dry weather, when they will grow least, and to ripen 
during the hot moist weather of December, January, February 
and March, when they will naturally grow most and ripen least. 
Far worse was that many planters could not get their cane crushed at all. 
In November 1878 the Fiji. Times lamented the 'hundreds of acres' going to 
waste on the Rewa because existing mills could crush only half the cane 
32 grown. 
This situation, combined with the failure of other commercial 
crops to produce quick prosperity, encouraged mounting criticism of Sir 
Arthur Gordon, the first substantive governor of Fiji after the islands 
were ceded to Britain in September 1874. Planters had hoped that Cession 
would herald a government which, unlike its predecessors in Fiji, would 
33 
champion their interests if need be against those of the Fijians. But 
within a short time settlers had become convinced that Gordon was more 
interested in native welfare than in the economic development of the colony. 
Alec Ivimey, a Melbourne journalist who visited Fiji in the early 1880s 
when criticism of Gordon reached its peak (though he had left the colony 
by then), suggested that Gordon had been positively hostile to the influx 3 A 
of Australian capital. Nothing, in fact, could have been further from 
the truth. 
29 Potts, 109-21. 
30 Ibid., 111-2. 
31 Home, 5. 
32 Fiji Times, 9 Nov. 1878. 
33 J.D. Legge, Britain in Fiji, 1858-1880, 247-9. 
34 Alec J. Ivimey, 'A ramble through the sugar plantations in Fiji', 
The Victorian Review, Sept. 1882. 
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Efforts to attract private inveotment 
The first priority of the new government was to maintain law and order; 
the islands had been ceded to Britain because of the threat to order posed 
by the early settlers. To establish its legitimacy with the small force 
of arms immediately available, government needed to rule with the consent 
of the Fijian chiefs. As Gordon pointed ouL, 
... the question how a large native population should be 
governed by a handful of white aliens - a question often 
raised but seldom satisfactorily answered - had once more 
to be dealt with. 
Fortunately, on this occasion, policy, and indeed ^^ 
necessity, pointed in the same direction as right and justice. 
The result was Gordon's now famous native policy, the essentials of which 
3 6 
are well known - so-called 'indirect rule' through Fijian chiefs, the 
entrenchment of native rights to the land, the protection of Fijians against 
exploitative labour recruiters, and the promotion of indigenous cash 
cropping through a system of native tax payments in kind. The policy could 
- and was - justified in moral terms, but it also helped solve the problem 37 
of political control in the colony. Thereby it created stability which 
was a prerequisite for overseas investment. This was well understood by 
Gordon, who in 1879 exaggerated to planters the fears of potential English 38 
investors that capital might be lost in Fiji because of racial conflict. 
Two years earlier John Thurston, who was closely involved in the implement-
ation of the native policy, had attributed the lack of commercial develop-
35 Stanmore, 1st Baron, Fiji: Records of Private and of Public Life 
1875-1880, II, 198-9. 
36 The term 'indirect rule' as applied by Legge needs to be qualified. 
Deryck Scarr in 'A Roko Tui for Lomaiviti: the question of legiti-
macy in the Fijian Administration 1874-1900', Journal of Pacific 
History, 5 (1970), 3-31, has shown how government proclaimed a 
policy of indirect rule, but then at times tried to rule directly 
through Fijians who held office at the will of government. Wlien 
this proved ineffective, government reverted to indirect rule, 
the policy it had embarked upon originally. 
37 Altruistic motives for the policy are stressed by Legge, chs. 
7-12, and J.K. Chapman, The Career of Arthur Hamilton Gordon First 
Lord Stanmore 1829-1912, ch. 5. Political realities are emphasized 
by K.L. Gillion, Fiji's Indian Migrants. history to the end of 
indenture in 1920, ch. 1. 
38 Stanmore, IV, 70. 
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39 ment between 1871 and 1874 to political unrest before Cession. 
Along with reconciling Fijians to British rule, the attraction of 
new capital was a major object of government policy. In 1874 Thurston was 
accused in the Fiji Times of believing 'that Fiji can't go-ahead till the 
present settlers clear out, and the rich sugar men come from the colonies' 
Soon after his arrival Gordon expressed a similar view: 
It will require a new set of men to come in before there is 
any real prosperity in the colony. Most of the present 
holders of land will sell, and as is usual in all new settle-
ments, the first-comers will be ruined and go to the wall. 
42 
He repeated this a year later. In the short term though, by helping to 
restore prosperity overseas investment could be expected to reduce European 
opposition to government. This was of some importance. Several officials 
at the Colonial Office were inclined to disagree with Gordon's emphasis 
on protecting native interests; they sympathised more with planters who, 
for example, resented restrictions placed on their recruitment of native 
labour and found their trade with Fijians disrupted by the sale of native 43 
tax produce through government. Since it would have shown that the 
native policy was not incompatible with economic development, the attraction 
of large scale investment would have helped Gordon to overcome opposition 
in London. The decision in 1880 of the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. to 
invest in Fiji was welcomed by Thurston on precisely the grounds that this 44 would strengthen government's hand against its critics. 
In particular, to make aspects of his native policy like the tax 
scheme palatable to the business community, Gordon wanted the support of 
the first unofficial members of the Legislative Council - Gustave Hennings, 
Rupert Ryder and J.C. S m i t h . T h e i r support would have been valuable in 
39 J.B. Thurston, Fiji. Report upon the trade and commerce of the 
Colony for the Year 1876, 1. 
40 Fiji Times, 22 April 1874. 
41 Stanmore, I, 137. 
42 Gillion, 8-9. 
43 Gordon to Selborne, 16 May 1878, in Stanmore, III, 137-8. 
44 Thurston to Gordon, 20 May 1880, reprinted in full by Potts, 127-9. 
45 Deryck Scarr, Viceroy of the Pacific, forthcoming, ch. 2. Read by 
kind permission of the author. 
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later years as well, following the growth of European opposition as hopes 
of early prosperity after Cession fell. Though Gordon and Thurston claimed 
to be unmoved by the opposition, it would have been difficult to ignore it. 
Officials were in daily contact with settlers. At one stage Thurston 
himself had been in debt to S m i t h . T h e plight of leading planters was 
well known. The Hennings brothers, who were owed large sums themselves, 
were in debt to over £50,000 and had gone into liquidation in March 187A. 
Smith had been more discriminate in his advances, but in 1872 he was owed 
at least £12,000 much of which, presumably, was still outstanding a few 
47 
years later. A return to prosperity caused by an inflow of capital 
would benefit these and other planters in the colony. Government might 
also have wanted overseas investment in the hope that support would be 
more forthcoming from a few large companies which had invested when the 
administration's objectives had become clear, than from the numerous 
planters who saw the native policy as the antithesis of all that they had 
hoped for from British rule. More experienced businessmen might identify 
their interests with the native policy, since it provided a means of 
preserving law and order. 
Apart from these political factors, there was also a pressing 
financial consideration. The administration had to balance its budget, 
for Britain was not prepared to subsidise her new colony for long. Fiji 
had been given a grant-in-aid of only £100,000, to be repaid as soon as 
possible.Gordon was frequently reminded of the need for economy, and 
with this in mind he did not draw his full salary of £5000 a year till 
49 
1877. Yet despite efforts to economise, the budget was in deficit 
throughout his administration and for a number of years thereafter. One 
way to solve the problem was to increase revenue by expanding trade. 'One 
or two good investments here', Thurston told Gordon in 1878, 'would soon 
46 Ibid. 
47 Scarr, 'Creditors and the House of Hennings', 106-7. 
48 Gillion, 5. 
49 Carnarvon to Gordon, 3 April 1877, in Stanmore, II, 506; 
Chapman, 173. 
50 For an account of efforts to balance the budget between 1875 and 
1888 see R.B. Joyce, Sir William MacGregor, ch. 4. 
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make an appreciable alteration in our customs r e c e i p t s . T h i s was 
specially desirable if government was to meet the cost of certain welfare 
measures involved in its native policy. By September 1876 Gordon had for-
bidden the sale of 'ardent spirits' to Fijians, causing a loss of revenue, 
and had imposed a strict observation of quarantine regulations entailing 
52 
an increase in government expenditure. True, the burden of this was 
eased by the taxation of Fijians, who were required to pay tax in kind by 
growing crops which government could sell. Thurston, who saw this as a way 
slowly to promote commercial agriculture among Fijians for their own 
benefit as well as government's, wanted to encourage them to grow cane as 
a tax crop. Yet he knew that this would depend on sugar mills large enough 53 to crush the cane, and wanted to attract overseas capital for this purpose. 
For these reasons, government implemented policies which were 
designed to encourage large scale investment. In a speech to settlers 
after his arrival in 1875, Gordon said: 
Now, as to capital, it is clear that it will not be invested 
in the colony until there is good security for its investment, 
that is to say, until the land titles are settled, and a 
steady supply of labour provided for. 54 
Under the Deed of Cession, settlers who had acquired land before September 
1874 had to prove the bona fide nature of their claims. A commission was 
appointed to examine the claims, the Governor-in-Council issuing certifi-
cates of title based on its reports.^^ Gordon gave the matter high priority, 
noting in the context of his proposal to give financial aid to planters 
who imported Pacific island labour in 1877, that 'No money can be raised 
5 6 
from them until they have received their land titles.' Thurston remarked 
in the same year that without these titles, settlers could not meet their 
debts by selling their partly improved lands for a prof it.^^ There could 
51 Thurston to Gordon, 15 Sept. 1878, in Stanmore, III, 413. 
52 Gordon to Carnarvon, 26 Sept. 1876, in Stanmore, II, 161-4. 
53 Thurston's involvement in the native tax scheme is described 
by Scarr, Viceroy of the Pacific^ chs. 2 & 7. 
54 Stanmore, I, 178. 
55 Legge, 175-7. 
56 Gordon to Carnarvon, 8 March 1877, in Stanmore, II, 344. 
57 Thurston, 2. 
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be no overseas investment till land claims had been resolved. So, despite 
all the problems involved in handling the land question, the majority of 
European claims were decided by the time Gordon left Fiji for New Zealand 
in 1880.^^ 
It was politically impossible, though, for government to grant 
all the settlers' claims, which totalled around 854,000 acres - about a 
59 
fifth of the colony's area and a large part of its most fertile land. 
After only a short time in Fiji, Gordon had no doubt that 'the association 
of the enforcement of these claims with the establishment of British rule , 60 
would preclude all hope of conciliating or benefiting the native race . 
A similar consideration, arising from the attachment of Fijians to the land, 
was one of the factors behind Ordinance 6 of 1875 and 21 of 1880 which 
prohibited the sale of native land and, in the case of the 1880 ordinance, 
set a maximum term of 25 years for leases of Fijian land. Yet Gordon 
was determined that his land policy should not prevent the inflow of new 
capital, and that sufficient freehold land for plantation agriculture 
should be left in the colony so that the short terms of native leases would 
not deter investors. Having been asked by Gordon to explain the nature of 
customary land tenure in Fiji, the Council of Chiefs declared in 1879 that 
by tradition land had been inalienable. A strict application of this view 
would have meant that all land purchased by Europeans before Cession had 
been obtained illegally.^^ This was so contrary to the interests of 
planters and of overseas investors who in future might want to buy land in 
Fiji - as well as to the practice of the chiefs - that the chiefs' state-
ment was ignored by the Land Claims Commission and by the Governor-in-
Council when issuing land titles. Of the 1,683 claims, 517 were granted 
as claimed. Of the rest not proved to have been bona fide, 390 were granted 
58 Chapman, 202. 
59 Legge, 170. 
60 Gordon to Carnarvon, 21 Aug. 1875, Stanmore, I, 168-70. 
61 There is controversy about the motivation of Gordon's land 
policy in 1879-80. France has argued that Gordon was greatly 
influenced by the anthropologist, Lorimer Fison's views on 
customary land tenure in Fiji. France, ch. 7. This has been 
challenged in favour of greater emphasis on political necessity 
by Ian Heath, 'Toward a Reassessment of Gordon in Fiji', JouvmiL 
of Pacific History, 9 (1974), 81-7. 
62 France, 113, 120. 
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6 3 
ex gratia either wholly or in part - so providing enough freehold land 
for the initial development of European plantations. Despite settlers' 
complaints about Gordon's land policy, about half the total area claimed 64 
- most of it lying idle - was granted to them. Furthermore, when in 
1879-80 Thurston agreed terms with overseas companies that would entice 
tiicm to Fiji, he arranged to sell 500 acres to Stanlake Lee & Co. Ltd^^ 
and 1000 acres to tlie Colonial Sugar Refining Co. These sales violated 
the policy of making native land inalienable; their approval by Gordon 
perhaps reflected a sympathy for big business, which enabled him at the 
turn of the century to press for the large scale alienation of land in 
the Solomon Islands for the benefit of the Pacific Islands Co., and to 
advance the interests of the Pacific Phosphate Co. against those of the 
inhabitants of Ocean Island.^^ 
Beside the availability of land, Gordon knew that a regular 
supply of cheap labour was essential for the development of plantation 
agriculture. The wages offered by settlers were not normally enough to 
attract Fijians into paid labour for long periods, particularly after the 
1875 measles epidemic which reduced the size of the Fijian population by 
one fifth or more.^^ In 1876, £2 10s Od a year was paid to Fijian men in 
Taveuni, but as A.P. Maudslay, Acting Colonial Secretary at the time, 
wrote: 
Any Fijian industriously disposed, might, without abandon-
ing his family, his home, his garden, and his district, 
obtain far more than this by raising produce on his own 
account. So long, therefore, as this low rate of remuner-
ation is maintained, his Excellency cannot share the sanguine 
63 Legge, 193-4. 
64 It was estimated that only 16,524 acres were actually cultivated 
by Europeans in 1874. Legge, 170. 
65 Lee to Thurston, 31 Oct. 1879, C.S.O. 2397/82. 
66 Gordon to C.O., 60, 25 May 1880, C.O. 83/22. 
67 For an account of Gordon's involvement in these companies see 
Deryck Scarr, Fragments of Empire: a history of the Western 
Pacific High Commission 1877-1914, 264-78. See also J.F. Hookey, 
'The establishment of a plantation economy in the British 
Solomon Islands Protectorate', The History of Melanesia, Second 
Waigani Seminar, 229-38. 
68 Norma McArthur, Island Populations of the Pacific, 26. 
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anticipation of those who expect large numbers of the ^^ 
population voluntarily to engage in plantation labour. 
The alternative - of obtaining a large supply of Fijian labour against its 
will and in the face of opposition from the chiefs^^ - would have required 
a degree of compulsion that the colony's meagre financial resources would 
have found hard to support. So, instead of meeting settler demands that a 
plentiful supply of Fijian labour be made available, government enacted 
Ordinances 15 of 1876 and 10 of 1877, which were designed to regulate 
labour recruiting and prevent an enforced mass exodus from native villages. 
As a result, planters had to rely mainly on labour from overseas. The 
import of (misnamed) 'Polynesian' labour from other Pacific islands had 
started in the 1860s,^^ but from the mid-1870s it was becoming clear to 
72 
more perceptive observers, like Thurston, that the future of this supply 
was uncertain. The end of the cotton boom had left settlers unable to 
match the increase in wages and the improvement in conditions which 
occurred in Queensland during the 1870s. By the early '80s wages in 73 
Queensland were almost double those in Fiji, making the former far more 
attractive to islanders. The time was coming when Fiji would no longer 
be able to meet her labour requirements from within the Pacific. 
Drawing on his experience in Trinidad and Mauritius, in 1875 
Gordon proposed that Indians be imported under five year indentures. He 
estimated the total cost to the planter of wages, transport, etc. at 
around £14 per head per year.^'^ A number of settlers, like Rupert Ryder, 
69 Maudslay to Hunter, 21 D e c . 1876, C.O. 881/5. A similar view 
was expressed by Thurston in 1878. Gillion, 2. 
70 Chiefly opposition to the recruitment of Fijian labour has been 
discussed by Legge, 259-60. 
71 For accounts of this see O.W. Parnaby, Britain and the Labor 
Trade in the Southwest Pacific; Deryck Scarr, 'Recruits and 
recruiters: a portrait of the Pacific Islands labour trade'. 
Journal of Pacific History, 2 (1967), 5-24; Peter Corris, Passage, 
Port and Plantation. A History of the Solomon Islands Labour 
Migration 1870-1914. 
72 Corris, 39-40. 
73 Ibid., 39. 
74 Gordon to C.O., 50, 9 Sept. 1875, C.O. 881/5. 
75 Stanmore, I, 129. 
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initially favoured the idea, but most Europeans eventually opposed it.^^ 
This was not surprising since E.L. Layard had estimated in 1874 that the 
annual cost of 'Polynesians' was £7 a head.^^ Settlers were understandably 
appalled by the prospect of a 100% increase in their immediate labour 
costs, even though Indians were likely to be cheaper in the long run, 
especially since they would remain in the colony for ten years whereas 
'Polynesians' usually stayed for only three. Trying to stave off bank-
ruptcy in the present, planters had little inclination to plan for a labour 
supply in the future. Yet it was the future of large scale investment that 
concerned Gordon, and accordingly he arranged for Indian labour to be 
imported from 1879 onwards. Labourers were to be indentured for five years 
and to have the right of a free return passage to India after ten. 
Employers were to pay two thirds of the cost of the passage to and from 




five and a half days were to be worked. By 1916, when the system came 
to an end, 60,553 immigrants had been imported under indenture. 
Conditions were appalling - they have been aptly described as 
80 
'A new system of slavery' - yet they did not provoke massive slave 
revolts. Indians were divided by deep-seated religious, language and 81 
cultural differences which overseers could exploit for their own purposes, 
while the hierarchical nature of the society they had left inclined in 
immigrants a relatively passive acceptance of their new world. Protest 82 
took the form of suicide rather than revolt. Further, for many labourers 
plantation life may have been rather better than the circumstances they 
had known in India. Provisional findings of new research suggest that 
indentured labourers were drawn primarily from landless classes living in 
the vicinity of towns and mostly unemployed; they were likely to have been 
on the verge of starvation. For those lucky enough to find work, wages 
76 Gillion, 13. 
77 Layard to Foreign Office, 5 June 1874, C.O. 881/4. 
78 Gillion, 16, 104. 
79 Ibid., 214. 
80 Hugh Tinker, A t^ew System of Slavery. The Export of Indian 
Labour Overseas, 1830-1920. 
81 Gillion, 104. 
82 Ibid., 127-8. 
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83 seem to liavc been even lower than they were in Fiji. Consequently, hard 
though it is to believe, for many Indians migration led to an improvement 
in their economic position - a reprieve from hell in favour of purgatory. 
And they used the time on plantations to look forward to a heaven beyond, 
wlicn after serving tlicir Lernis and after earning higher wages as free 
84 
labourers, they could return to India more wealthy than when they had left. 
It is unlikely that capital would have been attracted to Fiji without this 
assured supply of apparently docile labour, especially since Gordon's belief 85 
that islanders would not meet plantation needs for long proved correct. 
By 1885 the number of 'Polynesians' imported had fallen, those leaving Fiji 
exceeding newcomers by almost 400%.^^ Because of their lower mortality 
rate (which was nevertheless high) and the growing difficulty in obtaining 
'Polynesians', Indians were preferred to islanders by sugar companies which 
8 7 
by then had begun to invest in Fiji. 
Government - in particular Thurston - had made a special effort 
to attract these companies. Thurston had been in contact with the Colonial 
Sugar Refining Co., known as the CSR, in 1874 when its directors had 
considered building a central mill in Fiji to be supplied with cane by 
Q O 
outside contractors. No details of the discussions have survived, but 
evidently CSR was not impressed by conditions there for instead it erected 
89 
a mill at Harwood, in north New South Wales. It was several years before 
83 This is based on important work being done by Mr Brij Lai at 
the Australian National University. I am grateful to Mr Lai for 
allowing me to quote these findings, even though they are at a 
very preliminary stage. 
84 Gillion, 191. 
85 In a speech to settlers on 1 Nov. 1880, Gordon declared that the 
Colonial Sugar Refining Co. was sagacious enough to realize that 
future supplies of labour must be drawn from India rather than 
from within the Pacific. Cmd. 3642 (June, 1883). 
86 'Polynesian Immigration (Report for 1890)', C.F. 20/1891. 
87 Gillion, 71-2; Corris, 69-74. 
88 J.B. Thurston, Memorandum upon the establishment of District 
Plantations in the Colony of Fiji for the purpose of enabUng the 
Native Population to provide their Taxes in a manner aocordant 
with Native custom; Thurston to Gordon, 4 Feb. 1897, in Stanmore, 
III, 518-9. 
89 A.G. Lowndes (ed.). South Pacific Enterprise. The Colonial Sugar 
Refining Company Limited, 25. 
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CSR once more took an interest in Fiji, by which time the political environ-
ment was more favourable. Meanwhile, Thurston again tried to persuade 
sugar companies to invest in the colony. In 1877 he proposed that govern-
ment raise a £100,000 loan, of which £3,600 would be used to guarantee for 
three years a three per cent return on £40,000 privately invested in two 
central mills. The project was 'to start, in fact, sugar making upon such 
a scale and in such a manner that settlers may benefit by it'. But the 
Colonial Office opposed the loan, mainly on the grounds that Fiji could 
90 not afford to service it. 
Despite this, by the end of the following year there had been a 
significant increase in the number of investors interested in the colony. 
Among them were Edwardes and Hoerder, Dr C.B. Chalmers, the CSR and Spence 
Bros, all of whom were thinking of building central mills to crush cane 
supplied largely by Fijians and European planters. But, Thurston told 
Gordon, 
they all stand out for conditions - viz. Government to 
guarantee so many tons of cane per annum; contract to last 
five or ten years; Government to "assist" in finding "labour" 
for the mill; Government to find fuell or to assist in finding 
fuel; the "miller and his men" to be placed beyond the limits 
of native jurisdiction; no Roko or Buli to interfere with any 
man wanting to work at the mill, etc., etc.; and above all. 
Government to give a block of land as an "inducement"I I 91 
These were almost impossible demands to meet. Government could not 
guarantee a supply of cane, since this would either have required a degree 
of control over cultivation that government, with its limited resources, 
could not possibly exercise, or it would have involved a financial guarantee 
that government vi/as in no position to make. Nor could government breach 
with equanimity its native policy by placing Fijians employed, or wishing 
to be employed, in the mill outside native jurisdiction, since this would 
have aroused opposition from the chiefs. Nor would its limited financial 
resources have made it easy for government to help in finding labour and 
fuel, or to purchase land as a gift to the miller. Together with his moral 
commitment to the native policy, such practical considerations limited the 
concessions Thurston was able to make. Moreover, his negotiating position 
90 Gordon to C.O., 9, 9 May 1877, C.O. 83/13. 
91 Thurston to Gordon, 3 March 1879, in Stanmore, III, 537. 
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was strengthened by the number of people - coffee planters from Ceylon as 
w e l l as sugar interests - who in 1878-9 were thinking of investing in 
92 
F i j i . Perhaps there would be no great need to make concessions. 
On the other h a n d , government could not adopt too rigid an 
attitude in talks with potential sugar millers. In 1878 Rabone, Feez and 
C o . had taken over nearly all the land owned by F . & W . Hennings in settle-
ment of the latter's debts. The company was now the largest landowner (or 
claimant) in the colony and its agent, Carl Sahl, was eager 'to go in 
9 3 
heavily' for sugar. J.C. Smith, another major landholder as well as 
creditor, had for some time wanted to see profitable mills set up in the 94 colony. H e , h i m s e l f , had unsuccessfully experimented with one in 1874-6 
and it was probably h e , along with Sahl, who in 1878 asked CSR to build a 
95 
mill on the R e w a . Faced with growing European opposition to its native 
p o l i c y , and not yet having balanced its budget, government could hardly 
ignore an opportunity to revive the fortunes of plantation agriculture. 
So Thurston was prepared to offer concessions even if they contravened the 
native policy, but was determined to keep them to a minimum. He found that 
in some cases incentives were not even necessary. With his brother 96 
N a t h a n i e l , Dr Chalmers built a mill at Penang in 1880 without, apparently, 
having obtained any inducement from government. In other cases, minimal 
concessions were not enough to persuade investors to risk their capital in 
F i j i . Edwardes and Hoerder built no mills in the colony. CSR sent an 
o f f i c e r , James M u r r a y , to the islands but, finding that planters demanded 
a higher price for their cane than the company was willing to pay, refused 
to invest on the terms offered in 1879.^^ Government held more fruitful 
discussions with Spence Bros, a Melbourne company which, through the Rewa 
Plantation C o . L t d , had operated a mill in Fiji since 1875. Spence Bros 
agreed to build a second m i l l on the Rewa costing £20,000 to £25,000, to 
92 Le Hunte to G o r d o n , 1 D e c . 1878, in Stanmore, IV, 456. 
93 Thurston to G o r d o n , 7 D e c . 1878, in Stanmore, III, 445. 
94 P o t t s , 110-1. 
95 Ross to Des V o e u x , 16 Jan. 1879, C.S.O. 272/79. 
96 R . M . Frazer, 'A social and economic history of Ra Province', 
Transaetions & Proceedings of the Fiji Society, 9 (1962-3), 93-112. 
97 B . B . L e v i c k , 'Nausori and Viria m i l l s ' , CSR F 1.0/3/21. 
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buy all the cane grown by Fijians on 500 acres at the current price or at 
a price to be negotiated annually, and to crush native cane whenever it 
was delivered if necessary before cane grown by Europeans. Government's 
sole concession was an offer to sell the company 400 to 500 acres of land 
at 113 an ocre. Tt gave no guarantee on a supply of cnne and it offered 
no help in matters like the employment of Fijian labour. The terms were 
hardly generous to Spence Bros., who within a few months pulled out of the 
deal so as to invest in Queensland, where government inducements seemed 
greater. Its agreement with the Fiji government was taken over in 
November 1879 by the Bristol firm, Stanlake Lee and Co., which promised 
that the mill would have a capacity of at least five - perhaps even ten -
98 tons of raw sugar a day. 
Since a mill of that size, giving priority to Fijian supplies, 
could not have crushed all the cane Europeans wanted to grow on the Rewa, 
Sahl and Smith persuaded planters to accept a lower price for cane than 
99 
they had first demanded. They then asked CSR to reconsider its decision 
not to invest in Fiji. Sahl and Smith also promised to grow 500 acres of 
cane each for ten years, so as to ensure for the company an adequate 
supply. Their approach was supported by Thurston, who was in Sydney 
in early 1880 and was prepared to negotiate slightly greater concessions 
than the year before. No doubt his more flexible attitude owed something 
to the belief that the recent outbreak of coffee leaf disease had deprived 
planters and Fijians of an opportunity to grow an alternative crop to cane. 
It certainly owed much to the failure of government to find employment 
for the first Indians brought to the colony - in 1879 - and whose transport 
and maintenance costs seemed likely to fall on the public purse. Conse-
quently, an agreement was reached with CSR in 1880. Government promised 
to sell the company one thousand acres of land on the Rewa at £2 an acre 
(instead of five hundered acres at £3 to Stanlake Lee and Co.), and to 
reserve another one thousand acres in Savu Savu Bay till 31 December 1882, 
98 Thurston to Gordon, 3 March 1879, op. cit.; Thurston to Gordon, 
20 May 1880, op. cit.; correspondence between Stanlake Lee and 
government can be found in C.S.O. 2397/82. 
99 'Nausori and Viria mills', op. cit. 
100 Thurston to Gordon, 20 May 1880, C.S.O. 1326/80. 
101 Thurston to Sahl, 28 April 1880, ibid. 
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by which date CSR was to have decided if it wished to erect a mill in the 
vicinity of the land reserved for it. Unlike Stanlake Lee and Co., no 
obligation was placed on CSR with regard to native cane. The only commit-
ment made by the company was to have built on the Rewa, by the start of 
the 1882 crushing season, a mill capable of producing 500 tons of sugar 
a month. In return for Thurston's help in persuading CSR to invest in the 
district, Sahl and Smith promised to employ 200 Indians still held by 
102 
government. Later, at the turn of the century when CSR was thinking of 
extending its operations in Fiji, government would again offer the company 
incentives. The decision to build a mill at Lautoka, in western Viti Levu, 
followed a strong official indication, designed to allay CSR fears on the 
matter, that export duties on sugar were unlikely to be levied in the 
foreseeable future. The company was also permitted to import for the mill, 
across a wharf to be erected at Lautoka, supplies which would be exempt 
from government wharfage duties - a concession which from 1901 to 1912 103 
saved the company £26,493 3s 5d. \^ h^at characterized the negotiation of 
this arrangement, as also discussions prior to the construction of a mill 
at Nausori, was that neither side was able to dictate terms. The agreements 
were the result of compromise by both parties - compromises made possible 
by the identity of interest between company and government. The latter 
needed CSR to boost the revenue of, and promote economic development in, 
the colony: CSR wanted government assistance to help ensure that its 
investments would be profitable. 
Beside incentives offered by government - in its general policy 
which created conditions reasonably favourable to fairly large companies, 
as well as in the particular concessions negotiated by officials - there 
was a second inducement for CSR to invest in Fiji, and that was the absence 
of successful alternative plantation crops in areas suited to cane. Since 
the early 1870s planters had experimented with various forms of agricult-
ural activity. Along the south coast of Vanua Levu, in Taveuni and in 
102 Gordon to C.O., 60, 25 May 1880, C.O. 83/22; Thurston to Gordon, 
20 May 1880, op. cit. CSR decided not to build a mill at Savu 
Savu and so never obtained the 1000 acres there. Knox to Fairgrieve, 
Inspectors Out 1881-7, 2 (1882-3), 34-53. 
103 Hughes and Gemmell Smith, 'Extension in Fiji. Interview with the 
Governor of Fiji. 30th August 1899', 2 Sept. 1899, CSR F 2.0/1.1/-; 
Escott to C.O., 8, 10 Jan. 1914, C.O. 83/119. 
31 
some of the outer islands copra was produced. But down the Rewa and around 
the coast of Viti Levu no crop had acquired a dominant position by the 
104 
early 1880s. This was partly because little encouragement was given to 
those who tried meat, poultry or dairy farming, which some contemporaries^^^ 
believed could be developed profitably in Fiji. Importers and financiers 
like the Hennings, who were connected with Australian merchants through 
their indebtedness to Rabone, Feez and Co., naturally had no desire to help 
their mortgagors supply produce which might compete with imports from 
Australia. Efforts by government to attract overseas investment was 
directed toward export crops which the location of Fiji made extremely 
difficult to develop. There were better opportunities for investment in 
the nearby Australian colonies where land could be obtained more easily. 
Australian merchants with access to significant supplies of capital 
normally had no experience in cultivating the tropical crops that were 
thought to grow well in Fiji - coffee, cocoa, tea and others. Fiji's 
appeal to investors in Britain was limited because the colony was almost 
unknown and was a long way from the principal commodity markets. Crops 
like tea which were thought suited to Fiji^*^^ were already grown in more 
established areas closer to Europe. There was little incentive to risk 
capital in the new colony. 
Coffee was an exception, though, and with sugar was thought in 
the 1870s to offer the best prospect of commercial success. The leaf rust 
disease, Hemileia Vastatrix^ destroyed in the 1870s much of the coffee 
grown in Ceylon, so that several planters turned to Fiji in the hope that 
coffee could be grown more successfully there. The attitude of these 
planters to Fijians aroused government fears that an influx of settlers 
from Ceylon would damage race relations in the colony. 'These Ceylon 
people are terrible among Fijians and would cause much trouble', W.S. Carew, 
108 
the Stipendiary Magistrate on the Rewa, told Gordon in 1878. It seems 
that as a result coffee planters were offered no special inducements by 
government. Then, in 1879 the same leaf disease that had destroyed much 
104 Ward, 3-25. 
105 E.g., Dr T.P. Lucas, Cries from Fiji and Sighings from the South 
Seas, 109-10. 
106 Gordon to C.O., 60, 25 May 1880, op. cit. 
107 Carew to Gordon, 3 Dec. 1878, in Stanmore, III, 458. 
108 Ibid. 
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of the crop in Ceylon affected coffee in Fiji, thereby deterring investors 
who were thinking of coming to the c o l o n y . B u t the disease was only 
partly to blame for the failure of experiments with coffee. W.J. Thiselton 
Dyer, Director of Kew Gardens, told the Colonial Office in December 1879 
that planters should grapple with the disease and learn to grow coffec 
profitably despite it. An Attorney-General in Fiji from a planter 
family in the West Indies, H.S. Berkeley, argued in 1886 that coffee had 
never been given a fair trial in the colony as it had usually been grown 
at too low an altitude. He urged planters to experiment with Liberian 
coffee which was grown successfully elsewhere.^^^ Had planters heeded 
this advice, they might have discovered what eventually became known in 
Java - that Arabica coffee could be grown despite leaf disease at higher 
altitudes, and that certain robusta and Liberian species were resistant 
112 
to the disease. But there was little incentive for planters to persist 
with coffee. There was a steady fall in the world (sterling) price from 
65s Od per cwt in 1877-8 to 39s Od in 1881-2; whereas up to 1884 the price 113 
of sugar exports from Fiji remained firm. Cane was a more attractive 
crop, and in the early 1880s coffee planters like W.F. Parr turned to it 
when an opportunity arose. 
The possibility that GSR would face competition not from 
alternative crops but from the small mills already established in the 
colony was not one that worried the company. 'I do not think there is 114 
anything to be feared from them', E.W. Knox wrote in 1880. Some mills 
were situated far from where GSR planned to invest: others, with one or 
two exceptions on the Rewa, were so small that they posed no danger. 
Nearly all had been closed by 1900. The lack of serious competition from 
large sugar mills and from other plantation crops encouraged GSR to build 
a mill at Nausori. With no other source of income comparable to cane. 
109 Stanmore, IV, 63-71. 
110 Thiselton Dyer to C.O., 15 Dec. 1879, C.O. 83/20. 
111 H.S. Berkeley, Planting Enterprise in Fiji: past, present, and 
future. 
112 A.E. Haarer, Modern Coffee Production, 296-7. 
113 D.W. Rodriquez, Coffee: a short economic history with special 
reference to Jamaica, 28-9. For sugar prices see Table 2:1. 
114 'Extracts from Mr. E.W. Knox's reports on Clarence River Mills, 
1870-80', GSR F 1.0/3/2. 
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planters had little choice but to sell their crops to the company not for 
the price they had wanted, but for one that was more acceptable to CSR. 
The company needed this supply to help it economize on the capital cost of 
preparing mostly uncleared land for cane. In 1883 CSR decided to build a 
second mill - the Rarawai mill at Ba in western Vitl Levu. The decision 
was influenced by the availability of substantial areas of freehold land 
which, for the most part lying idle, could be bought relatively cheaply. 
The lack of alternative wage employment for Fijians in the district was 
also important, as it enabled CSR to rely on casual Fijian workers till it 
had obtained an adequate supply of Indians.^^^ It is most unlikely that 
CSR would have opened Rarawai if planters growing other crops, or supplying 
cane at other mills, had been vigorously competing for land and labour in 
the area. The same probably applied to the decision in 1891 to build a 
mill at Labasa on Vanua Levu, and to the construction of a mill at Lautoka 
about ten years later. The attraction of Fiji to CSR, then, partly lay in 
the absence of intense competition for scarce factors of production. 
The -Lrrrportanoe of F i j i to CSR 
Apart from this, the extension of CSR's operations to, and then within, 
Fiji was an outcome of the company's need to consolidate its position in 
Australasia. CSR had been established in 1855 by Edward Knox, the son of 
a Scotsman, George Knox, who had been a merchant in the seaport of Elsinor, 
Denmark. Drawn toward the commercial world like his father, Edward had 
first worked as a junior clerk in his uncle's merchant house, the London 
firm of Perkins, Schlusser and Mullens which traded in the Baltic. How-
ever, not being satisfied 'with being a junior clerk for the present' and 
wanting 'to jump from junior clerk to partner' almost straight away, the 
young Edvvrard had quarrelled with his uncle, had been dismissed and had 
subsequently left for Australia. He arrived at Port Jackson in 1840 aged 
20, and over the next fifteen years acquired both a high reputation among 
Sydney merchants, and a considerable personal fortune which in 1855 he 
invested, as founder, in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. He and his son, 
Edward William, who became general manager in 1880 and remained in that 
115 Fairgrieve to Knox, 7 March 1883, Fairgrieve A to H.O. Fiji 
1882-3, 203-25. Initially Rarawai was jointly owned by CSR and 
the New Zealand Sugar Co., in which CSR had a 50% holding. 
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position for forty years, devoted their lives to the company.^^^ They 
were austere, single-minded men, apparently lacking in humour and having 
few outside interests - except yachting, a rich man's sport in which Edward 
William indulged.^^^ They demanded of their subordinates hard work, 
honesty and, above all, dedication to the company. Loyalty, indeed, has 
been a distinctive feature of CSR Ltd. Even now, there are many on the 
staff whose fathers and grandfathers worked for the company. Family 
connections have bred a remarkable esprit de corps which has helped the 
company achieve its objectives. From the sense of loyalty has come, till 
recently, a great emphasis on experience. The length of time in the 
company's service used to be a prime qualification for advancement, produc-
ing mill managers who, though competent in technical matters, were seen by 
others in Fiji as unimaginative and conservative in general outlook. When 
it withdrew from Fiji in 1973, one of the legacies of CSR was the continued 
stress on experience by many in the sugar industry (or those connected with 
it), making change and adaptation to new circumstances more difficult to 
118 achieve. 
Edward Knox had originally built refineries, the first in Sydney 
followed two years later, in 1857, by a second in Melbourne controlled by 
the Victoria Sugar Co. From 1875 to 1883 these were replaced by two 
larger ones, to which was added a third in Auckland, run by the New Zealand 
Sugar Co. In 1887 all three companies were amalgamated into a limited 
liability company, the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. It was intended 
that this new company should be distinctly Australian in ownership. Since 
CSR depended on protective tariffs to maintain - and increase - its sales 
of refined sugar in the Australian colonies the Board feared that, if 
the company was foreign owned, there would be demands for the removal of 
the duties on grounds that they benefited capitalists abroad. Consequently, 
the Board tried to increase the number of shareholders in Australasia and 
116 This is based on Lowndes, 11-53. 
117 I am grateful to Dr Scarr for this point. 
118 Interview with Mr Gwyn Bowen-Jones, Chief Executive of Fiji 
Sugar Corporation, 10 June 1976. 
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discourage the sale of shares to people elsewhere.^^^ The tariffs remained, 
enabling this basically Australian company to consolidate its business in 
the 1890s, and open two more refineries in Adelaide and Brisbane. 
As well as increasing its refining capacity, CSR began to produce 
raw sugar. In 1869 it built in north New South Wales three large mills 
ion 
which made substantial profits. Ten years later the question arose as 
to whether CSR should increase the number of mills it had in New South 
Wales, or whether it should move into Queensland and Fiji. E.W. Knox wrote 
in 1879, the year before he became general manager of CSR: 
Personally I should wish our operations would be restricted 
to New South Wales, but sugar will be produced in Fiji sooner 
or later which will come into competition with ours, and it 
is a question whether it will not be better for us to take 
share in the development of the industry and in the profits. 
122 
The same could have been written of Queensland. Possibly the expectation 
of large profits was the main reason CSR had originally diversified into 
milling. Yet also important, perhaps, were the big fluctuations which 
occurred in the price of raw sugar - fluctuations that were considerably 
larger than in the price of refined sugar. This meant that annual profits 
from refining were liable to vary substantially. If CSR was involved in 
milling though, should the price of raw sugar rise, so increasing input 
prices at the refinery, the smaller returns from refining could be offset 
by higher profits at the mill - or vice versa. Thus the company's annual 
profits overall would fluctuate less widely. The advantage of reducing 
risks in this way could be set against the disadvantage of becoming more 
dependent on a single commodity than if CSR had moved into a field un-
related to sugar. 
119 Knox to Parbury, 15 March 1888, E.W.K. Special, 2 (1887-9), 
149-51. At first most of the leading shareholders in CSR were 
New South Wales businessmen, but over the years the number of 
shareholders has increased thereby reducing the influence of 
individuals on the company's operations. There is no evidence 
that the nature of CSR's activities in Fiji would have been 
different if the ownership of the company in Australasia had 
differed. For the ownership of CSR see Lowndes, ch. 14. 
120 Lowndes, 22-3. 
121 'Extracts from Mr. E.W. Knox's reports...', op. cit. 
122 In 1878 there were 68 mills in Queensland. Easterby, 9. 
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There was also the danger that if raw sugar was profitable in 
Queensland and Fiji, successful millers might invest in the refining trade 
to even out fluctuations in their profits. Already CSR had to contend 
with imports of refined sugar, but was at an advantage because its trans-
port costs were lower and because there were protective tariffs in New 
South Wales, Queensland and Victoria. If it allowed several Australian 
refineries to enter the market, it was likely that competitive price 
reductions would follow and that these would erode the company's cost 
advantage against overseas supplies. To avoid this, it would help if CSR 
established mills in Queensland and Fiji, especially since, as Knox 
suspected of Fiji, cane could be grown more cheaply there than it could 
in New South V/ales. If the company obtained a commanding position in the 
Queensland and Fiji industries, say by erecting mills on the most favourable 
sites and meeting the bulk of Australian demand for raw sugar, it would be 
harder for others to enter the business and later to diversify into 
refining. Moreover, profits from milling could be invested in refineries, 
thereby helping CSR to dominate the market for refined sugar; its dominant 
position could be used to defeat potential Australian competitors. So it 
is likely that CSR's interest in Fiji was motivated by more than just the 
desire to make profits from milling: the production of raw sugar would 
reduce the potential variability of its profits, and would help to 
strengthen its refining business in Australia and New Zealand. 
The decision of CSR to invest in Fiji was decisive for the 
development of the sugar industry in the colony, for the company's mills 
proved far more competitive than others which had been, or would be, 
established. Few mills survived the world-wide fall in raw sugar prices 
during the mid-1880s and mid-'90s, caused largely by competition from 
European beet supplies. Yet as Table 2:1 shows, there was no close 
correlation between actual changes in price levels and the collapse of 
sugar mills (see following page). Of the fifteen mills that were shut 
down from 1880 to 1897, only five were closed within three years of a 
decline in price. Nevertheless, lower prices were important because they 
made it more difficult for less efficient mills to compete. They accent-
uated, for example, entrepreneurial shortcomings which were an important 
reason for failure. Wilson and Murchie, who were originally timber 
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TABLE 2:1 
Mills known to have opened and closed in Fiji, 1873-1903 
Price of No. of mills No. of mills 
Year raw sugar opened closed 
1873 1 
1874 3 2 
1875 £34 per ton 3 1 
1876 39 1 2 
1877 34 
1878 34 2 
1879 34 
1880 40 1 
1881 34 2 
1882 34 1 2 
1883 34 2 1 
1884 25 3 
1885 20 4 2 





1891 16 1 
1892 16 
1893 16 
1894 16 1 3 
1895 9 2 
1896 12 






1903 9 1 
Souroe: J.C. Potts, 'The Sugar Industry in Fiji: Its Beginnings 
and Development' , Transactions & Proceedings of the 
Fiji Society3 1 (1958-9), 104-30 . 
Notes: 1. Five mills have been excluded because of insufficient 
data regarding the start and closure of their operations, 
2. Includes only those mills that actually operated. One 
or two were built but never used. 
3. Wiere a mill is moved from one location to another, it 
is treated as having been closed and then opened as a 
new mill. 
4. Where the information is that a mill was closed after a 
particular year's crushing season, the following year 
has been given as a date of closure. 
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12 3 
merchants and built a mill at Deuba in 1883, were typical of many 
mill ers in not having had much, if any, previous experience in making sugar. 
This inexperience was evident in the frequent location of mills in the 
wetter parts of Fiji which, by hindering the ripening of cane, reduced its 
sugar content. The ability of mills to survive the combined disadvantage 
of climate and lower prices was limited by the nature of their ownership. 
They were controlled either by proprietors whose financial resources were 
very small, or by larger firms (usually financial institutions) for whom 
sugar was only a small part of their total portfolio. Smaller concerns 
had not Che funds to increase milling capacity, while larger companies 
with diversified interests did not concentrate resources on their sugar 
investments. The result was that mills were denied the economic benefits, 
especially in the development of expertise, of large scale investment in 
sugar. Several had to close in the mid-1890s when the economic depression 
in Australia and New Zealand cut off their sources of finance. The 
Taveuni Sugar Co., for example, was taken over by the Bank of New Zealand 
Estates Co. Ltd which closed the mill in 1896, and itself went into 124 liquidation the same year. 
In contrast were the greater financial resources of CSR. Ever 
since it had been nearly ruined by paying a 50% dividend in 1856 that had 
left almost no reserves with which to weather a crisis that befell the 
company in the following year, CSR had adopted a conservative policy in 
125 
financial management. It had given priority to a speedy repayment of 
funds borrowed to overcome the crisis of the late 1850s and, preferring 
to accumulate reserves out of which future investments could be made, it 
never again paid dividends remotely comparable to those of 1856. Yet the 
mills and refineries built in the early 1880s could not be completely self-
financed and loans were again made, leading to renewed emphasis at the end 
of the decade on keeping dividends low so that debentures could be quickly 
repaid. In 1891 the company had accumulated the equivalent of two years' 
-I /-J ^ 
dividends as surplus profit. The result of this cautious approach was 
123 Potts, 117. 
124 C.S.O. 4190/95. 
125 This is discussed in Lowndes, 285-311. 
126 Knox to Buckland, 12 Nov. 1891, E.W.K. Special, 2 (1887-9), 
249-50. 
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that CSR was in a better position than many companies not only to survive 
the depression of the 1890s, but to further increase its investments in 
Fiji. It had the capital to reduce unit costs by building larger mills 
than others in the colony - the Lautoka mill was reputed to be the largest 
in tl\e southern hemisphere wlien it was opened - and it also had the 
resources to 'carry' the Nausori mill, which was unprofitable at first, 
till better manufacturing techniques and improved cultivation methods 
127 enabled the mill to yield a return. 
Moreover, CSR's Fiji operations greatly benefited from the extent 
of the company's milling interests in Australia and Fiji. It had fifteen 
128 
mills by 1903. With such a heavy investment in milling CSR had a strong 
incentive to increase its expertise in the manufacture of sugar, and it 
was more able to finance the required research than proprietors with fewer 
mills over which to spread the cost. The result was that CSR developed 129 
skills that far surpassed those of other millers in the colony. It 
could also reduce costs by purchasing in bulk for all its mills, including 
those in Australia, instead of obtaining supplies in Fiji through merchants 130 
who were found to be more expensive. Furthermore, the vertical inte-
gration of its operations from plantation (in many cases) to mill to 
refinery enabled CSR to profit at every stage, thereby increasing funds 
available for investment. 
CSR built five mills in Fiji between 1880 and 1903. One, at 
Viria on the upper Rewa, crushed for only ten years from 1886 to 1895 when, 
131 
apparently too small to be viable, it was closed. The other four were 
more successful, though it took longer than expected for the Nausori and 
Labasa mills to yield a return. The unfavourable climate at Nausori was 
a difficulty, while at Labasa CSR was plagued for many years by the higher 
cost of preparing the land than at other mills - drainage was a particular 
problem - and by being unable to get enough cane to work the mill at full 
127 'Extracts from Reports of E.W. Knox relating to Fiji in the 
1880s', CSR F 1.0/2/2. 
128 Lowndes, 402-7. 
129 The development of applied science by CSR in the late nineteenth 
century is discussed in Lowndes, 34-43. 
130 H.O. to Nausori, 25 Feb. 1887, Fiji Out 1880-92, 3 (1885-7), 
447-8. 
131 Potts, 114. 
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132 capaciLy. In addiLion to CSR there vjas the Pcnang mill, which following 
the death of D.C. Chalmers passed into the hands of Fraser and Co. Ltd, 
representing his estate, and was then sold to the Melbourne Trust Co. in 
1896. In the same year the capacity of the mill was enlarged with machinery 
133 
from Mago island, where a small mill had closed after the 1895 season. 
Its increased capacity, coupled xjith its location in an area well suited 
to cane, helped Penang to survive the depression and operate independently 
of CSR till 1926. The other major non-CSR mill, at Tamanua on the Navua 
river, was built by Stanlake Lee in 1884. Fearing that he would be unable 
to compete for cane supplies with Nausori two miles away, and being un-
willing to lease additional land so that his company could grow cane itself, 134 
Lee had sold his Rewa mill to CSR in 1882, when it was closed. From the 
proceeds of the sale, under the name of the Fiji Sugar Co. Ltd, he built 
another mill at Navua on land he had leased some years earlier. The mill 
was not a financial success, largely for reasons of climate, and soon 
depended on CSR support. It was managed by James Murray, who had been 
CSR's first manager at Nausori, and who in his new position was given 135 advice by CSR on how to make the mill pay. CSR also became a major, 
though not the only,source of finance for Tamanua by regularly making 
136 
advances on security of the crop. Although it was not willing to take 
a direct interest in the mill, perhaps because of doubts about its profit-
ability, CSR was anxious that Tamanua should not close. It wanted other 
millers in the colony, so that they could jointly approach government over 
tax concessions and the like. Government, Knox thought, would be more 
inclined to listen to several mill-o\raers than to one who had a monopoly 
in the colony.^^^ It was this, among other considerations, which decided 138 CSR against buying Tamanua when it was up for sale in 1905. Eventually 
132 H.O. to Labasa, 19 March 1907, Private Ltbk., 5 (1906-9), 194-9; 
H.O. to Labasa, 13 Sept. 1910, Private Ltbk., 6 (1909-11), 307-9. 
133 Potts, 115, 121. 
134 H.O. to Nausori, 11 April 1881, Fiji Out 1880-91, 1 (1880-2), 
120-31; C.S.O. 2397/82. 
135 H.O. to Nausori, 3 Feb. 1894, Nausori Out, 3 (1894), 8-12. . 
136 E.g., H.O. to Nausori, 4 April 1893, Nausori Out, 2 (1893-4), 
68-70; C.S.O. 3411/96, enclosed in C.S.O. 3329/96. 
137 Knox to Murray, 24 Jan. 1894, Private & Staff, 1893-4, 63-4. 
138 Knox to Rodgers, 25 Sept. 1911, E.W.K. Special, 4 (1909-37), 41. 
A1 
it was bought by the British Columbia Sugar Refining Co. Ltd which, having 
completely rebuilt the mill, re-opened it in 1906 as the Vancouver-Fiji 
Sugar Co. With finance available from Canada the mill was no longer 
supported by CSR. Yet it still failed to make satisfactory profits. An 
139 
unsuccessful attempt was made to sell it in 1911, and it was finally 
closed in 1923. 
In 1903 then, the year Lautoka first crushed, four of the six 
mills in the colony were owned by CSR, and of the other two only one -
Penang - was independent of the company's control. CSR's investment not 
only in its mills, but in the infrastructure associated with them, was 
considerable. It laid out an extensive network of tramlines on which to 
transport cane to the mills; it built houses for its officers, whose 
accommodation stood in marked contrast to the inferior 'lines' provided 
for Indian labour; and it provided dairies and butcheries to meet the needs 
of its European employees. By 1902 CSR had invested £1,373,000 in the 
140 
colony, a vast sum in relation to the size of the economy. It had 
helped sugar to become Fiji's principal export. From 7 November 1873 141 
when sugar was first exported, shipped in the schooner Nil Desperandum^ 
exports (destined mainly for New Zealand) had increased to 46,438 tons in 
1903. The value of the sugar was £403,318: of copra, the next most 
important export, £91,051. The sugar from CSR's four mills alone were 
worth well over half the colony's total exports and re-exports, put at 
£554,707.^"^^ CSR had not only become dominant in the Fiji sugar industry: 
it had attained a commanding position in the economy as a whole. 
The Fijians as an inadequate souroe of cane 
When sugar mills were being set up in the 1870s and '80s, it was hoped 
that a large proportion of their cane would be supplied by the Fijians. 
Sir William Des Voeux, Gordon's successor as governor, expected cane lA" 3 
cultivation to become increasingly popular with Fijians. And, indeed, 
139 Rodgers to Knox, 9 Aug. 1911, CSR F 1.0/1/14. 
140 Knox to Escott, 20 Nov. 1912, E.W.K. Special, 4 (1909-32), 53-4. 
141 Alec J. Ivimey, 'Fiji', Viatorian Review, 1 Aug. 1882. 
142 Blue Book, 1904. 
143 Minute by Des Voeux, n.d., C.S.O. 1693/82. 
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by the turn of the century they were growing it as a tax crop under the 
supervision of government in Tailevu, Rewa, Naitasiri, Ba, Ra, Namosi and 
Serua. Each province was assessed for tax, and if the value of the crop 
handed to government exceeded the assessment a refund was paid to the 
province concerned. In 1884 Fijians produced 8,884 tons, about 12% of 
the total cane crushed that year. In 1900 their output had risen to 15,447 
tons, but as a proportion of the colony's total it had fallen to under six 
144 
per cent. In the next ten years output would decline so that the per-
centage would fall even further, with the result that on the eve of the 
First World War Fijian cane was making a negligible contribution to sugar 
production in the colony. The reason was that Fijians hated growing cane, 
as was discovered by officials like W.L. Allardyce who in 1896 described 
his earlier experiences with the Namosi people: 
They certainly were the most unreasonable, uncouth and un-
tractable lot, they smashed the trucks and they bent the 
tramline, they skulked, they practised every known native wile 
and a good many others which they had learnt from the European, 
but I was quite as determined that they should produce cane as 
they were determined to make the attempt a failure. 145 
It was suggested by some officials, as well as by others, that Fijians be 
allowed to pay tax in cash rather than kind. In 1887 government reluctantly 
permitted Bauans to meet part of their tax assessment for that year by 
cutting cane at one shilling a ton on CSR's Nausori and Vuci Maca plant-
ations, but Thurston (governor, 1888-1897) refused to treat this as a 
precedent and a proposal in 1896 that Fijians at Labasa be allowed to do 
likewise was r e j e c t e d . T h u r s t o n ' s successors, though, were less 
sympathetic to the native tax system and in 1902, despite opposition from 
Allardyce as Colonial Secretary, the governor (Sir Henry Jackson, 1902-4) 
144 Mitchell to C.O., 73, 1887, C.O. 83/46; O'Brien to C.O., 23, 
18 June 1901, C.O. 83/72; Potts, 125. Figures for the total 
production of cane in the colony are based on sugar exports for 
the appropriate years multiplied by 8.5. About 8^ tons of cane 
were needed to make one ton of sugar. But note that the actual 
output of cane is slightly underestimated because no allowance 
has been made for the domestic consumption of sugar produced in 
Fiji. 
145 Minute, 17 Nov. 1896, C.S.O. 3825/96. 
146 Robertson to Wilson, 8 Nov. 1887, C.S.O. 3077/87; Chalmers, 
memo., 1896, C.S.O. 3825/96. 
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began a process of commutation for cash which was to kill the system for 
good, 
The trouble with cane was not just that Fijians, like most people, 
objected to paying tax: it was that the attraction of a refund by producing 
more than was due to government did not generally appeal to them. This was 
partly for cultural reasons. It was also because a relatively small amount 
of labour was required to grow subsistence crops. 'How easily they can 
supply their own simple needs in their own homes', Miss Gordon Gumming 
remarked in 1875.^ '^ ® Income from cash crops would have had to be high if 
Fijians were to be induced to switch from their traditional subsistence 
crops to crops which required more work. If returns were not high, it was 
likely that the willingness to earn cash would partly depend on the amount 
of surplus labour available. If Fijians had plenty of spare time, the 
opportunity cost of involvement in the money economy would be low. Now 
the comparatively small labour inputs needed for subsistence crops meant 
that often there was a certain quantity of labour to spare, but this was 
reduced in the late nineteenth century by a decline in the Fijian population 
from perhaps 140,000 before Gession to 105,800 in 1891, and 94,397 ten years 
later.^'^^ Though there were fewer mouths to feed, the amount of labour 
required for communal tasks (church building, etc.) was likely to have 
remained fairly constant, so that the amount of surplus labour would have 
fallen and with it the desire to produce crops for sale. 
The desire was reduced still further by the nature of European 
capitalism in Fiji. Fijians had been exposed to the cash economy for a 
relatively short time, and what they had seen had been goods which were 
comparatively expensive largely because of transport costs, and the 
practice of charging in the stores a higher price to Fijians than to 
E u r o p e a n s . H i g h prices would have had less effect on the willingness 
of Fijians to earn cash if they could have expected high money returns as 
a result of their labour. The larger the returns, the fewer hours they 
would have had to work to buy goods that appealed to them. But cane was 
147 Jackson to G.O., 38, 23 April 1903, G.O. 83/76. 
148 G.F. Gordon Gumming, At Borne in Fiji, 58. 
149 McArthur, 7-8, 27. 
150 Scarr, 'Greditors and the House of Hennings', 111. 
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a crop which did not give Fijians a high income. It was suggested in 1902 
that on the Rewa the equivalent of thirty days' work at cane earned a 
Fijian only 25s 8d. Returns in B a , where the climate was better, were 
much h i g h e r , but nowhere near as good as the 27s Od that could be earned 
in only three days by producing three hundredweight of copra. It was not 
surprising that of an estimated £100,282 received in cash by Fijians in 
1901, £42,880 was thought to have derived from copra produced for non-tax 
purposes, whereas the amount from cane - which was grown in areas unsuited 
to copra - was n i l . The income from cane was also lower than from trad-
itional subsistence crops.^^^ Though at first government did try, the 
reluctance of Fijians to grow cane discouraged officials from improving 
cultivation methods like applying manure, which would have required 
additional expenditure so reducing the size of the refund in the short 
152 
term and making it even more difficult to obtain Fijian co-operation. 
Yet since in the long run the absence of manure meant that the soil was 
more easily exhausted, the returns from land and labour were reduced by 
the lower yields which resulted and the extra work involved in preparing 
new ground. Another problem was that tax farms were often located some 
distance from the village - twenty miles was not uncommon. Sometimes 
bures had to be built and food gardens planted adjacent to the cane plot 
so as to eliminate the need for daily travel. All this added to the time 
required for growing cane and increased the opportunity cost involved. 
There were frequent complaints that the time could have been spent on work 
in the village. In 1902 it was also reported that some Fijians were 
objecting because cane entailed work between July and December w h e n , under 
the village 'Programme of W o r k ' , they would have been free to find employ-
ment in Suva at wages up to £3 or £4 for ten days' work. Even without the 
151 W . L . A l l a r d y c e , 'Memorandum on the Native Taxation System', 
6 D e c . 1902, enclosed with Jackson to C.O., 38, 23 April 1903, 
op. cit. Strictly, the incomes Fijians earned as a result of 
their labour were composed not only of returns to labour (the 
implicit w a g e ) , but of the implicit wage plus the interest from 
capital (land). The higher returns from copra and subsistence 
crops can possibly be explained by the fact that they were more 
capital intensive - they required larger areas of land - than 
cane farming- Assuming that returns to labour were identical 
(because the crops required the same degree of labour skill) and 
that returns to capital were equalized, the higher income from 
copra etc. would be due to the larger amount of capital invested. 
152 C . S . O . 2663/90. 
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problems of yields and travel, though, it is most unlikely that the opport-
unity cost of growing cane would have been so low to make it attractive to 
Fijians - except occasionally in the west of Viti Levu where one village 
153 was reported to have taken it up voluntarily. 
The basic problem was the miller needed cheap cane. This meant 
that under labour intensive methods of cultivation, which was character-
istic of sugar plantations in Fiji, what was required was a cheap supply 
of labour. In a situation of 'subsistence affluence' and with low money 
aspirations, just as they had been reluctant to become plantation labourers 
for long periods of time, so Fijians hated working for a low income by 
growing cane themselves. Instead, they often preferred to lease surplus 
land so that cane could be grovm by others. The terms on which they could 
do this were made more attractive to would-be tenants in 1896 when, to 
overcome the disadvantage of twenty-five year leases embodied in Ordinance 
21 of 1880, government began to lease for ninety-nine years native land 
which was sub-let to Europeans on fifty-year terms. Ordinance 4 of 1905 
permitted settlers to obtain these long term leases direct from Fijians, 
and also for the first time legalized the alienation of native land. 104,142 
acres were sold to a variety of purchasers between May 1905 and April 1908 
when, following pressure from Lord Stanmore (formerly Sir Arthur Gordon), 
the Colonial Office put an end to the sales.^^^ 
With fewer Fijians after the 1890s working for planters as casual 
labourers, rent became the principal way in which they shared the profits 
from sugar. Yet their share was small. At £5,989, rent from all leases 
(including those outside cane districts) was only about six per cent of 
the estimated total cash income received by Fijians in 1901. Moreover, 
though income from rent would increase with the subsequent expansion of 
sugar production (Lautoka had not yet opened) and the settlement of Indians, 
before 1915 the terms on which many large blocks were leased to Europeans 
153 Jackson to C.O., 38, 23 April 1903, op. cit. 
154 This interpretation of Fijian behaviour is based on the model 
outlined by E.K. Fisk, 'The Response of Nonmonetary Production 
Units to Contact with the Exchange Economy', in Lloyd G. Reynolds 
(ed.), AgTicultuve in Develo-pment Theory, 53-83. 
155 France, ch. 9. 
156 Allardyce, op. cit. 
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contaiaed no provision for Lhe Ireqiicnt reassessmenL of rcnL.^'^^ ConsequcnL-
ly, as land values rose rents fell below - often way below - the free 
market value of the land. The commoners' income from rent was particularly 
small, since chiefs were entitled to 30% of the rents in areas under their 
authority. On a per capita basis, this left relatively little for 
distribution to those who were not chiefs. Usually it was land of the best 
quality that was leased. The result was that when the Fijian population 
began to grow after the First World War, villagers increasingly had to 
plant food on less fertile soil, so reducing the surplus labour available 
and with it, perhaps, the incentive to play a greater role in the cash 
economy. Thus, although their willingness to leave the cane supply to 
others was not the only factor influencing the development of plantations, 
the extent of European landholdings and the number of Indians imported did 
owe something to the tendency of Fijians to become spectators of, rather 
than participants in, the cultivation of cane. 
So it was that a plantation enclave developed in the economy, 
thereby benefiting members of the uneasy alliance forged after Cession 
between government, the chiefs and European capital. The chiefs gained 
from government's restraint on the activities of early settlers and from 
a large share in the rents obtained from cane lands. Government to a great 
extent had established order, and saw its revenue increase through the 
stimulus to trade provided by overseas capital, notably CSR. And CSR used 
Fiji to supply its refineries with raw sugar. The development impact of 
the industry through the creation of social and overhead capital, the 
bringing of idle land into productive use, etc., created jobs which enabled 
many inmigrants to escape from destitution in India. To a limited degree 
commoners benefited from the receipt of rent. Along with Indians, they 
also gained from government transfers (made possible by increased revenue), 
though these were small. 
157 However, in 1890 government was trying to lease to CSR 3000 
acres at Labasa at a rising rental, though the terms finally 
agreed were more generous than the company had expected. Scarr, 
Viceroy of the Faoific, ch. 18. It might be thought that land 
was leased at fixed rentals because contemporaries did not 
expect values to rise significantly. But at least after the 
turn of the century CSR was expecting land values to go up quite 
sharply. It sought to obtain leases before this happened, even 
if the land was not immediately required for sugar (see below, 
p. 56). 
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YCL coastraiats imposed by overseas luarkcLs and by Lhe state of 
sugar technology meant that the industry could only survive if it was 
supplied with cheap labour. This restricted sugar's contribution to 
economic development. In contrast to other parts of the world where the 
spread effect of plantations was limited because members of the indigenous 
population were employed at low wages, the effect on Fijians was small 
because they dislike any involvement (except as recipients of rent) in the 
cultivation of cane. Though in explaining this account has to be taken of 
factors like 'subsistence affluence' which influenced the Fijian response, 
the lack of incentive caused by sugar's dependence on cheap labour was 
crucial. Also important was that by occupying large areas of top quality 
land plantations probably discouraged Fijians from developing commercial 
agriculture themselves. Instead of using Fijians as cheap labour, or cheap 
suppliers of cane, the Indians were imported. Although many might have 
been materially better off than if they had stayed in India, immigrants 
were certainly cheap as far as Fiji was concerned. The tendency for wages 
of free Indians to exceed one shilling a day indicates that the statutory 
minimum wage of indentured labourers was below what would have prevailed 
had there been a free market in labour; and even the free wage was not 
enough to induce immigrants who eventually settled on the land to seek 
158 wage employment for more than short periods at a time. Still worse was 
158 In 1913 wages of unskilled plantation labourers on the Rewa and 
Navua were Is 6d (see Table 5:3 below). It might be said that 
the wages of indentured Indians were below those of time-expired 
labourers because the former implicitly paid the cost of their 
return passage to Fiji. In 1913 the average cost of transport-
ing an adult male to Fiji, including the expense of recruiting, 
etc., was £16 17s 3d. Assuming the cost of the actual passage 
from Fiji to India was the same as India to Fiji, the return 
passage would have cost £5 15s Od, making a total £22 12s 3d 
(Indian Immigration Report for 1913). Wages of free labourers 
were sixpence above the statutory minimum wage of indentured 
labourers. So with a working week of five and a half days, over 
five years the wages of indentured labourers were £35 15s Od below 
the market rate, considerably more than the cost of the return 
passage. Moreover, employers paid only two thirds of the return 
passage costs. The rest was paid by government from a Return 
Passages Fund financed out of general revenue (i.e. by all tax-
payers including Fijians). Thus employers received a subsidy 
from others in the colony. Finally, since about 60% of immigrants 
remained in Fiji, a large part of the government fund was never 
used and in 1905 the surplus was paid into general revenue. The 
[contd. over] 
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that during the 1880s and '90s plantation wages were usually less than the 
159 
statutory mxnimum. On top of this was the high mortality rate on 
plantations, at least before the turn of the century, and the humiliation 
suffered by Indians under the indenture system. The harsh treatment of 
indentured labourers in a whole host of ways led them to describe life on 
plantations as 'narak' -
Within a few years of Nausori opening, acute observers in Fiji 
recognized a conflict of interest between the colony which grew cane and 
CSR which was mainly concerned with processing and marketing it. Dr T.P. 
Lucas, a visiting botanist in the 1880s, reported the views of almost 
certainly Thurston, with whom he agreed: 
I was informed for a positive fact that a high government 
official, who had been largely instrumental in securing the 
establishment of colossal sugar companies, had acknowledged 
that, instead of a benefit, they had brought a bear into the 
country. 161 
CSR, more than all the rest, was the type of investor Gordon and Thurston 
had wanted to attract to Fiji, but it soon became clear that the colony 
would be far from attracted to the investor. 
158 [contd.] 
wage difference, then, between indentured and free labourers 
cannot be explained entirely by the cost of transporting the 
former. It was partly due to the greater experience of plant-
ation work of free labourers than those under indenture, but 
mostly it arose from institutional arrangements designed to 
keep indentured wages below the free market rate. 
159 Gillion, 89-91. 
160 Ibid., 129. 
161 Lucas, 109. 
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CHAPTER III 
The Plantation System, 1880-1914 
CSR had originally hoped to buy cane from planters already living in the 
vicinity of its mills, as it had in New South Wales, the company itself 
growing enough only for experimental purposes and to even out fluctuations 
in supply.^ The objective was never abandoned, even though to obtain 
sufficient cane CSR had to develop plantations on a far larger scale than 
intended. By 1914, however, most of these had been leased to overseers 
who,instead of working for the company, farmed on their own behalf. Because 
CSR's mills were much bigger than those at Penang and Tamanua (Table 3:1), 
this decentralization of the plantation system became characteristic of the 
TABLE 3:1 
Maximum daily output of sugar mills in Fiji, 1914 






Source: Escott to C.O., 467, 30 Dec. 1914, C.O. 83/123. 
Fiji sugar industry as a whole - a characteristic of great importance not 
only for CSR-government relations, but because it increased the profit-
ability of the company's investments in the colony. In the long run it 
also reinforced CSR's position as a miller rather than grower of cane, 
making it easier for the company to turn to Indians for supplies after the 
First World War. To some extent, the plantation system devised before 1914 
was a prerequisite for what would come later. 
CSR's preference for the central mill system, whereby cane was 
purchased from outside suppliers, owed much to the attitude of politicans 
to the company, aptly expressed by Thurston in 1880. 'It would be a good 2 
thing if they invested, but not if they got all they want.' This remained 
1 Knox to Parr, 17 Nov. 1881, Fiji Out 1880-92, 1 (1880-2), 296. 
2 Thurston to Gordon, 16 March 1880, Stanmore, 1st Baron, Fiji: 
Records of Private and of Public Life 1875-1880, IV, 251. 
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the official view in Fiji till the company finally withdrew ninety years 
later. As CSR's importance to the economy grew, government's desire that 
the company should remain increased. Whenever officials felt that CSR 
might be forced to withdraw they would intervene - however reluctantly -
to provide it with support. On the other hand, government never wanted 
CSR's interests to be paramount. There were those of the Fijians to be 
considered as well, and of the European community apart from CSR. So long 
as the company remained, government was willing to act - over taxation for 
example - in ways that would reduce the profitability of sugar milling 
but benefit others in the colony. Of course CSR could - and did - threaten 
withdrawal on such occasions, but threats alone were not very effective 
especially if the company had failed to act on them before. Would CSR 
really sell its investments in Fiji, and risk the loss of capital as a 
result if, say, government increased taxes by only a small amount? Clearly 
it would not, unless the increase made the mills unprofitable. In its 
relations with CSR, then, it seemed that government might have had con-
siderable room for manoeuvre. 
From early days CSR was well aware of the danger that officials 
might act in ways which would be contrary to the interests of the company. 
In the late 1880s the Queensland government had proposed discriminatory 
3 
taxation of CSR, and had levied heavy duties on machinery for the mills. 
Thereafter, the company felt vulnerable because of its dominant position 
in the Queensland and Fiji sugar industries. It was an easy target for 
those who resented its influence, and a constant temptation for politicians 
who wanted to raise taxation. The company needed to strengthen its 
position by spreading risks - in an economic sense by reducing its invest-
ment in plantation work, and in a political sense by increasing the number 
of planters engaged in the industry so as to enhance the latter's influence 
with government. As Knox explained in 1899: 
This system of purchase from growers, we have been able to adopt 
to a very small extent in Fiji, and it has many advantages. It 
reduces by one-half the amount of capital which the mill-owner 
has to find; it places between the manufacturer and the legis-
lature a large number of permanent settlers, each of which has 
a direct personal interest in securing fair and reasonable 
A.G. Lowndes (ed.). South Pacific Enterprise. The Colonial 
Sugar Refining Company Limited:, 28. 
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treatment for the industry with which he is connected; and it 
thus gives the business a stability which would otherwise be 
wanting, and furnishes to the investor some security that the 
capital he sinks in plant and buildings shall not be made un-
remunerative by undue taxation. 4 
There was a strong political motive behind CSR's preference for the central 
mill system. 
To this was added a second factor - the need to minimise labour 
costs in growing cane. Sugar plantations have traditionally employed a 
labour intensive form of production, so that labour expenses form a large 
proportion of total costs. When discounted over the life of a plantation, 
land, the other major cost, was much less than labour. Now where, as in 
British Guiana, the main source of profit from raw sugar derived from 
growing rather than milling cane, companies specialized in maximising 
returns from labour in the field. In the case of CSR though, its back-
ground as a refiner turned miller meant that initially, except from 
refining, it earned profits solely from the manufacture of raw sugar. This 
was because when it first opened mills in New South Wales, the company 
tried to reduce the risk of embarking on a totally new venture by obtaining 
cane from outside suppliers, instead of developing plantations itself. The 
result was that E.W. Knox, who was responsible for the mills, concentrated 
on acquiring an expertise in the manufacturing process. Though he was 
also interested in cultivation methods, when he travelled to the West Indies 
in 1876 Knox's chief concern was to learn how to increase efficiency in the 
mills, and this continued to preoccupy him after he became general manager. 
The company made great advances in the application of chemical research to 
the crushing process, so that by the 1890s it had developed techniques in 
milling that were, perhaps, almost unrivalled in the rest of the world. 
Chemists became some of the most influential people in the company, and in 
future mill managers would be frequently drawn from their midst. This 
early specialization in milling meant that CSR knew relatively little 
about cultivation when, following its expansion to Fiji and Queensland, the 
company began to grow cane in large quantities itself. The fall in sugar 
prices in the 1880s and '90s intensified company efforts to improve the 
'Draft of letter to His Excellency the Governor of Fiji', 1899, 
CSR F 2.0/1-1/-. 
Lowndes, 23-43. 
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quality oE cultivation, and hcnce returns to labour, both on its own 
estates and those of independent planters. Yet, as head office acknowledged 
in 1902, the achievements in milling were not matched by comparable success-
es on the plantation side.^ So when faced with difficulties in reducing 
field expenses, the company's reaction was to lease estates in the hope 
that tenant planters would have more success.^ 
Experience showed that planters were, indeed, better able than 
CSR to control labour costs. It was found that they worked labour more 
efficiently than did overseers employed by the company. In 1908 one CSR 
tenant was quoted by Knox as working with eighty-five to ninety men an 
estate on which CSR had had to employ up to 130. Though part of the 
reduction was said to have been due to the planting of Badilla, a better 
variety of cane, most was due to 'more interested supervision' - planters 
were more profit conscious than overseers. Another saving - of up to £150 
a year - was to hire Indians as ploughmen instead of using Europeans as 
g 
did CSR, or for the planter to do the ploughing himself. On top of this 
was the point that if CSR ran a plantation it expected to make a return 
on investment over and above the cost of labour and the cost of supervision. 
For a self-employed planter though, the cost of supervision and return on 
capital were indivisible. He was more willing to combine a good yield from 
investment with a low salary Cor an acceptable salary with a low capital 
return) in exchange for the advantage he perceived from being self-
employed. In effect, supervision costs could be reduced, enabling the cane 
to be bought still more cheaply than if it had been grown by the company 
itself. The task for CSR, then, was to find an outside source of supply. 
European eontraators 
One possibility was that planters on non-CSR land, known as contractors, 
would become important producers of cane. In 1880 settlers on the Rewa 
had agreed to grow cane for the company till 1892 at 10s Od a ton, but as 
'Extension versus heavier crops from present areas in Fiji',' 
22 Sept. 1902, Nausori Out, 11 (1902), 365-9. 
H.O. to Nausori, 24 Jan. 1900, Private Ltbk., 3 (1899-1903), 85. 
Farquhar to H.O., 28 Oct. 1908, Inspectors Ltbk., 1908-10, 96-106; 
H.O. to Farquhar, 13 Oct. 1908, Private Ltbk., 5 (1906-9), 417-9. 
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CSR privately acknowledged this price proved to be well below the actual 
cost of growing cane. Even with a bonus of 2s 6d in 1884 and 1885, planters 
like J.C. Smith and W. Orr were unable to eke from their estates more than 
9 
a nominal return. The reason was largely the inflation that followed the 
expansion of CSR in the early 1880s. With a shortage of Indian labour 
because of delays in organizing a regular supply, initially planters and 
CSR had to rely heavily on Fijians and 'Polynesians'. The price of the 
latter had risen sharply by the mid-1880s in part because CSR's move into 
Fiji and Queensland had helped generate a greater demand. The cost of 
feeding the labour in Fiji with locally grown subsistence crops had also 
increased because of the larger number involved.^^ On top of higher labour 
costs, planters were required by CSR to reduce the number of crops taken 
from the land each year. The practice had been to harvest cane in Fiji 
three times in two years, but CSR insisted on only one crop a year so as 
to leave longer for the cane to mature. The miller benefited from sweeter 
cane while planters were faced with a lower income than expected.^^ They 
were not compensated with a demonstration by CSR of cultivation techniques 
which would have enabled them to farm profitably despite higher costs and 
fewer crops. Draught animals, for example, were not used on CSR's 
plantations at Nausori till the early 1890s, so that labour costs before 12 
then were particularly high. The only way that cane could have been 
made profitable for planters in the 1880s would have been for CSR to pay 
a price substantially higher than 12s 6d. Planters asked for 15s Od, and 
this was probably not much more than was needed to earn a reasonable return. 
Yet the fall in raw sugar prices from the mid-1880s, coupled with early 
difficulties in making CSR's plantations economical, prevented the company 
9 Knox to Tucker & Orr, 13 May 1886, Fiji Out 1880-92, 3 (1885-7), 
217-8; 'Extracts from Reports of E.W. Knox relating to Fiji in 
the 1880s', CSR F 1.0/2/2; H.O. to Nausori, 19 Feb. 1886, Fiji 
Out 1880-92, 3 (1885-7), 133-40; H.O. to Nausori, 4 April 1888, 
Fiji Out 1880-92, 4 (1887-8), 236-9. 
10 Knox to Harley, 10 June 1883, Fairgrieve A to H.O., Fiji 1882-3, 
379-82. 
11 Dr T.P. Lucas, Cvies from Fiji and sighings from the South Seas, 
108. 
12 11.0. to Nausori, 20 Aug. 1891, Private Ltbk. , 1 (1890-3), 285; 
H.O. to Nausori, 17 Jan. 1891, Fiji Out 1880-92, 7 (1890-1), 
187-92. 
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from raising the price. Instead, the 2s 6d bonus was withdra\m in 1886 
and 1887, and was only partly restored from 1888 to 1891 so as to bring 
the price up to lis Od.^^ 
It was hardly surprising that planters found themselves growing 
cane not out of choice, but because they were bound by contracts signed in 
1880. They were reluctant farmers, eager only to dispose of their land. 
Indeed, as Knox realized, originally the big landowners had had no 
intention of growing cane for long. They had wanted to attract sugar mills 
14 
simply because they had expected a rise in land values to result. So it 
was quite natural in 1882 for Sahl to exploit CSR's need of his co-oper-
ation by borrowing from the company funds with which to buy out Rabone, 
Feez & Co.'s interest in the land of F. & W. Hennings, and the next year 
to join J.C. Smith in trying to sell his properties on the Rewa.^^ But 
these would-be speculators had little success,for other Europeans, if not 
in the market as sellers themselves, either lacked the desire to buy 
because cane was unremunerative, or the means to buy because CSR, which 
financed those who grew sugar, only made advances for cultivation.^^ 
Enquiries were m.ade by some Melbourne capitalists about buying land so 
that another m.ill on the Rewa could be built, but CSR prevented its con-
tractors from selling for such purposes, and interest from Melbourne waned 
after the price of sugar fell in the mid-1880s,^^ CSR itself did not want 
to buy properties that were already under cane because the capital outlay 
would have done little to increase supplies, but it was eventually forced 
- much against its will - to take over such land. Contracts were due to 
expire at the end of 1891, and it was clear that with little prospect of 
being able to repay what they owed CSR, or of being able to sell at a 
13 H.O. to Nausori, 6 June 1888, Fiji Out 1880-92, 4 (1887-8), 
295-300. 
14 Knox to Parr, 12 July 1883, Fiji Out 1880-92, 2 (1882-5), 147-9. 
15 H.O. to Nausori, 5 Nov. 1880, Fiji Out 1880-91, 1 (1880-2), 46-56; 
H.O. to Fairgrieve, 20 March 1883, Inspectors Out 1881-7, 2 
(1882-3), 190-210; see also Deryck Scarr, 'Creditors and the 
House of Hennings: an elegy from the social and economic history 
of Fiji', Journal of Pacific History, 1 (1972), 109-10. 
16 H.O. to Nausori, 13 Jan. 1885, Fiji Out 1880-92, 2 (1882-5), 
472-86. 
17 Fairgrieve to Knox, 13 April 1883, Fairgrieve A to H.O., Fiji 
1882-3, 308-14. 
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profit to anyone else, planters would insist that the company take 
possession of their property as settlement of the loans secured by it. 
To ensure that a crop would be prepared for the 1892 season, CSR began to 
take over planters' land in 1889, though it refused to acquire that belong-
ing to Sahl who, owing £27,500 in October 1887, had borrowed more than his 
properties were worth. Sahl continued to grow cane for the company till 
able to sell his land in the 1890s, when values began to rise slowly as 
free Indians started to settle around plantations, and as the cultivation 
18 
of cane became more efficient. Failure of the original contractors on 
the Rewa to meet GSR's needs was matched by the refusal of several 
European landowners to grow cane for the company's mills at Rarawai, 
Labasa and Lautoka. Having bought land for speculative purposes, or in 
the case of financial institutions having foreclosed on the original 
purchaser, owners - often living abroad - were content merely to await the 
benefit of rising land values following the construction of GSR's mills, 19 and to force the company itself to buy land it wanted put under cane. 
Thus GSR acquired land on which to grow cane itself, and once it 
started to do this the company found that the very nature of plantation 
enterprise encouraged it to increase the area of land in its possession. 
By increasing the supply of cane CSR could reduce the unit costs of milling, 
and this was important on several occasions in persuading the company to 
20 
secure additional land at each of its mills. Moreover, once CSR had 
decided to grow cane it had to employ a large labour force to prepare the 
land for planting. Yet apart from seasonal periods of high demand for 
cultivation and harvesting, after the land had been cleared the numbers 
needed on an estate for most of the year were much reduced. Thus the 
problem arose of how to employ men during slack periods. Noting 'a 
18 'Memo for Mr. Robertson', 27 Feb. 1889, Private & Staff Out, 
1889-90, 97-9; H.O. to Nausori, 30 July 1890, Fiji Out 1880-92, 
6 (1889-90), 425-6; Knox to Sahl, 11 Nov. 1890, Private Ltbk., 
1 (1890-3), 126; H.O. to Nausori, 12 Oct. 1887, E.W.K. Special, 
2 (1887-99),91-3; H.O. to Nausori, 5 Aug. 1891, Fiji Out 1880-92, 
7 (1890-1), 469-70; H.O. to Nausori, 27 Feb. 1894, Nausori Out, 
3 (1894), 54-5. 
19 E.W. Fenacr, 'A Report on the Vcitoga and Nadi Districts...', 
1897, CSR F 2.0/1-1/-. 
20 This was particularly so at Labasa. See H.O. to Labasa, 13 Sept. 
1910, Private Ltbk., 6 (1909-11), 307-9. 
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plethora of labour' at Nausori in 1886, CSR's head office urged that more 
land be leased from Fijians to provide employment opportunities during 
21 
the slack season. To this was added, especially after 1900, an incentive 
to acquire land for speculative purposes. Rising values encouraged CSR 
to obtain more than was needed for its immediate requirements, so that by 
191A the total area under the company's control was over 100,000 acres,^^ 
The acquisition of land by CSR helped bring about a social transformation 
in districts where sugar was produced. The company was prominent among a 
new set of landholders who were replacing original settlers in much of the 
23 
colony. Many of these new men, if they did not farm themselves, leased 
their land to those who took advantage of improved cultivation methods and 
grew cane for CSR. These contractors became an important outside source 
of cane for the company. Yet because of the extent of the company's land-
holdings they were not so important as the tenants who occupied most of 
CSR's plantations on the eve of the First World War. The leasing of CSR's 
estates, in fact, enabled the company to realize its original aim of 
relying on outside growers for the bulk of its supplies. 
The leasing of CSR's plantations 
The process of leasing estates, mainly to plantation managers but also to 
2 A 
'others possessed of some little capital', began in 1890 and though 
initially sIovn?, proceeded more quickly after 1900 as the demand to lease 
grew. Given the failure of contractors to grow cane profitably on the 
Rewa in the 1880s, the desire to lease company plantations appears, perhaps, 
a little surprising. It was due, however, to a conviction that improved 
circumstances had made the cultivation of cane economically viable. Now 
this improvement was not the result of an increase in raw sugar prices for, 
in fact. Table 3:2 shows that the exact opposite had occurred. Nor did it 
21 H.O. to Nausori, 4 Feb. 1886, Fiji Out 1880-92, 3 (1885-7), 112-24. 
22 In 1944 government estimated that the total freehold and leasehold 
land held by CSR exceeded 132,000 acres. Most of this was acquired 
before World War I. C.S.O. 37/244; Farquhar to H.O., 26 June 
1906, Inspectors Ltbk., 1902-4, 192-204. 
23 A similar process was at work around Penang. R.M. Frazer, 'A 
social and economic history of Ra Province', Transactions & 
Proceedings of the Fiji Society^ 9 (1962-3), 103. 
24 H.O. to Nausori, 25 June 1891, Fiji Out 1880-92, 7 (1890-1), 407-10. 
TABLE 3:2 
Quantity and value of sugar exports , 1882-1914 
Value (£) Value (£) 
Tons Tons 
Year Exported Total Per ton Year Exported Total Per ton 
1882 1,731 58,857 34 1899 28,403 340,603 12 
1883 5,163 175,555 34 1900 32,961 393,987 12 
1884 8,729 218,224 25 1901 31,751 380,155 12 
1885 10,586 211,729 20 1902 35,905 347,691 10 
1886 11,716 187,456 16 1903 46,438 406,318 9 
1887 12,831 205,294 16 1904 52,138 469,391 9 
1888 16,916 270,649 16 1905 58,488 539,594 9 
1889 13,178 263,554 20 1906 38,523 347,198 9 
1890 15,291 244,655 16 1907 66,597 602,820 9 
1891 20,470 327,526 16 1908 66,149 647,306 10 
1892 18,883 302,133 16 1909 60,825 607,969 10 
1893 15,389 246,231 16 1910 61,761 669,432 11 
1894 27,265 436,245 16 1911 72,834 797,274 11 
1895 23,210 208,889 9 1912 61,718 671,712 11 
1896 27,334 336,929 12 1913 94,710 1 ,041,927 11 
1897 26,991 323,830 12 1914 93,773 1 ,023,914 11 
1898 34,156 409,884 12 
Source: J.C. Potts, 'The sugar industry in Fiji' , Appendix 1. 
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arise from advances made in milling techniques which might have allowed 
CSR to pay more for cane despite low prices, for on the contrary, whatever 
the developments in milling, after 1897 the price of cane was reduced 
(Table 3:3). Nor even was it due to the construction of mills at Rarawai, 
Lab asa and Lautoka where the climate was more suited to cane than on the 
R e w a , for as far as planters were concerned the benefit of this was offset 
w h e n , in 1898, the other three mills began to pay a lower price than 
Nausori for cane of equal quality. Rather, confidence in the profitability 
of cane increased because cultivation methods were being improved. In the 
early 1890s labour saving devices, like the use of draught animals, were 
introduced; the soil was allowed to rest longer after cropping; green 
manure was applied before re-planting; and to help the soil trash was 
saved instead of burnt. Improvements like the earlier planting of cane to 
TABLE 3:3 
Price of cane bought from Europeans on the Rewa, 1882-1914 
Year Price (including bonus) 
1882-3 10s Od 
1884-5 12s 6d 
1886-7 10s Od 
1888-91 lis Od 
1892-7 12s 6d 
1898-1901 12s 6d for cane of 11% P.O.C.S. 
1902-14 10s Od " 
Sources: Knox to Tucker and Orr, 13 May 1886, Fiji Out 1880-92, 
3 (1885-7), 217-8;H.O. to Nausori, 6 June 1888, Fiji Out 
1880-92, 4 (1887-8), 295-300; H.O. to Nausori, 14 Nov. 
1890, Fiji Out 1880-92, 7 (1890-1), 49-50; H.O. to Nausori, 
5 A u g . 1891, Fiji Out, 1880-92, 7 (1890-1), 469-70; H.O. 
to Nausori, 5 Nov. 1898, Nausori Out, 7 (1897-9), 438. 
Knox to Escott, 1912, Nausori to H.O., Private letters May 
to D e c . 1912. 
Notes: Before 1898 no standard was specified, the same price being 
paid for all cane regardless of quality, though cane below 
8% P.O.C.S. was rejected. 
P.O.C.S. (Pure Obtainable Cane Sugar) is calculated from the 
analysis of cane and forms a basis for assessment of the per-
centage of cane sugar recoverable under specific conditions 
of manufacture. The price was reduced or increased according 
to whether the P.O.C.S. measurement of a farmer's cane was 
below or above the standard. At Nausori the standard was 
fixed at 11%, but it was 13% at the other Fiji mills where 
cane was normally of a higher quality (see Table 3:4). 
The introduction of payment by quality in 1898 represented a 
fall in price for most Rewa planters, who were accustomed to 
producing cane of below 11% P.O.C.S. 
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give higher quality continued to be made, and new varieties were tried. 
Malabar, a superior cane to that grown hitherto in Fiji, was being widely 
planted in 1901. Within a few years it was replaced by the even better 
variety, Badilla. By the late 1890s advances in cultivation methods, 
though not as spectacular as achievements in the mill, had transformed 
the economics of growing cane in Fiji. Even on the Rewa cane could yield 
25 a profit to those ^^7ho were reasonably efficient. 
Moreover, CSR tenants found they had a particular advantage over 
contractors: they often had to pay less in rent. This was because many 
contractors occupied land leased from other Europeans, who were determined 
to maximise their income from rent. In the 1880s, for example, Sahl 
leased some of his Rewa property at a rent that CSR thought was more than 
the land was worth to W. Orr, who was tied to the land at an excessive 
rent and with an unprofitable crop presumably because he had financial 
2 6 
obligations to his landlord. Though men like Sahl were replaced in the 
1890s by a new set of property owners, the latter behaved no differently. 
There was J.B. Turner, who originally grew cane for CSR but found that it 
was more profitable to lease his land instead. In 1910 it was alleged 
that on one of his Rewa properties, bought for between £1,300 and £1,500, 27 Turner was charging rent of £420 a year. In Knox's view, landlords 
28 were charging 'exceedingly high rents' at the other mills as well. The 
result was to raise cultivation expenses so that in one or two cases rent 
29 
became the most important single item of cost. CSR on the other hand, 
perhaps hoping this would keep down rents on non-company land and wanting 
to minimise the cost of cane, charged lower rents than were paid by 
contractors. It hoped that eventually the subsidized rent could be 30 recouped in lower cane prices. On top of this was the advantage to 
25 K.O. to Nausori, 12 April 1893, Nausori Out, 2 (1893-4), 93-4; 
H.O. to Nausori, 13 July 1898, Nausori Out, 7 (1897-9), 301-4; 
H.O. to Nausori, 12 Aug. 1898, ibid., 340-1; Farquhar to H.O., 
7 Sept. 1901, Inspectors Ltbk., 1901-2, 184-95; Farquhar to 
H.O., 28 Oct. 1908, Inspectors Ltbk., 1908-10, 96-106. 
26 H.O. to Nausori, 14 Sept. 1887, Fiji Out 1880-92, 4 (1887-8),100-4. 
27 Nausori to H.O., 21 Nov. 1910, Nausori to H.O. Private Letters 
1906-10. 
28 H.O. to Nausori, 22 Nov. 1910, Private Ltbk., 6 (1909-11), 355-7. 
29 H.O. to Nausori, 22 Aug. 1894, Nausori Out, 3 (1894), 409. 
30 H.O. to Dixon, 26 Oct. 1909, Private Ltbk., 6 (1909-11), 82-4. 
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tenants of being self-employed, of not being absentee owners as were some 
of the early contractors and, therefore, of not needing to share the 
proceeds from cane with agents appointed to look after their farms. Thus 
overseers became increasingly attracted to the idea of leasing plantations 
from CSR. 
For the company, there was the hope that it could obtain cheaper 
cane. Indeed, its decision to part Vv'ith some of its estates was an 
extension of measures taken to reduce plantation costs in the late 1880s. 
Following a visit to Fiji in 1886, Knox suggested to the Board that staff 
should receive a proportion of any cost reductions that were made -
31 
'Personal interest will always ensure personal supervision.' For the 
Nausori plantations nine shillings was taken as the standard cost of 
producing a ton of cane: plantation staff were to benefit if expenses 
fell below it. But nine shillings was much less than the existing cost 
of growing cane on the Rewa, and no bonuses were paid to those outside 
12 
the mill. The incentive to earn a bonus fell as the frustration of 
trying to limit costs below an unrealistic standard grew. The leasing 
of plantations, however, increased the incentive to reduce costs. In 
effect the standard was raised to 12s 6d - the price of cane from 1892 
to 1897 - and instead of being able to keep only part of the savings made 
below the standard, farming leased estates on their own account, planters 
could retain the whole of the reduction as profit. In keeping with its 
overall objective, the first plantations CSR tried to dispose of were 
the ones it found least profitable to farm. On the Rewa for instance, 
there was Bau Levu on which the company expected to grow cane at 17s Od 33 
a ton in 1893, but where the actual cost proved to be £1 13s 2d. With 
the company willing to pay only 12s 6d a ton it V7as, perhaps, amazing 
that after several years of trying CSR found someone to take over the 
plantation. Mr John Rennie leased it in 1894 and, benefiting from improved 
cultivation techniques, made some profit from it. But the profit was not 
large enough to induce him to re-lease the land on terms acceptable to 
31 'Extracts from Reports of E.W. Knox relating to Fiji in the 1880s', 
op. cit. 
32 H.O. to Nausori, 3 June 1889, Private & Staff Out, 1889-90, 235-7. 
33 H.O. to Nausori, 7 Feb. 1894, Nausori Out, 3 (1894), 22-8. 
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3 ^ the company, and he was replaced by another tenant in 1899. As culti-
vation costs fell the number of overseers wanting to lease plantations 
increased and, despite the lowering of cane prices in 1902, this demand 
continued to grow. By 1904, 65% of the cane crushed at Nausori was 
supplied by Europeans (including contractors), 20% by Indian growers and 
only 15% by CSR.^^ 
Since the company had always found it difficult to grow cane 
economically at Nausori, it was not surprising that the leasing of estates 
proceeded faster there than at its other mills. For example at Rarawai, 
where more plantations had been let than at Labasa and Lautoka, in 1906 
3 6 
only about 40% of the cane was drawn from outside suppliers. There, as 
at Nausori, the least profitable plantations had been leased - the ones 
furthest away from the mill and so more difficult to supervise, or those 
on less fertile land where returns were comparatively low. The result was 
that working the most profitable land itself, CSR found in 1904 that it 37 
could grow cane at Rarawai for less than the cost of purchased supplies. 
Consequently W.A. Farquhar, the company's roving Inspector, opposed the 
further leasing of a large number of plantations in case the overall cost 
of cane should rise.- Because CSR would have to ensure that cane was 
remunerative to the 'average' producer, it would need to pay a price that 
was higher than the cost to the company of growing cane on its most profit-
able estates. Furthermore, since in the allocation of plantations priority 
would have to be given to overseers who had been longest in the company's 
service, CSR would be left with less experienced men who would be likely 3 8 
to work the remaining plantations less efficiently. 
Yet from about 1905 CSR came under increasing pressure to part 
with a larger proportion of its estates. This was not just because it 
needed the benefit 'of strengthening our position with the government' as 
34 H.O. to Nausori, 13 April 1894, ibid., 139-40; H.O. to Nausori, 
11 Jan. 1899, Nausori Out, 8 (1899-1900), 1-8; H.O. to Nausori, 
24 March 1899, ibid., 80-3. 
35 CSR to Fiji Sugar Co. Ltd, 7 March 1904, Private Ltbk., 4 (1903-6), 
216-9. 
36 Farquhar to H.O., 30 Oct. 1906, Inspectors Ltbk., 1906-8, 53-68. 
37 H.O. to Rarawai, 9 Aug. 1904, Private Ltbk., 4 (1903-6), 198-9. 
38 Farquhar to H.O., 30 Nov. 1906, Inspectors Ltbk., 1906-8, 92-6. 
62 
39 Farquhar put it, though Knox later recalled that this was a factor. 
Rather, the leasing of a greater number of plantations was seen as essential 
if the company was to retain control over its labour, and thereby stabilise 
costs. The problem was twofold. First, there was growing discontent 
among overseers who, seeing 'small fortunes' being made by planters like 
H.G. Carr at Nndi, wanted CSR to give more opportunities for officers to 
start on their Unrest among overseers was so great that in 1907 
Farquhar was forced to recommend the lease of three plantations at Nadi 
40 
to six overseers. Several estates were also leased at the other mills. 
The result, however, was to increase dissatisfaction among those who 
remained with the company. Tenants who had leased CSR land in 1907 were 
very successful, forcing Knox to admit: 'It is true that we parted with 
our Nadi land too cheaply, and that the blocks were too l a r g e . T h i s 
had enabled the tenants to make substantial profits so that, with those 
who had been doing well over a longer period, they had become the envy of 
men still in the company's employ. Though Knox purported to be unmoved 
by pressure from overseers to lease plantations, the danger for the 
company was real. Frustration was likely to be expressed in slack super-
vision of labour, or in a tendency to 'take it out' on those being super-
vised. Either way, labour would become more difficult to handle, the 
quality of work would fall and the cost of cane rise. 
Fear of this happening would have been particularly acute in 
1908, when trouble with labour caused a scare among company staff in Fiji. 
CSR attributed the problem to the vvrorking of new Indians by inexperienced 
overseers - the inevitable result of recent expansion by CSR and the 
leasing of its estates to more experienced men - and felt that the 
solution would be for government to discipline more severely labourers 
who broke the law. Government's view on the other hand, as reported by 
Farquhar, was that the problem was largely 'our own competitive system 
of working one plantation result against another', and that 'the trouble 
with the coolies was mainly due to us squeezing the last drop out of them. 
39 Farquhar to H.O., 30 June 1905, Inspectors Ltbk., 1904-6, 152-4; 
Knox to Masters, 4 March 1918, Private Ltbk. Out, 14 (1918), 236-40. 
40 Farquhar to H.O., 27 June 1907, Inspectors Ltbk., 1906-8, 131-43. 
41 H.G. to Labasa, 8 July 1908, Private Ltbk., 5 (1906-9), 359-60. 
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42 whereas the truth is the contractors always get more work done than we do'. 
Noting that relationships between tenants and their labourers were better 
than between overseers and Indians, presumably because tenants took greater 
care of labour so as to increase its productivity, Knox suggested in 1908 
that the answer would be to lease nearly all the company's plantations. 
The latter were rapidly divided into estates of 400 to 1000 acres, preference 
being given to those who had been longest in the company's service and who 
/ 3 
had little hope of further promotion. By the First World War the bulk of 
GSR's cane was bought from these tenants. The problem now was to prevent 
the realization of fears by I'arciuhar and others Lhal the widespread lensinp, 
of estates would cause a rise in the cost of cane to the company. In fact, 
what instruments of cost control over planters did CSR have? 
Control over planters 
Traditionally, the company had regulated the cost of outside cane by 
altering the price paid for it. Though it had wanted to see other mills 
established in the colony, CSR had opposed their location in the vicinity 
of its o\-m mills, lest by competing for cane supplies they had limited 
the company's ability to determine the price it would pay. CSR had fought 
particularly hard to obtain a monopoly of milling on the Rewa. It had 
acquired land with the object of preventing a rival mill from being 
established,^'^ it had purchased Stanlake Lee's mill in 1882 knowing that 
this would tend 'to club competition' on the river and enable CSR to offer 
a lower price for Fijian tax cane than that currently being paid, and 
the following year it had blocked an attempt by Sahl's partners to sell one 
of his properties to prospective investors in a mill that would have 
competed with Nausori.^'^ The biggest challenge to CSR's position had come 
42 Farquhar to H.O., 7 Oct. 1908, Inspectors Ltbk., 1908-10, 71-6. 
43 H.O. to Lautoka, 31 Oct. 1910, Nausori Private Letters 1906-10; 
Nausori to H.O., 21 Dec. 1910, Nausori to H.O. Private Letters 
1906-10. 
44 H.O. to Nausori, Fiji Out 1880-92, 1 (1880-2), 449-52. 
45 H.O. to Fairgrieve, 3 July 1882, Inspectors Out 1881-7, 1 (1881-
2), 157-9; H.O. to Fairgrieve, 5 July 1882, ibid., 174-9. 
46 Fairgrieve to H.O., 13 April 1883, Fairgrieve A to H.O., Fiji 
1882-3, 308-14; H.O. to Fairgrieve, 23 Aug. 1883, Inspectors 
Out 1881-7, 2 (1882-3), 389-407; H.O. to Fairgrieve, 16 Nov. 1883, 
ibid., 459-67. 
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in 1884 when the Rewa Plantation Co. Ltd, having changed its name to the 
Rewa Sugar Co. Ltd, transferred its mill to Koronivia and increased its 
capacity. Needing a larger supply of cane it had planned to acquire a 
property belonging to Henry Eastgate, who had contracted to grow cane on 
it for CSR. The latter had taken Eastgate to court in defence of its 
contract and as a deterrent to others, but the Chief Justice had found 
partly against the company. The matter was so important that CSR had 
considered an appeal to the Privy Council, but had been spared this by 
the intervention of a shareholder in the Rewa Sugar Co., which had conse-
quently agreed to do nothing that might damage the interests of CSR.''*^  
The company's position had not been fully secured, though, till 1894 when 
the Rewa Sugar Co. closed, leaving Nausori with a monopoly of milling on 
the Rewa - a position similar to CSR's other mills in Fiji. The result 
was that the company had substantial control over the price of cane and 
could use this to regulate the cost of outside supplies. 
But price was a relatively blunt instrument for this purpose. 
It could not be used to discriminate between planters on unusually fertile 
land and those who were not. Different prices for different planters 
would have caused unrest, while a uniform price had to be fixed at a level 
that would enable the average farmer to cover his costs. Thus when CSR 
leased plantations after 1908, it was unable to reduce the price of cane 
grown on what used to be its most profitable estates. Yet, as Farquhar 
had stressed, if CSR bought cane from these exceptional plantations at the 
prevailing price, it would be paying more than it would have cost the 
company to grow the crop itself, and the total cost of cane would rise. 
The answer was for CSR to regulate the incomes of its tenants in line 
with the profitability of each estate by varying the rents that were 
charged. After deducting its own outgoings for land held on lease, the 
company could set the balance from the proceeds from rent against the 
price of cane and so reduce the overall cost of supplies. This had been 
company practice for a number of years, making it natural in 1908 for 
Farquhar to suggest that if estates were leased, rents should be fixed 
'sufficiently high to safeguard our interests, for we can - as has often 
47 Fairgrieve to Solomon, 12 Feb. 1884, Fiji Out 1880-92, 2 
(1880-5), 226-9; H.O. to Nausori, 21 Feb. 1884, ibid., 230-6; 
H.O. to Nausori, 12 June 1884, ibid., 213-9. 
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been done - always lower a rental if it proved too high, but we can never 
raise it'.'^^ His advice was taken: high rents were charged, and in 
addition high valuations were put on improvements taken over by incoming 
tenants. Since most overseers had little capital, these valuations were 
treated as an advance, tenants being expected to reduce their indebtedness 
to CSR at the rate of £500 a year, but it soon became clear that rents were 
too high to enable them to do this. At the end of 1912 CSR wrote off 
arrears, amounting to £35,000 at Labasa, and allowed those who had become 
tenants since 1908 to start afresh with lower initial valuations and much 
49 
reduced rents. In effect, CSR had decided to accept an overall increase 
in the cost of cane, but it had limited the rise by not having to pay more 
for cane from contractors or tenants who had leased company land before 
1908. Beside having more satisfied tenants, in the short term the company 
could expect compensation for the higher cost of cane from the enhanced 
ability of tenants to repay at least part of what had been spent on 
improving the land: in the long run, as tenants bettered their position, 
CSR could hope to reduce the scale of its advances and employ more profit-
ably the funds thereby released. It was in the company's interest that 
tenants should do well - but not too well. Variations in rent were the 
means to achieve this. 
The amount of rent CSR could charge, or the extent to which it 
could reduce the price of cane, largely depended on the company's ability 
to control methods of cultivation by tenants and contractors. The lower 
the cost of growing cane, the lower the price that need be paid for it. 
But gaining control over growers' cultivation practices had been very 
difficult in the 1880s and '90s, when planters had tried to increase the 
quantity of cane regardless of its quality. CSR on the other hand, with 
a miller's interest in sugar content, had wanted to control the cultivation 
methods of planters to ensure not only maximum yields per acre, but 
optimum sweetness in cane. Among other points, in the contracts it first 
made with planters CSR stipulated that it should have control over 
harvesting to ensure that cane was cut when most ripe, and control over 
48 Farquhar to H.O., 28 Oct. 1908, Inspectors Ltbk., 1908-10, 96-106. 
49 H.O. to Rarawai, 11 March 1913, Private Ltbk. Out, 8 (1913-4), 
51-61; Knox to Masters, 4 March 1918, Private Ltbk Out, 14 (1918), 
236-40. 
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varieties for 'without it any planter could cultivate a gross and watery 
cane, which would give him a good return, and ourselves nothing'.^^ Yet 
even though contracts and tenancy agreements were designed to be legally 
enforceable, the company had great difficulty controlling the quality of 
cane delivered on the Rewa. In the mid-1890s Knox frequently complained 
about the low quality of cane being sold to CSR.'^^ In at attempt to raise 
quality and produce an identity of interest between planter and the company, 
in 1898 CSR adopted a new system of payment for cane. Rates were based on 
a sliding scale according to quality (Table 3:A). Despite opposition from 
growers, CSR was able to impose the new scale by exploiting differences 
among them. It first reached agreement with its tenants, and then used 
52 
this to get the acquiescence of contractors. The result was that planters 
came to share CSR's interest in raising the quality of cane, and this made 
it easier for the company to supervise their methods of cultivation. 
TABLE 3:4 
CSR sliding scales for payment of cane by quality 
Nausori Other Fij i mills 
P.O.C.S. 1898 1902 1898 1902 
8% 7s 6d 5s Od 4s 2d Is 8d 
9% 9s 2d 6s 8d 5s lOd 3s 4d 
10% 10s lOd 8s 4d 7s 6d 5s Od 
11% 12s 6d 10s Od 9s 2d 6s 8d 
12% 13s 9d lis 3d lOs lOd 8s 4d 
13% 15s Od 12s 6d 12s 6d 10s Od 
14% 16s 3d 13s 9d 13s 9d lis 3d 
15% 17s 6d 15s Od 15s Od 12s 6d 
16% 18s 9d 16s 3d 16s 3d 13s 9d 
Source: H.O. to Nausori, , Nov. 1895, Nausori Out, 7 (1897-9),438; 
Knox to Escott, 1912, Nausori to H.O. Private letters May 
to Dec. 1912. 
Note: It was very unusual for the quality of cane at Nausori to 
exceed 13% P.O.C.S., and for that at the other mills to 
fall much below 10%. 
50 H.O. to Nausori, 11 May 1880, Fiji Out 1880-91, 1 (1880-2), 1-5. 
51 E.g. Knox to Gemmell Smith, 13 Oct. 1895, Private & Staff Out, 
1893-9, 239-40. 
52 Farquhar to H.O., 28 Aug. 1896, Inspectors Ltbk., 1895-6, 230-3; 
H.O. to Farquhar, 7 Sept. 1896, Inspector of Mills Out 1891-1900, 
1 (1891-8), 117-21. 
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The instrument of supervision was the credit extended to planters 
by CSR. The poverty of the early settlers had forced the company to make 
advances to cover their cultivation and living expenses, and this practice 
was continued when CSR leased its plantations. Advances were made on 
security of the land or the crop, and interest of six per cent a year was 
53 
charged. The supply of credit gave the company great influence over 
planters, for it kept a close watch on the way its money was spent. It 
could refuse further advances unless specific cultivation techniques were 
adopted, it could threaten to cut off credit if the planter was not more 
diligent in his V \ / o r k , and it could use coiiipnny Jo.'uis to ensure tliat ];ind 54 
capable of supporting cane was not used for other purposes. The house-
hold expenditure of planters could also be controlled. With characteristic 
attention to detail, in 1915 head office complained of the 'extravagance' 
of C.W. Southey in buying a motor car. The offending tenant was told that 
CSR would not continue to finance him if he kept the car.'^ '^  The issue of 
new leases on easier terms in 1913 was accompanied by instructions from 
Knox that future advances to tenants were to be made in a more discrimin-
ating way. Greater attention should be paid to the quality of work. 
The Board thinks that the system of guaranteeing to the 
tenants a comfortable life, whatever the results of their 
work, has been an important factor in bringing about the 
failure of so large a proportion of the occupants of the 
plantations to make tiiem pay, for it is evident that once 
a man begins to lose ground his easiest course is to let 
things go and live on his allowance. 56 
The practice of making separate advances for living and cultivation expenses 
v,7as stopped. A single advance was made in the hope that if tenants failed 
to work their land efficiently, the reduction in the balance left for 
living expenses would encourage improvements to be made. Credit was seen 
as a lever with which to lower the cost of cultivation by increasing 
53 H.O. to Nausori, 31 Aug. 1880, Fiji Out 1880-91, 1 (1880-82), 
24-8. 
54 E g H.O. to Nausori, 14 March 1911, Nausori Out, 27 (1911), 9; 
Nausori to H.O., 21 May 1912, Private letters May-December 1912. 
55 H.O. to Rarawai, 1 Sept. 1915, Private Ltbk., 11 (1915-6), 25;^ ^ 
Dixon, 'Notes for the Manager. Rarawai Mill', 26 Nov. 1915, Fijx 
Inspectors (Rutledge and Dixon) 1915-28. 
56 H.O. to Rarawai, 26 Feb. 1913, Private Ltbk. Out, 8 (1913-4), 33-4. 
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efficiency on plantations. At the back of Knox's mind was the hope that 
the company would eventually be able to reduce the price of cane.^^ 
CSR's control over planters was considerable but not absolute, and 
was greater over tenants whose land it could resume than over contractors 
who could sell their property, or perhaps switch to another crop. Around 
1912 there were examples of planters using CSR advances for purposes other 
than they were intended, like the development of profitable side-lines in 
dairying or growing rice. There were instances, too, of CSR failing to 
prevent planters accumulating debts of a size they could never repay. By 
1911 the company had had to write off £2000 to £3000 advanced to Waring, 
a planter on the Rewa, and there were fears that the amount lost could rise 
5 8 
to twice that. Yet these were the exceptions, and when matters did get 
out of hand the company could always resume land or take over the crop 
against x\rhich a loan had been made. However, CSR had less control over 
the political activities of planters. Though it threatened to withhold 59 
advances if they publicly criticized the company, it could not prevent 
them voting for J.B. Turner, a long-standing critic of CSR, in elections 
for the Legislative Council after 1908. Sir Everard im Thurn (governor, 
1904-10) believed that the company had great difficulty controlling the 
views of its tenants 'in any matter outside sugar g r o w i n g N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
taken over all, CSR's control of planters was so great that Turner, 
representing the Rewa, had good cause to complain in 1911 that tenants were 
little better than employees of the company.^^ 
The result of this tight control was that CSR realized its aim 
of getting cheaper supplies than if it had grown the cane itself. Though 
it is impossible to quantify this because the necessary figures are not 
extant, it is clear from CSR correspondence that the cost of company gro\m 
cane at Nausori in the 1880s and '90s was substantially higher than 
57 H.O. to Nausori, 14 March 1911, Private Ltbk. Out, 6 (1909-11), 396. 
58 Nausori to H.O., 15 Jan. 1910, Nausori to H.O. Private letters 
1906-10; H.O. to Nausori, 28 March 1911, Private Ltbk. Out, 6 
(1909-11), 405-6. 
59 H.O. to Lautoka, 31 July 1913, Private Ltbk. Out, 8 (1913-4), 249-51. 
60 Im Thurn to C.O., 207, 6 Dec. 1909, C.O. 83/93. I am grateful to 
Dr K.L. Gillion for drawing my attention to this despatch. 
61 May to C.O., 190, 4 Sept, 1911, C.O. 83/102. 
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purchased supplies. In 1895 Farquhar told Knox that he thought CSR could 
eventually grow cane on the Rewa for 12s 6d a ton, the price paid to 
6 2 
planters, but that it was impossible to do this at present. And, of 
course, the only plantations to be leased elsewhere at first were those 
that were uneconomic for CSR to farm. It seems, too, that labourers were 6 3 
better treated after 1908 when the rapid leasing of plantations began. 
This averted the rise in labour costs which could have been expected 
following unrest among immigrants on CSR estates. Table 3:5 shows that 
there was no significant increase in the cost of cane to the company after 64 
1908. At Labasa costs seem to have been actually reduced. So it seems 
that one of the company's objectives in leasing estates had been achieved. 
TABLE 3:5 
Cost of cane (per ton) to CSR at the mill: 
(average for all Fiji) 
£ s d £ s d 
1905 4 16 9 1910 4 7 2 
1906 5 5 3 1911 4 10 6 
1907 4 2 9 1912 4 15 4 
1908 4 9 0 1913 4 10 7 
1909 4 9 7 1914 4 4 11 
Source: CSR R 3.0/2. 
Note: Includes the cost of purchased supplies as well as 
the cost of cane grown by CSR. 
CSR's political influence 
CSR also realized the hope that planters could be used to increase its 
influence with government. It believed that the economic viability of the 
industry largely hinged on government adopting favourable policies on 
taxation, labour, land and so on. The company tried to ensure this not 
mainly by working through the Legislative Council, though in 1884 when 
members were all appointed by the governor it did welcome the nomination 
of its Nausori manager, Mr R. Robertson, on the grounds that he would be 
able to protest against acts of iiijustice and obtain earlier and more 
62 Farquhar to H.O., 19 Dec. 1895, Inspectors Ltbk., 1895-6, 133-7. 
63 K.L. Gillion, Fiji's Indian Migrants. A history to the end of 
indenture in 1920, 116. 
64 H.O. to Labasa, 13 Sept. 1910, Private Ltbk., 6 (1909-11), 307-9. 
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reliable information about immigration and the like.^^ But when elected 
European representation was introduced in 1903 and Sir Henry Jackson 
suggested that one member of the Council might be elected by the sugar 
companies, the opposition from CSR was so great that the idea of separate 
representation for the industry was dropped. Knox feared that the member 
mJglit be regarded as a delegate rather than a representative, wliile 'the 
separation of the particular industry in the way proposed would be held to 
warrant the assumption that the welfare of the Colony and of the two 
companies concerned was not interdependent'.^^ Thereafter, CSR's inter-
vcnL.ioii in affairs of the .logj si alure was so .';.lij',hL LliaL iin Tlmni could 
write .in 1909 'that the influence of the Company as a body in the Legis-
lative Council is less than that of many individuals other than sugar 
producers'. Instead, CSR preferred to exert influence by dealing with 
officials direct. After all, it was they who made the final decisions. 
With its automatic majority in the Legislative Council, government could 
enact any measures it had decided upon. To try to alter policies after 
they had been agreed and placed before the Council was much less effective 
than lobbying quietly while they were still in preparation. And CSR could 
lobby with great effect. It could argue that help, for the industry would 
not merely benefit the sugar companies, but would assist the numerous 
planters dependent on cane for their livelihoods. 
One example of the political advantage to CSR of having otiier 
planters interested in sugar occurred in the 1880s and '90s. Though cheap 
labour was always important, in years of falling prices and high culti-
vation costs the need to reduce labour expenses was particularly great. 
Planters, as well as plantation managers under pressure from head office, 
were desperate to make economies, and found that they could do this most 
easily by increasing the work-load of their labour and minimising expend-
iture on coolie lines, medical facilities for immigrants, etc. In the 
1880s CSR repeatedly asked officials to assist in this by amending legis-
lation governing the conditions of indentured Indians, the company always 
putting its case in terms of the economic disaster that would befall 
65 H.O. to Nausori, 13 Nov. 1884, Private Ltbk., 13 Dec. 1882 to 
1 Sept. 1885, 173. 
66 Knox to Jackson, 4 Sept. 1903, Private Ltbk. Out, 4 (1903-6),13-4. 
67 Im Thurn to C.O., 207, 6 Dec. 1909, op. cit. 
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planters if labour costs were not reduced.^^ Though it is unclear how far 
government was influenced by the company's appeals, there is no doubt that 
officials were very worried about the plight of the small planter. Their 
concern was increased by fears that CSR would obtain a monopoly of milling, 
which would enable it to dictate the terms on which it bought cane.^^ In 
1885 a scheme of deferred payments for immigrant labour was introduced 
specifically to help farmers with little capital, but they were unable to 
take advantage of it and only the large sugar companies benefited. Con-
cessions by government on labour questions would be made more in the 
interest of the small planter than of CSR. 
So it was natural that at one stage the Agent-General of Immi-
gration, Henry Anson, should consider reducing the statutory minimum wage 
of indentured labour, set at one shilling a day, because he found that 
planters could hardly afford to pay more than about eight pence.^^ In the 
event, probably from fear that India would react by halting the labour 
supply, the minimum wage w^ as not lowered; but at the same time - partly 
because of a shortage of staff as well as the economic position of planters 
- it was rarely enforced. Moreover, the tasks set for labourers were 
permitted to exceed the legal limit of six hours' steady work for an able-
bodied adult male (three-quarters of this for a woman). The tasks became 
so heavy that in 1886 a series of labour disturbances broke out, causing 
government to pass legislation which curtailed the ability of immigrants 
to protest in support of grievances. The harsh treatment of Indians was 
reflected in high mortality rates, which in the mid-1890s produced fears 
that the supply of immigrants might be stopped. Having been warned of 
this in 1896 by government, the sugar companies made improvements in the 
ration scale, medical care and the like, though average wages remained 
7 2 below one shilling a day. Still, during the 1880s and '90s when it was 
68 E.g., H.O. to Nausori, 26 Feb. 1885, Private Ltbk. 13 Dec. 1882 
to 1 Sept. 1885, 285-92. 
69 Minutes on McGregor to C.O., 60, 17 April 1885, C.O. 83/40. 
70 Gillion, 73-4. Gillion discusses more fully government's desire 
to help the small farmer. 
71 Anson's minute, 28 Nov. 1887, C.S.O. 3481/87. 
72 This is dealt with more thoroughly by Gillion, 79-95, 103-29. 
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very difficult to make profits from sugar, CSR had been able to rely on 
government not to check the illegal efforts of planters and its overseers 
to reduce the costs of labour. At a most critical time, the existence of 
many planters in the industry had brought a big political advantage. 
Another important gain to CSR was over the question of taxation. 
Government's concern for the well-being of planters in the 1880s was 
reflected in its tax policy. It was normal for colonial administrations 
to raise much of their revenue through customs duties which, because the 
bulk of trade was conducted by Europeans, fell heaviest upon them. In 1890 
Fiji's revenue totalled £66,817. Almost a third of this came from Fijian 
taxes, which reduced the amount that had to be found from other (mainly 
European) sources. £26,159 was raised from customs duties, and though most 
of this fell on Europeans, government minimised its impact by shifting part 
of the burden on to others. Thus breadstuffs at £10,331 in value and meats 
at £9,170 were two of the most important foodstuffs imported by the colony, 
but since they were consumed by Europeans they were admitted duty-free. 
An equally valuable food item was rice, worth £10,193, but as this was 
73 
imported by Indians it was taxed at 20%. The advantage to CSR was that 
by keeping down the cost of certain key imports consumed by Europeans, 
government reduced - if only slightly - the need to increase the price of 74 
cane from planters and the salaries of European staff. Later, in 1898 
when the economic circumstances of planters were beginning to improve, 
duties on breadstuffs and meats were introduced,^^ and in 1901 the duty 
on rice was reduced. But by then the latter was to the advantage of CSR, 
since with the lower cost of imports Indian rice growers would find it 
harder to compete with overseas supplies, and might sell cane to the 
• . ^ 76 company instead. 
More significant was that the new cane contracts issued by CSR 
in 1898 and 1899 stipulated that any fresh taxation imposed on the industry 
73 Blue Book of Fiji^ 1890. 
74 Since the minimum wage of indentured labour was fixed by law and 
was not related to the cost of living, the heavy duty on rice 
would not have affected planters by increasing wages. 
75 Blue Book of Fiji, 1898. 
76 Farquhar to H.O., 7 Sept. 1901, Inspectors Ltbk., 1901-2, 184-95. 
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would have to be borne, at least in part, by suppliers of cane.^^ CSR used 
this to great effect in 1911, when government was being pressed by un-
officials in the Legislative Council to introduce an export tax on sugar. 
Sir Henry May (governor, 1911-12) told the Colonial Office that though 
CSR made large profits and was lightly taxed, he was reluctant to impose 
export duties lest they be transferred from the company to those who grew 
cane. Nevertheless, to raise the required revenue government quadrupled 
7 8 
the tariff on sugar sacks and introduced a Buildings and Hut Tax. CSR 
estimated that these measures combined represented a loss of one shilling 
in the pound on its net profits. It warned that though they would not be 
passed on to its suppliers, in future any extra tax on the industry would. 
In fact, the company had been rather fortunate. Instead of raising 
additional revenue with a selective tax increase on sugar companies, 
government had spread the burden more widely. General ad valorem duties 
were increased from 12\ to 15%, while under the Buildings and Hut Tax, 
79 
Indian householders had to pay a direct tax for the first time - ten 
80 
shillings a year. In effect, CSR had been spared the political embarrass-
ment of transferring part of an export tax on sugar to cane growers. 
After 1908 the company's ability to use planters to strengthen 
its position with government became increasingly important. Officials felt 
that CSR was obstructing the development of the colony. For example, in 
1912 CSR refused to make land available for a towiiship between its Lautoka 
wharf and the mill. It would only provide land at Namoli which was 
further away from the mill, and which the company preferred because a 
settlement there might 
later on clamour for better shipping facilities than are 
available at our wharf, and a second wharf may then be 
provided, ridding us of our obligations to accommodate the 
public, which is the main object we desire. 81 
77 H.O. to Nausori, 30 Nov. 1898, Nausori Out, 7 (1897-9), 461. 
78 May to C.O., conf., 13 May 1911, C.O. 83/101. 
79 H.O. to Nausori, 5 Nov. 1912, Private Ltbk. Out, 7 (1911-13), 
A31-2. 
80 Fiji Legislat-Lve Council Debates, 1911, 70-1. 
81 Nausori to H.O., 27 June 1912, Nausori to H.O. Private letters 
May to Dec. 1912. 
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Despite opposlLion from government at first, CSR had its way. A townsliip 
82 
was started at Namoli, now the centre of Lautoka, and many years later 
a separate wharf was built to handle non-CSR traffic. At the same time the 
company was busy opposing government plans, which never materialised, for 
a railway to be built from the upper Rewa to Suva. Officials saw the rail 
as a means to develop new crops in the district and bring additional trade 
to the port of Suva: CSR feared the scheme would be a financial disaster. 
The rail would either have to be subsidized from public funds which might 
mean higher taxes on producers, or else to make it economically viable 
government might have to force the company to use it, making redundant the 
latter's investment in tramlines, punts and shipping facilities at Laucala 
83 Bay. 
There were disagreements, too, about public rights on CSR's 
tramways. In 1913 the company refused to carry for more than twelve months 
seed cotton on its tramline from Nacobi to the Government Experimental 
Station at Lautoka. The local mill manager explained that since the cane 
area had proved to be smaller than expected, the company did not want 
other crops grown on land which was available. Since CSR's lines were 
virtually the only means of communication in areas served by its mills, 
officials were angered by what they saw as an unreasonable obstruction of 
efforts to diversify agriculture. This aggravated disputes about the 
company's responsibilities to the public in the use of its lines - whether 
CSR or the public should have prior right of way on the narrow bridges 
which carried road alongside rail transport; and whether CSR could be held 
responsible for the safety of the passengers it had agreed to carry free 
of charge in return for a lease of native land in 1905, the origin of the 
free passenger service which still operates today. After bitter dis-
cussions, during which the company feared that government had taken the 
first step toward securing control of its lines, compromise was reached 
whereby CSR promised to protect the public's safety and government agreed 
82 Nausori to H.O., 30 July 1912, ibid. 
83 May to C.O., conf., 4 April 1912, C.O. 83/105; H.O. to Nausori, 
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to limit its i n t e r f e r e n c e in the o p e r a t i o n of the c o m p a n y ' s trains.^^ 
T h e r e s u l t of these disagreements w a s a trial of strength b e t w e e n 
o f f i c i a l s and the company over the terms on w h i c h native leases for tram-
lines should b e issued and existing ones r e n e w e d . The dispute revealed 
the e x t e n t of CSR's influence on g o v e r n m e n t . Instances like the company's 
r e f u s a l to carry cotton indefinitely on its l i n e s , its o p p o s i t i o n to the 
p r o p o s e d R e w a railway and its resistance to g o v e r n m e n t i n t e r v e n t i o n on 
g r o u n d s of p u b l i c safety in the running of its t r a i n s , alerted government 
to p r o b l e m s that could arise from the situation in w h i c h CSR (and the other 
two sugar c o m p a n i e s ) controlled the only rail lines in the c o l o n y . It was 
p o s s i b l e in future that CSR's tramlines w o u l d interfere w i t h railway 
d e v e l o p m e n t planned by the g o v e r n m e n t , or that officials might w a n t to 
n e g o t i a t e w i t h the company certain rights for the public on its l i n e s . To 
s t r e n g t h e n its hand should the need a r i s e , the F i j i government proposed 
in 1912 that new tramline leases and the r e n e w a l of old ones should be for 
fifty y e a r t e r m s , w i t h government having the option to buy the line at a 
v a l u a t i o n after the twenty-fifth y e a r . In 1913 the C o l o n i a l Office w e n t 
further and p r o p o s e d t h a t , if agreement could be reached with C S R , in all 
new l e a s e s or renewals there should be a clause giving government the 
o p t i o n to a c q u i r e the w h o l e of the company's tramway system after twenty-
five y e a r s . If CSR strongly opposed this, the power to purchase should 
b e a p p l i e d only to rails in the district w h e r e the particular lease was 
l o c a t e d . CSR w a s horrified by the possibility of government taking over 
its l i n e s , for by owning the means of c o m m u n i c a t i o n between cane grower 
and m i l l e r g o v e r n m e n t would have b e e n able to exercise s u b s t a n t i a l control 
over the two p a r t i e s . Even if government never actually acquired the 
l i n e s , the threat to do so w o u l d have greatly strengthened its position 
in future r e l a t i o n s w i t h C S R . At stake was the extent to which the 
c o m p a n y ' s i n f l u e n c e in F i j i w a s to be limited by g o v e r n m e n t , or by other 
86 
i n t e r e s t s in the colony w o r k i n g through g o v e r n m e n t . 
CSR's n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n in the matter w a s greatly strengthened 
by fears in the C o l o n i a l Office about the 'outcry from the growers a f f e c t e d ' 
85 K n o x to C . O . , tel., 3 A p r i l 1 9 1 2 , C . O . 8 3 / 1 1 1 . 
86 T h e h i s t o r y of this d i s p u t e is summarised in m i n u t e s on Escott 
to C . O . , 324, 10 A u g . 1 9 1 5 , C . O . 8 3 / 1 2 6 . 
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that would follow a refusal by the company to renew, on tlie terms proposed 
• 87 
by government, tramway leases that were due to expire. Consequently, 
when Knox visited the Colonial Office in 191A, he was able to persuade 
officials to drop the requirement that renewals and new leases should 
contain an option for government to purchase company lines after twenty-
five years. This was important for CSR since it meant that no principle 
had been sacrificed. In any future discussions on government control over 
tramlines, the company's position would not be weakened by having conceded 
the principle some years before. But Knox had won no more than a tactical 
victory. Existing leases which expired before 1920 were to be renewed for 
only twenty-one years, and government was to deal with new leases on their 
88 
merit. CSR had not obtained the fifty years' security it sought, and 
official policy on the renewal of leases after 1920 remained open. Though 
CSR was not told of the fact, the Colonial Office planned to review the 
whole question in 1920. Yet the review never occurred, or if it did no 
decision was taken that would hurt the company, for by then the sugar 
industry was facing its most serious crisis since the 1880s. 
In 1916 India had halted the supply of indentured labour, putting 
at risk the whole future of the sugar industry which had traditionally 
relied on cheap labour. Government and CSR reacted by co-operating in the 
settlement of Indians on the land, not only so that they would grow a much 
larger quantity of cane than they had hitherto, but also to make conditions 
in Fiji sufficiently attractive to persuade India to permit emigration, in 
some form, to be resumed after the war. This was seen as essential to 
prevent the industry going into decline, and with it the level of economic 89 
activity and the size of government revenue. So officials were unwilling 
to take action on tramway leases which might cause CSR not to renew, and 
thereby hinder the settlement of Indians. It would be interesting to know 
what would have happened if the planned review of leases had occurred in 
less critical circumstances. Would the Colonial Office again have been 
influenced by a desire to avoid an outcry from the planters, and would CSR 
once more have benefited from having planters involved in the industry? 
87 Minutes on Escott to C.O., 16, 15 Jan. 1913, C.O. 83/112. 
88 Minutes on Knox to C.O., 23 May 1914, C.O. 83/123. 
89 This is discussed more fully in chapter 5. 
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Tlie Lrainline quesLion illusLraLcd very well Lhc abiliLy of CSR 
Lo increase its political leverage by identifying its interests with those 
of the planters. The company could then use this influence to obtain 
through government subsidies from other groups in the colony - from 
labourers wlio had to work longer hours and at lower wages than the law 
sL:i i)u 1 ated; from tlie community at large wliicli liad to pay higher taxes than 
might otherwise have been the case. By 191A dependence on others for cane 
had yielded the company a handsome political return. 
The J'ruiio of CBW r, irtvcr, Lmantr, 
During the 1880s Dr T.P. Lucas claimed that sugar companies in Fiji were 
'continuously harvesting money and sending it abroad, draining the 
90 
country'. Wanting a larger share of the benefits from sugar, many 
Europeans might have agreed. Yet in fact, European interests had done 
well from sugar. Though many of the early planters had left the colony, 
new settlers had arrived and had generally prospered. Plantation overseers 
had bettered their position by becoming tenants of CSR. The example of 
Waring, quoted by Turner in 1911 to demonstrate the plight of these tenants, 
was exceptional. He had leased CSR's Vuci Maca estate in 1904. Since 
then he had broken his agreement with the company by keeping part of the 
land suitable for cane under grass so as to augment his income from dairy-
ing. He had invested very little in the venture, so that what lie had lost 91 had been mainly advances from CSR. The company admitted that those who 
became tenants between 1908 and 1912 had made 'an unfortunate start', but 
argued that under leases to be issued in 1913 they should be able to do 
92 
reasonably wc.11 . In 191A head office commented on tlie general improve-
ment' in the finances of planters on the Rewa, and noted that of eighteen 
contractors and tenants around Rarawai eleven had been able to reduce their 
CSR debts in 1913 to some extent. One of them, H.G. Carr, had made a 
90 Lucas, 108. 
91 Nausori to H.O., 4 July 1911, Nausori to H.G. Private letters 
1906 to 1910. 
92 Knox to May, 1912, Nausori to H.G. Private letters May to Dec. 
1912. 
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profit of over £2000 from his Mataniqara estate, a result considered 
93 
'phenomenal' by CSR. 
The growing prosperity of planters provided merchants with an 
expanding market. In 1911 perhaps over ten per cent of Europeans in the 
94 
colony were directly engaged in the cultivation and processing of cane, 
while others were indirectly dependent on sugar. Naturally, merchants 
wanted to increase the size of their market. Some were dissatisfied 
because CSR itself imported supplies, Xv^hich were often cheaper than what 
local merchants could offer since the company ordered in bulk for its Fiji 
and Australian operations together. By 1912 Henry Marks and Maynard 
Hedstrom, both members of the Legislative Council, had been annoyed by the 
company's refusal to buy certain goods from them. Lautoka storekeepers, 
represented in the Council by Charles Thomas, had lost part of their trade 
when CSR set up its butcheries in western Viti Levu. Merchant 
interests combined to seek, but without much success, a redistribution of 
taxation away from the general public, \~iho would then have had more to 95 
spend locally, toward the company whose custom was to spend abroad. Yet 
whatever their differences with CSR, no one could deny that merchants had 
greatly benefited from the economic stimulus provided by its operations. 
CSR had also gained - but in terms of profits from milling not 
by a very large amount. Table 3:6 on page 79 summarizes information 
available on the company's profits from 1887 to 1911. The circumstances 
in w h i c h , and for w h o m , these figures were compiled are not clear. They 
may have been designed to convince officials that CSR's profits in Fiji 
were not excessive (Knox certainly quoted them for this purpose), in which 
case they may understate the true position. Nevertheless, taking the 
figures at their face value, CSR's annual average return on capital was 
3.38% from 1887 to 1891, 6.88% from 1892 to 1901 and at least 8.4% from 
93 H.O. to Nausori, 25 Feb. 1914, Private Ltbk., 8 (1913-4), 493; 
H.O. to Rarawai, 25 March 1914, Private Ltbk. Out, 9 (1913-4), 
36-41. 
94 Census report for 1911, C.P. 44/1911. It is not always clear 
from the categories of employment whether persons were engaged 
in sugar or, say, copra production. 
95 Nausori to H.O., 20 May 1912, Nausori to H.O. Private letters 
May to D e c . 1912; Nausori to H.O., 20 June 1911, Private letters 
1906-10. 
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TABLE 3: 6 
Profits fi'om CSR's Fiji Mills, 1887-1911 
P r o f i t If s u g a r s o l d o n 1 ) o p e n m a r k e t 
Profits from CSR's 
sugar milling 
2) 
Profits as 7. 2\ P r o f i t s ns % activities as a 
Year Capital Total profits on capital Total profits on c a p i t a l whole 
1887 667,000 21,132 3.17 6.45 
1888 671,957 19,628 2.92 2.72 
1889 694,786 9,993 1.44 5.83 
1 8 9 0 708,545 30,194 4.26 11.99 
1 8 9 1 729,106 36,226 4.97 7.84 
A n n u a l a v e r a g e 
4 ) 
1887-91 694,279 23,435 3.38 7.04 
1892 740,302 3.31 11.47 
1893 753,190 20,119 2.67 11.02 
1894 923,307 92,717 10.04 15.01 
1895 930,764 35,708 3.84 6.28 
1896 906,396 62,266 6.87 11.66 
1897 911,323 59,949 6.58 10.95 
1898 914,350 73,090 7.99 10.65 
1899 953,623 83,221 8.73 8.00 
1900 978,017 92,525 9.46 10.26 
1 9 0 1 1 ,006,380 76,118 7.56 11.32 
A n n u a l a v e r a g e 
4) 
1 8 9 2 - 1 9 0 1 901,765 62,025 6.88 10.63 
1902 1 ,073,125 43,024 4.01 42,483 3.96 6.39 
1903 1 ,559,523 126,396 8.10 128,073 8.21 8.38 
1904 1 ,614,129 243,590 15.09 249,596 15.46 18.02 
1905 1 ,690,859 107,683 6.37 112,045 6.63 12.77 
1906 1 ,830,546 36,171 1.93 43,989 2.40 5.85 
1907 1 ,959,419 144,209 7.36 192,227 9.81 11.93 
1908 2 ,053,460 140,806 6.86 178.546 8.69 9.76 
1909 2 ,050,805 223,587 10.90 264,187 12.88 13.85 
1 9 1 0 2 ,052,953 193,307 9.42 222,905 10.86 13.30 5) 
1 9 1 1 2, ,295,166 245,708 10.71 N/A N / A N / A 
A n n u a l a v e r a g e 
4 ) 
Annual average 1902-10 
1 9 0 2 - 1 1 1 ,873,478 157,397 8.40 167,021 8.92 11.27 
A n n u a l a v e r a g e 
4) 
1 8 8 7 - 1 9 1 0 1 ,182,244 90,478 7.65 10.45 
Sources: 
notes: 
CSR A 3.0/2/19; C S R F 1 . 0 / 2 / 4 . 
1) Open market price based on price CSR paid for sugar from the P e n a n g m i l l , 
2) Includes p r o f i t s from p l a n t a t i o n s , and after 1901 rents received from leasing 
estates; but excludes d e p r e c i a t i o n . 
3) Excludes w o r k i n g capital and s t o c k s . 
4) No allowance m a d e for c h a n g e s in general price level. 
3) A p p r o x i m a t e only 
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1902 to 1911; the last figure was slightly higher in fact, because CSR 
'sold' sugar to its Australian and New Zealand refineries at less than the 
open market value - a practice known as transfer pricing. Overall, from 
1887 to 1910 returns averaged 7.65%, which was below the average for all 
CSR's sugar milling activities in Australia and Fiji (10.45%). Actually, 
returns were lower still since the 7.65% makes no allowance for depreciation. 
Taking this into account, returns were around six per cent. Profits sub-
sequently increased, though. For the six months ended 30 September 1910, 
the first time comparative figures are available, CSR's Australian business 
(refineries and mills) yielded a net profit of £126,714: the profit from 
its New Zealand and Fiji business was £70,000. For the six months to 30 
September 1914 the respective profits were £121,360 and £135,000.^^ Since 
the improvement in the New Zealand and Fiji business had not been accompan-
ied by extensive capital investment, percentage returns on capital must 
have risen (though it is impossible to say what the returns were because 
exact figures for the value of the New Zealand and Fiji assets are not 
available). As most of the capital employed was in the Fiji mills, it is 
likely that much of the improvement was due to better results from Fiji. 
Still, taking the figures overall, it seems that CSR's profits 
in the colony were very modest. The average return after depreciation of 
around six per cent compared unfavourably with the six to nine per cent 
9 7 charged on overdrafts between 1887 and 1910 by Australian trading banks. 
Yet the risks involved in sugar production were much higher. As Knox said, 
six per cent was well below what could have been considered a reasonable 
98 return. Despite this, the company steadily increased its capital outlay 
in Fiji. By 1905 it had sunk more into the manufacture of raw sugar there 
99 
than it had in Queensland. l\niy was this? The reason appears to have 
been that the small returns from milling, caused by the low world price 
of rax^7 sugar, were offset by high returns from refining, due to the low 
cost of sugar inputs. Thus overall CSR's profits v^ 7ere satisfactory. The 
96 Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd, Half-Yearly Reports, 30 Sept. 
1910, 30 Sept. 1914. 
97 S.J. Butlin, A.R. Hall, R.C. White, Australian Banking and 
Monetary Statistics, 1871-1945, Table 51. 
98 Knox to Escott, 20 Nov. 1912, E.W.K. Special, 4 (1909-32), 53-4. 
99 'Notes for Senator, the Hon. J.T. Walker', n.d., Private Ltbk., 
4 (1903-6), 441-2. 
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company paid a dividend of seven per cent in 1888. By 1891 this had risen 
to ten per cent, at which level it stayed till after 1914. In addition, 
from 1910 to 1914 a bonus was paid, the size varying. Yet with the price 
of raw sugar so low, CSR's total profits would have been higher still if 
it had not owned the mills. Wliy, then, did it increase its milling 
capacity? The answer probably lies in the company's desire to reduce 
risks. There was no guarantee that raw sugar prices would remain depressed. 
If they increased (as they would during the First World War), refining 
margins would be reduced; by producing raw sugar, though, CSR could set 
against this the larger profits from milling. So although by 1914 in terms 
of the return on capital gains to CSR from Fiji had been quite small, the 
company felt this was outweighed by the advantage of evening out profit 
• 1 100 riuctuatxons so as to lessen risks. 
Despite the gains to European interests, the industry's spread 
effects on the Fiji economy was limited by the leakage abroad of much of 
the income created by sugar. From 1887 to 1910 CSR's profits (excluding 
depreciation) totalled £2,171,471, just over the £2,052,953 it had invested 
in the colony by the end of that period. Most of this was remitted over-
seas. To this, of course, must be added European earnings which were 
repatriated either as savings or through the purchase of imports; for 
European consumption consisted mainly of imports - processed food, alcohol, 
certain luxuries, etc.^^^ Furthermore, much of the value in the final 
products from sugar was added outside Fiji - through the costs of shipping, 
refining and so on. True, a distillery to process molasses, a by-product 
of raw sugar, had been established at Nausori in 1893, but it was closed 
ten years later so that a much larger one could be built at Pyrmont, 
Sydney.^^^ The latter's advantage was its proximity to the market, and 
the economies of scale afforded by processing molasses from Queensland, 
New South Wales and Fiji all in the one plant. Proposals after the First 
and Second World Wars that a distillery should again be established in 
100 H.O. to Nausori, 20 June 1911, Private Ltbk. Out, 6 (1909-11), 
453-6. 
101 Lucas, 110. 
102 Correspondence relating to the Nausori distillery can be found 
in CSR A 7.2/1/1-8. 
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Fiji - not necessarily by CSR but by other European interests - were to 
meet with successful opposition from the company. It controlled the supply 




molasses in Australia - an excellent example of the disa ntage of 
capital specificity stressed by George Beckford and others.' 
So the economy did not gain - through the creation of jobs and 
additional government revenue, for example - from much of the income 
generated from the processing of sugar. Nor were the gains as large as 
might have been expected from the infrastructure constructed by CSR. The 
tramway system was very extensive, yet the company refused to allow its 
use for the promotion of diversified agriculture in cane districts. This 
reduced the opportunity for Indian settlers in particular to increase their 
incomes by growing crops whose returns were higher than cane, or whose 
inputs were complementary to cane so that they could be produced in a 
system of mixed farming. Finally, as noted in chapter 2, the industry's 
dependence on cheap labour meant that rewards were too small to attract 
many Fijians into sugar production, while Indians suffered from the control 
over labour costs which created conditions that even contemporaries 
realized were appalling. Whatever the advantages of CSR's investments, 
then, it was not surprising that on the eve of the First World War there 
Vsrere many who felt that Fiji was getting from raw sugar a raw deal. 
103 Knox to Colonial Secretary, 10 Jan. 1921, Private Ltbk. Out, 20 
(1920-1), 797-8; A.G. Carver, 'Memo, to the General Manager. 
Power Alcohol Production in Fiji', 2 Aug. 1951, Inspectors' Memos, 
to the General Manager, April 1951 to August 1957, CSR mfm 254. 
104 George L . Beckford, Persistent Poverty, 161-4. 
105 In 1886, when conditions were at their worst, the Colonial Office 
expressed indignation at the 'frightful' mortality among labourers, 
and the 'monstrous' scale of tasking. But there was little 
effective action to remedy this till ten years later. Gillion, 84. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Indian SeLLlemcut, 1884-1912 
A remarkable development in the Fiji sugar industry was the transfer of 
plantations from the hands of Europeans to tliose of Indian small farmers. 
The process occurred in three stages. During the first, up to 1912, 
Indian settlement was seen as a way to augment the supply of labour on 
plantations. During the second, from 1912 to 1923, settlement came to be 
seen as a substitute for plantation labour while in the third, from 1923 
to 1939, there were efforts to ensure that this substitute was effective. 
The important point was that settlement was promoted in ways that would 
benefit plantation enterprise, particularly CSR. The result was that 
though Indians were better off as growers than they had been as plantation 
labourers, the advantage of settlement to them and to the rest of the 
colony was limited by the subordination of their interests to the needs of 
plantation enterprise. 
The first phase began in 1884 when the original shipload of 
Indians to Fiji completed their terms of indenture, which were set at five 
years plus any extensions imposed as punishment by a court. Once their 
indentures had expired immigrants were free to leave the plantations on 
which they had worked and seek alternative employment. They could become 
free labourers, traders or farmers in their own right. They could re-
indenture if they wished (but not after 1912), or else they could return 
home at their own expense. But if they stayed in the colony for another 
five years, making ten in all, their return passages to India would be 
paid for by government. In the event, about 60% of migrants chose to 
remain permanently in Fiji, and by 1911 three-quarters of these were 
living on the land as owners or tenants, nearly always in districts where 
sugar was grown.^ A similar process of Indian settlement occurred in 
British Guiana, but there settlers were seen as a threat to plantation 
K.L. Gillion, Fiji's Indian Migrants, 136. The 1911 census showed 
that there were 40,286 Indians in Fiji. Nearly 26,000 of these 
were free. Census report for 1911, C.P. 44/1911. 
8A 
2 xnterests because they competed for scarce resources of land and labour. 
In Fiji on the other hand, though Indian acquisition of land led to a rise 
in values which often infuriated planters who were trying to extend their 
3 
holdings, settlement was encouraged largely in the hope that it would 
contribute to the development of plantation agriculture. 
Indians on government settlements 
Government saw Indians mainly as a source of labour for plantations. 
Thurston expected that they would continue to work for planters for at 
least five years after their indentures expired. GSR liad similar hopes, 
believing that the re-indenture of time-expired immigrants would help over-
come the acute shortage of labour in the mid-1880s.'^ But the company was 
soon to be disappointed. The Indian Immigration Report for 1886 commented 
on the reluctance of Indians to enter into further contracts of service 
once their indentures were over. In 1892 of the 2,A00 male time-expired 
Indians in Fiji, only 180 hiid been re-indentured. This was significantly 
less than in 1890 and 1891.'^  The reason was simple. Though GSR wanted 
Indians to re-indenture, it was not willing to pay wages high enough to 
persuade them to do so. Indeed, it was determined to limit the upward 
pressure on free Indian wages caused by the shortage of labour. In March 
1887 Knox asked the Nausori manager to arrange with planters on the Rewa 
for wages of free labour not to exceed a shilling a day, since 'it would 
never do to let the coolies get the idea into their heads that they were 
to be sought after by the masters'. Within three months such an agreement 
had apparently been reached, causing one or two planters to reduce wages 
by six pence.^ The result was that Indians began to drift away from 
2 For an historical account of aspects of the sugar industry in 
Guyana see Jay R, Handle, The Plantation Economy. Population 
and Economic Change in Guyana, 1838-1960. 
3 For example, GSR abandoned efforts to obtain a large lease of 
land on the Rewa in 1906 because Indian demand had encouraged 
Fijians to ask higher rents than the company was willing to pay. 
Nausori to H.O., 11 Dec. 1906, Nausori to H.O., Private letters 
1906-10. 
4 G.S.O. 1380/93; H.O. to Nausori, 24 Dec. 1886, Fiji Out 1880-92, 
3 (1885-7), 397-403. 
5 G.S.O. 3208/93. 
6 H.O. to Nausori, 16 March 1887, Fiji Out 1880-92, 3 (1885-7), 
453-60; G.S.O. 1282/87. 
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planta t-ions as th6ir indentures expired. 
At first they migrated toward the towns, especially Suva, where 
they hoped to find jobs. To counter fears of vagrancy and of a fall in 
property values should Indians settle near to Europeans, government estab-
lished in 1887 an Indian settlement at Vatuwaqa outside Suva, to be 
followed soon after by a second one at Samabula. 'i'lie object, Tiiurston 
recalled, v^?as that Indians 'should be able to live near Suva and so form 
as they wished to form a not distant working community'.^ They were to 
provide labour for urban, but not plantation interests. Yet since there 
were not enough jobs for everyone, as more immigrants completed their terms 
of indenture a greater number began to settle on land around plantations. 
The advantage of this to planters was that with their livelihoods based 
on land, settlers might be more prepared to accept off-farm employment than 
to re-indenture on a full time basis. The number of indentured labourers 
on an estate could then be reduced, saving planters the cost of importing 
Indians and the expense of maintaining a large labour force at a time when 
there was little work for it. They could turn to free Indians when they 
needed additional labour for the harvesting and milling of cane. Perhaps 
to attract this labour, planters could even afford to pay on a daily basis 
more than for re-indentured immigrants, since they would not have to meet 
labour costs in the slack season when their men were underemployed. As 
the Nausori manager, R. Gemmell Smith, told the Colonial Secretary in 1893: 
'To work a sugar plantation with indentured labour solely will in my 
opinion never pay any planter, and I do not think it is done in any other 
country but in Fiji.' The extent, though, to which Indians would seek 
vtfork largely depended on the size of their farms, as well as on the 
seasonal work requirements of their crops. If holdings were big, farmers 
would not only have little time to become wage-earners themselves: they 
might even become employers of Indians, thereby competing with planters 
for labour. Already in 1893 there were instances of this. Gemmell Smith 
complained that the wages of free immigrants were being pushed up by 
Q 
Indian employers. Ten acres were regarded as the absolute maximum that 




farms could be kept below this it w£is likely that settlers would form a 
pool of labour ready to work on plantations or in the m i l l s . 
The potential advantage of having Indians settled close to 
plantations helped overcome official reservations about government assist-
ance for immigrants who wanted to obtain land. Anson had feared that the 
immediate result of granting land to Indians would be 'to draw a certain 
proportion of Free Coolies from the Plantation work at the time when the 
labour supply is scanty'. A proposal from Labasa in 1893 that government 
help Indians find land once they had completed their indentures was 
rejected for this reason.^^ Nevertheless, a proposal that government 
encourage Indians to settle near plantations was discussed in 1887, two 
years before government became liable for the repatriation of the first 
immigrants brought to the colony, in 1879. Government's responsibility 
for this arose from its commitment to pay one third of the total cost of 
transporting indentured labourers to and from Fiji. Officials were con-
cerned because at existing rates there would be enough in the Return 
Passages Fund to pay only 60% of the cost of returning these Indians. If 
they all exercised their right to a free passage, the balance of the cost 
would have to be met from general revenue, possibly leading to an increase 
in taxation which would be against plantation interests. It was also 
argued that far from drawing labour away from plantations, Indian settle-
ments close to them would be 'a great convenience to the employers of 
labour'.^^ ^ A n s o n , himself, was certain that the retention of Indians in 
the colony was 'a matter of the highest importance, the labour supply 
being limited'. The question was how to achieve this. He opposed any 
action to force a rise in the wages of free Indians; though it might have 
encouraged them to remain in Fiji, it would have been against the interests 
of planters who could not afford more than the current rate. Instead, 
Anson suggested that part of the return passage money be offered to 
Indians if they re-engaged and stayed in the colony. 
Yet, more than a cash inducement was needed to persuade immigrants 
not to leave: grants of land were also required. So, in 1888 government 
9 C.S.O. 2051/87. 
10 C.S.O. 1380/93. 
11 C.S.O. 1282/87. 
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announced that Indians who had been in Fiji for more than ten years would 
be allowed to commute their right to a return passage in exchange for a 
gift of land and an allowance equal to the cost of a passage home, to be 
paid mostly in kind (seed, food for six months, etc.). That the allowance 
was to be equal to the cost of a return passage, and not less as Anson had 
proposed, implies that the desire to minimise drawings from the Fund was 
no longer a principal aim of the scheme. Rather, as shown by the limit 
of five acres on the grants of land, the intention was to retain in Fiji a 
12 
permanent supply of casual labour. However, no Indian took advantage 
of tlic scheme. At the time officials attributed tliis to the reluctance of 
immigrants to forego their right of free passage, which provided a form 13 
of escape should fortune turn against them. Indeed, it seems that the 
majority of the first 480 Indians to arrive in Fiji chose to return home. 
From 1879 to 1889, 771 Indians left the colony. Among them were children 
born in Fiji who returned with their parents, those repatriated because 
they were unfit for service, and those x^ho travelled at their own expense 
because they had been in the colony for under ten years but could stand 
it no longer. With its first attempt to settle Indians a failure, in 
the early 1890s government refused to try again. 
In 1896, though, the matter was considered for a second time. 
The Colonial Office feared that the conditions of indentured labour, as 
recorded in the 1894 Indian Immigration Report, were so bad that the Indian 
government might wish to stop further recruitment for the colony. In a 
despatch commenting on the report, the Secretary of State noted that it 
contained remarks 
as to the difficulty experienced by free labourers in renting 
or purchasing land for settlement. This is a matter of 
importance to the future of immigration into Fiji, and you 
should see that every possible facility is afforded to the 
immigrants for this purpose. 15 
The despatch coincided with the growing importance attached by officials in 
12 C.S.O. 3012/88. 
13 C.S.O. 2147/90. Officials later claimed that Indians were un-
willing to commute return passages because the land offered was 
inaccessible. Gillion, 139. 
1 4 A.G. Anderson, Indo-Fijian Small farming: profiles of a peasantry, 
20. 
15 C.O. to Thurston, 57, 13 Nov. 1896, C.S.O. 7/97. 
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Fiji to scLtJ.ers as a source of labour themselves. In 1897 Sir Henry 
Berkeley, the acting governor, suggested that the commutation of return 
passages in exchange for land should be tried once more, and that govern-
ment should assist those in India who wanted to migrate to Fiji as free 
settlers. lie hoped that the latter would come in such numbers as event-
ually to remove tlie need for indentvrred labour, tluis saving planters tlie 
16 cost of importation. 
The new governor. Sir George O'Brien (1897-1902), rejected 
Berkeley's proposals on the grounds that there was not enough unoccupied 
land near the mills on which to put settlers, at least on the scale 
proposed by Berkeley. Though plenty of small plots for individual farms 
could be found, it would have been more difficult to obtain sizeable areas 
of good cane land suitable for settlement. Most of the first class land 
was already occupied by plantations; the rolling country (inland of the 
flats) on which cane is now grown was not regarded as potential cane land 
till much later. The expense of bringing over free Indians was another 
reason for rejecting Berkeley's proposals. O'Brien opposed, too, the idea 
of commuting return passages for land, since this would only encourage 
those without capital to stay. The type of person the colony should 
attract, the governor argued, were Indians leaving Fiji with up to £30 or 
more in savings. So instead of Berkeley's ambitious scheme, he put forward 
the more modest suggestion that an Indian Settlement Fund be created to 
acquire what blocks were available for lease to Indians on easy terms. 
The Colonial Office agreed, £5000 for this purpose being taken from 
surpluses which by then had accumulated in the Return Passages Fund.^^ GSR 
was told that 'The Governor believes that the success and extension of such 
18 a [settlement] scheme would result in the cheapening of labour.' 
Settlements were nearly always developed on lines which benefited 
planters, partly because officials were naturally sympathetic to plantation 
interests and partly because GSR had tremendous influence in the economy. 
16 Berkeley to C.O., 56, 14 June 1897, and 65, 28 June 1897, G.O. 
83/66. 
17 O'Brien to C.O., 109, 22 Oct. 1897, and 117, 30 Oct. 1897, G.O. 
83/67. The Colonial Office was surprised that in the first 
despatch O'Brien should appear to be against settlement, but then 
to favour it one week later. 
18 Colonial Secretary to Gemmell Smith, 28 Aug, 1897, C.S.O. 2936/97. 
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If necessary, as when it later refused to carry cotton from Nacobi to the 
Experimental Station at Lautoka, the company could use its tramlines to 
hinder the cultivation of crops which might compete with planters for land 
19 
and labour. One settlement scheme at Ba failed because it did not have 
the support of the local mill manager. In late 1897 government proposed 
to settle Indians on a block of Fijian land at Nanukudrala. Since it was 
intended that settlers should grow cane, the attitude of CSR was crucial. 
The company itself had been trying to secure the lease of Nanukudrala for 
several years because land was of good quality and close to the m i l l . It 
offered to buy cane from Indian settlers and help them with cultivation 
if it was given Nanukudrala and if the Indian settlement was located 
further away from the m i l l , below Varoko, one of GSR's outer estates. It 
also promised to extend a tramline to the settlement, at a cost of £750 
if, instead of being under government control, the settlement was super-
vised by the company which would lease land to Indians in five acre plots. 
The transfer of leases would be permitted so long as CSR had the right to 
approve incoming tenants - a provision that would have enabled the company 
to prevent transfers if it wished. This in itself was enough to make the 
scheme unappealing to Indians, for whom one of the main attractions of 
holding land was the prospect of being able to sell the lease and return 
home if they wanted, or else to use it for speculative purposes. By May 
1899 there had been no applications to lease, and officials suspected that 
CSR had never intended making the scheme a success. They were probably 
right, for though Knox was eager for Indian settlement to progress E.W. 
Fenner, the Rarawai manager, was less enthusiastic; he doubted if it would 
yield worthwhile results. Under the terms of its arrangement with govern-
m e n t , CSR could take over the land if it had not been settled within three 
years. Fenner seized the opportunity to do this and to complete the 20 
conversion of a crown settlement into a company estate. 
This was an exception, though. Other settlements were established 
more easily. The first was at Labasa, but by 1914 there were eighteen in 
the colony altogether, mostly near mill centres or the towns (see Table 
4:1 below). The majority were established between 1897 and 1906, before 
19 See above, p . 74. 
20 C.S.O. 2936/97; 4009/97; 3347/98; 2396/99; H.O. to Nausori, 
13 Sept. 1897, Nausori Out, 6 (1896-7), 395-7. 
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TABLE 4 : 1 



































Acres Acres Acres L . s . d . [ . s . d . 
Vatuwaqa 1387 Crownf reeliold 2 Miles from 
Suva 
Vltllevu 161 - 85 58 27 2 20 . 0 . 0 . -
Samabula 1889 Do. Do. Do. 324 - 165 136 29 2 15. 0. 0 . -
Signal 
Station 
1890 Do. IS Miles out 
of Suva 
Do. 39 - 21 21 - i V . 20. 0 . 0 . -
Kalabo 1906 Do. Suva-Reva 
Road 
Do. 729 - 185 112 23 3. 0 . 0. -
Naainu 1906 Do. Do. Do. 569 - 77 67 10 713 3. 0 . 0 . -
Walnabiika 1907 Do. Do. Do. 730 - 117 63 54 6 3 . 0. 0 . -
Bullleka 1899 Do. Near Labasa Vanualevu 462 1 , 292 154 129 25 3 7 . 6 . 0 . -
Boubale 1900 Do. Do. Do. 189 1 , 0 7 0 65 65 - 3 7 . 6 . 0 . -
Rarnnlka-
wai 1901 Do. Do. Do. 155 895 55 41 14 3 5 . 0 . 0 . -
Wainikoro 1903 Leasehold 12 Miles 
from Labasa 
Do. 404 985 137 129 8 3 7. 6. 0 . 97. 0 . 0. 
NavuCuv-
utu 
1906 Do. 8 Miles from 
Labasa 
Do. 61 - 19 18 1 3 7 . 6 . 0 . 15. 5 . 6 . 




1910 Leasehold D istr ict of 
Dogotuki 
Do. 132 - 38 38 3 6. 0 . 0 . 1 8 . 1 1 . 4 . 
Tokatoka 1901 Crownfreehold Near Navua 
Mill 
Vltllevu 228 - 76 76 - 3 7. 6. 0 . -
Namau 1908 Do. 10 Miles up 
the Ba 
river 
Do. 149 2 , 0 0 0 
(approx) 
30 18 12 5 7 . 6 . 0 . 
Koro N o . l 1911 Do. 8 Miles 
from Tavua 
Do. 588 4 , 0 0 0 
(approx) 
117 34 83 5 5. 0 . 0 . -
Nacobi 1913 Do. Nadi Do. 321 745 
58 - 58 5 10. 0. 0 . -
Qeledra-
dra 1913 Do. Tavua Do. 35 
471 7 5 2 
TQ/. 
5 10 . 0 . 0 . -
Acres Acres 
Souive: Cmd. 7 744-5 ( 1 9 1 4 ) , Appendix 43 . 
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the Indian Settlement Fund was merged into general accounts and the momentum 
21 
to expand settlements was lost. Judged on acreage, government's con-
tribution toward the settlement of Indians was not great, but in terms of 
the numbers involved it was more significant. In 1909 between 882 and 930 
Indians occupied up to 2,500 acres of crown settlement (excluding grazing 
land), while 1,123 Indians were said to have leased 11,928 acres direct 
22 
from Fijians. The size of allotments on government settlements rarely 
exceeded seven and a half acres, the norm being just under four. Tenants 
were forbidden to hold more than one block so that land would not be 
concentrated in a few hands. This prevented the emergence on settlements 
of comparatively large-scale farming, which by creating a demand for wage 
labour would have competed with plantations. In fact, farms were so small 
that for parts of the year settlers were likely to become wage-earners 
themselves. Planters stood to gain in another way. Rents on government 
settlements were lower than for leases of Fijian land. They generally 
ranged from 3s to 7s 6d in 19 08, against 10s to 30s an acre (plus a large 
premium) for land leased direct from Fijians. Subletting was forbidden, 23 
preventing rents from rising in this way. Consequently, because rent 
was a major expense for Indians, the cost of producing cash crops on 
government settlements was reduced. Though the surplus available for sale 
was limited, competition from lower cost producers on crown settlements 
may have encouraged other Indian farmers to minimise their expenses, 
especially around the turn of the century at Labasa where a large proportion 
of free immigrants grew rice and other food crops on government settle-
24 
ments. Gradually this influence on price was reduced as the number of 
Indians outside the settlements increased. Yet at least for a time settle-
ments may have helped stabilise the cost of living, perhaps even causing 
a rise in real wages at no cost to the planters. 21 C.S.O. 569/07. 
22 C.S.O. 6206/09. The figures exclude those Indians who had not 
registered their leases of Fijian- land, and those who occupied 
land as subtenants of the Indian lessee. 
23 C.S.O. 1961/98; Indian Immigration Report for 1908. 
24 Officials were eager for settlers to grow cash crops. Coffee 
was suggested for those at Labasa, but nothing came of this per-
haps because it would not have complemented plantation interests, 
In 1909, E. Hutson, Colonial Secretary, was keen to encourage 
Indians on settlements to grow crops for sale. C.S.O. 1292/98; 
4991/10. 
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Indiana on European land 
The advantages of Indian settlement were so great that planters themselves 
began to encourage it on land under their control. As well as having a 
supply of labour close to the plantation, they wanted to benefit from the 
frequeiit ability of Indians to grow crops more cheaply than Europeans. 
Settlers had lower capital costs because their cultivation tools were 
rudimentary and they had no need to erect office buildings and the like. 
Nor did they have to make a profit on top of both wages and the cost of 
supervision as did companies like CSR, or a profit in addition to wages 
alone as did the smaller European planter. For the settler wlio was not 
normally an employer of labour, profits and wages were indivisible. More-
over, since his money expectations were lower, the income an Indian was 
willing to accept from his land was considerably less than for a European. 
This was largely because he had few alternative occupations. Wage employ-
ment, the main option, was not well paid - say Is 6d a day including a 
bonus if the labourer re-indentured - and farming was likely to be attract-
ive even if immediate returns were no higher than that. Apart from having 
the satisfaction of being self-employed, if land was held as freehold or 
leased on reasonable terms, settlers had a form of security against bad 
times ahead. As a growing number of Indians tried to obtain land which 
was relatively scarce, in a period of rising values the farm - however 
small - was also a form of investment. Speculation through the transfer 
of leases at a profit was very popular among Indians, and may have 
encouraged them to accept a relatively low current income from the land 
in the hope of a capital gain in future. The result was that Indians were 
often able to sell cane, or crops like maize, cowpea, rice and dhal needed 
as food for livestock and labour on plantations, for less than their 
25 
existing cost to the planter. Though there was a danger that the 
quality of produce would be low, there was also the opportunity for 
planters to benefit by obtaining cheaper supplies. In addition, they 
could supplement their income by leasing land that was uneconomic for a 
European to farm to an Indian whose costs and expectations were less. 
Some Europeans leased the whole of their plantations to Indians. 
In 1897 it was thought that the tenant of CSR's Tausa property on the Rewa 
25 Farquhar to H.O., 30 July 1901, Inspectors Ltbk., 1901-2, 120-9. 
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2 6 
could get £30 to £^0 more than the rent he was paying for the land. If 
plantations yielded only a marginal return, it paid their owners to sublet. 
The reduction in the price of cane in 1902 was expected by CSR to encourage 
the settlement of Indians by planters, 'some at least of whom will make 
more money out of leasing land to coolies than by cultivating it them-
27 
selves'. The majority, though, still found it profitable to grow cane 
on their own account. After all, if the whole of a plantation was settled 
by Indians, there was still the administrative responsibility of collecting 
the rent, resolving boundary disputes and ensuring that tenants cared for 
the soi] in a way that, by maintaining its fertility, enabled it to continue 
supporting the rents being charged. Often it was just as easy for a 
European to farm the estate himself. Where this was the case, it was still 
worthwhile to lease part of the land - often under share-farming arrange-
ments which were popular on the Rewa, Indians would grow cane for a 
planter who lielped with harvesting and ploughing, took over the crop for 
sale to the mill and after deducting charges for rent, assistance with 2 8 
cultivation and so forth, paid the balance of the proceeds to the grower. 
Share-farming was less common in other areas, where it was more usual to 
find a European leasing isolated blocks that were expensive to supervise, 
or less fertile areas from which returns were low. In 1901, as indentures 
expired, planters were settling their labourers on hills surrounding 
estates where they grew cowpea at Id a lb., maize and other crops needed 
on plantations. Settlers were expected to work for planters as necessary. 
One planter at Koronubu, Ba, was said to be charging ten shillings an acre 
in rent in 1905, and to be expecting his tenants to work for Is 6d a task 
whenever required.^^ 
Indians were settled on plantations most extensively at Navua. 
Following the closure of Sharpe, Fletcher and Co.'s mill in 1884 and the 
failure of banana crops due to disease in 1893, large areas of European 
land became available for the cultivation of cane. Rather than do this 
26 H.O. to Nausori, 22 April 1897, Nausori Out, 6 (1896-7), 144-8. 
27 Farquhar to H.O., 7 Sept., 1901, Inspectors Ltbk., 1901-2, 184-95. 
28 Indian Immigration Reports for 1901 and 1904. 
29 Farquhar to H.O., 7 Sept. 1901; Farquhar to H.O., 30 June 1905, 
Inspectors Ltbk., 1904-6, 143-51. A similar process occurred in 
Ra. See R.M. Frazer, 'A social and economic history of Ra Province', 
Transactions & Proceedings of Fiji Society, 9 (1962-3), 104. 
9 A 
tliGinsclves planters, many of whom were absentee landowners, leased their 
land to free immigrants. In 1894 the Fiji Sugar Co. Ltd offered to contract 
with Indians to buy their cane for three years. It promised to supply 
labour for harvesting and for some of their cultivation work, it provided 
tramline and trucks for the transport of cane to the mill, and on occasions 
t made loans to time-ex|iircd labourers wlio wanted to become growers. Tlie 
cost of these services was deducted from the price of cane which was 
initially fixed at 13s 6d a ton, higher than anywhere else in the colony. 
The issue of three year contracts to Indians, unprecedented in Fiji, 
together with the availability of land, provided a tremendous spur to 
settlement, Indians coming from as far away as Labasa, as well as from Ba 
and the Rewa. The process was encouraged by government which, after an 
inquiry in 1897, legalised the company's previously illegal practice of 
assisting growers with labour indentured to its plantations. Land was 
usually leased in large blocks to Indians who sublet to others. The 
example of a seventy acre native lease ('Nasasa') being sublet by a 
European to two Indians who re-subleased in twenty-two blocks, was fairly 
typical. Generally, land was held on one year terms and farmed as holdings 
of four to five acres. In December 1896 the number of free Indian con-
tractors was put at 107. By July of the following year the total had 
risen to 270. There were in the same month 3000 acres under cane, 1000 
being cultivated by the Tamanua Estate, 750 by Europeans and 1,250 by 
Indians. The amount of cane groim by free immigrants increased from 1,700 
30 tons in 189A to 32,500 in 1901 (see Table A:2 on following page). 
The result was an economic boom in the district, European 
interests being the first to benefit. Merchants gained from an expansion 
of trade, which they assisted by making advances at high rates of interest 
(often over 30%) to prospective Indian farmers and landlords. By 1904 
A.M. Brodziak and Co., who ran the Navua Trading Co., had invested £20,000 
to £24,000 as loans in Navua. Marks and Co. had also lent large amounts. 
The size of individual advances was often substantial. Marks and Co. were 
said to have lent £1,788 to a Mr Deoki, and £980 to Nundan Singh. Presum-
ably the loans were used to obtain land for subletting. European property 




Cultivation of cane by Indians at Navua, 1894-1901 
Year Production (tons) Price (incl. bonus) 
1894 1,700 13s 6d 
1895 3,500 13s 6d 
1896 10,300 lis lOd 
1897 12,200 12s 2d 
1898 18,800 12s Id 
1899 19,600 10s 6d 
1900 22,500 9s lOd 
1901 32,500 9s lid 
Source: H.O, to Nausori, 22 April 1902, Nausori Out, 11 (1902), 
69-73. 
holders benefited by leasing their land at profits wliich often not only 
gave them a useful return, but also enabled them to pay a European manager 
to supervise their tenants. Messrs. Corbett and Hunt's Togalika estate 
was managed by J.H. Nicoll, while W.J. Robertson's Kabacake Plantation was 
in the hands of R.D. Trazevant. Above all, there were advantages to the 
Fiji Sugar Co., which obtained cane that it could not have grown itself 
either because costs would have been too high, or because it could not 
have afforded the capital expense of preparing the land. The company had 
not yet made a profit, but hoped that the settlement of free immigrants 
would increase the mill's throughput and help it to start reducing its 
debts. The rapid expansion of Indian grown cane also enabled the company 
to lower the price gradually (Table 4:2), so that growers experienced a 
fall in their standard of living. Noting the consequent threat of social 
unrest, in 190A the Stipendiary Magistrate at Navua claimed that Indians 
had been encouraged to grow cane with a promise of 12s a ton and a £1 bonus 
for each acre planted. The response had been so great that the company 
had lowered the price to 10s, then 9s and now, with almost twice as much 
cane as the mill could crush, Indians 
are given any price the company likes. The issue is serious, 
for if Indians get only 5/- or 6/- per ton, it will take them 
4 or 5 years to pay off their present indebtedness... [and] 
they will most certainly stop working if there is no hope of 
anything more than bare food for the next 4 or 5 years. 31 
31 C.S.O. 3158/04. 
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In 1904 Gemmell Smith believed that with its present policy of 
32 
buying cane from Indians the mill ought to have been profitable. On the 
other hand, the British Columbia Sugar Refining Co. Ltd which bought, 
rebuilt and enlarged the mill in 1905, thought that returns would be 
increased by relying for cane not on Indians, but on its own plantations. 
Its view was understandable. Too many interests seemed to be sharing the 
benefits of Indian cultivation - traders charging high interests on loans 
they advanced, planters earning rent, Indian lessees profiting from the 
subletting of land. At a price acceptable to the miller, therefore, cane 
was unlikely to be remunerative to the grower once interest and rent had 
been paid. In the short terBi this threatened to cause unrest among 
Indians, possibly leading to the intervention of government (as was 
suggested in 1904 and 1908), while in the long term there was a danger 
that the supply of cane would drop. Moreover, it could have been argued 
that the mill saved very little through buying cane from Indians, except 
when the price was very low, since it still had to bear the cost of super-
vising some of their cultivation work and most of the harvesting. Against 
what savings there were, the company had to set the lower yields and 
steadily falling quality of free immigrant cane that were noticed by 
observers. Might it not be just as economical to grow the cane itself? 
Accordingly, the Vancouver-Fiji Sugar Co. increased its own 
acreage under cane, and discouraged Indian cultivation by paying a low 
price and charging more for services to growers, whose reaction was to 
switch to another crop (usually rice). Yet, because most settlers were 
not on its land, the company could not obtain a larger cane supply simply 
by resuming properties it already o\<med: rather, it had to incur the 
substantial capital expense of acquiring new, often virgin land. This, 
in turn, reversed the downward trend in the number of indentured labourers 
employed at Navua. To clear and cultivate the new land more immigrants 
had to be imported, causing a rise in wage and supervision costs. I<?hat 
the company had not understood, however, was that climatic conditions on 
the Navua would not enable it to make an adequate profit on top of these 
additional expenses. In 1911 a purchaser for the mill was being"sought, 
but well before then the boom on the river had turned into a slump. Land 
32 Gemmell Smith to Knox, 7 March 1904, CSR F 1.0/1/13. 
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was less able to support the high rents that had been charged, merchants 
were unable to recover their debts. The Navua Trading Co., for example, 
abandoned cane over which it had liens because it found that, even if it 
worked the land itself, it still could not recoup the amounts owed. The 
fact was that with the decision of planters to lease land to free immigrants 
in the 1890s, so making it impossible to depend mainly on Europeans for 
cane, the success of sugar in the district rested largely on the ability 
of Indians to produce cheap supplies. The failure of the Vancouver-Fiji 
Sugar Co. to perceive this, and to co-operate with other interested parties 
to evolve a scheme to facilitate it, greatly damaged plantation (and 
33 merchant) interests on the Navua. 
The settlement of Indians on CSR's plantations had started in the 
early 1890s, as part of the company's wider policy of leasing estates. At 
one time, Knox even hoped that free iTmnigrants would grow the bulk of cane 
34 crushed at Nausori. In his view, settlement would help the company to 
'divide our risks with others... to go back to the system on which we 
35 
originally started in New South Wales'. He also hoped to obtain cheaper 
cane. Indians were to be given land 'on which we cannot grow cane at 
anything like the price at which this can be purchased from the coolies'. 
At Nausori, though not at the other mills, they were to be paid a shilling 
a ton less than Europeans. Within a short time Knox was hoping that if 
the output of Indian cane was increased, the company's position would be 
strengthened if it tried to reduce the price of European supplies. This 
may well have proved to be the case when the price of European cane was 
reduced from 12s 6d to 10s Od per standard ton in 1902. The following 
year, amid fears that CSR would squeeze them out in favour of Indian 
growers who would accept a lower price, several planters advocated legis-
lation to prevent Indians producing except as paid labour, but no such 
legislation was introduced.^^ 
33 C.S.O. 2912/08. 
34 H.O. to Nausori, 2 March 1894, Nausori Out, 3 (1894), 58-61. 
35 H.O. to Nausori, 23 Dec. 1891, quoted by Gillion, 99-100. 
36 H.O. to Nausori, 5 Oct. 1897, Nausori Out, 6 (1896-7), 432-6; 
CSR to Fiji Sugar Co., 7 March 1904, Private Ltbk., 4 (1903-6), 
216-9; H.O. to Rarawai, 5 Sept. 1904, 4 (1903-6), 213-5; Gillion, 
100. 
98 
The settlement of Indians on company plantations proceeded more 
slowly than Knox had hoped. In the late 1890s Fenner at Rarawai did 
little to encourage settlement. He was against leasing land to Indians, 
perhaps partly because cane was being grown reasonably cheaply by the 
company. There seemed little need to incur the administrative cost of 
subdividing plantations if CSR could grow cane economically itself. It 
was also felt that the drier climate which made the soil more difficult to 
work than at Nausori would discourage Indians from growing cane in western 
V i t i Levu and on Vanua Levu. Relatively few were settled as cane growers 
37 
at Rarawai and Lautoka, and none at Labasa. It was at Nausori, where 
the cost of company cane was much higher than on the other side of the 
island, that the greatest efforts were made to settle Indians on CSR land. 
The company began in the 1890s by placing them on individual plots, 
usually of five acres or less. It would prepare the land for cultivation 
and help with harvesting, deducting the cost of such services - and rent -
from the price paid for cane. Leases were for only two years, after which 
settlers were moved on to new land leaving the old to lie fallow - a 
system of rotating the grower rather than the land. This must have 
reduced the appeal of CSR's land to Indians w h o , in the certain knowledge 
that they would be moved after two years, would have had few rights of 
ownership over a particular plot. Right of transfer, for example, would 
38 
have been greatly curtailed. 
This may have been one of the reasons why in 1901 CSR felt that 
the settlement of free Indians was proceeding too slowly, and needed to be 
supplemented by experiments with a new arrangement - a system of 'planting 
companies'. Each 'company' consisted of several Indians who had collect-
ively leased land from CSR. Where necessary houses were provided by CSR, 
which also paid one shilling a day to each member who did hand work -
planting, w e e d i n g , cutting cane and loading on trucks - which was the 
'company's' responsibility. Horse work was done by CSR. After deductions 
for rent, wages and other expenses incurred by CSR, the balance of the 
37 Farquhar to H . O . , 3 A u g . 1901, Inspectors Ltbk., 1901-2, 134-46; 
H.O. to Nausori, 16 June 1902, Nausori Out, 11 (1902), 167-72. 
38 H.O. to Nausori, 5 A u g . 1891, Fiji Out 1880-92, 7 (1890-1), 
479-83; H.O. to Nausori, 2 March 1894, Nausori Out, 3 (1894), 
58-61; H . O . to Nausori, 16 Oct. 1897, Nausori Out, 6 (1896-7), 
452-5. 
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proceeds from cane was paid to the 'company' for distribution among its 
members. For CSR, which was referred to as 'the employer' in its contracts 
with planting companies, the scheme offered a chance to secure a more 
productive labour force, while settlers with little capital saw it as a 
half-way house between leaving the plantation and obtaining land which 
could be farmed individually. They were guaranteed an income at least 
equal to that received under indenture, with the prospect of a bonus at 
the end of the season. So at first planting companies were quite popular 
among Indians at Nausori, and realized CSR's hopes too. But in a co-
operative Indians were found not to have so great a personal interest in 
the yield of the crop as CSR had hoped. After a time the interest of 
members fell and the cost of cultivation to CSR increased. In 1904 it was 
noticed that the cost of 'company' grown cane was higher than if produced 
with indentured labour. Knox called for a review, but before this could 
have any effect there occurred a drought which prevented any bonus being 
paid in 1906. Indians abandoned the company system, and CSR did not try 
39 to revive it. 
Thereafter, the company's attention was focused on the question 
of leasing plantations to overseers. They were likely to achieve the cost 
reductions that were wanted, without involving CSR in the time and expense 
of settling large numbers of Indians on its land. Though in the long run 
Knox still hoped that settlers on company land could be persuaded to grow 
cane, for the immediate future they were valued for the ways in which they 
could help stabilise - perhaps even reduce - the cost of cane on plant-
ations and the cost of crushing it in the mills. This was clear from 
contracts the Labasa manager proposed to make in 1905 with immigrants in 
their last year of indenture. In return for a cash payment of £2 and the 
lease of three to four acres, the Indian was to reside on his allotment 
with his family, to work for three days a week (or for the whole week if 
in the mill) whenever required by CSR at wages 25% higher than those of 
indentured labourers, and to grow a certain quantity of crops annually for 
sale at fixed rates to the company. The rate for maize was to be Is 9d 
39 C.S.O. 3426/01; 874/02; H.O. to Nausori, 8 Oct. 1902, Nausori 
Out, 11 (1902), 403-7; H.O. to Nausori, 4 March 1904, Nausori 
Out, 14 (1903-4), 257-60; Knox to Jackson, 24 April 1906, Private 
Ltbk., 5 (1906-9), 31-3. W.P. Dixon, 'Notes on Indian Settlement', 
21 Feb. 1916, CSR F 4.0/5/-. 
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comparc-d with 2s lid for Fijian tax maize. Penalty for brcach of contract 
AO was put at between £1 and £5 - a large sum for Indians. 
By 1912, then, the trend among planters in general, on the Navua 
and by CSR was away from seeing settlers on plantation land as primarily 
a source of cane. Instead, the emphasis was on settling immigrants so that 
they would provide a pool of casual labour and, of secondary importance, 
so that they would provide food crops needed on plantations. Except at 
Navua and on a few estates elsewhere, settlers were placed at the edges of 
plantations, on marginal land. As a result, though almost certainly 
greater than the number on government settlements, the number of Indians 
settled by planters was smaller than the number which, in the absence of 
land elsewhere, was forced to occupy blocks leased direct from Fijians. 
Indians on Fijian land 
Free immigrants had leased land from Fijians ever since the 1880s. The 
size of their holdings was greatly influenced by the extent of plantation 
agriculture, which was responsible for both the number of immigrants 
looking for land and, to a significant degree, for the scarcity of land 
available. The shortage in cane districts, where Indians preferred to 
settle because of proximity to markets and poor communications elsewhere, 
was of course partly due to the amount of land held by Fijians. However 
it also owed much to the fact that large areas - mostly of the best 
quality - had been taken up by plantations. Comparatively little remained 
for Indians when their indentures expired, so that the intense competition 
which resulted encouraged the occupation of land in small plots. Moreover, 
on leaving the plantation the average immigrant could not afford more than 
a few acres of land - if any at all. Wages under indenture had been so 
low that the amount he could save was minimal. The exception to this were 
sirdars - those in charge of other Indians under the supervision of a 
European overseer. Not only were their incomes higher than others under 
indenture, but they also received bribes - in individual amounts of up to 
one shilling a week apparently - from labourers who wanted to receive 
favourable treatment. They also obtained an income from Fijians by spending 
part of their wages on gambling, 'professional Indian gamblers' being known 
40 C.S.O. 216/05. 
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'to flccce the Fijians' deliberately. One sirdar, from Wailevu estate at 
Labasa, has recalled (perhaps with exaggeration) that he was paid £1 Is Od 
41 
a week and saved £100 while serving his indenture. Once free, sirdars 
were well placed to increase their wealth through trade, and to obtain 
sizeable areas of land; over fifty acres was not uncommon. Because of 
growing demand for smaller blocks by Indians who were less fortunate, these 
land holders began to sublet in allotments of a few acres, receiving more 
in rent than they paid the Fijian owners. Frequently attached to the sub-
lease was the offer of credit, an extremely important provision since it 
spared those with little capital having to re-engage on plantations till 
they had saved more. As government and CSR recognized, without the Indian 
middleman, the zamindar, settlement would have proceeded more slowly. Just 
as they had helped planters by maintaining order among indentured labour, 
time-expired sirdars now served the same interests by hastening settlement 
on small blocks. 
As part of other measures to promote settlement, government action 
in 1897-8 reinforced the pattern of small holdings. The procedure for 
leasing small plots of Fijian land was simplified. Proposals to lease no 
longer had to go before Provincial Councils which met at six monthly 
intervals, but could be submitted to District Councils which met every 
month. Legislation was passed to save Indians with little capital the 
cost of surveying land (and waiting while the survey was carried out) in 
order to obtain a lease. For leases of under ten acres it was no longer 
necessary to employ a surveyor and register a plan, though a rough tracing 
and description of the proposed lease was later required by Ordinance A of 
/ 2 
1905. These measures encouraged Fijian land to be leased more rapidly 
by Indians. From thirty Indians occupying 492 acres in 1898, ten years 
later the number had risen to 1,467 on 13,881 acres. Though settlement 
initially proceeded fastest on the Navua and the Rewa, the expansion of 
CSR's operations on the west of Viti Levu led to a substantial increase 
after the turn of the century in the number of Indians occupying Fijian 
41 C.S.O. 350/90; 1178/91; transcript of interviews with ex-indentees, 
kindly shown me by Dr Ahmed All, University of the South Pacific, 
Suva. 
42 Berkeley to C.O., 31, 13 April 1897, C.O. 83/66; Ordinance 7 of 
1898. 
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land in Lhat part of the island. In 1911 nearly half the registered leases 
of Fijian land held by Indians were in the Province of Ba, a quarter within 
ten miles of the Nausori mill, an eighth on the northern coast of Vanua 
Levu in the Province of Macuata, and the remainder were scattered in small 
A 3 settlements over the rest of the two islands. 
From 1907 to 1910 government tried to regulate Indian settlement 
on Fijian land more closely. Officials were concerned, for example, about 
the whole host of informal and illegal leasing arrangements that Indians 
entered into with Fijians. Apart from a variety of share-farming agree-
ments, there was tlie practice of leasing a plot for several short periods 
in succession. Since this was done in secret, the owner could evade the 
legal requirement that his Roko and Buli receive a portion of the rent. 
The problem had wider significance, though. Under informal agreements 
tenants had no security of tenure, and hence little incentive to maintain 
the fertility of the soil. If the land continued to be farmed by Indians, 
it was likely that the output of crops for sale to plantations would fall, 
and that in the search for land which had not been exhausted settlers 
would move away from the centres of employment, so reducing the supply of 
4A 
casual labour. Following representations by G.V. Maxwell, the Stipend-
iary Magistrate at Lautoka and then Macuata, the police were instructed in 45 1907 to prosecute in cases whore land was leased informally. 
There was mounting official concern, too, about the provision 
that no proper survey need be obtained for leases of under ten acres. 
Tenants were expected to mark out their land with pegs, but it was often 
found that pegs were moved to increase the area of the lease, or that 
leases of tenants overlapped. As in the case of informal leasing, concern 
was expressed mainly in terms of law and order - disputes might break out 
between tenants for example - but once again plantation interests were 
involved. Frequent disputes might involve tenants in expensive legal 
action which would increase costs, and might lead to reprisals in the form 
A3 Anderson, 29; C.S.O./M.P. 3274/11. 
44 In 1909 officials were concerned about the settlement of Indians 
in the interior, largely because it reduced the supply of labour 
to plantations, and in 1911 settlement was limited mostly to sugar 
districts. C.S.O. 6206/09; 3274/11. 
45 C.S.O. 3127/06; 5241/07. 
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of the destruction of crops otherwise for sale. Moreover, the tendency 
to increase the size of leases raised the possibility that they would no 
longer be worked with family labour alone but would need hired workers as 
wel]., so increasing the competition for labour. Finally, as government 
acknowledged, to provide the rough description required under Ordinance 4 
of 1905, Indians often paid a European or half-caste more than would have 
been paid to a registered surveyor for a proper lease. The cost of 
settlement was increased and with it the burden of debt, often at high 
rates of interest, making the cheap production of cash crops more difficult, 
More than law and order was therefore at stake when government enacted 
Ordinance 4 of 1909, which required that in future all applications to 
lease, regardless of the land's size, should be accompanied by plans drawn 
by a registered surveyor. To prevent the extra demand driving up survey 
costs to prohibitive levels, fees charged by surveyors for small plots 
46 were regulated under Ordinance 4 of 1912. 
A third area of government intervention about this time was on 
the question of subletting land. Knox had always felt that rents would 
be lower if Indians leased land direct from Fijians instead of through 
middlemen, a view that rested on the assumption that Indian land holders 
could drive harder bargains than Fijians. This was undoubtedly true, not 
only because Indians who already held land at fixed rents could take 
advantage of rising values, but also because they could often attract 
tenants at high rents through the offer of credit as well. In 1902 Knox 
had told government that because the crop would have to pay several 
profits, subletting would increase the costs of Indian cultivation. No 
action, though, had been taken by officials - and Knox had even allowed 
his managers to experiment with the zamindar system on company land -
because the benefits of speedy settlement were thought to outweigh the 
disadvantages of subletting.^^ By the end of the decade the situation 
had changed. Settlement was well advanced, and government could risk 
slowing the process to ensure that the pattern of land holding was in line 
with its overall objectives. Im Thurn became convinced of the need for 
action in late 1909, when details of numerous transfers and subletting 
46 C.S.O. 4914/08; 379/09; 5972/09; 7249/09; 7538/11. 
47 'Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited', 8 Oct. 1902, E.W.K. 
Special, 3 (1899-1908), 98-105; C.S.O. 4438/02; 2863/03. 
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on a forty-three acre lease were brought to his attention. In 1910 it 
was decided that in future leases would normally be issued to Indians in 
sizes of only five acres or less (or ten acres of grazing land). The hope 
was that the high rents being charged by middlemen would be reduced, and 
that by encouraging smaller allotments the supply of casual labour would 
be increased. The latter was a curious thought, for under the existing 
practice subletting was so extensive that leases were eventually fragmented 
into small plots. However, it showed that the main purpose of settlement 
in official eyes was the same as it had been in the 1890s. 
In 1907 to 1910, then, government intervened in ways that might 
have substantially modified the conditions on which Indians leased Fijian 
land. Yet this intervention had only a marginal effect on the pattern of 
settlement. Neither Ordinance 4 of 1909 nor the five acre limit applied 
to leases that had been taken up over the past twenty-five years. Nor does 
it seem that they greatly altered the pattern of leasing over the next few 
years. The size limit could be overcome if the owner of a lease persuaded 
a 'dummy' to apply for an adjacent plot, to be handed over to him once the 
application had succeeded. The requirement that all leases be properly 
surveyed could be easily evaded by coming to an informal arrangement with 
Fijians while, from the extent of the practice in 1915, it seems that the 
instruction to prosecute in such cases had little effect. Informal leasing 
was so widespread that it was beyond the resources of the police department 
49 
to control. There were other aspects of settlement that were not sus-
ceptible to control by planters or government - the rise in land values, 
for example. Rent for an acre of Fijian land at Ra and Ba rose from 
between 7s 6d and twenty shillings in 1905 to from ten shillings to thirty 
shillings in 1908 - a substantial increase for a three year period. 
Higher rents increased the amount that Indians with little capital had to 
borrow, while the shortage of capital in the Indian community, together with 
the poor security that most borrowers had to offer, meant that loans could 
generally be obtained at only high rates of interest - often over 30% a 
year.^^ Though the Fiji Sugar Co. made a few loans to growers, as did CSR afte 
48 C.S.O. 676/10; 6561/10; 10396/10. See also confidential appendix. 
49 C.S.O. 821/13; 9097/15. 
50 Indian Immigration Reports for 1905 and 1908. 
51 Gillion, 143. 
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1905, the restriction of loans to those with good security limited the 
52 
extent of advances. Frequently, Indians on-lent European advances at 
much higher rates of interest to compatriots with less adequate security. 
The result of high interest rates and rising land values was to increase 
cultivation costs and limit the ability of planters, with their greater 
bargaining power against the numerous and scattered Indian growers, to 53 
reduce the price of crops bought from settlers. Nevertheless, in 1912 
government and planters could have taken comfort from the fact that Indian 
produce was normally cheaper than alternative supplies, and that in the 
most important respect settlement had developed on lines consistent with 
the needs of plantations - by far the majority of settlers were farming 54 small plots of land. 
Settlement helped Indians to substantially improve their standard 
of living. In 1912 they held over £16,000 in the banks.^^ To this could 
be added sums that were hoarded rather than banked, and capital which had 
been accumulated, say, in the form of livestock (see Table 4:3 below). Yet 
though the sugar industry had encouraged settlement, its contribution to 
economic development in this way was limited by planters' demand for cheap 
labour. Apart from attempts to get them to grow cane, settlers were seen 
primarily as a source of labour. Consequently, planters were willing to 
lease them only marginal land, and since rents seem to have not always 
taken the quality of soil fully into account, perhaps this limited the 
income settlers could obtain from their plots. The frequent stipulation 
that they work on plantations, or in the mill, whenever required meant 
that growers could be forced to leave the land at times critical for 
planting, cultivating or harvesting their crops. It may also have helped 
planters to keep wages below what would have prevailed had there been 
52 C.S.O. 337/97; Anderson, 51. 
53 The ability of plantation interests to determine prices, though 
considerable, should not be over-estimated. In 1906 CSR was 
sufficiently xTOrried about increases in the price of Indian maize 
to propose growing a certain amount itself. Farquhar to H.O., 
30 Oct. 1906, Inspectors Ltbk., 1906-8, 53-68. 
54 This is impossible to demonstrate statistically since informal 
leases and subleases were not registered, but it was certainly 
the prevailing view at the time. 
55 Cmd. 7744-5 (1914), Appendix 45 (a). 
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Uliil .rlcl l,.nid-
I.ANI) mil 1.1)1 NCS CROPS 
or h o l d L T B KKI.KIIOLI) LKASKIKll.l) T o t a l Su;', .ar- liaiiu- Oilier To La i To t a 1 
P r o v i n c e N o . A c r e s C a p i t a l 
v a l u e 
A c r c a K e n t a l 
v a l u e 
v a l u e 
of 
h o l d i n g 
No . Value cane , 
a c r e s 
R i c e , 
a c r e s 
n a s , 
a c r e s 
c r o p s 
a c r e s 
a r e a , 
a c r e s 
v a l u e 
C C t t t. 
S u v a Itbt, 327 2 7 , 6 4 8 1 , 8 2 8 1 , 4 0 0 3 5 , 9 2 8 5 6 2 1 1 , 8 2 7 - - - - 4 6 2 1 , 6 3 1 
Rewn - 7 6 0 5 , 0 7 5 7 , 0 4 5 3 , 2 8 9 8 , 3 6 4 • 1 , 7 0 3 1 2 , 6 2 5 2 , 4 3 3 864 1 , 4 8 5 29 4 , 8 1 1 4 5 , 0 0 0 
T a l l c v u 34 1 , 2 4 3 6 , 4 5 0 1 , 1 5 1 1 4 6 - 39 2 4 0 - - 1 5 2 16 1 6 8 1 , 6 0 0 
C o l o K a n t * 'lO - - 2 0 0 - - - - - 5 14 6 7 1 5 8 -
Navua — 
S e r u a 
7 2 0 2 , 4 1 7 1 2 , 0 8 5 2 , 3 9 3 2 , 6 7 5 5 , 1 5 1 7 2 0 2 , 8 8 0 1 , 3 3 6 5 2 2 1 7 0 16 2 , 0 4 4 1 8 , 6 8 9 
Ra* 2 2 9 - - 1 0 , 0 0 0 1 , 0 2 1 - 244 8 0 4 64 - - - - 3 , 5 1 5 
C o l o 
N o r t h * 
6 0 - - 1 , 2 4 2 2 9 1 - 2 7 8 6 9 0 3 7 5 6 4 1 - 6 3 6 1 , 6 5 2 
5 , 3 5 0 
B a * 567 - - 5 , 1 8 4 2 , 2 7 9 1 2 , 7 1 4 - 2 , 0 8 0 1 , 1 3 6 8 3 4 - 2 2 6 2 , 1 9 6 2 2 , 1 3 6 
L a u t o k a * 4 2 2 - - 4 , 2 6 3 - - 6 1 7 3 , 2 9 4 7 09 - - - - 8 , 2 8 9 
N a d l * - - - 6 , 4 5 8 - 2 3 , 5 2 8 9 3 0 3 , 5 0 2 624 1 , 5 2 3 1 74 2 2 , 8 9 0 1 4 , 5 8 7 
Nad rogn 312 - - 7 4 0 303 - 2 9 ; 2 , 4 7 2 7 0 6 0 0 3 0 - - 2 , 8 0 6 
Bua - 604 1 , 8 1 2 6 6 5 217 - - 308 - - - - - 1 , 1 4 0 
M a c u a t a * 8 3 1 5 0 0 1 , 5 0 0 4 , 6 8 6 1 , 8 0 5 - - 5 , 6 9 8 20 3 , 8 4 4 - - 4 , 6 8 6 1 4 , 0 3 4 
S a v u S a v u 4 2 - - 227 - - 32 152 - - - - - 4 7 8 
T a v c u n i N i l - - - - - - - - - - - - -
L e v u k a - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
L a u - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
T O T A L : - 5 , 8 5 1 5 4 , 5 7 0 4 6 , 0 8 2 1 3 , 4 2 6 8 5 , 6 8 5 5 , 1 7 8 4 6 , 5 7 2 6 , 7 6 7 8 , 8 3 3 1 , 9 8 4 1 , 6 7 2 
1 9 , 0 6 7 1 3 9 , 2 5 5 
L IVE-STOCK OTHER PROPERTY 
D i s t r i c t or 
P r o v i n c e C a t t l e H o r s e s G o a t s S h e e p , 
p i g s , 
e t c . 
Fowls V a l u e C u t t e r s , 
b o a t s , 
e t c . 
Farm 
Implements 
V a l u e 
£ i 
S u v a 4 5 8 5 0 4 2 - 3 , 6 6 0 5 , 9 9 6 - - 7 6 5 
Row a 1 , 5 9 7 91 1 0 0 70 1 0 , 1 0 8 1 2 , 7 7 7 1 7 1 4 1 2 2 , 0 1 8 
T a i l e v u 117 14 2 - 2 5 4 7 5 4 - - 4 6 
C o l o E a s t * 35 1 2 7 5 9 1 2 0 0 - - -
N a v u a - S e r u a 8 9 2 25 192 22 3 , 3 2 5 4 , 9 8 2 36 Not s t a t e d 1 , 3 1 6 
Ra* 1 , 0 1 8 1 9 6 64 - 3 , 1 8 6 4 , 5 7 2 -
2 0 1 3 0 0 
C o l o N o r t h * 1 , 1 4 6 15 2 1 2 0 - 2 , 6 0 0 
5 , 1 3 2 - 1 5 0 6 0 0 
B a * 2 , 3 6 1 5 0 1 1 4 5 -
6 , 7 0 0 2 4 , 4 5 7 - - -
L a u t o k a * 1 , 0 1 5 9 0 9 -
2 , 0 0 4 5 , 9 5 8 - - 8 8 9 
N a d i * 2 , 5 3 0 2 3 5 -
8 2 6 , 5 1 5 1 4 , 7 0 9 - - 4 , 9 2 4 
N a d r o g a 8 8 1 1 3 6 1 5 2 - -
3 , 9 1 0 2 3 1 4 7 5 5 1 
Bua 554 4 
1 8 8 - 1 , 0 0 0 1 , 8 9 0 - - 4 5 5 
M a c u a t a * 3 , 3 0 1 6 7 2 , 0 6 3 
85 1 1 , 3 2 8 1 1 , 4 4 2 - - 3 , 3 5 0 
S a v u S n v u - - - -
- 4 8 5 - - 6 4 9 
T a v e u n l - - - -
- - - -
L e v u k a - - - - - - -
-
l.au - - - -
- - -
T O T A L : 1 5 , 9 0 5 1 , 5 6 2 3 , 0 1 9 
2 6 6 5 1 , 2 7 1 9 7 , 2 6 4 2 3 0 1 5 , 8 6 3 
:-.ui\-r: Cnnl. 77/.'i-5 ( l O l / i ) , Appo.uilx 'I'l. 
iW-trn: Tl\c cloLnllN MupplU-il iiro 1 iiiimip li'l o In respoct of d l n t r l c t i i imiikinl 
TLU- v,il\ii-!i ari- llki-lv U - h.ivo bri-n ix.iK.V.i'R.i 1 '^>1 LO I m p n ' I M llio I I U H I M I 
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perfect competiLion in the market. In 1905 CSR's Labasa manager had hoped 
to settle Indians on condition that they work as required for Is 3d a day; 
but the free market wage of time-expired labourers was often nearer to 
Is 6d, though it did vary. Of particular significance was the encourage-
ment given to settlement on small holdings. Plots of under five acres 
suffered 'incessant intense cropping' which caused the soil to be impover-
ished. In a report on the condition of Indians in Fiji, C.F. Andrews and 
W.W. Pearson contrasted the use of 'scientific cultivation', like the 
extensive use of green manure, by the handful of large-scale Indian planters 
with the inferior techniques of small growers who overcropped the soil.^^ 
The problem was that to derive what they considered to be an adequate 
income from their small farms, Indians failed to rotate the land. The long 
term result was that their incomes were reduced. So it was that the sugar 
industry's dependence on cheap labour, largely because of market constraints, 
limited the contribution to economic development of Indian settlement. 
56 See confidential appendix. 
57 C.F. Andrews and W.W. Pearson, Indentured Labour in Fiji: an 
Independent Enquiryj, 40. 
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CllAPTEJI V 
Crisis and Change, 1912-23 
THE period 1912 Lo 1923 was a watershed in the history of the Fiji sugar 
industry, for it was during these years that the supply of indentured 
labour came to an end. Though in Britain there had been growing opposition 
to it on humanitarian grounds, it was nationalist agitation in India which 
finally brought a halt to this form of migration. In 1916 Lord Hardinge, 
the Viceroy, announced that the recruitment of indentured labour would be 
prohibited when a less objectionable scheme had been devised, but the 
danger of widespread disturbances, and even mass disobedience organized 
by Mahatma Gandhi, forced the Indian government the following year to stop 
all further migration to the colonies for the duration of the war and two 
years after. The last shipload of indentured labourers had already arrived 
in Fiji, but they never served their full terms for, to satisfy public 
opinion in India, all indentures in the colony were cancelled on 1 January 
1920. The sugar companies and planters reacted to the threat, and then 
the reality, of the disruption of their labour supply by settling immigrants 
on their estates, in the hope that eventually their dependence on imported 
labour might be greatly reduced. At the same time, they tried to persuade 
India to permit a resumption of emigration on new terms, provided the 
conditions would not cause a prohibitive rise in the cost of labour. No 
new scheme of immigration satisfying all parties could be devised, however, 
with the result that at the end of the period, to overcome the shortage of 
labour, CSR began to abandon the estate form of production completely, in 
favour of the cultivation of cane by Indian growers. The preoccupation of 
the period, then, was with the retention of a cheap supply of labour. 
Indian settlement, 1912-22 
In 1912, several years before the flow of indentured immigrants ceased, 
both CSR and government had become concerned about growing opposition to 
Accounts of Fiji and the end of Indian immigration can be found 
in K.L. Gillion, Fiji's Indian Migrants, ch. 9; K.L. Gillion, 
The Fiji Indians. Challenge to European dominance 1920-46, chs. 
2-5; Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery, The Export of Indian 
Labour Overseas, 1830-1920, chs. 7-10. 
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this method of procuring labour. Officials warned planters that ' tlie non-
conformist party' in England, including several leading members of the 
Liberal Government, disapproved of existing arrangements while GSR, through 
the visits of its officer Thomas Hughes, was well aware of the mounting 
feeling against the system in India. In the opinion of Hughes though, an 
even more serious and immediate threat to the future of immigration was 
the increased demand for Indian labour. Although the population of United 
Provinces and the Madras Presidency, which supplied about 75% and 25% 
respectively of Fiji's immigrants, was put at 88 million, only a small 
proportion of these were willing to migrate. In 1912 Hughes estimated 
that against the requirement of 25,000 labourers a year to all the sugar 
colonies combined, annual migration to tea districts within India had 
averaged about 350,000 over the previous ten years, while that to Geylon 
had varied from 150,000 to 175,000. Migration to the Malay States had 
risen from 45,000 in 1909 to 103,000 in 1911. Already a shortage of labour 
was being felt in Geylon: it could only be a matter of time before Fiji 
experienced the same. To 'avoid the calamity that would follow a stoppage 
or serious curtailment of the labour supply', GSR urged that new measures 
be adopted to settle Indians near plantations. Knox wrote: 
The only means by which the position could be rendered really 
secure would be to make the industry independent of immigration 
by permanently attaching to it the people introduced for 
plantation work. 3 
GSR's efforts in this direction were supported by government, 
which saw improved facilities for immigration partly as a way to augment 
the colony's supply of labour but also, and of growing importance, as 
necessary to persuade India to allow immigration to continue. Added 
urgency to the question was given by the visit in 1913 of the McNeill and 
Ghimman Lai Commission, sent from India to examine the conditions of 
indentured labourers overseas. The Commission's recommendation that more 
be done to encourage settlement in Fiji"^  met with a quick response from 
2 H.O. to Nausori, 17 July 1912, Private Ltbk. Out, 7 (1912), 302-7. 
3 'Labour Position in Fiji', March 1912, Private Ltbk. Out, 1' 
(1912), 168-70. 
4 Report to the Goveimment of India on the Conditions of Indian 
Immigrants in Four British Colonies and Surinam, by James McNeill, 
I.G.S. and Mr. Ghimman Lai, Gmd. 7744-5; Memo, by James McNeill, 
G.S.O./M.P. 8693/13. 
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officials, who were already dealing with one matter raised by the Commission 
- the question of Indian indebtedness. The high interest rates associated 
with credit from storekeepers and money-lenders, occasionally up to 120% 
a year, made it more difficult for intending settlers to finance the 
acquisition of land. The government wondered if some form of co-operative 
credit could be introduced to cheapen loans and facilitate settlement. 
Enquiries about this had been made in India before the arrival of McNeill 
and Chimman Lai but in late 1913, despite the Commission's concern about 
the problem, government decided that the time was not yet ripe to introduce 
co-operative credit societies. Not only would they have been very difficult 
to supervise, but the security most Indians could offer was considered 
totally inadequate. The vast majority of settlers held land on short 
tenure, even in government settlements where a six months' occupation 
licence instead of a lease had become normal. It was resolved that 'the 
question of granting advances to settlers should await the final decision 
in regard to the native land question'.'^ 
Thus attention was focused on the leasing of Fijian land. Follow-
ing a recommendation by McNeill and Chimman Lai, the five acre limit on 
leases of Fijian agricultural land was raised in 1914 to ten acres, with 
twenty acres for grazing land, thereby increasing the income a new settler 
could expect to derive from his farm. Soon after, to increase returns to 
the owners, a system of auctioning leases of Fijian land was introduced, 
but to prevent this more complicated and expensive procedure from hindering 
Indian settlement, leases of under ten acres of planting and twenty acres 
of grazing land were made exempt. In addition, security of tenure for 
Indians (and others) with registered leases was increased by Ordinance 23 
of 1916, under which if an owner refused to renew a lease he had to compen-
sate the outgoing tenant for the value of permanent and inexhaustible 
improvements made during the currency of the lease. Since Fijians had 
difficulty in raising cash to pay compensation, at least initially leases 
were generally renewed, so increasing the tenant's feeling of security and 
reducing his need to bribe the owner to obtain a renewal. Yet the benefits 
S.S. 295/13; C.S.O. 1622/14; May to C.O., 97, 18 March 1912, 
C.O. 83/106; Escott to C.O., 139, 1 April 1913, C.O. 83/113; 
Escott to C.O., 69, 13 Feb. 1914, C.O. 83/119. 
Ill 
of Lhis were I:iiiiiLeci only lo KcttJcrs witli roj'/i .st ered lenses. The mnjorJLy 
on Fijian land, those with informal agreements, were unaffected.^ 
Consequently, a more effective way to encourage settlement - and 
one that government tried - was to increase the amount of available land 
for leasing. The trouble was that it was virtually impossible to open new 
government settlements because not enough crown land was available, and 
Fijians were reluctant to lease suitable blocks for the purpose. For a 
number of years officials had been trying to persuade Fijians to hand over 
to government surplus land which would be leased on their behalf. Origin-
ally, it had been hoped to throw this open to Europeans, but from 1912-13 
government acquisition of land in this way was seen in terms of Indian 
settlement. In 1903, 1911 and 1912 the Council of Chiefs had supported 
proposals to make available to government surplus land in the colony, but 
despite official efforts to persuade Fijians to give effect to the Council's 
resolutions, especially that of 1912, the response had been poor. Between 
1912 and 1914 Fijians released land only in areas where for many years 
settlement was not likely to occur, or only on conditions that would be 
unacceptable to prospective tenants. They wanted all land that had in the 
past, or might in the future, be used for planting to be excluded. 
To overcome the problem, in 1914 Sir Ernest Sweet-Escott 
(governor, 1912-18).proposed to establish Land Boards comprising of the 
District Commissioner for the area concerned, the Roko and a land officer. 
The Boards would discuss with Fijians what land was available and then, 
on the advice of the Commissioner of Lands and the Native Commissioner, 
the governor would decide what land should be acquired in the public 
interest, particularly for Indian settlement. The Colonial Office refused 
to sanction the plan because of opposition from Fijians who wanted a 
majority on the Boards. Instead, the following year a compromise solution 
was agreed. Land could only be leased if it was first handed over to 
government to lease on the owner's behalf. Fijians were spared the fear 
that government would acquire land against their will, while government 
hoped to prevent direct negotiations between Indians and Fijians which, by 
leading to high premiums, was thought to have hindered the process of 
6 A.G. Anderson, Indo-Fijian Smallfarmingj 34; Hutson to C.O., 
363, 7 Sept. 1915, C.O. 83/127; C.S.O./M.P. 753/22. 
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settlement; the hope was not in fact realized, for Indians still bribed 
Fijians to give their consent when proposals to lease were considered by 
government.^ 
Moreover, this attempt to solve the land question did not enable 
government to acquire large areas of Fijian land for Indian settlement. 
Though under Ordinance 16 of 1906 government could obtain land compulsorily 
in the public interest, the Colonial Office was against any action in 
regard to Fijian land that did not have the support of its owners. The only 
way to acquire large areas would be to persuade Fijians to lease in return 
for high rents. It was in this situation that officials welcomed in 1915 
CSR's offer, designed to increase the company's labour supply, to lend 
£100,000 for the acquisition of Fijian land, improving it and subletting 
it to Indians at five per cent of the capital outlay. A trust was set up 
in 1916 to administer the fund, but by 1918 none of the money had been 
spent and CSR withdrew the offer. Circumstances had changed. Immigration 
had stopped, so that it was no longer necessary to settle the 3000 or so 
Indians whose indentures would have expired each year. The problem now 
was not so much to open up new land for settlement: rather, with the 
shortage of labour to work plantations, the need was to settle Indians on 
existing estates so that they could cultivate cane themselves. Indeed, 
the more new areas made available the more difficult it would be to find 
tenants to occupy plantations. So paradoxically, though government had 
encouraged settlement on Fijian land largely in the interest of planters, 
the very modesty of its achievement became, after the halt in immigration, 
a major contribution to meeting the immediate needs of the industry. 
Since 1912 the Vancouver-Fiji Sugar Co. and CSR had been trying 
to settle Indians on their estates. Though some were expected to take 
off-farm jobs as well, in an emphasis which had not been seen since 1905 
it was intended that the majority should do nothing else but grow cane. 
In settling immigrants, the sugar companies had to overcome the widespread 
May to C.O., 135, 10 May 1912, C.O. 83/107; Escott to C.O., 
260, 28 July 1914, C.O. 83/121; Hutson to C.O., 363, 7 Sept. 
1915, C.O. 83/127. 
Hutson to C.O., 367, 7 Sept. 1915, C.O. 83/127; Hughes to C.O., 
21 May 1915, C.O. 83/129; Escott to C.O., conf., 9 April 1918, 
C.O. 83/141; C.P. 7/1916, 21/1916, 67/1916; H.O. to Nausori, 
26 April 1915, Private Ltbk. Out, 10 (1915), 266. 
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tendency for yields on Indian farms to fall. In 1912 it was reported that 
some growers produced just over eight tons an acre, compared with twenty-
four tons or more under the plantation system. Seeing that Indian methods 
of cultivation (because terms of their leases were short) caused the soil 
to be exhausted, CSR's managers in Fiji were at first lukewarm toward 
head office suggestions that immigrants be settled on company estates. 
There was also the problem that settlers had shown a decided preference 
for crops other than cane. Table 5:1 below shows that between 1909 and 
1913 there had been a decline in the output of Indian grown cane and an 
increase in the production of alternative crops. Though part of the decline 
was due to the discouragement of Indian cane production at Navua, what was 
significant was that with the growth of the free Indian population this 
had not been offset by an increase elsewhere. The importance of ensuring 
that tenants actually grew cane and that their cultivation practices were 
of a high standard was reinforced by Thomas Hughes's examination of the 
Mauritius sugar industry in 1913. It was reported that yields suffered 
because, once they had obtained freeholds, many settlers were content 
merely to exist on their small plots. l\rhether the lack of incentive was 
really due to land tenure is unclear, but CSR certainly interpreted it in 
this light. Perhaps" output was higher on leases because their occupants 
had to meet rent obligations which, in a period of rising values, were 
likely over a number of years to exceed in total the freehold price. More-
over, the landlord could stipulate conditions which would ensure that a 
high output was maintained. Hughes also found that Indian smallholdings 
should have comprised about one third of the total cane area in Mauritius, 
but that many had gone out of cane while 'the Indians' defective agricult-
ural methods constitute a source of grave anxiety as to the mills' future 
supplies of cane'. Past experience of settlement in Fiji and Mauritius, 
TABLE 5:1 
Acveage of crops cultivated by free Indians, 1909-13 
Year Cane Rice Maize Bananas Beans Tobacco Others Total 
1,990h 7,000 689^ ^ 1,054 294 29 17,464Ji 
7,487^1 9,553 756I5 200 54 189^ 1 19,220 
6,630 ll,450Jg 2,221 l,338ig 328 184 581 22,733 
6,621 10,008 2,503 2,064 559 100 Ihlh 21,9661^ 
6,233 13,022 2,808 1,850 364 139 1,056 15,Ml 
Source: Indian Immigration Reports, 1910-14. 
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then, encouraged sugar companies to devise schemes that would enable them 
9 to exercise considerable control over their tenants. 
This need for control was reflected in agreements, dating from 
1912, between the Vancouver-Fiji Sugar Co. and immigrants whose indentures 
were due to expire in three to six months. In return for the cancellation 
of liis iiidenture, an Indian was obliged to reside on a block of company 
land, to devote the whole of liis time to the cultivation of cane unless 
given permission by the company, to plant the variety of cane and do all 
the drainage work and cultivation required by the company, to deliver cane 
free of trash and of a quality judged by the company to be satisfactory, 
to give no lien over his crop to third parties without the company's 
consent, and to pay five per cent interest on advances made by the company 
which would be a first charge against the crop. The agreements were to 
last till 1919. Contracts with CSR's Indian tenants contained similar 
provisions, but with an additional one that forbade subletting.^^ However, 
it was one thing to make contracts but quite another to enforce them. 
Enforcement depended on the general satisfaction of Indians with the 
settlement schemes that were devised. Yet, even though the experiments 
up to 1922 attracted tenants, there was far from general contentment with 
the conditions on which land was held. Dissatisfaction stemmed largely 
from the size of plots that were leased. 
The Vancouver-Fiji Sugar Co., for example, divided some of its 
estates into farms of about six acres of which no more than four, sometimes 
less, were supposed to be cropped in any one year. The manager in 1912, 
Mr E. Duncan, believed that £20 a year would cover a man's living and 
working expenses, and that the proceeds from a farm of that size would 
exceed this by a few pounds. In an effort to attract growers, the company 
adopted a policy of paying higher prices than elsewhere in Fiji. At the 
start it paid 6d a ton for Malabar and Is 6d for Badilla more than was 
9 'Coolie Settlement on Estates', 22 April 1913, Nausori Out, 30 
(1912-13), 416-20; Nausori to H.O., 19 June 1912, Nausori/H.O. 
Private letters. May to Dec. 1912; Knox to Colonial Secretary, 
5 Sept. 1913, CSR, 'The Labour Position in Mauritius. Enquiries 
made June 1913', end. with Escott to C.O., 403, 23 Sept. 1913, 
C.O. 83/116. 
10 C.S.O./M.P.141/13; Escott to C.O., conf., 9 April 1918, C.O. 
83/141. 
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paid on the Rewa. It also charged lower rents than were often paid by 
Europeans in the district. Settlers were expected to pay around six to 
seven shillings an acre. Initially the company seems to have found the 
scheme quite a success. By 1917 the amount of Indian cane exceeded that 
grown by the company. Yet, in a period of rising prices and of industrial 
and political unrest after the war, the policy of paying relatively high 
prices and charging moderate rents was not on its own enough to satisfy 
tenants for long. Wliat counted was the total net proceeds from cane, and 
these were limited by the size of the farms. As was later recognized (by 
CSR), Indians were capable of farming more Lhan six acres. Settlers at 
Navua found they had surplus labour which, under the terms of their 
contracts, they could not devote to wage employment away from their farms. 
But because of the number of growers it was difficult for the company to 
enforce this provision, so that the likelihood of settlers neglecting 
their plots in search of seasonal wage employment was considerable. It 
was likely, too, that in an attempt to increase their total income growers 
would try to crop a larger area than that stipulated by the company, there-
by adding to the problem of supervision and exhausting the soil. These 
factors, together with poor harvests in 1918 and 1919, account for the 
decline after 1917 in cane production at Navua. By the end of 1921 output 
had fallen from a potential of between 45,000 and 50,000 tons to 11,000, 
and this was one of the reasons given for closing the mill the following 
11 year. 
The small size of farms also caused problems with one of CSR's 
settlement schemes, known as the 'settlement area system', which was 
started on the Vuci Maca plantation at Nausori in 1912. Most of the farms 
were of four to eight acres, producing difficulties similar to those at 
Navua. But there were other problems as well, because unlike the Vancouver-
Fiji Sugar Co., CSR decided that the farms were too small for the growers 
to do the necessary horse-work themselves. The company would have to do 
it for them. Initially CSR made a fixed charge per acre for the work, 
but it found that after meeting this expense plus rent, when yields were 
low the surplus left to growers was very small. So in 1916 the company 
11 C.S.O./M.P. 141/13; C.S.O. 497/22; Nausori to H.O., 29 July 
1912, Nausori/H.O. Private letters. May to Dec. 1912; confidential 
appendix. 
116 
switched to charging a fixed sum per ton of cane, only to find that growers 
with high yields complained that they had to pay more for the same amount 
of horse-work than those whose farms produced less. To this was added 
another difficulty. In devising the scheme, CSR had to ensure that the 
advantage of reducing the labour it needed for cultivation would not be 
offset by the need for more labour to plough a large number of farms each 
with its own system of rotation, than would have been required to plough 
the land if worked by the company itself. Consequently, CSR had grouped, 
say, four farms on about sixteen acres which were worked as a single area -
four acres plant cane, four first ratoon, four second ratoon, four acres 
fallow. Growers owned a quarter of each four acres, were responsible for 
hand work, and were to take individual care of their plots rather than 
work them on a co-operative basis as had the 'share companies' before 1906. 
However, working sixteen acres as a single area encouraged farmers to gang 
together to work the land co-operatively under the guidance of a CSR over-
seer, the company advancing wages to the gang which deducted from the 
proceeds of a grower's cane the cost of the work done on his farm. The 
individual's identification with his plot was reduced, while disputes 
arose when differences in the quality of land caused yields, and hence 
incomes, to vary between farms even though the amount of work done on each 
was the same. Plantation labourers complained because growers were little 
more than labourers in effect, and yet their incomes were higher than if 
they had been employed as such. Disputes between growers and the dis-
satisfaction of labourers increased the difficulty for CSR of controlling 
both groups, with the result that there would be considerable risk for the 
company if it perpetuated the scheme; at the same time, any profits made 
from the land would go to the growers. CSR decided that the settlement 
of Indians on small plots with the company doing the horse work had not 
12 
been a success, and the experiment was terminated in 1921. 
In 1917 CSR tried a different settlement scheme. Plantations, 
especially in the west of Viti Levu, were divided into 50/70 acre farms 
12 'Coolie Settlement on Estates', 22 April 1913, Nausori Out, 30 
(1912-13), 416-20; Dixon, 'Notes on Indian Settlement', 21 Feb. 
1916, CSR F 4.0/5/-; Dixon, 'Notes for the Manager, Labasa Mill', 
12 July 1916, Fiji Inspectors (Rutledge & Dixon) 1915-28; Dixon 
to H.O., 19 Dec. 1917, CSR F 4.0/7/-; Dixon, 'Various types of 
leases to Indians', 22 Feb. 1922, CSR F 4.0/6/-. 
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which were handed over to Indians, who were to be responsible for all the 
horse as well as cultivation work. Some, as on its Mataniqara estate at 
Ba, were fairly successful, but with others CSR had constant difficulty. 
At Lautoka it was unable to prevent Indians on large farms subletting the 
land at a profit. 
It ends always in trouble, and our experience has been through-
out the Sigatoka district that, where large areas are concerned, 
the Indians have always partitioned them amongst themselves, 
and it is these cases that are continually having us embroiled 
in trouble with the Suva lawyers. We never get into legal 
discussions or court cases with men on small areas.... [It] 
ends in nothing but continual strife, dissatisfaction, 
squabbling and quarrelling, which makes such inroads into the 
happiness of the community and the general inclination to work 
steadily. 13 
The company also had difficulty preventing its tenants from spending too 
much time away from their farms. In 1923 this form of settlement was also 
abandoned. Once again, the problem had been the size of blocks leased to 
Indians• 
A further problem with these settlement schemes was that the size 
of farms aggravated, rather than helped solve, the shortage of labour on 
plantations. If a fifty to seventy acre block was worked as a single farm 
by its o^Nmer, hired labour would be required; this would lead to compet-
ition with plantations for labour, making it more difficult to work 
economically the remaining ones before they were leased. Beside this 
critical short term problem, it was doubtful if in the long run large 
Indian-owned farms would overcome the labour shortage. If all plantations 
were divided into fifty acres or so, was it likely that Indians would work 
their labour so much more efficiently as to be able to farm with fewer 
men than Europeans? And would Indians be more successful than planters in 
resisting demands for higher wages? On the other hand, leasing in small 
plots of four or six acres, with a prohibition on off-farm employment, 
added to the scarcity of labour by creating underemployment among growers. 
The number of Indians settled on a given area was greater than it need 
have been. Moreover, the 'settlement area system' required CSR to maintain 
a small labour force - about four men per one hundred acres - to do the 
13 Lautoka to H.O., 2 Sept. 1922, CSR F 4.0/5/-. See also Dixon, 
'Various types of leases to Indians', op. cit. 
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ploughing, so reducing the number of immigrants who could be settled on the 
14 
land. In short, the settlement schemes tried before 1922 failed to over-
come the shortage of labour, and failed to induce tenants to accept the 
control of sugar companies, because the fam:s were either too small or too 
large. 
Plantations and their labour supply, 1916-22 
When CSR began to settle Indians in 1912, Knox thought that eventually they 
might replace the European planter. The company's Inspector, W.P. Dixon, 
who was to spend much time on Fiji matters over the next thirteen years, 
also inclined to this view. But, after the report on Mauritius, Knox 
became less optimistic than Dixon about the success of settlement schemes. 
He was concerned not only about the tendency for yields of Indian growers 
to fall, but also by a suggestion that dependence on a large settled 
population in Mauritius was making it increasingly difficult to obtain 
labour for the mills. Consequently, Knox saw the settlement of Indians 
as subordinate to the interests of planters. In 1919, he gave clear 
instructions to this effect: 
We would say that we do not wish to do anything that would 
tend to prejudice the returns of the European growers, such 
as cutting an undue proportion of Indian grown cane now that 
full supplies are available. 15 
There were, then, no grounds for the fear among some Europeans that CSR 
wanted to encourage Indian settlement at their expense - a fear that 
increased in 1917 when the Nausori mill discontinued the practice of paying 
6d a ton less for Indian than for European cane. For Knox, settlement was 
simply a precaution in case the supply of immigrant labour should fail; 
so long as immigration continued the plantation system would last. 
The survival of planters also depended on control over labour 
costs. At the beginning of the war, CSR tried to cushion planters against 
14 Lautoka to H.O., 12 Aug. 1920, CSR F 4.0/5/-; Colonial Sugar 
Refining Co. Ltd, Mr. W.P. Dixon - chief architect of the small 
farm system in Fiji; Dixon, 'Leasing to Indian tenant farmers', 
10 Oct. 1917, CSR F 4.0/5/-; Dixon, 'Notes for the Acting Manager, 
Nausori', 28 Aug. 1918, Fiji Inspectors (Rutledge & Dixon), 1915-28. 
15 H.O. to Lautoka, 20 Aug. 1919, Private Ltbk. Out, 17 (1919), 305. 
16 Nausori to H.O., 1 Nov. 1917; 'Notes for the information of 
H.M.'s Government', 1918, CSR F 4.0/6/-. 
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what it realized was an unavoidable rise in the pricc of labour. To help 
them meet an increase in the minimum wage from Is to Is 6d, in 1915 the 
company introduced a war-time bonus of 2s 6d per ton of cane. It also 
gave planters up to 6d a week per man to help defray the higher cost of 
providing rations, which by law had to be supplied for the first six months 
of a person's indenture. From 1916, however, the emphasis switched to 
helping planters solve the problem of escalating labour costs themselves. 
A proposal by Knox that CSR meet part of the increased expense to planters 
of importing immigrants was defeated by the Board, thanks largely to the 
arguments of Dixon. If CSR promised to pay the extra passage money, there 
would be less incentive for planters to economise in their use of labour. 
A smaller labour force, both on company estates and on those of planters, 
18 
was essential if the shortage of labour was to be overcome. In pressing 
this point, CSR could draw on its experience in Queensland where high 
labour costs since the turn of the century had led to the adoption of 
labour-saving devices. So the number of horses employed in Fiji was 
increased and motor tractors introduced, while Indian growers were encour-
aged to use better farm implements. Before 1916 an average throughout the 
year of thirteen to fourteen labourers had been used to cultivate one 
hundred acres. Within four years this had been reduced by 20%. In 
addition, more strenuous efforts were made to secure a permanent supply 
of labour by settling Indians on the edges of plantations. All these 
measures were quite successful at first, especially in western Viti Levu 
and at Labasa. But on the Rewa, they failed to prevent CSR's tenants 19 allowing their estates to revert to the company after 1915. 
Beside the frugal use of manpower, CSR was determined to prevent 
the shortage of labour pushing wages to an uneconomic level. Before late 
1919 it refused a further increase in cane prices, so limiting the ability 
17 Dixon, 'Supplementary notes for the Manager, Rarawai', 14 June 
1915, Fiji Inspectors (Rutledge & Dixon) 1915-28. 
18 Knox to H.O., 9 Oct. 1916, Private Ltbk. Out, 12 (1916-7), 116-9. 
19 Dixon, 'Crisis in the Fiji sugar industry 1920/1925', CSR N,2.0/ 
-/I; 'Statement by CSR for use in discussion with planters, etc., 
16/1/22', Private Ltbk. Out, 23 (1921-2), 113-7; Dixon, 'Notes 
for the Manager, Rarawai mill', 30 July 1918, Fiji Inspectors 
(Rutledge & Dixon) 1915-28; H.O. to Nausori, 27 March 1916, 
Private Ltbk. Out, 11 (1915-6), 312-3 
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of planLers to raise wages. Pressure was put on tenants not to pay more 
in order to compete for labour, the extension of credit by CSR being a 
useful weapon to prevent those on more profitable estates getting out of 
20 
line. Furthermore, on top of all its other advantages to CSR, the 
encouragement of Indian cane cultivation was seen as a way to strengthen 
resistance to demands for better wages. In 1917 Indian growers at Lautoka 
had defeated an attempt by labourers to raise mill wages by promising to 21 
work the mill themselves. Thereafter, CSR wanted to bind growers still 
more closely to the company. The resident inspector of immigrants at 
Lautoka, S.S. Lord, reported in 1920: 
With the ingenuity which is characteristic of this company 
the policy seems to be to create in each district a small 
number of wealthy cane planters, and these will act as a 
buffer between the Co. and the ever-increase-demanding wage 
earner. The interests of these affluent and influential 
Indian cane growers will be drawn towards the company, for 
they becomc employers of labour and thus wage payers. 22 
CSR's own files show that this was an accurate description of company 
policy. In 1921, though, it was noticed that while CSR's control over 
harvesting gangs enabled it to regulate the wages paid by growers to 
cutters, wages of Indians employed in cultivation work were not so easy to 
23 control. 
Not only was the company anxious to prevent an increase in 
current wages: it was also determined that any new scheme of immigration 
should not be on terms that would cause labour costs to rise in future. 
Thus it was utterly opposed to a scheme of 'aided colonization' devised 
in 1916 by an Inter-Departmental Conference in London. The scheme would 
have entailed a massive rise in importation costs since a wife and up to 
two children could have been introduced with each adult male. Immigrants 
would work for only three instead of five years, so reducing the period 
20 H.O. to Nausori, 6 April 1916, Private Ltbk. Out, 11 (1915-6), 
339; H.O. to Lautoka, 9 Feb. 1921, Private Ltbk. Out, 20 (1920-
1), 906-7. 
21 H.O. to Lautoka, 4 July 1917, Private Ltbk. Out, 13 (1917-8), 105. 
22 C.S.O./M.P. 6365/20. 
23 Dixon, 'Notes for the Manager, Rarawai', 9 Oct. 1919, Fiji 
Inspectors (Rutledge & Dixon) 1915-28; H.O. to Nausori, 26 Sept. 
1921, Private Ltbk. Out, 22 (1921), 275-6. 
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over which the expense of introduction could be recouped. Moreover, after 
six months in the colony the immigrant would be free to move from one 
employer to another, thereby increasing for planters the difficulty of 
controlling labour. The Conference suggested that the cost of importation 
be met by a levy on each employer, payable four times a year and based on 
the number of recent immigrants in his service during the previous three 
months. In Fiji, however, in order to shift the cost from the planter to 
the miller, government rejected this last suggestion in favour of an export 
tax on sugar. It was not surprising that CSR and the Vancouver-Fiji Sugar 
2 A 
Co. united in opposition to the scheme. In 1919-20 an alternative plan 
for state-aided migration was advanced by a government backed unofficial 
mission to India, led by the Bishop of Polynesia. The plan was for immi-
grants to come specifically to settle on the land without any obligation 
to work for a particular employer, their passages being paid from a common 
fund raised in the colony. Though Hughes discussed the idea with the 
mission and made suggestions, the scheme would have been no solution as 
far as CSR was concerned. There was no guarantee of a continued supply of 
cheap labour, while the likelihood of a special tax on the industry to 25 
cover the cost of importation remained. Though public opinion in India 
and industrial unrest in Fiji during 1920 and 1921 were more responsible 
than CSR for the failure to introduce either of these schemes, it was clear 
that the terms on which the company wanted a resumption of immigration 
were totally incompatible with political realities in India. Knox reacted 
with demands that the British government coerce India over the question, 
that it pay as much attention to business interests in Fiji as it had to 
those in Malaya and Ceylon whose supply of Indian labour continued after 
the war, and that it honour Lord Hardinge's supposed pledge in 1916 that 
after the war a form of state-aided migration from India would be resumed. 
Although these demands were totally unrealistic, given his opposition to 
a rise in labour costs they were the only option left to Knox. 
24 C.P. 89/1917; 63/1918. 
25 Rodwell to C.O., 181, 3 July 1920, C.O. 83/152; 'Notes of an 
interview between the Governor of Fiji and Mr. Thomas Hughes...', 
end. with Rodwell to C.O., tel., 22 July 1920, C.O. 83/152. 
26 These views were repeatedly expressed in correspondence with the 
Fiji government and during Knox's visit to the Colonial Office 
in 1922. A fuller account of this is in Gillion, The Fiji 
Indians, chs. 4, 5. 
122 
The General Manager's approach was criticized by some of the 
company's senior officers like Dixon and Hughes, and by government. It 
was felt that Knox's views were old-fashioned, that he was insensitive to 
public opinion in both India and Fiji. The Colonial Office described him 
as a 'peppery aristocrat', and as 'an irascible autocrat of 75, notorious 
27 
for his methods of dealing with strikers and business opponents'. Since 
the 1870s, through his single-minded devotion to profit and his grasp of 
the technicalities of sugar production, Knox had been largely responsible 
for the success and expansion of CSR. But now, during and after the First 
World War, he was as much dominated by, as dominating, the company to 
which he had contributed so much. His obstinacy over wages and immigration, 
expressed in open attacks on the British government, was not simply the 
idiosyncrasy of an old man. Rather, it was a reflection of commercial 
realities, of an understanding where the best interests of CSR share-
holders lay. 
And the one place they did not lie was in the distribution of 
windfall profits in higher wages. Since it was generally expected that 
sugar prices would fall after the war, or after their short-lived boom 
following the war, Knox was determined to restrict any increase in wages 
and cane prices to what the industry could support once the world price 
returned to 'normal', the pre-war level. It would be easy to raise prices 
and wages but much more difficult to reduce them later. Moreover, it 
was by no means certain that a future supply of labour could be arranged. 
Apart from the problems with India, the import of Chinese and Japanese 
labour was impossible for political reasons, while difficulties with CSR's 
settlement schemes gave little hope - except to Dixon - that Indian cane 28 
growers would provide an eventual solution to the shortage of labour. 
There was, therefore, a very real possibility that the industry would 
collapse. 'In such circumstances', Knox told Sir Cecil Rodwell (governor, 
1918-25), 
27 Minute by J.M. Green, Rodwell to C.O., conf., 22 Aug. 1919, 
C.O. 83/147; Memo, by Green, Fell to C.O., tel., 22 Dec. 1921, 
C.O. 83/158. 
28 Knox to Rodwell, 8 Aug. 1919, Private Ltbk. Out, 17 (1919), 
269-76; Dixon, memo., 2 Sept. 1921; Knox, 'W.P.D. note - Fiji 
cultivation', 5 Sept. 1921, CSR F A.0/7/-. 
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It behoves us to husband, as far as practicable, any windfall, 
derived from high prices, so that in the event of a collapse, 
we may be in a position to return to our shareholders as 
large a proportion as possible of the capital they have sunk 
in the colony. 29 
In other words, the industry had become particularly high risk and corres-
pondingly high profits were required. 
CSR's determination to limit the rise in labour costs increased 
the friction between company and government that had existed before the 
war. Officials appreciated the industry's need for cheap labour, but felt 
that if the company had spent more on improving the welfare of plantation 
workers not only would the industrial unrest that hit the colony in 1920 
and 1921 have been avoided, but also the chance of finding an immigration 
scheme acceptable to India would have been increased. Although officials 
readily accused Knox of being politically naive, they were hardly being 
more astute themselves in believing that India could be persuaded to allow 
immigration to resume on terms that would have been economically viable 
30 
for Fiji. Nevertheless, government felt that CSR should do - and should 
have done - more to share its profits with others in the industry, 
especially since Rodwell estimated that the cost of living for a single 
male Indian had risen from up to 7s a week before the war to as much as 
31 
12s in 1919. At the same time, the price of raw sugar had risen from 
an average of £11 in 1913 to £16 in 1919, reaching a peak of £29 the follow-
ing year (see Table 5:2 below). Despite CSR's protestations to the 
contrary, government felt there was plenty for the company to distribute 
in higher wages, and in higher cane prices which could be passed on in 
better wages by planters. Eyre Hutson, administering the government in 
1916, estimated that though the increase to date in sugar prices represented 
an extra profit to CSR of up to £5 a ton of raw sugar, the bonus of 2s 6d 32 
to planters represented a cost to the company of only £1. Furthermore, 
in order to minimise increases in the price of refined sugar in New Zealand, 
the company had arranged to sell the bulk of Fiji's output during and 
29 Knox to Rodwell, 3 Dec. 1919, 'E.W.K. Special', 4 (1909-37), 109-13. 
30 See Gillxon, The Fiji Indians, 40-6, 61-5. 
31 Rodwell to C.O., 107, 18 Sept. 1919, C.O. 83/147. 
32 Hutson to C.O., 58, 18 Feb. 1916, C.O. 83/130. 
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TABLE 5:2 
Quantity and value of sugar exports, 1913-23 
Year Tons exported 
Value per ton 
(f.o.b.) 
Raw sugar prices on 
world 'free' market 
(c.i.f. London) 
1913 94,710 £11 £10 
191A 93,773 11 19 
1915 85,562 12 19 
1916 120,528 14 22 
1917 97,335 15 27 
1918 63,010 16 25 
1919 64,348 16 30 
1920 72,985 29 66 
1921 72,624 28 25 
1922 71,731 19 16 
1923 44,108 20 26 
Source: J.C. Potts, 'The sugar industry in Fiji. Its Beginnings 
and Development' , Transactions d. 3 Proceedings of the Fiji 
Society, 7 (1958--9), 125. A.G. Lowndes (ed.). South 
Pacific Enterpri. se, 443. 
Note: These are approximate figures per calendar year, not per 
crushing season. The c.i.f. London price was rather higher 
than the f.o.b. price of Java raws which were a better 
guide to the open market value of exports from Fiji. 
immediately after the war at prices, except in 1921 and 1922, below that 
on the world 'free' market (see Table 5:2) - an arrangenient by which 
producers in Fiji effectively subsidised the consumer. This aroused 
indignation among officials who, not entirely understanding the position 
at first, suspected CSR of submitting misleading returns to the Customs 
Department. In compiling statistics, government relied on CSR and the 
Vancouver-Fiji Sugar Co. for information about the quantity and value of 
sugar exports. The value of exports in 1915, not only to New Zealand but 
also to Australia and Canada, was reported by these companies to be £12 
a ton, whereas on the open market, as measured by the value of Java raws, 
they would have fetched nearer £15 10s Od. Similarly, exports of molasses 
were valued by CSR at £1 a ton, although government had it 'on good 
authority' that the open market value was twice that. Officials were 
incensed by what they took to be a 'monstrous understatement' of export 
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values, and were even more convinced that CSR could do more to improve the 
33 welfare of Indians. 
Though officials strongly disagreed with the company's attitude, 
they did little to force a change of heart. True, an export tax on sugar 
was introduced in 1916 first at 5s a ton, then the next year at 10s and 
finally at £1 in 1920. A tax on molasses exports of El a ton followed the 
year after. In 1920 an excess profits tax, directed mainly at CSR, was 
also introduced. These measures increased the colony's share of the 
exceptional profits being made but by the time they were introduced, or 
increased as in the case of the export tax on sugar, a large proportion of 
the profits had already accrued to the millers. For CSR, though any 
taxation was deplored, these taxes were better than being forced to raise 
wages and cane prices. l-Jhen raw sugar prices returned to normal, it would 
probably be easier to persuade government to reduce taxation than to 
persuade labourers to accept lower wages. Indeed, what is striking about 
their attitude is that though officials believed CSR should encourage an 
increase in wages, they did nothing to ensure that this was brought about. 
Rodwell opposed raising the statutory minimum wage of indentured labourers 
3A 
in 1919 lest this make the industries of the colony uneconomic, and when 
in November of the same year wages of unskilled employees of government in 
Suva were increased from 2s to 2s 6d, officials made sure that wages on 
the Rewa and Navua did not rise by the same amount (see Table 5:3 below). 
Parity between government urban and rural workers was abandoned so as not 
to put pressure on wages in the sugar industry. Whatever officials might 
say - and significantly in terms of what they were saying, the 1920 strike 
by labourers in Suva, Rewa and Navua began as a protest against longer 
hours of employment (for the same wages) in the Public Works Department -
the reluctance of government to force up wages in the sugar industry 
reinforced CSR's strategy of limiting wage increases. 
The outcome of this policy was a decline in the real incomes of 
free Indian labourers. Table 5:3 shows that wages of non-government 
employees on the Rewa and Navua rose by 33% between 1913 and 1920. A 
33 Sec. of Sugar Commission to C.O., 23 June 1913, C.O. 83/140; 
Escott to C.O., 89, 4 April 1917, C.O. 83/136; minutes on Rodwell 
to C.O., conf., 22 Aug. 1919, C.O. 83/147. 
34 Rodwell to C.O., 107, 18 Sept. 1919, C.O. 83/147. 
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TABLE 5:3 
Movements in wage rates of unskilled labourers in Suva^ 
Rewa and Navua, 1913-20 
Government employees Non-government employees 
r 1 2 "'-'ear Suva Rewa & Navua Year Rewa Navua 
1913 2s Od 2s Od 1913 Is 6d Is 6d 
1919 2s 6d 2s Od 1915 2s Od Is 6d 
1917 2s Od 2s Od 
Source: 'Commission to Inquire into the Cost of Living', C.P. 
46/1920. 
Notes: 1 Based on CSR wages 
2 Based on Vancouver-Fiji Sugar Co. wages 
commission to inquire into the cost of living, appointed in 1920 and 
chaired by the Acting Chief Justice A.K.Young, estimated that in the same 
period the average price of Indian foodstuffs had risen by between 86% and 
35 
almost 100%, depending on hov^r items were weighted. Moreover, the increase 
in rural wages had occurred before the end of 1917, whereas much of the 
rise in prices had come later. There was particular distress in 1919 
because most of the rice and sharps consumed in Fiji was imported from 
Australia, which in turn imported from India. The flow of trade that year 
was disrupted by a ban on the export of rice from India following the 
widespread failure of the crop, by a prohibition on the export of sharps 
from New South Wales and by a shipping strike in Australia. The situation 
was aggravated still further because merchants in Fiji used the shortage 3 6 
to profiteer at the consumer's expense. In early 1920 labourers in Suva, 
Rexca and Navua went on strike. Though the stoppage had important political 
dimensions, it was essentially a protest at the steep rise in the cost of 
living. There was talk of strikers demanding a wage of five shillings, and 
resentment was expressed against merchants who were held responsible for 
price increases. The strike was quickly brought to an end through a display 
of force by government which, in an effort to reduce the cost of living, 
soon after began to subsidise the sale of imported rice and encourage the 
35 C.P. 46/1920. 
36 Knox to J.M. Hedstrom, 30 June 1921, Private Ltbk. Out, 22 
(1921), 19-20; H.O. to Lautoka, 25 April 1919, Private Ltbk., 
17 (1919), 55-6. 
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local cultivation of foodstuffs. Subsequently the hut tax, the main direct 
tax on Indians, was abolished as were customs duties on certain food 
imports. The reaction of officials, then, was not to increase wages which 
planters and other European employers might be unable to afford: rather, 
it was to switch the burden of taxation (through higher export duties and 
the excess profits tax) away from Indians to sugar companies, who were 
doing exceptionally well from phenomenally high prices in 1920. Since the 
high cost of living was likely to be short-lived - prices would fall when 
the post-war boom was over - it was natural for government to prefer as a 
solution temporary relief from taxation raLher tlian wage increases wliich 
might be difficult to revoke later. This was consistent with CSR's view, 
37 though the company objected to paying more in taxation itself. 
The 1920 strike was confined to south and southeast Viti Levu 
and did not affect cane districts elsewhere, even though the Indian 
community throughout Fiji had come on hard times following poor cane 
harvests in 1918 and 1919. Not only were labourers in difficulty. Many 
growers were heavily in debt, having borrowed large sums to obtain land 
at values which had risen sharply during the war. Under the leadership 
of T. Riaz, in 1919 Indian growers in western Viti Levu proposed an 
ambitious scheme under which CSR x^uld take over their debts, but the 
company refused to become involved because of the complexity of the problem 
leaving it might be thought a situation ripe for industrial action by 
o o 
growers as well. Yet outside Suva, Rewa and Navua, where many growers 
supported the strike, none occurred in 1920. Why was this? The main 
reason was that, compared to other districts, a higher proportion of Indian 
cane farmers in Rewa and Navua occupied extremely small farms - a couple 
of acres or less. Consequently, off-farm employment and wage rates were 
more important to them than to growers elsewhere. Suva was a major centre 
for casual employment. There was no town of equivalent size in western 
Viti Levu or Vanua Levu. The introduction of longer hours for the same 
v,7ages in the Public Works Department, which sparked off the 1920 strike. 
37 A more detailed account of the strike, and also that of 1921, ^^^  
with a stress on political aspects is given in Gillion, The Fiji 
Indians, chs. 2, 3. 
38 Lautoka to H.O., tel., 23 Feb. 1920, Private Ltbk. Out, 18 
(1919-20), 207-9; H.O. to Lautoka, 28 Feb. 1920, Private Ltbk. 
Out, 18 (1919-20), 211-2. 
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represented an attempt to reduce hourly rates. Since government was the 
largest employer of unskilled labour in Suva, this was bound to influence 
the wages for casual labour in the city, thereby affecting a large number 
of part-time growers on the Rewa. So they were willing to make common 
cause with the urban labourers on strike. 
In contrast, cane growers on the west of the two main islands 
were less dependent on casual labour as a source of income. This was true 
even of those on very small farms, since for climatic reasons yields were 
higher than in Rewa and Navua. CSR appeased these growers with a number 
of concessions. First, the company promised to increase the bonus on cane 
prices for 1920 from 2s 6d to 5s, making a total price of 15s. Under 
pressure from growers, by mid-1920 the bonus had been raised to lis with 
39 
the offer of an extra 20s for every acre planted in cane. Thus cane 
prices in 1920 would be over 100% higher than in 1913, meaning that if 
the general price level had moved at the same rate as in Suva, Rewa and 
Navua, real cane prices would have been maintained, if not slightly 
increased. Growers would be less likely to support a strike by labourers 
and, indeed, might be expected to defeat one as they had in 1917. With 
growers satisfied, CSR was able to make a less generous offer to labourers, 
increasing the bonus on wages by 6d to make a total wage of 2s 6d a day. 
This represented a 66% rise on the 1913 rate, which was almost certainly 
not enough to compensate for changes in the cost of living. Yet without 
the support of growers, who could always man the mills in the event of a 
strike, wage earners were in no position to push for a better deal. CSR 
had capitalized on divisions within the Indian community. 
The bonus on cane prices and wages was a breach of CSR's policy 
of limiting wage and price increases. The company had not abandoned this 
as a long term objective, but the exceptionally high world sugar prices 
in 1920 made it eager to mill as large a crop of cane that year as possible. 
Profits would then be increased, placing it in a stronger position should 
one or more of its Fiji mills have to be closed. However, the world price 
soon began to fall, as CSR had long predicted it would, and in late 1920 
the company announced that the price it would pay for cane in 1921 would 
39 11.0., to Lautoka, tel., 30 Jan. 1920, Private Ltbk. Out, 18 (1919-
20), 141-A; H.O. to Dixon, tel., 1 June 1920, CSR F 1.0/3/3. 
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be 20s - noL 21s - a ton, and that it would stop paying the 20s an acre 
40 
bonus. This might have been accepted by growers if government had had 
greater success in reducing the cost of living, but the abolition of 
customs duties on certain items was not passed on by merchants to the 
consumer. Merchants, who to the disgust of Knox still charged one price 41 
to Europeans and a higlier one to others, reaped the benefit. The 
reduction in cane payments encouraged growers, particularly those on small 
farms who did not hire workers, to support labourers in western Viti Levu 
so that they struck in early 1921. Though it had political significance, 
tlie strike was caused mainly by economic grievances. In the view of T.E. 
Fell, the Colonial Secretary, 'There is no doubt that there is a political 
aspect to this question... but the industrial aspect is being made the A 2 
peg on which to hang these political aspirations.' Demands for improved 
conditions of work and a 12s wage were made. 
The strike lasted for six months till mid-August, and the 
principal concession won from the company - belatedly at that - was an 
offer to import essential supplies and sell them to labourers at cost. 
Despite pressure from some of his colleagues, Knox had refused to make 43 
this concession before lest CSR alienate the business community in Fiji. 
The company, indeed, had been so concerned about its public image during 
the war that for a while it had financed the Fiji Times, so as to have a 44 
newspaper sympathetic to its point of view. Evidence of profiteering 
by merchants, however, especially after the tariff changes in 1920, 
finally persuaded Knox to try and reduce the cost of living of Indians. 
Yet the concession was not enough to induce strikers to return to work and 
they stayed out for another two months. The company was helped in defeat-
ing the strike by the long term interest of growers in having their cane 
crushed. If the strike was prolonged much beyond August, harvesting and 
milling would be disrupted. As early as April CSR noticed a rift developing 
40 H.O. to Lautoka, 15 Oct. 1920, tel., CSR F 1.0/3/3. 
41 C.S.O./M.P. 3015/21; 3563/21. 
42 Fell to Farquhar, 28 Sept. 1921, Nausori Private & Confidential 
1918-29. 
43 Knox to Hedstrom, 30 June 1921, Private Ltbk. Out, 22 (1921),19-20. 
44 Joske to Dixon, 13 March 1917, CSR F 2.0/4/7. See also Fenner 
to Rothe, 7 May 1914, CSR F 2.0/4/7. 
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beLwecn Indian labourers and growers, aiid it sought to widen the breach 
by offering inducements to leading growers. Knox even thought that a 
few of the latter had encouraged a strike early in the year so that it 
46 
would be over by the time crushing began. Also important was that CSR 
could draw on support from the rest of the community. With the support 
of the cliiefs, the missions recruited Fijian labour to do essential work 
on plantations, particularly in looking after the livestock which represent-
ed a significant capital investment. This played some part in ending the 
strike by showing the ability of planters and the company to sit it out. 
There was also support from government, whose action to prevent intimi-47 
dation encouraged a return to work. So the dispute was brought to a 
close. The strength of CSR's position had been demonstrated, enabling it 
without another strike to announce in early 1922 that, because of a further 
drop in the world price, wages would be reduced to Is 6d a day and cane 
prices to 10s. 
Although CSR had tried to prevent the shortage of labour leading 
to an increase in costs, no permanent solution to the shortage had been 
devised. Instead, the decline in Indian real incomes had made the problem 
worse by encouraging a substantial number of immigrants to return to India. 
48 
4,741 left in 1920. The fall in living standards also ended any linger-
ing hopes that India would allow systematic emigration to resume. In 1922 
a deputation from India arrived in Fiji to see if conditions in the colony 
might justify a scheme of free Indian migration. The deputation was 
appalled by CSR's announced reduction in cane prices and wages, and 
advised against any such scheme. Not only had no resumption of Indian 
immigration been arranged, but by early 1922 no alternative supply of 
cheap labour had been found. The various attempts at Indian settlement 
45 H.O. to Rarawai, 18 April 1921, Private Ltbk. Out, 21 (1921), 
235-6; H.O. to Lautoka, tel., 6 April 1921, Private Ltbk. Out, 
21 (1921), 254; H.O. to Lautoka, 11 May 1921, Private Ltbk. 
Out, 21 (1921), 369. 
46 H.O. to Rarawai, 11 May 1921, Private Ltbk. Out, 21 (1921), . 
364-5. 
47 H.O. to Lautoka, 5 July 1921, Private Ltbk. Out, 22 (1921), 
24-5; H.O. to Lautoka, 30 July 1921, Private Ltbk. Out, 22 (1921), 
9 6 - 8 . 
48 C.P. 40/1920. 
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liad noL proved much ol: a success. Conse(|uen L J y, p.lanLers who liad uot 
already abandoned their esLaLes did so afLer the .1921 strike, which had 
prevented planting and cultivation. The Melbourne Trust Co., which owned 
Penang, and the Vancouver-Fiji Sugar Co. announced that they would close. 
With growers refusing to plant cane for 10s a ton and labourers refusing 
to work lor Is 6d, CSR tlrreatened to do tlie same. The industry, as it had 
49 
hitherto been run, appeared to be on the verge of collapse. 
The salvage of the Fiji sugar industry 
Tlie industry^^ was saved by two things. The first amounted to subsidies 
from the rest of the community, agreed in 1922 during a crisis visit by 
Knox to the Colonial Office.^^ Export taxes on the industry were removed, 
though several years later a duty on sugar exports was again introduced. 
This temporary relief from taxation affected those outside the industry 
because government expenditure - say on the Department of Agriculture 
which was concerned with other crops than sugar - was reduced as a result. 
More significant was the effect on Indians who, from 1923, were required 
to pay a residential tax of £1 per male aged betxjeen 15 and 60. A poll 
tax on Indians had been considered soon after the abolition of the hut tax, 
which had left them as the only major ethnic group not paying a direct 
tax - a situation, government feared, that might lead to protests particu-
larly from the Fijians. Fell had originally hoped that the poll tax would 
be graduated, £1 being a maximum, and that cases of hardship ranging from 
illness to hurricane damage would be made exempt. The tax on Fijians 
could be reduced so that overall they would pay the same as Indians. The 52 
abolition of export duties, which had raised £44,000 in 1922, prevented 
Fell's hopes from being realized. The residential tax - a poll tax in 
effect - was introduced in an ungraduated form, and virtually without 
49 C.S.O./M.P. 6703/21; 6788/21; 1322/22; H.O. to Lautoka, 27 April 
1922, Private Ltbk., 23 (1921-2), 364; confidential appendix. 
50 That is, the operations of CSR. The Navua mill was never re-
opened. The Melbourne Trust Co. started crushing again at Penang 
in 1925, but only so it could sell the mill to CSR in running order. 
51 Rodwell to C.O., tel., 4 Aug. 1922, C.O. 83/161; CSR F 4.0/2/1; 
4.0/10/8. 
52 'Export Duty on Sugar and Molasses', C.P. 13/1923. 
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exempLions. There were proUesLs against it from CSR, who believed (wrongly 
as it happened) that the tax would lead to further industrial unrest, but 
having abolished export duties on sugar, government was desperate for the 
£37,000 the new measure would yield. If this had not been the case, the 
introduction of the tax might well have been delayed. Officials justified 
the new imposition as a substitute for the hut tax, but under the latter 
Indians had paid an average of only 10s per adult male and CSR, in 1919, 
had paid £7,635 of the total £23,684 raised in this way. Under the new 
tax Indians would pay 20s a head and CSR nothing. In short, CSR had 
obtained temporary relief from taxation while that given to Indians, by 
the abolition of the hut tax, had been removed. Since Indians were expected 
to benefit from a continuation of the sugar industry they were, in effect, 
being asked to help pay the cost of their own salvation, as well as that 
53 of CSR. 
Tlie more important subsidy, as far as CSR was concerned, was an 
imperial preference on imports of raw sugar to Britain. This had been 
introduced in 1919, but it was not till his visit to London that Knox 
realized the preference applied to Fiji, as well as to the West Indies 
and Mauritius. This was of great significance as raw sugar production in 
Australia had increased rapidly since the war. The dominion was about to 
become not only self-sufficient but an exporter of raws as well. This 
meant that the Australian market, which would have been valuable because 
of the relatively high price of refined sugar, was now closed to Fiji, 
forcing the colony to rely on exports to Canada and New Zealand. The 
former granted a preference on sugar imported from the Empire, but the 
latter did not. By exporting mainly to Britain rather than New Zealand, 
the British preference would enable Fiji to sell almost entirely in 
preferential markets. Most of New Zealand's requirements could be met by 
low cost imports from Java, allowing the price of refined sugar to be kept 
to a minimum. Knox calculated that the British preference of £3 15 Od a 
ton was worth only 35s in Fiji because of higher transport costs than from 
the West Indies. Nevertheless, this would enable the company to increase 
cane prices to 13s 6d a ton and pay a bonus of 6d a day to labourers. CSR 
could also continue the supply of essential clothing and foodstuffs at 
53 C.S.O./M.P. 3002/21; CSR F 2.0/4/14; Fell to C.O., tel., 
25 June 1924, C.O. 83/169; confidential appendix. 
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cost price, so brin;];ing Ulic LotaJ wage to tlic ccniivalcnt of just over two 
shillings a day. Finalized after Knox's return from London, this arrange-
ment was enough to persuade Indians to plant cane and enter cash employment. 
The imperial preference is often said to be a subsidy by consumers in 
Britain, but it also entailed a subsidy by consumers in Fiji. After intro-
ducing the preference in 1919, the United Kingdom government asked all 
sugar colonies to reciprocate by granting a preference on British imports. 
In Fiji duties on articles of non-British origin were raised by an average 
margin of 125^ %. Henceforth, consumers would either have to pay more for 
54 imports, or they would have to purchase less preferred British goods. 
The second reason for the survival of the sugar industry was 
the settlement of Indians as cane growers. Bearing in mind the general 
failure by 1922 of CSR's settlement schemes, Knox had not been very 
optimistic about switching from estate to smallholder production within 
a short space of time.^^ Consequently, during his visit to London he had 
linked his willingness to increase wages and prices to the renewal of 
immigration. Yet despite concessions made by Fiji, the Indian government 
was still not prepared to permit a scheme of state-aided migration. With 
no prospect of an increase in the labour supply, there arose a clear need 
to proceed as rapidly as possible with Indian settlement so as to overcome 
the shortage of labour. To this was added the fear that wage-earners 
might take advantage of the situation and put pressure on the company to 
improve rates of pay. Given the experience of 1920 and 1921, head office 
thought that Indians were likely to be more loyal to the company as cane 
growers than as labourers. The Labasa manager was told in 1925, with 
reference to the 30,000-odd acres still farmed by CSR: 
the further we progress in the work of bringing these back 
into productivity the greater becomes our stake in the 
cultivation, and our vulnerability to attack by labour 
agitators or by those who may desire to put pressure on us 
by interfering with our labour supply... [Therefore] we 
must push on in the direction of reducing the risk in the 
only way possible, viz. the curtailment of area by leasing 
54 C.S.O./M.P. 5027/21; 5918/21; confidential appendix. 
55 H.O. to Nausori, 7 Dec. 1922, Private Ltbk. Out, 24 (1922-3), 
224-5. 
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to farmers - wiio will provide their own labour supply - as 
rapidly as suitable tenants can be found. 56 
Settlement was seen as a means of labour control. 
The scheme that was finally devised owed much to the experiments 
in Indian settlement since 1912, and much too to the efforts of Dixon, who 
throughout had remained confident about the final outcome of these trials. 
In 1922-3 there was discussion about what form Indian settlement should 
take. The Rarawai mill favoured a continuation of the forty to fifty acre 
settlement scheme: Lautoka was against it. The solution was a compromise, 
The practice of close company supervision of growers, as developed at Ba, 
was ad')pted at all the mills. The owiership of farms as single units, 
rather than as four separate blocks under the settlement area sclieme, was 
also continued. But instead of leasing farms of only four acres, or of 
between forty and fifty acres, it was decided to lease them in sizes of 
eight to twelve acres. R.T. Rutledge, CSR's Inspector, concluded from a 
visit to Fiji in 1925, 
Even on those Estates where l:he labour supply is short I 
believe the leasing of 8-12 acre blocks will be found most 
satisfactory in the long run... . For every 8-12 acres so 
leased we reduce the labour requirements by one, whereas for 
every 4 acre block leased we lose one man for the greater 
part of the time if not wholly, and still have 6 to 8 acref; 
left on our hands which the tenant would be capable of 
cultivating for himself. 59 
Thus the main disadvantages of the two earlier schemes were overcome -
underemployment on small farms and the employment of wage labour on, or 
subdivision of, large farms. Settlement on this basis proceeded apace, 
and was largely completed by the early 1930s. In the selection of tenants, 
head office asked that priority be given to those not currently employed 
by the company, so as not to deplete the size of the labour force. 
56 H.O. to Nausori, 6 May 1925, CSR F 4.0/5/-. Many estates had 
gone out of cultivation as a result of the 1921 strike. 
57 Rarawai to H.O., 16 Feb. 1923; Lautoka to H.O., 2 Sept. 1922, 
CSR F 4.0/5/-. 
58 H.O. to Rarawai & Lautoka, 15 May 1924, Private Ltbk. Out, 26 
(1923-4), 490-4. 
59 Rutledge to H.O., 17 June 1925, Fiji Inspectors (Rutledge & 
Dixon) 1915-28. 
60 H.O. to Labasa, 4 April 1924, Private Ltbk. Out, 26 (1923-4), 
371-7. 
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Consequently, those on non-company land tended to become tenants of CSR, 
while those working for the company in the 1920s more often became con-
tractors - that is, they occupied Fijian or European land and sold cane to 
CSR by agreement. 
The result of settlement was that the cost of cane was stabilized 
at around the level in 1917-18, before the end of immigration had had its 
full impact (see Table 5:4), whereas returns to the grower from days worked 
on his farm were substantially more than he would have earned as a labourer, 
TABLE 5:4 
Cost of cane to CSR^ 1913-30 
Year Cost of cane Year Cost of cane 
1913 £4 10s 7d 1922 £7 10s 3d 
1914 4 4 11 1923 10 10 5 
1915 5 5 9 1924 7 16 7 
1916 5 0 11 1925 6 7 11 
1917 5 5 10 1926 7 3 7 
1918 6 9 1 1927 6 8 4 
1919 6 12 2 1928 5 15 1 
1920 9 4 5 1929 6 12 2 
1921 8 11 6 1930 6 9 0 
Source: CSR S 2.0-2, Library, CSR Ltd. 
Average net returns from growing cane in 1930 were estimated to be £9 12s Od 
61 62 per acre cropped. Assuming at most twenty man days per acre, the 
average return for a day's work would have been 9s 7d. The equivalent 
wage rates for Indians had risen, yet the cost of cane to CSR remained 
stable. Why was this? One reason probably was that the smallfarmer used 
his labour more efficiently than when he worked on plantations. With a 
greater interest in the outcome of his work, he achieved a higher output 
per hour. Another was that part of the cost of supervision on plantations 
was distributed as extra income to the cane grower. Instead of labour 
61 Memo, by J.R. Pearson, 15 March 1932, C.S.O. 2558/30. 
62 In 1959 it was estimated that 10-15 man days a year were required 
to wo rk one acre of cane land. This was probably less than the 
number in the 1920s and '30s, for in the 1950s tractors were 
increasingly used to plough cane farms. 20 man days is taken as 
a maximum figure. Burns et al., 'Report on the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Natural Resources and Population Trends of the 
Colony of Fiji, 1959', C.P. 1/1960, 40-1. 
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gangs being supervised for culLivaLion work eacli day, the self-employed 
farmer supervised himself. Though overseers paid frequent visits to 
growers, the amount of detailed direction was less than on plantations. 
This was reflected in the number of overseers employed by CSR in the late 
1930s. One overseer looked after between 100 and 200 farms, the equivalent 
6 3 
of 1000 to 2000 acres or more. On plantations there had been at least 
one European, often several, per 500 to 1000 acres. As well as the saving 
in supervision costs, growers had the benefit of profits sometimes made 
by Europeans or the company over and above the expense of supervision. So 
it was that growers could do very well from the smallfarm system, while 
CSR would be no worse off. Clearly, the company's main objective had been 
achieved. 
By keeping its operations viable, CSR could derive full benefit 
from the windfall profits it had made in Fiji since 1913. For most of 
this period the company's Fiji and New Zealand business had been run as a 
separate enterprise, the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. (Fiji and New Zealand) 
Ltd, established in 1915. This was a financial device more than anything, 
ownership being unaffected. Shareholders of CSR held preference shares in 
the new company, while a small number of ordinary shares (with the right 
of control) were held by CSR itself. The company's financial fortunes, in 
both senses of the word, are shown in Table 5:5 belov;. From 1915 to 1923, 
when it was wound up, shareholders received at least £4,131,562, by far 
the most of which came from Fiji. The total was in fact higher than this, 
for besides excluding the small dividends paid to the ordinary shareholders 
for which figures are not available, it allows for the writing down of 
assets in Fiji to £1,139,000. This was done largely for political reasons. 
The Board had wanted the assets to be written in at about twice that sum, 
which is what they are worth, but Knox persuaded it against this lest 
the Colonial Office should think that the grievances of which CSR had 
complained had been dispelled. The valuation of assets according to 
political circumstances was to be repeated in later years, and formed an 
important aspect of CSR's financial management in Fiji. Nevertheless, as 
calculated in Table 5:5, from 1915 to 1923 the Fiji and New Zealand company 
63 C.Y. Shephard, The Sugar Industry of Fiji, 12. 
64 E.W. Knox, 'Memorandum for the Board. Transfer of the Fiji 
Coy's Assets', 25 Sept. 1923, CSR F 3.0/3/-. 
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TAUI.F. 5 : 5 
The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. (Fiji and Haw Zealand) Ltd, 1015-23 
( I n C) 
31 H.u-cli 1 015 (.0 
31 Mnrcli 1 9 2 0 
Sh.'ire Cap] La i 
H r e f , S h a r e s 
O r d . S h a r e s 
3 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 
1 A p r i l ,1920 to 
31 SopLoinl)i;r 1920 
1 OcLobor 1 9 2 0 to 
31 Marcli 1933 
31 Narcll 192 3 to 
15 May 192 3 
3 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 
3 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 
2 5 0 , 0 0 0 
3 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 
1 , 6 2 5 , 0 0 0 
2 5 0 , 0 0 0 
1 , 8 7 5 , 0 0 0 
In l i q u i d a t i o n , 
15 May 1923 
Total 
31 March 1915 to 
15 May 1 9 2 3 
Not a p p l i c a b l e 
ValvicH o f 
a s s e t s at 
l i q u i d a t i o n 
I.ltiuld a s s e t s 
M i x e d and 
f l o a t I n g ' 
a s s e t s 
2 , 8 7 9 , 5 7 8 
1 , 6 0 7 , 6 0 9 
Not a p p l i c a b l e 
« , A 8 7 , 1 8 7 
Sbarf^liolders 
rcce Ipts 
P r e f . S h a r e s 
D i v i d e n d 
Repayments 
Bonus 
T o t a l 
O r d . S h a r e s 
D i v i d e n d 
Repayments 
Bonus 
T o t a l 
T o t a l r e c e i p t s 
1 9 1 5 - 2 3 
L e s s o r i g i n a l 
c a p i t a l 
G a i n s to 
s h a r e h o l d e r s 
As % o r i g i n a l 
i n v e s t m e n t 
9 7 5 , 0 0 0 
Not known 
9 7 5 , 0 0 0 
9 7 , 5 0 0 
1 , 6 2 5 , 0 0 0 
2 0 3 , 1 2 5 
Not known 
1 , 9 2 5 , 6 2 5 
2 4 3 , 7 5 0 
Not known 
2 4 3 , 7 5 0 
9 7 5 , 0 0 0 1 , 9 2 5 , 6 2 5 
1 2 , 1 8 7 
1 , 6 2 5 , 0 0 0 
Not known 
2 5 0 , 0 0 0 
2,600,000 
2 4 3 , 7 5 0 
1 , 6 3 7 , 1 8 7 
2 , 8 5 0 , 0 0 0 
4 , 4 8 7 , 1 8 7 
1 , 3 2 8 , 4 37 
3 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 
2 0 3 , 1 2 5 
Not known 
2 5 0 , 0 0 0 
2 , 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 
4 , 7 8 1 , 5 6 2 
2 , 8 5 0 , 0 0 0 
7 , 6 3 1 , 5 6 2 
3 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 
4 , 1 3 1 , 5 6 2 
118% (-
14 . 752 : 
p . a . ) 
Source: A . G . Lowndes ( e d . ) . South Pacific Enterprise, 2 2 9 - 3 0 0 ; C o l o n i a l Sugar R e f i n i n g Co . L t d . , 
Half yearly Reports; CSR F 3 . 0 - 1 , CSR F 3 . 0 - 2 . 
Notes: 1) No a l l o w a n c e s made f o r g e n e r a l p r i c e i n c r e a s e s up to 1 9 2 0 , and s l i g h t f a l l t h e r e a f t e r , 
2 ) O r i g i n a l s h a r e c a p i t a l r e p r e s e n t e d total funds a v a i l a b l e to tlie company. Number of 
p r e f e r e n t i a l s h a r e s was 1 6 2 , 5 0 0 , of o r d i n a r y s h a r e s 1 2 , 5 0 0 . The d i v i d e n d on 
p r e f e r e n t i a l sliares was f i x e d at 6% p . a . 
3 ) The repayment of p r e f e r e n t i a l siiares in 1920 took p lace a few weeks l a t e r than 
1 O c t o b e r . Tlie e x a c t date i s not known; and 1 October has been chosen for i t s 
c o n v e n i e n c e . 
4 ) Of the 1 : 2 , 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 r e c e i v e d as b o n u s e s in Hay 1 9 2 3 by CSR , in I t s c a p a c i t y as h o l d e r 
of o r d i n a r v s h a r e s in The C o l o n i a l Sugar R e f i n i n g Co . ( F i j i and New Z e a l a n d ) L t d . , 
tlie sliareho Ide rs in tlie p a r e n t company r e c e i v e d u d I s t rl hu t ion as f o l l o w s : 
In Cash 
To r e s t o r e the pa id-up v a l u e of t h e i r s h a r e s from t l 6 to 120 
eacli (£4 per s h a r e liad been returned to s h a r e h o l d e r s in 
1 9 2 0 ) . 
A sluire I s s u e ( 1 f o r 2 ) as c o u n t e r p a r t of a s s e t s r e c e i v e d 
back from the s u b s i d i a r y . 
C 3 2 5 , 0 0 0 
6 5 0 , 0 0 0 
1 , 6 2 5 , 0 0 0 
C 2 , 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 
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had made a return on investment of 118%, which was an average of 
a year. Since the yield from assets in New Zealand were less than in Fiji, 
returns from the latter must have been even higher. They would have been 
greater still if the company had sold sugar to New Zealand at the world 
price. They certainly compared favourably with the maximum of 7^% charged 
on overdrafts at the time by Australian trading banks. Since over the 
period CSR undertook little new investment in Fiji, nearly all the profits 
were to the benefit of people living outside the colony. The company had 
taken out more than it had put into Fiji. 
Not only was salvage of the sugar industry to the advantage of 
CSR: the colony also gained. In the short term Fiji was saved from 
massive economic dislocation, involving a sharp reduction in Indian living 
standards and the loss of rents to Fijians. In the long run, given the 
colony's distance from important markets for tropical products, the high 
returns to land and labour of sugar (under preferences) compared with 
other commodities, and the nature of plantation enterprise which, regard-
less of the crop, seeks to maximise profits to itself rather than returns 
to the rest of the community - in other words, given the real world -
continuation of the industry probably meant higher incomes to Indians and 
higher rents to Fijians than would have been possible if the land had been 
put to some other use. Moreover, the continued presence of CSR enabled 
Fiji to benefit from the company's exceptional expertise in marketing and 
milling. The results of technical research on sugar done in Queensland, 
for example, were passed on to the colony. Further, during the inter-war 
years, Australia became the largest exporter of raw sugar in the British 
Commonwealth, and as agent of the Queensland government CSR handled all 
of the dominion's exports. In the process the company acquired considerable 
experience and knowledge of marketing, and this was made available to Fiji 
as well. 
On the other hand, the Fiji industry had lost much of its inter-
national competitiveness. Henceforth, it would continue only with the 
help of subsidies, notably the imperial preference. In this respect, the 
colony's position was little different to sugar producers in the rest of 
65 S.J. Butlin, A.R. Hall, R.G. White, Austvalian Banking and 
Monetary Statistics, 1817-1945, Table 51. 
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the world, both inside and outside the Empire, most of whom also depended 
on some form of preferential treatment. However, it might be argued by 
George Beckford and others that Fiji was ill-served by sugar preferences 
since they increased the economy's dependence on those who paid the sub-
sidies - Britain and Canada.^^ One result of this dependence was that 
Fiji was denied an opportunity to process sugar up to 99° polarisation, 
instead of the standard 96°. 'Plantation white' sugar, which is only 
marginally inferior to the refined product (100° polarisation), is suitable 
for industries which use inputs of sugar. It fetches a higher price than 
raws of lower quality, and leaves a larger quantity of molasses in the 
exporting country; for as well as from milling, molasses is a by-product 
from refining. Against this is that the costs of producing raw sugar are 
less, while in a given time a bigger quantity of the latter can be obtained. 
In 1927 a committee of experts in Mauritius decided that in existing 
circumstances it was preferable to produce plantation white sugar of a 
very high quality rather than raws which were less pure. But to protect 
its refining interests, in 1928 Britain altered the imperial preference 
so as to make it uneconomic to export sugar of 99° polarisation. Together 
with similar barriers in other countries, this prevented Fiji - if it had 
wanted to - from exporting sugar of higher quality. 
Moreover, the payment of subsidies enabled CSR to remain in 
the colony. During the height of the crisis in 1921-22, officials had 
considered what would happen should the company be forced to withdraw. 
They had decided that the mills would have had to be run on a co-operative 
6 8 
basis, owned and supplied by Indian farmers. In many ways this might 
have been a better structure for the industry than allowing CSR to continue, 
for it would have avoided the conflict of interest between miller and 
grower that was to prove so harmful to Fiji in the years ahead. After 
payment of compensation to CSR. it would also have enabled profits from 
milling to be retained within the colony. So against the definite benefits 
from saving the company's investments in Fiji, there were disadvantages 
which underlined the constraints on sugar's contribution to economic 
development. 
66 George L. Beckford, Fersistent Poverty, 181-2. 
67 Charlotte Leubuscher, The Processing of Colonial Raw Materials: 
A Study in Location, 110-12. 
68 Fell to C.O., secret, 11 Oct. 1921; Fell to C.O., tel., 22 Dec. 
1921, C.O. 83/158. 
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CHAPTER VI 
The Smallfarm System, 1924-39 
DURING Lhe 1920s and '30s ImporLant changes occurred in the Fiji sugar 
industry and in its relation to the rest of CSR's operations. The trans-
ition from estates to the smallfarm system of production was completed. 
Closure of the Tamanua mill in 1922 and the purchase of Penang four years 
later left CSR as the sole miller in the colony. Britain gradually 
replaced New Zealand as the chief market for Fiji's sugar (see Table 6:1 
below), which meant that, with the company's Auckland refinery switching 
to alternative supplies, the industry became far less integrated into the 
rest of CSR's activities. At the same time, the relative importance of 
Fiji to the company as a whole declined. After the First World War there 
was a rapid expansion of the Australian sugar industry which was partly 
financed by CSR and which by 1939 had caused the company, as agent of the 
Queensland government, to become one of the largest exporters of raw sugar 
in the world. Further, in the late 1930s CSR increased the range of by-
products which it manufactured from raw sugar - notably building materials. 
As a result, it concentrated capital expenditure in Australia rather than 
Fij i. 
Despite these changes though, constraints on the industry's 
contribution to economic development remained. True, the transition to 
smallfarming provided growers with higher incomes than if they had been 
wage-earners - and this was important. Yet the leakage of income abroad 
through the purchase of imports and repatriation of CSR's profits continued. 
The company's contribution to income growth was still limited by its 
dependence on overseas markets, and the location of refining, distilling 
and other processing facilities outside Fiji. CSR's obstruction of agri-
cultural diversification in cane areas, of which there had been at least 
one major example before 1914, would be repeated with the consequential 
underutilization of land and labour in sugar districts. Of great importance 
would be the continuation of company efforts to keep down wages and the 
cost of cane, which would lead to strikes by cane growers in 1943 and 1960. 
The conflict of interest between CSR and farmers would become a dominant 
theme in the history of the industry. And as before, on questions of major 
TABLE 6:1 







New Zealand Others Total Approximate value 
per ton (£) 
1920 2,285 12,775 57,914 11 72,985 29 
1921 5,365 - 4,505 62,732 22 72,624 28 
1922 3,050 2,940 5,300 60,418 23 71,731 19 
1923 2,331 - 222 41,519 36 44,108 20 
1924 - - 6,013 38,419 40 44,472 17 
1925 - - 56,902 34,809 33 91,744 15 
1926 6,165 - 14,415 36,358 53 56,991 14 
1927 208 - 57,271 15,236 37 72,752 15 
1928 - 12,365 79,485 28,781 52 120,683 15 
1929 432 21,989 45,020 4,783 51 72,275 12 
1930 3,165 39,430 38,604 9,739 41 90,979 9 
1931 549 7,122 54,340 5,897 29 67,937 9 
1932 - 70,984 54,781 5,525 12 131,302 10 
1933 - 63,763 47,712 2,349 12 113,836 11 
1934 - 56,468 46,275 1,116 4 103,863 10 
1935 - 85,353 49,244 1,031 4 135,632 10 
1936 - 82,636 57,123 1,103 2 140,864 9 
1937 - 71,456 57,002 1,191 44 129,693 11 
1938 - 75,296 57,983 1,111 25 134,415 10 
1939-'^  7 49,343 68,793 84 243 118,470 12 
Source: 
JL. 
Government of Fiji trade reports, 1921 to 1940 
Exports to Canada exceeded those to Britain because of 
of war. 
the effects of the outbreak 
-p-
iniporLaiice governiueiiL - and at Limes Llic chiefs - would Lend Lo side wiLli 
the company. 
CSR's conflict with growers was exacerbated by the company's 
attempts to minimise the disadvantages of smallholder as against plantation 
agriculture. Tlie relative merits of the two have been the subject of 
academic debate, in which (along wiLh argumenLs in Lhe oLher direcLion) the 
inefficiency of the former has been frequently stressed.^ Compared with 
plantations, the smallholder's returns per unit area tend to be low 
because of poor yields and quality. Left to himself, he will also lack 
the economies of scale normally associated witli plantaLions and reflecLed 
in the sysLematic organization of cultivation, harvesting, transport and 
so on. To overcome these problems smallholder production has often been 
organized so that it embodies certain characteristics of the plantation -
the organization of growers so that they work in teams, for example, or 
the close supervision of farmers so effectively making them little different 
from plantation labourers because important decisions are taken by others. 
Smallfarming in the Fiji sugar industry illustraLes one such attempt to 
combine with peasant agriculture benefits from the plantation mode of 
production. 
At first sight, though, the pattern of smallfarming as it had 
evolved by the Second World War looked very different from the plantation 
system which had preceded it. Of the 91,812 acres cultivated in cane, 97% 
were on smallholdings. The total number of these was about 10,000, nearly 
2 
all of them occupied by Indians. Tenants on CSR land, which included 
the vast majority of former plantations, accounted for 52% of the area 
under cane and conLracLors 45% (see Table 6:2 below). Contractors held 
land under several forms of tenure. Some possessed it as freehold, others 
rented from private owners, but most held native leases usually for periods 
See for example V.D. Wickizer, 'The plantation system in the 
development of tropical economies'. Journal, of Farm Economics^ 
40 (1958), 63-7; 'The smallholder in tropical export crop 
production'. Food Research Institute Studies^ 1 (1960), 49-99. 
Figures for Llie number of farms before 1^952 are noL available, 
buL according to Fiji Sugar Corporation Ltd records in 1952 
there were 10,587 farms owned by 9,233 growers. Since the sugar 
industry had expanded by a relatively small amount between 1939 
and 1952, an estimate of about 10,000 holdings on the eve of the 
war seems reasonable. 
TAHI.F, 6:2 








COHrANY EUiiOl'KAN PLANTERS 
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Acres Percen tage 
of Area 
1925 64,963 33,6 79 52 4,446 7 6, ,905 10 19, ,933 31 
1926 67,494 30,350 45 4,040 6 9, ,080 13 24 ,024 36 
1927 70,526 28,828 41 3,677 5 11, ,448 16 26, ,573 38 
1928 75,007 23,700 32 2,342 3 20, ,710 28 28, ,255 37 
1929 77,645 20,025 26 2,004 3 25, ,559 33 30, ,057 38 
1930 78,250 17,641 22 1,611 27, ,896 36 31, ,102 40 
1931 78,373 12,610 16 1,133 1 34, ,300 44 30, ,330 39 
1932 80,939 9,160 11 744 1 39, ,412 49 31, ,623 39 
1933 83,692 7,450 9 645 1 43, ,077 51 32, ,520 39 
1934 84,497 5,335 6 658 1 44, ,989 53 33, ,515 40 
1935 87,738 4,874 5 661 1 45, ,690 52 36, ,513 42 
1936 89,924 4,532 5 653 1 46, ,031 51 38, ,708 43 
1937 91,197 4,500 5 717 1 46, ,139 50 39, 841 44 
1938 91,475 3,219 4 369 - 47, ,405 52 40, ,482 44 
1939 91,812 3,126 3 240 - 47, ,421 52 41, ,025 45 
1940 91,624 3,111 3 206 - 47, ,268 52 41, ,039 45 
1941 92,628 3,153 3 161 - 46, ,521 50 42, ,793 47 
1942 94,046 3,119 3 221 - 46, ,439 50 44, ,267 47 
1943 90,913 2,728 3 197 45, ,383 50 42, ,605 47 
1944 89,059 2,425 3 197 - ,332 51 41, ,105 46 
Source: C.Y. Shephard, JTic Sugar IndusU'j of Fiji, 38. 
Notes: 1) Pounns Mill figures are Included from 1928 onwards. 
2) The docllnc In .ireas cultivated after 1942 vas due 
to resumption of land Cor military purposes. 
3) Records are not available for years prior to 1925. 
3 of up Lo Lwenty-one (later thirLy) years. Tenants leased land from CSR 
on ten year terms. Very few leases - and none issued by CSR - carried 
an automatic right of renewal, but it was normal for the company and most 
Fijians to renew. The farms of contractors were generally smaller than 
those of tenants: 87%, against 31% of contractors, had farms ranging from 
eight to 15.9 acres in size. Half the contractors had farms of less than 
eight acres, and only 19% cultivated sixteen acres or more. The picture 
was of considerable diversity among a large number of small growers. 
Yet, in a most important way there was similarity between the 
plantation and the smallfarm systems: they were both dominated by CSR. 
Indeed, after buying the Penang mill in 1926, the company was the only 
purchaser of cane in the colony; it paid the same price throughout the 
period - 13s 6d a ton for 13% P.O.C.S. (11% at Nausori), with a bonus of 
Is 3d for every one per cent above the standard, and a deduction of Is 8d 
for every one per cent belovs^ . Growers were closely supervised by a large 
staff of company field officers, each being responsible for between 100 
and 200 farms. Through these officers the results of CSR's experimental 
work were brought to the farmer, credit for essential cultivation and 
living expenses was made available to growers at 6 per cent^ interest a 
year, farm implements were hired out and fertilizer sold. CSR attached 
great importance to the regulation of growers' cultivation practices. The 
Memorandum of Purchase of Cane, a legally binding agreement made by CSR 
with each contractor, stipulated that cane varieties should be approved 
by the company, that plant cane should be sown before 30 June, that cane 
would only be purchased if the company considered it fit for manufacture 
and, in a very sweeping clause, that 'crops must be tended and harvested 
to the complete satisfaction of the company'. As well as these provisions 
or ones like them, agreements with CSR's tenants went further. They laid 
do\<m the precise system of rotation to be followed on each farm - normally 
25% under young plants, 25% under plant cane, 25% under ratoons and 25% 
From 1933, 21-year leases could be extended for one nine-year 
period. See 'Native Lands Ordinance 1905 Regulations (leases)', 
Fiji Royal Gazette, 1933, 310. 
For a description of the Fiji sugar industry as it had evolved 
by the Second World War, see C.Y. Shephard, The Sugar Industry 
of Fiji, 1-23. 
In 1940 the rate of interest was reduced to four per cent. 
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fallow - and Lhcy included as specific rcqvii rcinents Lhat land be kept clear 
of all noxious weeds and artificial manures be applied as directed by the 
company. These agreements were designed to enable CSR to maximise the 
output of sweet cane over a long period of time.^ This, and the prevention 
of an Increase in Lhe price of cane, were Llic company's pr;incii)al aims. 
But the realization of these objectives, partly through the enforcement 
of its agreements with farmers, depended on the extent of CSR's influence 
with growers, on whether in effect the company could bring to Lhe small-
farm system that essential cliaracteristic of the plantation - tight control 
over lalKJur. 
Company control over growers 
The task was made more difficult for CSR by the divergence of interest 
between farmers and the company. This is not to deny their dependence on 
each other - CSR for supplies of cane and growers for a market. Nor is 
it to ignore the fact that the company's interest in high yields per acre 
so as to obtain the maximum cane for the mill was shared to a large degree, 
but for different reasons, by growers. Occupying relatively small 
holdings, cane farmers had to adopt an intensive rather than extensive 
form of agriculture, the effect of which was to make large returns from 
labour partly depend on high returns from land. Sizeable incomes per acre 
were needed to earn the equivalent of high wages. In its revenue per acre 
and per hour worked, cane was a more remunerative crop than the main 
alternatives open to an Indian farmer in Fiji. No figures are available 
for the profit per acre or returns from labour of growing cotton, but it 
was generally recognized that these were less than for cane.^ There are, 
however, some estimates for the cultivation of rice. The Department of 
Agriculture reckoned in 1938 that the average profit per acre of growing 
padi was £2 5s Od. This required about thirty man days of work, making 
the equivalent of Is 6d a day in wages. The figures were higher if the g 
rice was milled by the grower himself. For sugar the average return for 
6 Copies of the agreements can be found in Shephard, 51-8. 
7 Minute by H.W. Jack, July 1935, C.S.O. 2/99. 
8 Memo, by Acting Director of Agriculture, 4 April 1938, C.S.O. 
2/181 (pt. 1). 
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n 
a day's work would have been about 9s 7d. Not surprisingly, sugar came 
to be regarded as a high caste crop and as such, depending on the amount 
of work involved, it carried an incentive for Indians to increase yields 
per acre so that average returns from labour would rise too. Furthermore, 
growers had an incentive to increase not just the output of cane but also 
its sweetness, because before 1940 payment was on the basis of quality as 
well as weight, deliveries from each grower being chemically tested. In 
these ways the interests of farmers were close to those of CSR. 
Yet in important respects the interests of the two parties 
diverged. The main concern of growers was to maximise returns from their 
inputs of labour, but often they could only do this by reducing the returns 
to CSR from its inputs. Land was a good example of this.^^ The company 
wanted to maximise its returns by obtaining the largest possible output 
of sweet cane, yet although returns from labour partly depended on this, 
at times the maximisation of labour returns was incompatible with the 
maximisation of returns from land. This was particularly the case where 
uncertainty about the future discouraged growers from taking a long term 
interest in preserving soil fertility. The problem for Indian farmers was 
that there was no guarantee of renewal when leases expired. Professor 
C.Y. Shephard, an agricultural expert from the West Indies who examined 
the sugar industry in 1944, found that the ten year leases granted by CSR 
(to maintain the company's control over growers), were too short to enable 
the farmer to identify his welfare with that of the land. The same applied 
to leases held by contractors.^^ Uncertainty was increased because, with 
price contingent on maintenance of the imperial preference, CSR was unable 
12 
to fix cane prices for more than three years ahead. Given their lack 
of security, the incentive for growers was to maximise returns from labour 
9 See above, p. 135. 
10 CSR wanted to maximise returns from its investments in land, as 
well as to use land to maximise returns from its investments in 
milling. The position of tenants and contractors was little 
different in this respect. Though CSR did not own the latter's 
land, it had still invcsLcd in it (very often) I)y nuiking advances 
to growers so that they could prepare it for cane. 
11 Shephard, 35-6. 
12 Notice to Cane Growers, 8 Aug. 1924, Private Ltbk Out, 27 (1924-5), 
204. 
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13 in the short run regardless of the long term effects on the soil - a 
situation diametrically opposed to the interests of CSR. 
Moreover, although average labour returns from cane were higher 
than from rice, if a small part of the farm was planted in padi or another 
food crop, marginal returns from labour were likely to be increased. A 
small subsistence garden provided security against failure of the cane 
crop, a guarantee that the labour spent on tending the farm would yield 
at least some return. The value of this security was thought, especially 
by those from south India, to be greater than the value derived from 
planting the additional area in cane. Furthermore, there was the saving 
of time that would otherwise have been spent in walking to the market for 
food, and perhaps finding supplies not available. The planting of sub-
sistence crops threatened CSR's returns from land since there was a 
possibility that the area under cane would be reduced, that crops would 
be grown on soil which should have been fallowed, and that in the case of 
rice labour inputs would be required at times which would interfere with 
14 
the cultivation and harvesting of cane. Thus the desire of growers to 
obtain high returns from labour in the immediate future conflicted with 
the company's need to secure the maximum quantity of cane over a longer 
period. 
One partial solution might have been for CSR not to have charged 
its tenants exceptionally low rents, which was its practice, but to have 
fixed rents so that they more accurately reflected the market value of 
the land. The rise in farm costs would have been offset by an increase 
in the price of cane, while CSR would have been compensated for the higher 
cane price by receiving more in rent. Growers would then have had an 
incentive to pay more attention to the returns from land. The cost of 
growing rice, for example, would have been higher so reducing, because its 
wholesale price was related to the cost of imports, the marginal returns 
13 F. Stockdale, Report by Sir Frank Stockdale, K.C.M.G., C.B.E., 
Agricultural Adviser to the Secretary of State for the Colonies^ 
on his visit to Fiji, 1937, 25. 
14 J.R. Pearson, 'Attitude of the C.S.R. Co. towards rice growing', 
28 Aug. 1931, C.S.O. 2/36. 
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from planting pad! instead of cane.^^ However,the situation in Fiji, where 
by 1939 nearly half the growers were on non-company land, prevented CSR 
from adopting this course. Since it had to pay all growers the same price 
to avoid dissatisfaction among those who would have received less, the 
company would have had to increase the cane price to contractors as well 
as to its tenants. The result would have been a rise in its total expenses, 
for it could not have recouped the extra outlay through higher rents from 
those on non-CSR land. Indeed, by paying more for cane the company would 
have encouraged other landlords to raise rents, so that ultimately con-
tractors would have been little better off whereas landowners other than 
CSR would have done rather well. The company's best option was to keep 
rents as low as it could. It leased its estates at between 7s 6d and £1 
an acre depending on fertility, this being enough to cover the rent it paid 
to Fijian owners and part of the cost of improvements. CSR did not expect 
to profit overall from these rents for it knew that its reward lay in 
having to pay less for cane, but the result was that the incentive for 
farmers to maximise returns from land was reduced. 
The same was true in the use of artificial fertilizer and of 
certain farm implements provided by the company. CSR's need was to minimise 
farm costs and ensure that the inputs it supplied were used to the company's 
advantage. Thus it could either provide fertilizer at cost, allowing 
growers to benefit from its ability to purchase in bulk, or it could aim 
to make a profit on the sales. The advantage of the latter would be to 
increase the incentive for growers to apply fertilizer in ways that would 
maximise yields from the land. The higher the price the greater the 
opportunity cost of inefficient application. But the disadvantage to CSR 
would have been that unit costs on the farm would have been higher than 
if fertilizer had been sold more cheaply, so adding to potential pressure 
for an increase in the cane price. To have granted a rise would have 
15 Such a strategy would have affected contractors, who tended to 
grow more food crops than growers on CSR land (Stockdale, 29), 
as well as tenants. In the long run, higher cane prices would 
have made possible an increase in rents on non-company land, so 
increasing farm costs. 
16 F.C.T. Lord, 'The Fiji sugar industry: Memo prepared for the 
information of the West Indian Sugar Commission, 1929', C.O. 
83/189 file 73836. 
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caused a loss of income to the company, since profits from fertilizer sales 
to those who needed it would not have offset the higher price of cane all 
round. Not all farms required the same quantity of fertilizer. Generally 
plant cane on first-class land received no artificial fertilizer, whereas 
that on third-class soil required a considerable amount. Consequently, 
CSR adopted the alternative of supplying fertilizer at cost.^^ The danger 
from this, though, was that it would encourage waste since the cost to the 
farmer of inefficient application was less. He might consider the cost 
of wastage outweighed by the saving in labour from not having to apply the 
fertilizer more carefully. CSR could overcome this problem either by 
increasing the total supply of fertilizer which would add to farm costs 
or, which it preferred, by the exercise of tight control over growers. 
There were similar difficulties over the rental of farm implements, notably 
disc ploughs, which were too expensive for growers to buy. CSR made them 
available at a rate barely sufficient to cover the cost of maintenance, so 
that they were cheaper than if they had been rented on normal commercial 
18 
terms. The result was that from the company's view they were used 
inefficiently. Wanting to reduce its capital stock, CSR complained that 
the reluctance of growers to co-operate in the use of disc ploughs meant 
that a larger number was required. This was because farmers wanted to use 
disc ploughs at the same time, when conditions were most suitable. If 
they waited, the weather might change, ploughing become more difficult 
and the amount of labour required for the work increase. Yet rather than 
charge a higher rental, the company tried to realize its aims by exerting 
pressure on growers. In short, it preferred to substitute for economic 19 incentives the paternalistic control of its staff. 
There were, then, occasions when the concern of farmers to 
maximise returns from their labour conflicted with CSR's desire to maximise 
returns from the inputs it supplied. There were also times when CSR 
wanted to use growers' labour in ways that would secure for the company 
the optimum use of its inputs, but at the expense of returns to the grower. 
In the past plantation labourers had been organized as gangs to do weeding. 
17 Shephard, 11. 
18 Ibid., 10. 
19 Letter from G.H. Allen, 12 Feb. 1927, CSR F 4.0/7/-. 
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harvesting, etc. This had afforded certain economies of scale. Co-operative 
labour was more productive than individuals working on their own, and 
supervision was easier. Though under the smallfarm arrangement growers 
were expected to cultivate their farms as individuals, CSR continued the 
system of gangs for certain tasks tliat were essential if a large supply of 
cane was to be secured over a long period. Gangs were used for harvesting, 
the upkeep of main drains, the weeding of tramlines and the removal of 
20 
stools affected by the Fiji and Mosaic diseases (known as roguing). The 
company advanced wages to members of the gangs, and charged the cost on a 
pro rata basis to growers who benefited from the work. Obviously it was 
in GSR's interest to keep down wages so as to stabilize farm costs, but 
this was not easy to achieve. The individualistic nature of Fiji-Indian 
society reduced the attraction of co-operation to growers and made them 
less willing to join gangs. To this was added the acute general shortage 
of wage labour during the 1920s and early '30s, with the result that there 
was constant upward pressure on wages. As Dixon observed in 1923: 
Of course, the smaller men, and those whose crops are mortgaged 
to the hilt, may be more interested in keeping the wages up 
rather than down, but if the growers can be made to work the 
lesser demand from outside will tend to keep down the rates 
within reason. 21 
And growers were made to work. Since the wages offered for casual employ-
ment were too low to attract labourers in sufficient numbers, GSR had to 
force growers, much against their will, to 'volunteer' for employment in 
22 
the gangs or in the mills. Great emphasis was placed by the company on 
the control of gangs by its staff. Sirdars in charge of each gang were 
appointed by overseers and were expected to demand the maximum work from 
the men under their charge. 
The conflict of interest between CSR and farmers both made it 
necessary, and more difficult, for the company to impose an authoritarian 
control over growers. From its experience with European planters, GSR 
20 Shephard, 11-4; Ayodhya Prasad Sharma, Kisan Sangh ka lUhas, 
Vol. 1, 39. 1 am grateful to Mr Bir Sahai for translating this 
work from Hindi. 
21 Dixon, 'Notes for the Manager, Rarawai Mill', 17 July 1923, 
Fiji Inspectors (Rutledge & Dixon) 1915-28. 
22 Ayodhya Prasad, 39-40. 
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23 well understood the importance of credit in this respect. Advances were 
a means by which field staff could ensure that growers worked to the 
satisfaction of the company. A request for credit from CSR had to be 
approved by the overseer who was familiar with the farmer's work and with 
his financial position. Credit could be refused if a grower failed, say, 
to apply fertilizer as directed. IL was hard for farmers to escape this 
instrument of control, for company credit at six per cent a year was far 
cheaper than that available from other sources. Interest of up to 60% 
24 
was common for loans obtained from Indian storekeepers and money-lenders. 
The opportunity for tenants to incur debts from outside the company was 
more limited than for contractors, because CSR forbade the grant of a lien 
or encumbrance over crops except to the company. Moreover, demand for 
credit was large. Tenants had to meet the value of standing crops when 
they took over their farms, while for contractors there were the initial 
costs of preparing the land for cane and so on. Very few growers had the 
resources to finance their consumption and cultivation expenses over the 25 
period from planting to harvesting the crop eighteen months later. In 
this situation, the company's ability to offer cheap credit gave it great 
leverage over growers. In fact, apart from the monopoly of milling, this 
was its main instrument of control. 
Almost as important was the land held by CSR. The threat of 
eviction was a means by which the company could force tenants to obey its 
instructions. Though in later years CSR would, quite justifiably, 
emphasize its excellent record as a landlord, before 1939 there were times 
when it used its power of eviction. In 1936 it ejected four tenants who 
2 6 
had led an industrial dispute on the Ellington estate near Penang. The 
influence arising from control over land may have been one reason why the 
company refused to finance Europeans who wished to buy land and lease it 
to Indians. In 1925, N. Chalmers and C.J. Easton asked CSR to help them 
buy a property near Lautoka, which they would have used for this purpose. 
23 Dixon, 'Notes for the Manager, Rarawai Mill', op. cit. 
24 Minute by Colonial Secretary, 3 May 1926, C.S.O./M.P. 1098/26. 
25 Shephard, 18-9. 
26 Nausori to H.O., 19 Oct. 1935, Nausori Private In, CSR mfm 236. 
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9 7 
The company refused, preferring itself to buy the land for £10,000. Part 
of the motive was to reduce the number of landlords who exploited their 
tenants, a major preoccupation of CSR which feared that high rents would 
28 
lead to demands for high cane prices. But also important, perhaps, was 
the knowledge that if land was held by the company the ability to enforce 
its will on growers would be greatly increased. The power that its land-
holdings conferred on CSR was well understood by contemporaries, who 
partly attributed to this the higher yields on tenants' farms compared 
with contractors': the poorer soil tended by most contractors was also 
29 
a factor. It would be wrong to conclude, however, that control of land 
affected the company's influence with tenants alone. Its power over 
tenants increased the authority of overseers in general, adding weight to 
their dealings with growers on non-company land. Today, the impression 
of overseers (known as field officers since 19A0), is that the withdrawal 
of CSR in 1973 has reduced their influence with tenants and contractors 
alike because the company's successor, the Fiji Sugar Corporation Ltd, did 
not acquire control of CSR land.^^ 
In a phrase that has often been quoted, Shephard in 1944 described 
31 
the field officer as a 'guide, philosopher and friend of the farmers'. 
This was how CSR liked to present the situation, but it was certainly not 
the Indian view before 1939. Growers saw the overseer as a man who acted 
arbitrarily, who demanded of them work which they were reluctant to perform, 
and who used brute force at times to ensure that his orders were carried o o 
out. It was not advice they received from the field staff: it was 
control imposed from above. 
CSR and other interests in the colony 
This control would be weakened if the smallfarm system was subject to 
influences which might produce discontent among growers. Thus if alternative 
27 H.O. to Lautoka, Sept. 1925, Private Ltbk. Out, 28 (1925), 480. 
28 Rutledge, 'Notes for the Manager, Penang Mill', 20 Nov. 1926, 
Fiji Inspectors (Rutledge & Dixon) 1915-28. 
29 Stockdale, 23. 
30 Information collected during the first half of 1976. 
31 Shephard, 12. 
32 Ayodhya Prasad, 37-9. 
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cash crops were allowed to compete with sugar, labour might be drawn away 
from the mills and the cultivation of cane, leading to a fall in production 
and a rise in wages. Or, if in the widespread process of currency re-
alignments in the early 1930s the Fiji pound was allowed to depreciate 
by too large a margin, import prices would rise, forcing up growers' costs 
of living and perhaps producing demands for a higher cane price to 
compensate. Again, if there was no security of tenure for growers on 
Fijian land, farmers might be inclined not only to overcrop the soil but 
also to start industrial agitation to obtain better terms, thereby jeopard-
izing the supply of cane. Finally, the high interest rates on loans made 
to growers by storekeepers and money-lenders reduced real farm incomes, 
so increasing the possibility that farmers would eventually press for a 
rise in the price of cane. All these were matters which were of great 
concern to CSR in the 1920s and 1930s. They raised very acutely the 
question of how far the company could maximise its profits. 
Now obviously this made it very important for CSR that it should still 
have a great influence on government policy. Yet, in one way the replace-
ment of European planters by Indian growers had reduced its influence. 
Previously, the company could threaten to pass on to its suppliers any 
increase in costs arising from official action or inaction, but after 1923 
this was less easy as everyone knew (following the refusal of Indians to 
plant in 1922) that 13s 6d was the minimum price growers would accept for 
their cane, and that if necessary Indians would be far more willing than 
Europeans to resort to subsistence farming. In the past, the minimum 
price for which Europeans would have grown cane had never been clear. On 
the other hand, because threats to close at least one of its mills seemed 
to carry more weight in the 1920s and '30s than before, CSR still could 
33 
have a great effect on policy. At first no one could be sure that the 
transition to the smallfarm system would succeed, while later the fall in 
raw sugar prices on account of the world depression made the continued 
operation of the least profitable mills in Fiji (Nausori and Labasa) 
appear distinctly uncertain. 
In these circumstances, it was understandable that government 
should wish to support CSR as far as it could. With memories of the 1920 
33 CSR threatened to close Nausori on several occasions, e.g. C.W.R. 
Powell to C.O., 6 April 1937, C.O. 852/84 file 15036/17. 
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and 1921 strikes still vivid, officials wanted to avoid the political 
repercussions of a fall in Indian living standards should the smallfarm 
system fail. They were supported by most of the European community which, 
in contrast to its generally antagonistic attitude before and during the 
First World War arising from short term tactical differences with the 
company, now identified its interests more closely with CSR. The settle-
ment of Indian farmers provided merchants with an exceptionally stable 
market in the 1930s, despite the depression, because CSR was unable to 
34 
offset the fall in raw sugar prices with a reduction in the price of cane. 
Moreover, from at least since the war the company had patronised local 
traders where possible, and had directed its custom specially to those 
with political influence. It purchased farm implements, for example, not 
from Burns Philp but from Morris Hedstrom Ltd because J.M. Hedstrom, who 
had a large stake in the firm, was a prominent European and sat on the 35 
Executive Council (as also did H.M. Scott, CSR's legal adviser in Fiji). 
The close interest of Hedstrom in the purchasing power of the company 
reinforced the improved relations between CSR and the European community, 
with the result that on the whole there was less pressure on government 
to oppose the company than there had been in the past. Yet although the 
attention of Europeans was focused on their long term strategic interest 
in the continued prosperity of CSR, differences on matters which did not 
affect the viability of the company's operations still arose. On such 
occasions, and when the interests of the Fijians were involved, the views 
of CSR were not always decisive. The company was only one of several 
parties in the alliance between Fijian chiefs, government and European 
capital. Nevertheless, its opinions were listened to with respect, and 
influenced to a significant degree the outcome of official deliberations. 
The importance that government attached to CSR's views was well illustrated 
in 1926 when, with the Executive Council's approval, the proposed budget 
was secretly submitted to the company for its comments before being 
34 Note also that CSR increased the size of its advances during 
years when the crop was poor so that there were larger repayments 
when the harvest improved. Thus fluctuations in demand were 
evened out. See Burns Philp, Labasa Inspection Report No. 2, 11 
Oct. 1932, 2, mfm PMB 500. 
35 Burns Philp, Labasa Inspection Report No. 2, 11 Oct. 1932, 12, 
mfm PMB 500. 
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presented to the legislature. As CSR's inspector remarked with glee, 'from 
3 6 our point of view it is a great position to be in' . 
CSR's views were especially decisive on the question of diversi-
fying the economy. It feared that the development of commercial agriculture 
outside the sugar industry would increase competition for labour, so making 
it more difficult for the company to obtain manpower for work in the gangs 
or in the mills. This would be particularly the case if wage rates for 
casual labour outside the industry were higher than for workers within. 
Moreover, the larger the supply of labour the more selective CSR could be 
in its recruitment of growers. These considerations were in direct 
conflict with government which wanted to diversify agriculture. Alarmed 
by Fiji's dependence on sugar, whose price was subject to wide fluctuations 
on the world market, officials hoped that diversification would place the 
38 
37 economy on a more secure foundation. It would also enable idle land. 
often quite close to the sugar belt, to be brought into productive use.' 
Government was keen to encourage an expansion of copra and banana exports 
(normally gro\m well away from sugar areas) and to promote new exports 
39 
like pineapples and cotton. But it was difficult to get a remunerative 
price for exports. The fall in commodity prices during the depression was 
an obvious problem, though not the only one. The opportunity for increased 
trade with Australia and New Zealand was limited by competition from 
producers within the dominions or their dependencies. Both Australia and 
New Zealand, for example, placed import quotas on bananas from Fiji. Any 
hope of increasing its share of their markets depended on the colony being 
able to offer trade concessions in return. 
Yet Fiji was handicapped in this by its dependence on sugar, and 
in particular by the vertical integration of much of CSR's activities, 
despite the smaller volume of sugar going to Auckland. Coal, one of the 
36 Rutledge to Lautoka, 1 Dec. 1926, Fiji Inspectors (Rutledge) 
1924-8. 
37 Minute by S. Caine, 4 Dec. 1933, C.O. 83/204 file 18493. 
38 Fletcher to Knox, 17 Nov. 1930, C.O. 83/194 file 83874. 
39 Pearson, 'The probable effects of a fall in sugar^prices on 
Indian farmers and agricultural labourers in Fiji', Feb. 1930, 
C.O. 83/189 file 73836. 
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colony's mosL important imports,was brought by CSR from Newcastle in 
Australia. The company refused to obtain its supplies from the south 
island of New Zealand, as was once suggested, since it transported coal 
in its own steamers which on their return trip took Fiji molasses to Sydney, 
It would have been uneconomic to divert the vessels to New Zealand. 
Similarly, because the company had its principal workshop in Sydney, it 
refused to have its Fiji machinery repaired in Auckland, So for these 
imports the Fiji government could make no concessions to New Zealand and, 
41 
by the same token, could not threaten to divert trade from Australia. 
Furthermore, Fiji could not offer a more generous preference than it gave 
British imports since the preference on British goods, at least up to 
1932, was a quid pro quo for the imperial preference on sugar. The colony 
could only offer countries which gave its exports favourable treatment a 
reciprocal preference equivalent to what was given to Britain. The value 
of such an offer was correspondingly reduced. So it was that in negoti-
ations for a trade agreement with New Zealand before 1932, at the Ottawa 
Conference (1932) and in subsequent attempts to gain access to Australia 
for exports of fruit and cotton, Fiji's negotiating position was consider-
A2 
ably weakened. She was forced to rely heavily on markets in Britain and 
Canada where her competitors had the advantage of lower transport costs. 
How far this determined the outcome of attempts to diversify the economy 
is hard to say: what is certain is that the sugar industry did not help. 
On the supply side too, except for copra and bananas, the 
influence of CSR was considerable, for it purchased land to prevent its 
use for competitive crops. In 1925 the company heard that land at Yaqara, 
lying between Tavua and Ra, might be sold and put under cotton. Fearing 
that this would damage the very bleak labour position at Tavua, CSR bought 43 
Yaqara and imported a stock of Herefords to be grazed on it. In another 
pre-emptive strike, the company acquired the Penang mill in 1926. Govern-
ment was experimenting at Vitilevu Bay to see if pineapples could be grown 
40 Coal imports in 1925 were valued f.o.b. at £42,000; coal was 
the principal item bought from Australia. Even more important 
was the import of sugar sacks, but they could only be obtained 
from Calcutta. C.P. 64/1930. 
41 Confidential appendix. 
42 C.S.O. 1437/28; C.S.O. 69/29; confidential appendix. 
43 Rutledge to H.O., 7 Dec. 1925, Fiji Inspectors (Rutledge) 1924-8. 
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44 commercially in Ra, and there were rumours that Penang might be purchased 
by a canning company. Through buying the mill and keeping the area under 
cane, CSR hoped to 'push pineapples further afield and so make them less 
attractive to I n d i a n s ' T h i s made it more difficult to establish a 
pineapple industry in Fiji. Unable to find enough suitable land in Viti 
Levu, in the late 1920s the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. commenced trials at 
Seaqaqa, some distance from Labasa. Transport costs must have been relative-
ly high, especially for imports coming via Suva, so that, coming on top of 
the fall in world prices in the 1930s, this perhaps contributed to the 
failure of the scheme.Pineapples were also grown at Nadi, first by 
the West Coast Pines Co. and then from 1936 by CSR, but after the Second 
47 
World War the project was abandoned. Land that might have given high 
returns from pineapples was already under cane. 
The colony probably benefited from the continuation of sugar 
production at Penang, since it is unlikely that a crop with higher returns 
from land and labour could have been found. Yet by controlling the land 
CSR removed the opportunity to experiment with such crops, and possibly-
prevented the evolution of a system of mixed farming in the district. In 
terms of the optimum use of resources, the benefit to the colony from the 
company's acquisition of Yaqara was less, for CSR failed to obtain maximum 
returns from the land. Following a visit to Fiji in 1937 Sir Frank 
Stockdale, Agricultural Adviser to the Colonial Office, remarked that CSR's 
44 C.P. 44/1924. 
45 Rutledge to H.O., 7 June 1926, Inspectors Ltbk., 1925-6, 157-61. 
46 C.S.O. 2/59. 
47 C.S.O. 2/118/1; 69/191. It is not at all clear that the failure 
of pineapple schemes in the early 1930s was due mainly to poor 
markets. The Director of Agriculture observed in 1932 that 
'very satisfactory prices' could be obtained in Canada and that 
there were good market openings in New Zealand and Britain. If 
he was right, then supply factors are more likely to have been 
responsible for the closure of pineapple companies. CSR's attempt 
to grow pineapples at Nadi was a commercial failure because con-
struction of the Nadi airport after the Second World War reduced 
the area available for pineapples. Understandably, CSR was not 
willing to grow pineapples on cane land. Director of Agriculture, 
'Pineapple Canning industry in Fiji', 15 June 1932, C.S.O. 2/60; 
Interview with J.C. Potts, 9 Sept. 1977. 
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48 Herefords were the finest he had seen in the tropics, but the quality 
of the herd was not maintained. Some twenty years later an expert from 
Australia reported that the cattle were undernourished, and that the 
49 
pasture was deficient in nitrogen. Specialization in sugar had prevented 
CSR from paying attention to this. 
More significant, perhaps, was the company's obstruction of 
government attempts to diversify Indian smallfarming. Officials wanted 
to encourage the production of Indian foodcrops to reduce the demand for 
imports. In particular, J.R. Pearson, Secretary for Indian Affairs in the 
early 1930s, pressed for the development of cash crops so that, should 
the depression force CSR to curtail production, Indians would have an 
alternative to cane. CSR feared that if subsistence or cash crops were 
grown alongside cane they would compete for land and labour, making it 
harder for the company to control farmers' cultivation practices. How-
ever, CSR did provide growers with small rice plots on marginal land, 
hoping in this way to reduce the cost of living and effect an increase in 
the real price of cane. These plots were particularly numerous at Labasa, 
x^ here the company controlled extensive areas unsuited to cane. In 1929 
seasonal conditions favoured rice and a regular boom set in. Even sugar 
farmers joined, to the neglect of their cane land, forcing the local mill 
manager to tighten restrictions on the cultivation of such crops. Pearson 
was perturbed by this but was unwilling to intervene because, as he put 
it, CSR was a large corporation and government needed its co-operation.^^ 
The company itself did very little to develop subsistence and cash crops 
which could be rotated, or grown inter-row, with cane. Its interest was 
in profits from the mills, not in mixed farming which might reduce the 
seasonal underemployment of growers. Stockdale lamented the failure to 
diversify crops in the cane districts, and his complaint would be echoed 
, ^ 52 on numerous occasxons xn the ruture. 
48 Stockdale, 30-1. 
49 Pacific Islands Monthly, 29 (1959), 6, 73-5. In the 1960s 
CSR paid more attention to the ranch. 
50 Pearson, 'The probable effects of a fall in sugar prices...', op.cit. 
51 Pearson, 'Attitude of the C.S.R. Co. towards rice growing', op.cit. 
52 Stockdale, 32-3. 
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It was lefL Lo the inadequately funded Department of Agriculture 
to experiment with crops that might be grown with cane. Cotton was 
thought to be a possibility. The cotton boom of the late 1860s had shown 
that the Sea Island variety flourished in Fiji, but since then the problem 
had been the colony's distance from the European market. As part of 
efforts to increase the production of Empire cotton, after the First World 
War trials had been made in Fiji and some cotton had been exported to 
Britain. Attempts to persuade Indians to grow the crop, though, had been 
53 hindered by CSR's refusal to carry it on its tramlines. The company 
feared that cotton might compete with sugar for Indian labour and that its 
5A 
transport would interfere with the movement of cane during harvesting. 
Experiments were abandoned during the height of the depression but were 
resumed in the mid-1930s. In 1937 Stockdale emphasized the value of 
cotton as a rotation crop with cane. Not only would it benefit the land 
by improving aeration and the tilth of the soil as well as by maintaining 
fertility, but it would also yield an income - just under £5 an acre, 
gross - whereas the existing rotation crop, cowpea, did not.^^ Government 
eventually developed a high quality cotton for which a limited market 
existed in Britain, but efforts to encourage its cultivation were impeded 
by a lack of co-operation from CSR. There were frequent complaints about 
this from Dr H.W. Jack, the Director of Agriculture. The attempt was 
finally abandoned in 19A1, just before the receipt of a report from Messrs 
Dalgety and Co. Ltd which suggested that, under wartime conditions, there 
might be a market in Australia if Fiji cotton could be sold in sufficient 
quantities. CSR had played a large part in preventing the required supply 
from being available. And more important, as Pearson commented in 1932, 
the company's opposition to the development of alternative crops had 
reduced the willingness of officials to try.'^ ^ Jack had pushed cotton in 
53 Rutledge to H.O., 17 May 1924, Fiji Inspectors (Rutledge) 
1924-8. 
54 H. Dixon to Colonial Secretary, 30 July 1924, Private Ltbk. Out, 
27 (1924-5), 178-80. 
55 Stockdale, 29. 
56 Pearson, 'A Survey on the Position of Indians in Fiji, September 
1932', C.O. 83/199 file 93473, The year before the same point 
had been made by the Director of Agriculture. Barnes to Stockdale, 
14 May 1931, C.O. 83/194 file 83874. 
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the 1930s in the face of indifference from many of his colleagues. When 
it was abandoned he predicted, with some truth, that the industry was un-
likely to be revived and that Fiji as a source of excellent quality cotton 
might be overlooked in the future.^^ 
Another concern of CSR was with the rate of exchange. Though it 
would benefit from the increased value in local currency of its export 
earnings, it was very much in the interest of the company to prevent a 
large depreciation of the £ Fiji. Devaluation could cause a rise in 
internal prices, which in turn might provoke an irresistible demand for 
an increase in the price of cane. The last thing the company wanted was 
a confrontation with growers, yet if it granted an increase on the grounds 
of a rise in the cost of living, farmers might treat this as a precedent 
for the future. To buy off conflict in the present might make it harder 
to control growers later on. Before 1933 the exchange rate was fixed by 
the two banks operating in Fiji, the Bank of New South Wales and the Bank 
of New Zealand. The custom was to keep the rates between Australia, New 
Zealand and Fiji at par, but to let their rates against sterling vary. 
Fiji's exchange on London was quoted at the same rate as that of Australia, 
so that when the £ Australian began to depreciate in late 1929 the £ Fiji 
followed suit (see Table 6:3 below). This arrangement was abandoned on 
22 January 1931, when the total Australian devaluation had reached 25%. 
Rates between Australia, New Zealand and Fiji were fixed so that they 
reflected differences in their rates on London, and the value of Fiji's 
currency against sterling was based on the New Zealand rate in London 
instead of Australia's. After the revaluation this entailed, the Fiji 
rate was stabilized from the end of January at £F110 = £StglOO, a devalu-
ation since 1929 of 10 per cent. Following the devaluation of the £ New 
Zealand two years later, the Fiji rate was raised by an equivalent amount 
5 8 
making a total devaluation of about 25%. 
The banks justified the new rate on the grounds that Fiji had 
an adverse balance of payments against London. This arose from CSR's 
57 C.S.O. 2/99. 
58 An account of the currency question- in Fiji, 1930 to 1933, can 
be found in R.F. Holder, Bank of New South Wales: A History. 
Volume II, 1894-1970, ch. 38. Unfortunately, Holder relies 
exclusively on Bank of New South Wales records, and his account 
is misleading as a result. 
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TABLE 6:3 
Changes in the Australian, New Zealand and Fiji 
exchange rates against £ sterling 
£Stg 100 = 
Date £A £NZ £F 
March 1930 106 100 106 
April 1930 106 105 106 
9 Oct. 1930 109 105 109 
5 Jan. 1931 115 105 115 
13 Jan. 1931 118 105 118 
14 Jan. 1931 118 107V 118 
17 Jan. 1931 125 107^ 126 
22 Jan. 1931 125 107Jg 1073^  
29 Jan. 1931 130 110 110 
3 Dec. 1931 125 110 110 
20 Jan. 1933 125 125 125 
28 Mar. 1933 125 125 111 
Source: R.F. Holder, Bank of New South Wales: A History, Volume 
II 1894-1970, 681-781; confidential appendix. 
practice not to remit to the colony the £Stg800,000-odd that it received 
each year from the export of Fiji sugar. Some of the proceeds, but no 
more than £Stg200,000, were used to finance the sterling imports needed 
for its operations in Fiji. The rest were used to pay for the company's 
imports in Australia and New Zealand. The result was a large, balance of 
59 
payments deficit between Fiji and London. In theory this should have 
been offset by an inflow of funds from New Zealand, because CSR used the 
profits from its Auckland refinery to finance its activities in Fiji. Yet 
unknown to others in the colony, no such inflow occurred. Under arrange-
ments dating from the 1920s, CSR held on special deposit in Fiji over 
£F800,000, against which the banks advanced the company's working expenses. 
These advances were repayable in New Zealand at par, irrespective of 
alterations in the exchange. . Thus if the Fiji currency was left at a 
lower rate than New Zealand's in January 1933, the banks could expect to 
59 Fletcher to C.O., conf., 28 Jan. 1931, C.O. 83/193 file 83831. 
60 CSR to Bank of New South Wales (hereinafter, BNSW), 16 Aug.1923, 
Banks Out, 15 (1923-7), 14; CSR to BNSW, 5 Feb. 1930, Banks Out, 
17 (1929-31), 371; CSR to BNSW, 26 Sept. 1931, Banks Out, 18 
(1931-3), 98; CSR to BNSW, 25 Jan. 1932, Banks Out, 18 (1931-3), 
156; CSR to BNSW, 26 Sept. 1933, Banks Out, 19 (1933-4), 188. 
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make a loss. They would be repaid Lheir loans to tlie company, buL in a 
currency worth less than that in which the advances had been made. Against 
the banks' desire for a devaluation was the government's hope for a 
revaluation which would return the £ Fiji to parity with sterling.^^ Able 
Lo recall the rampant inflation tliat liad accompanied the depreciation of 
central European currencies in the mid-].920s, officials were understandably 
concerned about the possible inflationary effects of devaluation in Fiji. 
Tliey also knew that devaluations in the Empire - and of course elsewhere -
would reduce the competitiveness of British exports. 
Between the interests of the banks and of government stood those 
of CSR. The company wanted a limited devaluation because it would increase 
the value in Fiji currency of its exports, but it did not want the de-
preciation to be much more than ten per cent since this might lead to a 
sufficient rise in prices to cause unrest among growers. It was thought 
a ten per cent devaluation would be accepted by farmers, since the ensuing 
rise in import prices would be offset by the general fall in commodity 
prices associated with the world depression. CSR's desire for a ten per 
cent devaluation was shared by the major export/import firms in the colony. 
The supply of Fiji's most important exports after sugar, copra and bananas, 
would not have been very responsive to the effects of devaluation since 
copra has a long gestation period - about seven years - while the export 
market for bananas was limited. Though in the short term profits from 
exporting these crops would be increased by a large devaluation, major 
exporters like liedstrom were also substantial importers and, if devaluation 
caused a large rise in prices, they could expect to see these higher profits 
outweighed by a decline in the demand for imports. A limited devaluation 
would increase export earnings without greatly damaging their import 
trade. 
These interests combined to put pressure on government to allow 
a limited degree of devaluation, but to oppose the rate favoured by the 
banks. Their view prevailed at a London conference, held in June 1933, 
at which were represented the Colonial Office, the Fiji government, CSR, 
61 liedstrom to Goldfinch, 15 Feb. 1933, C.O. 83/201 file 18432 
(pt. 2). 
62 See generally C.O. 83/201 file 18432 (pts. 1-3); confidential 
appendix. 
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other exporters in the colony and the banks. It was agreed, though with 
reluctance by the banks, that government should have control over the 
exchange rate, which was to be fixed at £F111 = EStglOO. To persuade the 
banks to accept this, CSR promised to make available to them £Stg400,000 
from its annual Fiji earnings in London, so as to reduce the Fiji/London 
6 3 
balance of payments deficit. In other words, the company agreed to repay 
advances it received in Fiji in sterling rather than New Zealand currency, 
thereby saving the banks from a loss on the arrangement they had made to 
finance CSR. Thanks partly to the support of other business interests in 
the colony, CSR had achieved its objective. It had obtained a ten per cent 
devaluation which, as it told government, was an important source of profit 
in the years of exceptionally low sugar prices during the early 1930s. 
It even went so far as to claim that this, coupled with the imperial 
preference on sugar, was the only reason why it could continue in the 
colony,^^ This was probably an exaggeration, but it is at least likely 
that without the devaluation the company would have had to close its 
Nausori mill. Equally important was that it had limited the devaluation 
to an amount which would not, via the price structure, cause discontent 
among growers and so increase the difficulty for CSR of maintaining control, 
Land tenure was an especially difficult question because Fijians 
have always attached great importance to the ownership of land. So whereas 
it was in the company's vital interest that there be security of tenure 
for growers, it was equally important to Fijians that they be able to 
resume leases in the not too distant future; otherwise their rights of 
ownership would exist in name but not in fact. Since the war it had been 
the practice of government to refer to Fijian owners the proposed terms 
for the renewal of native leases when they expired, thereby giving them 
an opportunity not to renew.^^ The first refusals occurred in 1924 and 
thereafter, observers agreed, there was a growing tendency for landlords 
to oppose renewals.^^ The trend never reached large proportions though. 
63 'Note of a meeting to discuss Fiji currency matters, held on 
14 June 1933, in Sir J. Campbell's room, 2 Richmond Terrace, 
S.W.I', C.O. 83/201 file 18432 (pt. 3). 
64 Seymour to C.O., tel., 4 March 1933, C.O. 83/201 file 18432 
(pt. 1). 
65 Nausori to H.O., 27 Sept. 1934, Nausori Private In, CSR mfm 236. 
66 Nausori to H.O., 22 Dec. 1932, ibid. 
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because under Ordinance 23 of 1916 landowners had to compensate the out-
going tenant for permanent and unexhausted improvements made during the 
currency of the lease. Often Fijians could not afford the amount of 
compensation fixed by the Governor-in-Council, and leases were therefore 
renewed. ^^^  Yet the threat of non-renewal was sufficient to create 
insecurity - a climate in which cases of non-renewal were easily exagger-
ated. This alarmed CSR which feared the situation might eventually breed 
industrial unrest. In the immediate future it could lead to an increase 
in farm costs, which might produce demands for a higher cane price, for 
Fijians hoped that the threat of non-renewal would induce liigher rents to 
6 8 
be paid. If its leases were affected, CSR would have to pass on to 
tenants the higher cliarge or else absorb the increased rent itself. For 
contractors the problem was worse since on expiry it was customary, though 
illegal, for growers to pay premiums of one year's rent or more to induce 
landlords to renew the lease.^^ By threatening not to renew the owners 
could extract larger premiums, and so add substantially to farm costs. If 
the disposable income of farmers was reduced, the chance was increased 
that they would ask for higher cane prices. Yet if the company resisted 
such a demand, there was a risk that growers would start to neglect their 
farms or even take part in a strike. More generally, CSR feared that if 
insecurity of tenure led to a sense of injustice, 
the way will be open for agitators to sow seeds of discontent, 
which may easily be manifested in such ways as refusals 'en 
bloc' to pay native rents, refusing to man the sugar mills 
when crushing Fijian-grown cane, or a general non-co-operative 
strike. 
In short, the company's control over growers - and perhaps the very future 
of the industry - was at stake. 
Accordingly, CSR urged government to take action. In February 
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general manager, and Sir Murchison Fletcher, Lhe governor, who was so 
sympathe Lie to the interests ol CSR that he once made the outrageous 
suggestion that Indians were too well off and if possible the price of 
cane should be reduced.^^ The meeting was a classic example of company-
government collusion. 'We have no doubt', Goldfinch said, 
that the ideal set of conditions would be that all leaseliold 
lands used for cane growing should be leased in tlic first 
place by the Government to the mill-owner (in this case the 
company), who should in turn sub-let to tenants over whom 
the mill-owner would then be able to exercise a certain amount 
of control and supervision as to the general working of their 
farms. 72 
Terms of renewals should be settled without reference to the Fijian owners. 
The outcome of the discussions was that 'His Excellency agrees and proposes 
73 
to proceed on the lines set out'. But it was impossible for Fletcher 
to act exactly along these lines,for government, however it might want 
to, could not ignore the interests of the Fijians. It had not the resources 
to enforce unpopular measures in the face of active opposition. Consequent-
ly, the reform of land tenure devised by Fletcher's successors in the late 
1930s owed much to the influence of Fijians, who had a good incentive to 
compromise. If insecurity of tenure caused disruption in the sugar 
industry, or led to a deterioration in the soil because of overcropping 
before the lease expired, the incomes they could expect from rent would 
be reduced, while deterioration in the quality of soil would erode the 
capital value of their land. Moreover, as Ratu J.L.V. Sukuna told the 
Council of Chiefs in 1936, concessions vTOuld lessen the risk of government Ik 
imposing a land tax on the large areas of unimproved land held by Fijians. 
Compromise, then, would maintain the alliance between cliiefs, government 
and European capital to the advantage of all parties. 
The result of the initiative taken by CSR and the subsequent 
influence of the Fijians was the Native Land Trust Ordinance (NLTO), 
71 Nausori to H.O., 15 March 1935, CSR R 2.0/2/-. 
72 'Memorandum to His Excellency the Governor...', op. cit. 
73 P. Goldfinch, 'Notes of my interview with Sir Murchison Fletcher, 
Governor of Fiji', 26 Feb. 1934, CSR R 3.0/2/-. 
74 Barton to C.O., 312, 31 Oct. 1936, C.O. 83/215 file 85214. 
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enacted in early 1940.^^ It provided for the declaration of reserves which 
were to contain sufficient land for 'the use maintenance or support' of 
Fijian owners. Land within the reserves was not to be alienated, nor 
leased to non-Fijians. Land outside reserves was to be available for 
lease but, following Fijian pressure, for periods of only thirty years. 
instead of the 99 government originally had in mind.^^ Sukuna was appointed 
Commis sioner to demarcate the reserves, so giving Fijians a large measure 
of control over this important exercise.^^ At the heart of the Ordinance 
was the creation of a Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) which, independent 
of government control, was to administer all native land 'for the benefit 
of the Fijian owners' - a far cry from earlier demands by CSR that the 
company should control land leased for cane purposes. The concept of the 
NLTB acting as a trust for Fijians was underlined by the rejection of a 
request from the Indian government that there be a Fiji-Indian on the 
Board. The Fiji government argued that if the request was granted it would 
undermine the confidence of Fijians in the Board and that, in any case, 
Indians had no right to expect representation among trustees who were 
7 8 
responsible to the Fijian race. Clearly, in the preparation of the NLTO 
the vital interest of Fijians in the land had been upheld. Nevertheless, 
the measure was a compromise under which Indians were allowed to remain as 
farmers, provided Fijian land ownership rights were guaranteed and Fijians 
continued to benefit from the receipt of rents. CSR could hope that the 
payments to Fijians would be reduced since the creation of the NLTB was 
expected to eliminate the need for Indians to bribe owners to obtain a 
renewal of their leases. It was generally thought at the time that this 79 compromise would solve the problem of land tenure for good. 
75 Ordinance 12 of 1940. 
76 'Address to Fijian Chiefs and People by His Excellency Sir 
Arthur Richards, K.C.M.G., Governor, Prior to his departure from 
the Colony', C.O. 83/222 file 85044; 'Native Land Trust Regu-
lations, 1940', C.P. 31/1940. 
77 Luke to C.O., tel., 16 Oct. 1938, C.O. 83/222 file 85044. 
78 Bajpai to I.O., 20 July 1938, ibid.; Luke to C.O., tel., 16 
Oct. 1938. 
79 Fiji Legislative Council Debates, 1940, 95-119; minute, 14 July 
1939, C.O. S2>/2n file 85044. 
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A final question involving CSR's control of growers was the 
heavy indebtedness of farmers. Many had had to borrow to become growers 
in the first place - to acquire land, or to finance their household or 
farm expenses till they received their first payment for cane. Much of 
the payment was then used to pay off existing debts, and a large part of 
expenditure during periods when no income from cane was received was met 
by further borrowings. Farmers' dependence on credit was increased since 
up to 1940 the whole price of cane was paid on the delivery of the crop; 
most growers had no other cash income for the rest of the year. CSR credit 
was limited to what the company considered essential farm and household 
expenditure. This excluded a variety of items, ranging from wedding 
ceremonies to premiums on land, which growers regarded as highly desirable, 
if not essential. To finance these expenses growers turned to Indian and 
(sometimes) European moneylenders, usually lawyers, landowners and store-
keepers all of whom, because of the poor security available, lent at high 
rates of interest. Leaseholds were not considered good security because 
their terms were too short, while the value of cane as a security was 
limited because CSR advances were treated as a first charge against the 
crop. Yet the payment of steady prices by CSR and an inspection of the 
borrower's land enabled moneylenders, barring a natural disaster, to make 
a reasonable estimate of a grower's likely income in the season ahead. 
They were, consequently, prepared to extend fairly liberal credit even if 
the interest rates were high. Borrowing from outside the company was more 
extensive among contractors than tenants, because CSR's tenancy agreement 
prohibited the latter from granting any lien or encumbrance over their 
crops except to the company. However, nearly all growers borrowed 
informally from storekeepers, though how extensive this was is impossible 
to judge. So it was that part of the income of growers was syphoned off 
in interest payments. The immediate beneficiaries were storekeepers and 
moneylenders, but their gains were also to the advantage of importers in 
the colony. The extension of credit facilitated the consumption of 
imports, including food items like rice. 
CSR was concerned because high interest rates reduced the real 
incomes of farmers. It feared, too, that liberal credit encouraged 
growers to live beyond their means, and that one day they might demand an 
increase in the cane price so that their means could catch up with their 
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80 standard of living. To some extent this concern was shared by govern-
ment, which wanted to avoid unrest among Indians. Yet any action to 
control credit would damage business interests since liberal credit helped 
trade. Government appeared sensitive to these interests when it tried to 
regulate moneylending by law. In 1932 it introduced legislation which 
empowered the courts, in any suit for the recovery of a loan, to reopen 
a transaction where it was substantially unfair or the interest excessive. 
But it proved impossible to enforce the law because of verbal understand-
ings and false book-entries, and because debtors could rarely afford to 
81 
apply to the court for relief. " Following representation by GSR, in 1933 
Fletcher promised to introduce further legislation to prevent growers 
giving assignments over their crops. Assignments took the form of a 
written instruction from the grower to GSR that the proceeds from cane up 
to a certain amount, less what was already debited by the company, be paid 
direct to the moneylender or storekeeper. Assignments were often used by 
contractors, and in the early 1930s were increasingly used by tenants 
because of a recently discovered loophole in their tenancy agreements. 
GSR hoped that legislation would close this loophole and open the way for 82 
the company to increase its control over the indebtedness of contractors. 
But Fletcher had second thoughts about the matter and the proposed legis-
lation was dropped. GSR understood that he had come under pressure from 
Morris Hedstrom Ltd and the legal profession, whose business would have 8 3 
suffered if credit to Indians had been curtailed. Government again 
appeared responsive to these interests when it introduced the Moneylenders 
Ordinance in 1938. The legislation required that moneylenders be regis-
tered, and set a limit of 12% on interest for loans. Excluded from the 
measure were la\jyers when advancing sums on behalf of clients - so making 84 
the law, in GSR's view, little more than a gesture. Even so, the 
ordinance was impossible to enforce because of the variety of ways in 
which the 12% limit could be evaded. 
80 Nausori to H.O., 29 Oct. 1937, Nausori Private In, GSR mfm 236. 
81 K.L. Gillion, The Fiji Indians, 163. 
82 Nausori to H.O., 3 Oct. 1933, Nausori Private In, GSR mfm 236. 
83 'Memo to the General Manager. Fiji matters for discussion', 
5 Feb. 1934, GSR R 3.0/2/-. 
84 Nausori to H.O., 1 March 1938, Nausori Private In, GSR mfm 236. 
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An alternative solution had been proposed by CSR in 1930: the 
company, other sources of private capital and government should join in 
establishing a Cane Growers Bank which would provide farmers with cheap 
85 
credit. Although this was never put on paper, presumably to be effective 
the scheme would have had to be accompanied by legislation to prevent 
growers borrowing from other sources as well. An experiment at the Penang 
mill, whereby CSR financed the liquidation of growers' debts, had recently 
failed because borrowing from outside the company had been quickly 
resumed.^^ CSR's proposal was rejected by officials on the grounds that 
it would help only cane growers whereas there were other farmers - at Navua 8 7 
for example - who also needed credit. Ten years later, the company was 
again thinking of establishing an agricultural bank for cane farmers. It 
was willing to consider putting up £200,000 to take over the liabilities 
of those who were in debt, but nothing came of the idea, possibly because 
government was not prepared to legislate for the compulsory disclosure of 88 
debts - a prerequisite for the implementation of the scheme. Though 
there is no evidence that officials discussed the question in these terms, 
their lack of support for CSR's proposals may have owed something to the 
knowledge that if implemented they would have damaged those with a vested 
interest in the existing system. 
Government's willingness to heed business interests other than 
CSR was increased, perhaps, by an awareness of the extraordinary complexity 
of the question, and doubts as to whether legislative action or proposals 
on the lines suggested by CSR were capable of providing a solution. So 
long as other sources of finance were available, growers could use a whole 
host of informal arrangements - way beyond the ability of the law to 
control - to obtain credit. And so long as their security was poor, 
advances would always be at high rates of interest. Maybe it was this 
realization, especially after the Penang experiment, which lay behind the 
relatively low priority given to this question by both CSR and government; 
certainly, officials frequently stressed the practical difficulties in the 
85 Pearson, 'Co-operative Credit', 18 Oct. 1930, C.S.O. 2/25. 
86 'Indebtedness and credit of Fiji cane farmers', SPSM Newsletter, 
1 (1962), 7-8. 
87 Pearson, 'Credit Facilities for Agriculturalists', 4 March 1931, 
C.S.O. 2/25. 
88 H.O. to Nausori, 16 May 1940, CSR R 2.0/2/-, 
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89 way of a solution. The long Lerm answer would have been to increase 
farmers' credit worthiness by raising their incomes. The higher their 
incomes the bigger the chance that loans would be repaid, and the lower 
the interest that need be charged. But this would have required CSR to 
pay more for cane, and the company was not prepared to do this. The price 
of cane and the short terms on which growers held land meant that there was 
no alternative to the provision of crcdit at high rates of interest. How-
ever much CSR disliked it, the availability of this credit brought advant-
ages to the company which far outweighed the disadvantages. Without it 
many growers could not have become farmers at all. If they had been unable 
to finance expenditure which they considered essential, the discontent 
among growers would almost certainly have been greater than that caused 
by the high cost of credit. The interests of CSR and those of moneylenders 
and storekeepers were closer than the company may have realized. 
The transition to the smallfarm system, then, involved compromises 
between CSR, government, the chiefs and other business interests in the 
colony. Only on the question of diversification did the company have its 
way almost completely. Though these compromises were a prerequisite for 
the success of the smallfarm system, they weakened CSR's exclusive control 
over growers and made it easier for farmers in the future to express their 
opposition to the company. For if CSR, by some miracle, had possessed 
almost total control over the supply of credit to farmers, and if it had 
won greater control over the leasing of Fijian owned cane lands, would 
growers have dared to strike in 1943 and 1960? Could they have afforded 
to? The inter-war years showed that CSR had great influence in the 
economy at large, but its influence depended on working with other members 
of the elite. 
Some effects of the smallfarm system 
What limits there were to CSR's influence were outweighed before the Second 
World War by the extent of its control over growers. Although there were 
occasions, especially among contractors, when the company's cultivation 
instructions were not carried out, the amount of control exercised was 
90 very considerable as contemporaries acknowledged. The result was that 
89 E.g. minute by Seymour, 1 June 1932, C.S.O. 31/46. 
90 E.G. by Kilmer 0. Moe, Principal of the Kamehameha School, Honolulu, 
who examined the Fiji sugar industry in 1929. CSR F 1.0/1/23. 
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cerLaiii characteristics of the plai\tatlon were perpetuated. Apart from 
the continuation of ganging, this was evident in the retention of certain 
job descriptions used on plantations. The term field officer only became 
current in the late 1930s. Before then he was known, as he had been on 
the plantation, as an overseer - the name was tlie same because the job was 
the same. Growers were treated as if they were still on plantations. The 
Labasa manager wrote in 1928: 
Thus it is essential that after leasing our officers must 
retain that personal influence over the people, which is the 
outcome of discipline under the indenture system and may be 
looked upon as a Capital asset not to be dissipated. 91 
It was a 'Capital asset' that the company preserved very well. Indians 
were trained not to become decision makers and decide for themselves how 
to allocate resources on their farms: rather, they were expected to obey 
decisions taken by CSR. Since smallfarming in the Fiji sugar industry, 
then, falls within that category of agricultural enterprise which is 
characterized by the employment of a relatively large number of unskilled 
workers whose activities are closely supervised, George Beckford is quite 
itic 
93 
92 right to regard it as a type of planta on. Growers were little more 
than plantation labourers in disguise. 
CSR regarded this control as essential if the smallfarm system 
was to succeed. It enabled overseers to ensure that on balance the 
standard of cultivation by growers was about the same as it had been on 
plantations. Ploughing was not always so thorough, but the land was kept 
94 
more clear of weeds. There seems to have been no significant drop in 
the quality of cane grown, while as Table 6:4 shows, yields per acre 
actually increased a little, though this was partly due to the introduction 
91 Labasa to H.O., 7 April 1928, CSR F 4.0/7/-. 
92 George L. Beckford, Persistent Poverty^ 253. 
93 Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru, who was president of the Servants of 
India Society and a member of the Council of State in New Delhi, 
wrote in 1938: 'I had no idea till I went to Fiji of the 
enormous power wielded by the C.S.R. Co. Its tenants are no 
better than labourers and completely under its thumb.' Quoted 
by Gillion, 161. 
94 W.P. Dixon, 'The sugar industry in Fiji. Labour troubles and their 




Nausori Rarawai Labasa Lautoka Penang 
1904--15 18.61 17.40 16.57 21.16 N.A. 
1928-•39 20.45 19.36 18.57 20.07 20.17 




Source: CSR Ltd, Manufacture Reports, 1905-40. 
* Excludes Penang. Makes no allowance for difference in 
total output between mills. 
95 
of better varieties. There can be no doubt that growers derived great 
advantage from the smallfarm system of producing cane. They could earn 
more than if they had remained as labourers, or if they had had to rely 
exclusively on the cultivation of crops like cotton and rice. Moreover, 
by paying the same price for cane despite changes in the world price of 
sugar, CSR shielded growers from the worst effects of the depression. The 
Colonial Office was told in 1933, with reference to sugar production: 
Confidence in the success of this industry is the main reason 
for the general optimism in commercial circles, which is so 
remarkable of Fiji at this time and separates Fiji sharply 
from the rest of the Pacific territories. 96 
And not just the Pacific. Unlike the overwhelming majority of peasant cash 
farmers in the tropics, cane growers in Fiji did not experience a fall in 
their incomes as a result of the depression. Their earnings remained 
relatively stable, apart from fluctuations caused by weather conditions. 
On the other hand, the spread effects of the sugar industry were 
still limited. Despite attempts by CSR to train Fijians as growers in the 
1930s, the price of cane was not sufficiently high to attract more than a 
few into the industry, with the result that they were unwilling to share 
97 (in addition to rent) more of the profits from cane. CSR also repatri-
95 'FIJI MILLS. Comparison and effect of improved work at the Fiji 
Mills since 1931', 21 March 1944, CSR F 5.0/12/-. 
96 Seymour to C.O., secret, 27 May 1933, C.O. 83/203 file 18496. 
97 CSR's efforts to promote cane farming by Fijians is described by 
Timothy J. Macnaught, 'Mainstream to Millpond? The Fijian 
Political Experience 1897-1940', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 307-16. 
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TABLE 6:5 
Aggregate profit from CSR's sugar mills in Fiji 
for years ended 31 March 1925 to 31 March, 1940'^ 
CF 
Sales of raw sugar^ 19,684,758 
Operating costs: 
Direct costs - purchase of cane, etc. 15,859,061 
Estimated overhead c o s t s 3 506,880 16,365,941 
3,318,817 
Add miscellaneous profits from sale of 
molasses, operation of S.S. Rani, 
sundry trading ^ 346,637 
Gross profit ^ 3,665,454 
Less charge for depreciation and replacement 1,623,942 
Net profit before tax 2,041,512 
Less income tax" 137,401 
Net profit after tax 1,904,111 
Sources: Mill profit and loss accounts. Chief Accountant, CSR Ltd, Sydney; 
C.Y. Shephard, The Sugar Industry of Fiji, 49., 
Notes: 
1. No allowance has been made for changes in the general price level. 
Compared with the previous ten years and the years after 1939, prices 
were relatively stable during the period: the fall in prices which resulted 
from the Great Depression was at least partly offset by the devaluation of 
the £ Fiji. 
2. Excludes income from sale of stocks held on 31 March 1924 but 
includes income from sale of stocks held on 31 March 1940. Because of 
absence of relevant figures, it is assumed that there was no profit or loss 
from sale of stocks held on 31 March 1925 and credited at current prices 
to returns for the year ended on that date. 
3. Figures only available for years ended 31 March 1934 to 31 March 
1940 inclusive. Annual overhead costs for the previous eight years have 
been assumed to be the average of the following seven years. 
4. Though it is not certain, the profits do not seem to include any 
gains or losses from rents, the Yaqara cattle station, the dairies and 
butcheries, and the pineapple cannery. Losses from the cannery would have 
offset some if not most of the gains from the other activities. -
5. Though not absolutely certain, the charge seems to have been on a 
straight line basis - four per cent each year on the original cost of fixed 
assets. Assumed is that gains/losses from disposal of fixed assets are 
treated as capital transactions and are excluded from mill profit and loss 
accounts. 
6. Income tax paid for period up to and including year ended 31 March 
1930 has been estimated on basis of net profit before tax in year^ X rate 
tax in year^. 
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ated most of the profits it earned in the colony. Table 6:5 above shows 
an estimate of the aggregate profit, £1,904,111, from its sugar mills in 
Fiji for the years ended 31 March 1925 to 31 March 1940, and Table 6:6 
overleaf presents a conservative estimate of the cash surplus arising from 
milling over the same period. No account has been taken of transfer 
pricing and the like. After allowing for capital inflows, CSR was in a 
position to take out of Fiji an estimated £1,992,971 - a very large sum 
in relation to the size of the Fiji economy. Except for the amount on the 
98 
pineapple cannery in which the company had invested £76,389 by 1940, 
nearly all the surplus was repatriated. It helped finance the expansion 
of the Australian sugar industry in the 1920s and the development of 'Cane-
nite' production in the late 1930s. 'Cane-nite' is a low density wall-
board which was manufactured by CSR initially from megass, a by-product 
of sugar. As in the case of distilling (and of course refining), the 
company found it more economic to process megass in Australia than Fiji. 
CSR's diversification into the manufacture of building materials and then 
into other areas during and after the Second World War was financed 99 
largely by profits made in previous years. Table 6:7 (see page 176) 
shows that profits from Fiji - at least in 1926, 1927 and 1929 - Vvfcrc a 
significant, but not a major, proportion of the company's earnings. On 
top of this was the harm done by CSR's obstruction of diversification, 
which denied the colony the option of developing new exports and left it 
dependent on imports for a significant proportion of Indian foodstuf f s. 
Finally, the dominance of CSR in Fiji and its treatment of farmers 
produced resentment, which would flare into open defiance of the company 
during the Second World War and reduce the national income as a result. 
So it was that in these ways, to borrow the words of a West Indian writer, . r 101 sugar proved to be a sweet malefactor. 
98 
99 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd, Half-Yearly Report, 31 
March 1940. 
The process of diversification is described in Lowndes (ed.) 
South Pacific Enterprise, ch. 11. 
100 In 1939 ricc imports totalled £27,901, and imports of sharps were 
valued at £44,289. 'Trade report for the year 1939', C.F. 37/1940. 
101 Wallace R. Aykroyd, The Story of Sugar. Sweet Malefactor. 
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TABLE 6:6 
Estimated cash flow arising from Fiji sugar milling activities 
for years ended 31 March 1925 to 31 March 1940^ 
£F 
Net profit after tax 1,904.111 
Add back depreciation & replacement 1,623,942 
3,528,053 
2 
Less estimated capital expenditure 1,535,082 
Cash surplus 1,992,971 
Sources: Table 5:5; 'Fiji Sugar Mills', 4 April 1944, CSR F 5.0/2/-. 
Notes: 
1. Not all the cash flow would have occurred during this period. 
Tax payments and certain expenses incurred in the last year(s) would 
have been paid after 31 March 1940, while income from sugar stocks 
held on that date would not have flowed in till the following year. 
Similarly, certain expenses incurred before 1 April 1924 would have 
been met after that date. 
2. The estimate is based on a statement, 'Fiji Sugar Mills', 
prepared by CSR for the Shephard enquiry in 1944. The statement shows 
the value of 'Fixed Assets plus Improvements' for each year from 1930 
on the basis of replacement values in 1939, the valuation having been 
made in 1941. The value of assets for each year before 1941 was 
calculated by subtracting the capital expenditure for each year back to 
1930. Total capital expenditure for the years ended 31 March 1931 to 
31 March 1940 was £896,926. No figures are available for the six years 
before 1930, so it has been assumed that annual capital expenditure for • 
that period was the same as the annual average for the years ended 31 
March 1931 to 31 March 1940. To this has been added £100,000 to cover 
the purchased land and the Penang mill in the late 1920s. Actual 
capital expenditure was almost certainly less than the estimate here, 
for these reasons; 
(a) The Penang mill and subsequent additions to it cost only £25,000. 
It is highly unlikely that purchases of land amounted to £75,000 since 
the book value of all land in Fiji held by CSR in 1941 amounted to £222,000. 
The area of CSR's land acquisitions in the late 1920s were a small part of 
the total area owned by the company.^ 
(b) From Fiji's annual trade reports, the average annual f.o.b. value of 
imports of sugar making machinery, railway material and locomotives and 
component parts was £F45,544 for the calendar years 1924 to 1939. Even 
after allowing for other capital goods imported for the sugar industry 
(e.g. rolling stock which was not recorded as a separate item till 1944 -
was it too small to be treated as a separate item before then?), costs of 
transport and of installation, it is likely that average annual capital 
expenditure was less than £89,692. 
(c) The assumption that capital expenditure for the six years before 1930 
averaged the same as for the 10 subsequent years probably overstates the size 
of capital expenditure in the former period. The annual average f.o.b. value 
of the imports mentioned above and recorded in the trade reports was £F34,082 
from 1924 to 1929, against £F52,422 for the next 10 years. 
Thus the estimate for capital expenditure represents an upper limit. 
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TABLE 6:7 
Sources of CSR's profits for years ended 31 March 1926, 
19-27 and 1929 
Year ended 31 March 1926 1927 1929 
Total CSR profits (L Australian) 890,732 1,072,797 1,346,306 
% derived from Australia 52.4 64.0 54.2 
% " New Zealand 8.9 7.8 6.2 
% " Fiji 32.3 22.8 28.6 
% " Other sources 6.4 5.4 11.0 
.Source: CSR Ltbk., 'E.W.K. Special', A (1909-37), 122-39. 
Notes: 
1 'Otlicr sourccs' include InLercst; on various debts, dehcnLures, 
temporary deposits in London, etc., and 'trading income from 
buying and selling sugar outside the [Australian] Commonwealth 
and upon which income tax has not been paid'. ('E.W.K. Special', 
150.) 
2 These figures were produced for the Deputy Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation in Australia. 
3. In 1930 and 1931 the Fiji percentage of total profits dropped 
to 3.9 and 6.8 respectively, but these were years of exception-
ally small profits in Fiji and were not typical of the colony's 




CSR's Hegemony Under Attack - the 1940s 
THE Second World War saw the first major challenge to CSR's control of 
growers since the inauguration of the smallfarm system - a challenge 
fuelled by the resentment of Indians at their inferior political and 
economic status in the colony, especially vis-a-vis Europeans.^ Starting 
in the late 1930s farmers' unions were formed, and in 1943 growers 
refused to harvest their cane. If one assumes a consensus model of society 
in which divergent interests are locked together in mutual support, these 
unions can be seen as voluntary associations which served as a link 
2 
between the 'traditional' farming community and the 'modern' CSR. Emerging 
at a time of structural (economic) change which had a destabilising effect 
on the industry, they can be viewed in terms of their integrative function 
which was to channel the grievances of farmers in ways that would not 
threaten the stability of the smallfarm system. Yet to adopt such a 
model would be to overlook the dichotomy of interest between growers and 
the company. True, to a great extent they were both mutually dependent, 
one for a market and the other for supplies, but they were also funda-
mentally opposed to each other - over the price of cane for example. 
Their opposition was increased by market constraints on the price of raw 
sugar, which favoured the consumer but restricted the funds available for 
distribution among those engaged in the industry. Though sugar proceeds 
would grow considerably over the next thirty years, they would never be 
large enough to meet the long term needs of both the millers and the 
farmers. Obviously, CSR's ability to pay more for cane would be limited 
by the price it received for raw sugar, as well as by its need to make a 
profit. Consequently, with marketing arrangements for Fiji sugar designed 
1 For the Indian challenge to European dominance see K.L. Gillion, 
The Fiji Indians, especially ch. VII. 
2 For a survey of some of the literature on voluntary associations 
see James Nwannukwu Kerri, 'Studying Voluntary Associations.as 
Adaptive Mechanisms: A Review of Anthropological Perspectives', 
Current Anthropology, 17 (1976), 23-47. See also Graham E. 
Johnson, 'Voluntary Associations and Social Change: Some theor-
etical Issues', International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 
16 (1975), 51-63. 
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mainly to benefit interests overseas, growers found themselves in conflict 
not just with CSR, but with consumers of sugar abroad. The emergence of 
unions should be seen as the beginning of an awareness by farmers of the 
contradiction in which they were placed. 
Demographi-c change and -its economic effect 
It was no accident that the unionisation of growers began just before the 
Second World War, when the transition to the smallfarm system was nearly 
complete. Many of the Indians who Vsrere settled as cane farmers in the 
1920s and '30s had already experienced two major improvements in their 
economic status - from unemployment, perhaps destitution, in India to 
indentured labourers in Fiji, and from the indenture system to free workers 
and agriculturalists. Now under the smallfarm system they had experienced 
a third, perhaps the largest, advance in their standard of living. Some 
had been able to supplement, or substitute, the plots they already leased 
with higher quality and larger areas of company land, while others had 
moved from wage- to more lucrative self-employment. Since, despite the 
control it entailed, the treatment of farmers by CSR compared favourably 
with the iniquities of the indenture system and the exploitation of tenants 
3 
by landlords in India (and by a number of Indian landlords in Fiji ; 




farming laid do^sm by the company.'^ An Indian Planters Association, formed 
in 1934, had not survived long.' 
By the late 1930s, however, many of these farmers were growing 
old. Assuming no deaths in the meantime, by 1936 about 40% of the male 
Indian population aged between 15 and 50 in the 1920 census - those most 
likely to become growers under the smallfarm system - had passed the age 
of 50 (see Table 7:1 below). In 1941 the proportion would have been about 
67% and in 1946 about 90%. Though these figures are for the male Indian 
3 A.D. Patel who would champion the cause of farmers was himself 
a landlord. Though there is no evidence that his tenants had 
less security than those of CSR, which was often the case when 
land was leased from Indians, the gross rental on one of his 
leases in 1947 was over four times as high. H.O. to Lautoka, 
26 July 1947, Private Ltbk. Out, 70 (1947), 151. 
4 Ayodhya Prasad Sharma, Kisan Sangh Ka Itihas^ Vol. 1, 35. 
5 Gillion, 164. 
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TAniJ', 7:1 
Age distribution of adult male Indians in 1921 
Age Number % total 
15 - 20 410 1 .88 
20 - 25 1,609 7.36 
25 - 30 4,381 20.05 
30 - 35 5,161 23.62 
35 - /lO 3,476 .15.9.1 
40 - 45 3,099 14.18 
45 - 50 1,337 6.12 
50 - 55 1,308 5.99 
55 - 60 380 1.74 
60 - 65 456 2.08 
65 and over 235 1.07 
Total 21,852 100.00 
Source: Census report for 1921, C.F. 2/1922. 
population as a whole, including non-farmers, and do not allow for those 
who were under fifteen in 1921 and may have acquired farms when they were 
older (probably only a few), they provide at least a rough guide to the 
number of original cane growers who had reached fifty. Once they attained 
this age growers tended to leave most of the responsibilities of farm 
management to their sons. Thus cane farming was passing into the hands of 
a new generation, a generation which had not served under indenture and 
which could not compare conditions in Fiji with those their fathers had 
left in India. This had important consequences. The first was that not 
having been indentured to plantations, younger growers were less willing 
than their fathers to undertake the very unpleasant job of harvesting cane, 
preferring to pay for substitutes instead.^ In 1943 it was estimated that 
just under 50% of cane cutters were substitutes.^ Though some were 
farmers' sons, not all would have been so. Some were repaying in labour 
Some of these younger growers, though, would have been sent by 
their fathers to harvest CSR's estates in the 1920s and '30s, 
as part of the compulsory labour extracted from farmers by the 
company. The compulsory nature of the work would have hardly 
increased its appeal. Moreover it was physically exhausting, 
the heat was often intense and the cane was frequently infested 
with hornets. No wonder that when the labour supply increased, 
growers wanted to hire substitutes instead. 
C.Y. Shephard, The Sugar Industry of Fiji, 13. 
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debts Lo moneyleaders and storekeepers, a niiiiiber of wlioin were also cane 
farmers. The wages (or equivalent) of those who were not sons reduced the 
cash surpluses from each farm, provoking demands that the price of cane g 
be increased. The second consequence was that growers were more willing 
to challenge the smallfarm system as it liad evolved. Not having experi-
enced the harsh alternatives, they could ignore the past in order to 
question the present. 
And they found much to question. There was bitter resentment 
against CSR's tight control of farmers, especially its restrictions on the 
planting of food crops, the limited length of the company's leases, the 
authoritarian - sometimes bullying - attitude of certain field officers 
and the obligation on growers, when directed by CSR, to work the mills, 
weed the tramlines and harvest the company's estates for wages too low to 
9 
attract voluntary labour. Resentment against the company was heightened 
in the late 1930s and early '40s by the rapid growth of the Indian 
population, which meant that the number of dependants of non-working age 
- those under 15 and over - increased more rapidly than the number of 
those who had to support them (see Table 7:2 below). Women are not counted 
as dependants since before the \jar, when there was a shortage of labour, 
they performed various tasks on the farm.^^ The likelihood that this 
increase would reduce per capita incomes in the sugar districts was made 
greater by the limited employment opportunities available for members of 
cane-growing families who were capable of work. The number of Indians in 
rural areas, which included persons living in the vicinity of towns but 
not necessarily engaged in agriculture, increased by 50% between 1936 and 
1946 whereas the amount of new land coming under cane rose by only one per 
8 In support of a higher cane price, representatives of growers 
in January 1940 claimed that for some farmers harvesting expenses 
were almost 50% of gross returns. See confidential appendix. 
9 For the grievances of farmers see Prasad, 37-45, 90, 182, 244. 
10 Fifteen is taken for conventional reasons, though in Fiji 
children younger than that and not at school frequently work on 
the farm. Similarly, older men often do relatively little work 
after the age of fifty or so. 
11 Rutledge to H.O., 9 June 1926, Inspectors Ltbk., 1925-6, 166-8. 
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12 cent (see Table 7:3). Even though a large proportion of the increase in 
rural population consisted of those too young to work, it is clear that 
the labour shortage in cane areas was being transformed into a surplus -
a trend that was recognized by CSR in 1941.^^ 
TABLE 7:2 
Age structure of Indian population, 1936 and 1946 
Ages 1936 1946 % increase 
1 - 14 
15 - 59 










Total population 85,002 119,727* 40.9 
Total under 
15 & over 59 42,382 66,392 56.7 
% total under 
15 & over 59 
to total pop. 49.9 55.5 11.2 
Source: Census reports for 1936 and 1946, C.P. 42/1936, 35/1947. 
* Excludes the 336 who did not specify an age. 
TABLE 7:3 
Increase in cane area and in nvmher of Indians in 
rural areas,1936-1946 
1936 1946 
Acreage under cane 89,924 90,816 
% increase 1 
No. of Indians in rural 
areas 66,921 100,943 
% increase 50 
Source: Michael Moynagh, 'Land tenure in Fiji's sugar cane 
districts since the 1920s', Joumial of Pacific History, 
forthcoming. Table 3. 
Includes Indians in the vicinity of towns and not 
necessarily engaged in agriculture. 
12 Nor does it seem that there was an increase in the total area 
(including non-cane land) available for Indians to farm. From 
1936 to 1940, the years for which figures are available, the 
total area of freeholds, leases of farm land and leases of 
native land actually fell by about 9000 acres. Blue Books of 
Fiji, 1936 and 1940. 
13 Confidential appendix. 
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The growing population pressure on sugar land might have been 
alleviated by the creation of new jobs in activities not directly associ-
ated with the cultivation of cane. Table 7:4 shows that the number of 
Indians engaged in primary industry apart from cane, and in secondary and 
TABLE 7:4 
Occupational status of male Indians, 1926 and 1946 
Nos. employed 
Occupation 1936 1946 
Sugar cane farming 12,501 9,611 
Other primary industry 4,338 10,798 
Secondary & tertiary sectors 7,505 11,476 
Total employed 24,344 31,885 
Source: Census reports for 1936 and 1946, C.P. 42/1936, 35/1947. 
tertiary sectors almost doubled between 1936 and 1946. Particular care, 
though, is needed in interpreting this table, which is based on census 
reports for the two years. Whereas the 1946 census stated that only those 
aged 12 or over were questioned about their occupations, the 1936 ccnsus 
gave no such information and left it unclear whether the figures on occu-
pational status included persons under 12 years or not. This makes 
comparison between the two difficult. Moreover, a significant number of 
respondents in 1936 did not indicate their occupations, with the result 
that when the tables were compiled it was assumed that if Indians lived 
in sugar districts, and had not provided information about their occupations, 
they were engaged in the cultivation of cane. But this was not necessarily 
the case since, despite CSR opposition, a number of contractors cultivated 
food crops in addition to cane, while there were others - albeit only a 
few - in the sugar districts who did not grow cane. Consequently, the 
12,501 said to have been involved in the production of cane in 1936 may 
have been an overestimate. Finally, the two censuses were taken at 
different times of the year - on 26 April in 1936 and on 3 October in 1946. 
In April farmers were likely to have been cultivating cane: in October 
they would have been harvesting it. This helps explain why the numbers 
involved in producing cane in 1936 were higher than in 1946. In October 
of the latter year some members of cane growing families, who in April 
might have assisted with cultivation, would have been employed in casual 
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jobs connected with the milling of cane. This in turn would have swelled 
the figures for those engaged in secondary industry. In 1946 the number 
of Indian males employed in the manufacture of sugar was put at 1,204: in 
1936 it was only 580. The difference was almost entirely due to the 
dates on which the censuses were taken. 
Yet despite difficulties in comparing the two census reports, it 
is clear that between 1936 and 1946 non-cane employment opportunities for 
Indians increased. The number of new jobs was especially high in 1942 
and 1943 when about 70,000 Allied troops x^ e^re stationed on the west of 
Viti Levu, but most of these jobs were short term and did not outlast the 
14 
presence of the troops. Of the permanent increase in jobs over the ten-
year period, some were in the secondary and tertiary sectors but most were 
in agriculture. There was a substantial increase in the number of Indians 
involved in the cultivation of food crops other than cane, particularly 
maize, rice and other grains in which the total rose from 2,025 in 1936 
to 6,387 in 1946. Over the period the area under rice in the colony grew 
from about 13,800 to about 23,800 acres.^^ The increase in subsistence 
crops was due to the relaxation of company restrictions on the cultivation 
of such crops by cane farmers. GSR's more flexible attitude arose from 
the immediate need to overcome the shortage of food during the war, as 
well as being a response to pressure from growers, and was not subsequently 
reversed.^^ Thus the fall in numbers cultivating sugar between 1936 and 
1946, and the increase in those involved in other agricultural pursuits, 
was partly the result of a greater number of families tending crops in 
addition to cane. 
The increase in employment opportunities between 1936 and 1946 
does not necessarily mean that, in the face of a growing number of depend-
ants, the workforce was able to maintain per capita incomes (or their 
equivalent) among the Indian population. Most of the non-cane occupations 
in which Indians were engaged in 1946 were less lucrative than the culti-
vation of sugar. This was certainly true of the equivalent money returns 
from growing subsistence crops like rice. It was also true of much of the 
14 Shephard, 26-7. 
15 Blue Book of Fiji, 1936; C.P. 23/1946. 
16 'Food and cash crops grown by cane growers'. Agricultural Jouimal, 
Fiji, 18 (1947), 52; confidential appendix. 
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wage employment open to Indians. Table 7:5 shows the wages of unskilled 
government employees In 1939, 1944 and 1945 which were broadly in line 
with the wages of unskilled workers in other activities. In 1939 an un-
skilled labourer working five and a half days a week, fifty weeks a year, 
TABLE 7:5 
Daily wage rates of unskilled government employees 
in 1939, 1944, 1945 
1939 1944* 1945* 
Suva 2s 6d 4s Od 4s 4d 
Country 2s 6d 3s lOd 4s 2d 
Source: 'Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labour, Fiji, 1945', 
C.P. 8/1946 
* Includes cost of living bonus 
would have earned £34 7s 6d. After deducting farm costs, the estimated 
income of a cane grower on twelve acres of land would have been about 
£48 10 Od. At 1944 wage rates, a labourer in Suva would have earned about 
£55, while the cane farmer in 1943 (assuming he had harvested his cane) 
would have netted about £70 18 Od.^^ In fact, many labourers would have 
earned considerably less than these sums because they would have been 
engaged in only casual work. 
Now, given the limited earnings from alternative occupations to 
cane, it is clear that with the increase in population, especially in the 
proportion of non-working age, the maintenance of per capita incomes in 
the sugar districts depended on a rise in the net proceeds from cane. But 
in the late 1930s this did not occur. There was no significant improve-
ment in farm productivity (see Table 7:6 below) and cane prices were not 
raised till 1940. Consequently, assuming a constant rate of population 
growth between 1936 and 1946, just before the Second World War per capita 
incomes in the cane areas were almost certainly in decline. This was 
reflected in the demand by growers in 1939 that the size of their farms 
18 
be increased, so that they could more easily support their large families. 
During the war, but in response to a problem that must have begun earlier. 
17 'Report of the Sugar Cane Commission', C.O. 852/518 file 19666/56. 
18 Confidential appendix. 
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TAJ'.LE 7:6 
Yields of cane - tons pep acre croppedj 1930-1950 
True 
Year Nausori Rarawai Labasa Lautoka Penang average 
1930 20.3 15.8 13.7 18.0 19.2 17.1 
1931 17.0 9.0 13.5 16.3 16.1 13.6 
1932 24.2 22.8 20.8 26.0 26.6 24.2 
1933 19.4 19.8 19.1 19.3 19.0 19.4 
1934 20.6 18.5 18.7 18.9 19.0 19.0 
1935 23.3 21.5 20.2 22. 7 19.1 21.9 
1936 19.1 24.0 20.5 22.7 22.2 22.3 
1937 22.7 22.5 20.1 21.5 23.7 21.9 
1938 24.3 21.1 21.5 22.5 20.8 22.1 
1939 15.0 20. 7 18.4 18.8 19.6 18.9 
1940 21.4 19.4 15.6 19.6 17.9 19.1 
1941 16.7 20.8 20.9 21.0 20.1 20.2 
1942 18.1 18.9 21.8 21.3 18.8 20.2 
1943 15.9 18.7 17.4 20.2 18.0 18.2 
1944 16.4 13.6 14.7 14.9 11.5 14.4 
1945 17.4 15.5 14.5 15.3 14.7 15.4 
1946 18.0 19.7 17.0 21.9 17.6 19.7 
1947 21.1 22.3 17.8 22.0 16.6 21.0 
1948 16.5 22.5 19.4 23.9 21.8 21.8 
1949 16.1 25.7 15.1 23.2 20.4 21.6 
1950 10.8 18.1 14.9 16.7 15.6 16.2 
Source: CSR Ltd, Manufacture Reports^, 1931 to 1951 
growers also protested at CSR's restrictions on the number of houses that 
19 
could be built on each farm. So it was that with the decline in per 
capita incomes, coupled with long-standing grievances against CSR and the 
existence of a new generation of farmers willing to press for change, 
conditions in the late 1930s were ripe for the unionisation of growers. 
Farmers' unions and the 1942 strike 
The first major union, the Kisan Sangh ('Farmers' Association'), was 
founded in late 1937 as the result of efforts by Ayodhya Prasad, its 
General Secretary who had originally come to Fiji as a schoolteacher in 
1926. In his autobiographical history of the Kisan Sangh, Prasad 
described an argument he had had in the early 1930s with an American. The 
latter had 
advised not to put the blame on Europeans. Instead, Indians 
should learn to unite, become powerful and at once the 
19 Confidential appendix. 
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Europeans would be friendly. Later, that night 1 started 
pondering what the American had said and it seemed his every 
word was correct. Since then I left hating Europeans and 
thought of correcting the Indians. 20 
Prasad believed that if they would unite and form, as it were, a loyal 
opposition to the company, Indians could win major concessions that would 
raise their incomes and reduce CSR's control over them. This strategy 
of collaboration, though, ignored the basic conflict between growers and 
CSR. 
The adoption of the strategy reflected farmers' psychological 
dependence on the company; they felt they could not do without CSR. Prasad 
told A.G. Sahu Khan, Indian Assistant to the District Commissioner 
(Western) in 1940, that growers wanted to co-operate with the millers 
for the good of the sugar cane industry in this Colony in the 
welfare of which we are relatively much more interested than 
the capitalists who constitute the Company, for with us 
farming is the end-all of our existence in this Colony, where-
as the capitalists could easily transfer their capital to some 
other part of the world. 21 
In addition, CSR appeared so strong that many doubted whether an effective 
union could be formed at all, let alone one that sought a confrontation 
22 
with the company. Prasad himself was a North Indian, so that much of 
the early support for the union came from this section of the farming 
community. Because they had been longer in Fiji, North Indians were 23 
generally more prosperous than those from the south, with a larger stake 
in the existing order. They had more to lose than South Indians from a 
strategy of confrontation which failed, and yet they stood to gain from 
concessions won through co-operation with CSR. 
At first, though, it was not easy to collaborate since CSR 
refused to recognize the union. The company hoped that if it was ignored 
the association would wither away. Previous attempts to organize unions 
among the Indian population had failed. Wliy should the Kisan Sangh be any 
exception? Indeed, would not recognition give legitimacy to the union, 
increase its prestige with growers and transform it into an organization 
20 Prasad, 80. 
21 Confidential appendix. 
22 Prasad, 92. 
23 Gillion, 165. 
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capobJc of laurelling a powerful cliallcnj'.e to CSR in Llic future? lietter, 
the company thought, to defeat the union now, while it was still small, 
24 
than to pile up trouble for the future. This approach ran into conflict 
with government which feared the law and order implications of unrest in 
the sugar industry, believed tliat it was in CSR's own long term l^ est 
interest to co-operate with the Kisan Sangh and was under pressure from 25 the Colonial Office to legislate for the compulsory recognition of unions. 
2 6 
For almost ten years CSR had successfully staved off such legislation. 
Informed opinion in Britain would not allow it to do this for much longer. 
Sir Harry Luke (governor, 1939-41), considered CSR's managers to be dull, 
unimaginative and behind the times in their tendency 'to regard the Indian, 
as in the days of indenture, as a person who is not expected to think for 
himself. He thought the general manager. Goldfinch, was a 'complete 
2 7 
autocrat*. For its part, the company believed Luke to be 'weak and 
indolent'. Its legal adviser in Fiji, Sir Henry Scott, described him in 
private as 'a dirty little Jew' - a remark that reflected the widespread 28 
unpopularity of Luke among the Europeans. Yet for all this personal 
antagonism, what was in dispute was not the company's right to make 
profits in Fiji but rather, how this could best be done. 
Had CSR persisted in its refusal to make concessions to the union, 
it is unlikely that the Kisan Sangh would have emerged so quickly as a 
powerful force in the industry. Indeed, like its predecessors it too 
might have collapsed. But government pressure forced the company to 
modify its approach. Officials promised that if CSR refused to be more 
conciliatory, they would introduce legislation for the compulsory recog-
nition of unions and arbitration in the case of unresolved disputes. 
Rather than have collective bargaining imposed on it, especially in a way 
that provided for outside intervention in the industry, the company chose 
to dribble out concessions in the hope that they would satisfy government 
and appease the growers. In fact they did neither. Each concession was 
24 'Memorandum for the Board', 1 March 1939, CSR R 3.0/2/-. 
25 Confidential appendix. 
26 Gillion, 167-8. 
27 Confidential appendix. 
28 Irving to Goldfinch, 14 April 1939, CSR R 2.0/2/-; Lord to Goldfinch, 
25 May 1939, CSR R 3.0/1/-. 
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attributed by farmers to tlie efforts of the Kisan Sanpji, so that tlie more 
concessions were made the more the strength of the union increased. By 
July 1940, 72% of growers in the Ba-Sigatoka belt were listed as members, 
29 
42% of whom were financial. As membership of the union grew, and as it 
continued to demand recognition, so pressure on CSR from government was 
intensified. The result was defeat for the company's strategy and recog-
nition for the Kisan Sangh. 
30 
Recognition occurred in three stages. In 1939, without 
actually negotiating with any of the leaders of the Kisan Sangh, CSR met 
a few of their demands. It gave each farmer a written account of the 
proceeds from his cane, it reversed its policy of discouraging growers 
from planting food crops even on land away from their farms, it reduced 
the length of the working day in the mills from twelve to eight hours 
(effectively a 33^/3 per cent rise in wages), and it increased its efforts 
to hire Fijians so as to obviate the need to extract compulsory labour 
from growers. Field officers were taught Hindi and instructed to use less 
force and more tact in their treatment of farmers. At the end of the year 
the company offered growers a ten year contract to govern the terms on 
which it would buy cane - an important demand by the Kisan Sangh - and in 
response to another demand (as well as to save the cost of analysing each 
grower's cane) it promised to abandon the system of paying for cane accord-
ing to the quality of each farmer's crop. Instead, the price was to be 
based on the average quality of cane crushed in each mill, with a scale 
of bonuses once the price of sugar exceeded £11 a ton. 
Following threats not to plant cane if modifications to the 
contract were not made, and after further pressure on the company by 
government, major concessions were next offered by CSR on 6 April 1940. 
It met a deputation of cane growers which, though not a formal deputation 
of the Kisan Sangh, contained six members (of a total seven) nominated by 
it. The company promised a few minor alterations to the contract - it 
would try to improve the delivery of fertilizer, interest on advances 
would be reduced to four per cent, growers would be allowed a represent-
ative at the weighbridge (to check the weights recorded for their cane), 
29 Confidential appendix. 
30 Confidential appendix. 
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and the cultivation of second ratoons would be allowed. More important 
was that for the first time the company had, in effect, recognized the 
principle of collective bargaining. In response, the growers agreed to 
sign the contracts offered by CSR. The third stage occurred the following 
year, again after government pressure. In March 19A1 the company offered 
three instead of ten-year leases to seven allegedly unsatisfactory tenants 
in Raki Raki. \^ Jhen they refused to sign, eviction proceedings were 
started by CSR and agitation begun by the Kisan Sangh. Luke urged the 
company to withdraw the notices of eviction, but CSR proceeded with the 
court case and, having won it, then announced that the tenants would be 
reinstated on their farms. Meetings were subsequently held with leaders 
of the Kisan Sangh, and on 30 May the union was recognized. Soon after, 
on instructions from the Colonial Office, industrial legislation was 
introduced and, to the dismay of CSR, brought into effect the following 
year. 
Once the Kisan Sangh had been implicitly recognized in 1940, it 
began to co-operate with CSR, and this collaboration was increased after 
formal recognition in 1941. One area of co-operation was over the harvest-
ing of cane. Hitherto, often under the influence of field officers, gangs 
had elected sirdars from their midst to supervise the cutting of cane and 
loading on trucks. But in 1940 and 1941 CSR gave the Kisan Sangh responsi-
bility for the appointment of sirdars, though the union's nominees were 
usually men who would have been elected in any case. The sirdars were 
allowed a greater say in determining the order of harvesting, an important 
point since it reduced the opportunity for field officers to punish 
recalcitrant growers by having their cane harvested when it was disad-
vantageous to them.^^ In return, the Kisan Sangh used its influence to 
settle disputes among farmers and increase the efficiency of harvesting. 
The Kisan Sangh worked with the company in another way. In 1941 part of 
the output of raw sugar from Fiji had to be destroyed because, due to the 
wartime shortage of shipping, it could not be marketed. The result was 
31 Though there have been comparatively few instances of this, 
farmers have always been afraid that mills would close at the 
end of the season before their cane is cut. So a field officer's 
threat to delay harvesting a farm till late in the season would 
have carried considerable weight. 
32 Smith to H.O., 27 Aug. 1941, Inspectors Ltbk., 1940-3, 173-4. 
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that growers received a slightly lower price for their cane than would 
otherwise have been the case. Yet instead of supporting the claim from 
some quarters that CSR should have paid the whole price, the union backed 
the company/government view that growers should bear part of the loss.^^ 
Furthermore, having won a ten-year contract in 1940, ratlier than seek to 
raise the living standards of farmers by again pressing CSR for a higher 
cane price, the Kisan Sangh directed its attention toward the chronic 
indebtedness of growers. Apart from high interest rates on cash loans, 
the real incomes of farmers were reduced by the relatively high prices 
they had to pay for goods bought on credit. As an attempt to solve the 
problem, in 1941 the Kisan Sangh established a co-operative store to supply 
goods at cost price to members on a rationed basis (imports were controlled 
during the war). Capital of about £10,000 was raised from a levy on 
34 members of one penny a ton of cane. CSR gave moral support to the 
venture, and advanced money to growers who wanted to make cash purchases 
35 
from the store. The company stood to gain from the Kisan Sangh's con-
centration on indebtedness, since it diverted attention from the price of 
cane as a means to raise real incomes. 
Because the Kisan Sangh sought to reconcile the interests of 
growers to CSR, in a situation where long term reconciliation was impossible, 
room was left for the emergence of a second union appealing to growers' 
distrust of the company. The question was whether it would supersede the 
Kisan Sangh and unite the growers against CSR, or whether it would divide 
them. It divided them. The Kisan Sangh's campaign against storekeepers 
encouraged the Indian trading community, through a Gujerati lawyer, A.D. 
Patel, to defend their interests by using the new union to undermine 
public support for the Kisan Sangh. So from the date of its formation, 
15 June 1941, the Akhil Fiji Krishak Maha Sangh ('All Fiji Farmers' Union') 
represented an alliance between one group of farmers, at first mainly 
South Indians led by their religious leader in Fiji, Swami Rudrananda, and 
the Gujerati-dominated but small Indian business community. The result 
33 H.O. to Nausori, 24 Nov. 1942, Private Ltbk. Out, 61 (1942-3), 
67-72. . 
34 C.S.O. F 69/110; 69/155. 
35 H.O. to Lautoka, 1 Dec. 1941, Private Ltbk. Out, 58 (1941-2), 
164-8. 
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was Lhat, Lhough it; won support by exploiting the diflerences between 
growers and CSR, the Maha Sangh was unable to win the allegiance of the 
whole farming community because it was backed by storekeepers and money-
lenders who were unpopular with a large number of growers. Moreover, by 
playing on communal rivalries, union leaders widened the divisions which 
already existed among farmers. Instead of being united, then, farmers on 
the west of Viti Levu, where unions were first formed, were split between 
the Maha and the Kisan Sanghs, both of whom wanted to side with interests 
fundamentally opposed to the growers. To some extent, the unions were 
agents of competition between CSR and Indian businessmen for a larger 
share of the income from cane. 
The Maha Sangh, which was formed just two weeks after the Kisan 
Sangh had been recognized by the company, derived great advantage from 
its rival's collaboration with CSR. In particular, it benefited from 
Ayodhya Prasad's failure to obtain as much help from the company as he had 
expected. In CSR's view, the gains from too closely co-operating with 
the Kisan Sangh were outweighed by fears that the union might become so 
strong as a result that it would pose a threat to the company in future. 
It was hoped in Sydney that rival unions would compete for support among 
3 6 
growers, so preventing them from launching a united attack on the company. 
Though no instructions to this effect have come to light, it is possible 
that field officers encouraged growers to join the Maha Sangh in order to 
foster divisions within the farming community. More certain is that fears 
of the union becoming too strong led CSR to refuse a request that it 
provide loan capital for the co-operative store and help in its adminis-
tration, with the result that the store was badly managed and short of 
3 7 funds. Prasad later claimed that the manager, M.T. Khan, had been forced 38 
to use some of his own savings to tide the store over when cash was short. 
I'rtiatever the truth of this. Khan's administrative methods were highly 
unorthodox and the distinction between his income and the store's not at 
36 H.O. to Lautoka, 8 April 1943, Private Ltbk. Out, 61 (1942-3), 
464. 
37 Smith to H.O., 10 Oct. 1941, Inspectors Ltbk., 1940-3, 220-1. 
38 Prasad, 345. 
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all clear. AllegaCions ol corrupLlon became widespread, and were used by 
-5Q opponents to discredit the union. 
The effects of collaboration were open to attack in other ways. 
The Id levy to finance the store was very unpopular with members of the 
40 
union, a point that Rudrananda and Patel exploited to the full. The role 
of the Kisan Sangh in the organization of cane harvesting enabled it to be 
blamed for an increase in the wages of substitutes in 1940, even though 
this was not its fault but the outcome of the previous year's reduction 
in mill-working hours which had caused an increase in the demand for casual 
41 labour. There was also the union's failure to press for the full price 
42 
of cane in 1941, which provided further grounds for criticism. Above 
all, there was the absence of any tangible concessions from CSR in response 
to collaboration from the Kisan Sangh. The union seemed to have won most 
from the company when it had been in conflict with it. Now, with its 
leaders working (it appeared) almost hand in glove with CSR, it was thought 
by many that the association had abandoned farmers in favour of serving 
the interests of the company. It was natural that growers should turn to 
an alternative union which, in its anti-CSR stand, seemed to have assumed 
the mantle of the Kisan Sangh. How far the emergence of the Maha Sangh 
was the outcome of disenchantment with Ayodhya Prasad's union, and how 
far it was due to communal loyalties which were also important, is hard 
to say. What is clear, though, is that collaboration by the Kisan Sangh 
made it much easier for the Maha Sangh to outflank its rival and appeal 
to the opposition of farmers to CSR. 
Realizing that it was losing support, in March 1943 the Kisan 
Sangh asked CSR to raise the contract price of cane, but in May the 
company refused. Yet rather than abandon its collaborative strategy by 
taking industrial action, the union pursued an approach it had made to 
government in April. To obtain higher cane prices it asked for an increase 
in the price of raw sugar, which was sold to Britain's Minister of Food 
during the war under arrangements for the bulk purchase of all exportable 
sugar in the Commonwealth. In July B.D. Lakshman, one of the union's 
39 Confidential appendix. 
40 Confidential appendix. 
41 Smith to H.O., 22 April 1940, Inspectors Ltbk. 1940-3, 49-53; 
confidential appendix. 
42 Confidential appendix. 
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officials, requested Sir Philip MiLcliell (governor, 19/i2-5) Lo appoint a 
commission to inquire into the price of cane, although its report would 
not have been binding whereas that of an arbitration tribunal would. 'Our 
main reason', he wrote, 'in asking for a Commission rather than an Arbi-
tration Board is that the Imperial Government is to be guided on the 
subject; for, it may perhaps turn out that the problem could be solved by 
/ o 
London rather than by Sydney.' A split within the Kisan Sangh now broke 
into the open. The so-called right wing faction, led by Ayodhya Prasad, 
M.T. Khan and B.D. Lakshman, would continue, except for a brief period, 
to press for the appointment of a commission. The left wing faction, led 
by a Punjabi Mehar Singh, joined the Maha Sangh in taking an initially more 
popular, but also more extreme, approach. They refused to give evidence 
before a coiimiission set up in July, with the result that in order not to 
lose face Prasad's faction boycotted it as well and the commission was 
unable to produce a report. Later, in September, Prasad and Lakshman asked 
that the commission be reconstituted, which it was under the chairmanship 
of E.E. Jenkins, the Attorney General, but its report recommended against 
an increase in the price of cane so vindicating the stand of those who had 
44 
opposed it. Instead of a commission the Maha Sangh, the left wing of 
the Kisan Sangh and a new association, the Rewa Cane Growers' Union, 
demanded an arbitration tribunal whose report would be binding, and 45 announced that until then growers would refuse to harvest their cane. 
In contrast to its rival, now the right wing of the Kisan Sangh, 
the Maha Sangh adopted a strong anti-CSR position, arguing that although 
recent advances in the price of sugar had been reflected to some extent in 
higher cane prices (see Table 7:7 below), the company was still able to 
make exorbitant profits part of which ought to be shared with the growers. 
If necessary, farmers should force GSR to do this. The argument had wide 
appeal among growers, who recalled that the threat of a strike in 1939-40 
had been followed by a reversal of the company's refusal to negotiate with 
them, and that agitation by the Kisan Sangh in early 1941 had led to 
further concessions. Compared to the moderation of men like Ayodhya Prasad 
43 Confidential appendix. 
44 'Report of Sugar Cane Commission', G.O. 852/518 file 19666/56. 
45 'Dispute in the Sugar Industry', C.P. 16/43. 
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TABLE 7:7 
Volume of sugar exports, value of exports per ton 
and price of eane from 1939 to 1950 
Year Tons exported 
Approximate 
value per ton 
Average 
price of cane 
1939 118,470 
£ 
12 15s 4d 
1940 93,631 14 20s Id 
1941 70,328 13 n.a. 
1942 131,294 13 19s 7d 
1943 92,528 15 23s 8d 
1944 67,252 15 24s Od 
1945 30,504 18 28s lOd 
1946 106,274 20 29s 8d 
1947 112,433 25 32s 2d 
1948 149,497 29 35s Id 
1949 110,968 29 36s 5d 
1950 114,254 33 49s 2d 
Source: J.C. Potts, 'The Sugar Industry in Fiji: Its Beginnings and 
Development', Transactions S Proceedings of the 
Fiji Society, 1 (1958-9), 126; FSC Ltd, 'Industrial 
Statistics Summary', Table 23. 
Notes: 1. Tons exported and values per ton are for each 
calendar year, whereas the average price of cane 
relates to each season which normally started mid-
way through the year and ended during the follow-
ing January. 
2. Under a new contract, growers received a sub-
stantial increase in price in 1950. 
and to the Kisan Sangh store, which at best had met the needs of only a 
few farmers, direct action against CSR seemed to offer a quicker and more 
effective way to raise real incomes. And this was important, for during 
the war there had been an increase in essential farm and household costs 
which had reduced the real income from cane. The Jenkins commission found 
that the annual average costs of production and of living on a twelve-acre 
farm had risen from an estimated £88 4 ll^ d^ in 1939 to £132 8 3d in 1943, 
an increase of about 50.5%. After computing an average value for the rice 
it was assumed each grower cultivated, total receipts from the farm of a 
cane grower were thought to have risen by only 39.8% - from £98 5 Od to 
£139 3 Od. Thus the surplus of receipts over expenditure, which provided 
the savings from which farmers could meet socially important life-cycle 
expenses - weddings and the like - had fallen from about £10 in 1939 to 
195 
£6 15 Od in 1943, a drop of about 32%. From this the commission came to 
the surprising conclusion that no increase in the price of cane was justi-
fied. 
These figures do not tell the whole story, however. By taking 
an average farm - whose size was mistakenly put at twelve acres instead 
of just over eleven - the commission underestimated the hardships exper-
ienced by those on smaller holdings. It reckoned that the cost of living 
- excluding luxuries - for a married man with four children rose by 66%, 
or about £30, over the period. Obviously a farmer on twelve acres, who 
would have seen his gross receipts increase by about £40, would have had 
less difficulty in accommodating this rise than a family on six acres, 
whose gross income would have grown by only £20. Moreover, the commission 
had nothing to say about the sharp contraction of credit in 1942 when 
wholesalers, led by Morris Hedstrom and Burns Philp, reacted to uncertain-
46 
ties about the future price of raw sugar, and hence of cane. Doubts 
about what price it would fetch reduced the value of cane as a security, 
and this specially hurt farmers who could not rely on alternative sources 
of income while they awaited payments for their 1942 crop. Most important 
of all was that the commission took 1939 as its base year, so that the 
decline in real farm incomes between 1940 and 1943 was understated. Table 
7:8 on the following page shows the average price of cane from 1938 to 
1943, the annual incomes of an average farmer over the period and estimated 
changes in the cost of living. From these it can be seen that cane prices 
rose more sharply between 1939 and 1940 than they did from 1940 to 1943, 
whereas the cost of living rose more quickly over the latter period. Con-
sequently, having seen an improvement in real incomes during the first 
year of the war, growers experienced a fall in their real earnings from 
cane over the next three years. 
Of course, a large number of farmers in western Viti Levu were 
coBipensated by the availability in 1942 and 1943 of part-time jobs in 
laundry and other services to Allied troops or in supplying them with 
46 C.S.O. F 2/210; confidential appendix. 
47 At the same time merchants seem to have done rather well. In 
May 1945 Morris Hedstrom Ltd had £1 million in surplus funds 
which they were trying to invest, preferably in Australia. Carver 
to H.O., 14 May 1945, Inspectors Ltbk., 1944-6, 143. 
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TABLE 7:8 
Average -price of cane, annual incomes of a farmer on 11 acres 
of land and cfwcnges in the cost of living, 1939 to 1943 
Average 
Year price of cane 
Source. 
Notes: 
Income from cane of a 
farmer on 11 acres 
Cost of living index 
for ViLi Levu except 
Suva 
1939 15s 4d £79 13s lid 100 
1940 20s Id £105 9 9d 109 1941 n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1942 19s 7d £108 15s 128 
1943 23s 8d £119 12s 156 
CSR Ltd, Manufacture Reports, 1940 to 1944; FSC Ltd, 'Industrial 
Statistics Summary', Tables 7(a), 23. 
1. The income from cane of a farmer on 11 acres of land, 
approximately the average size of a cane farm, was 
calculated by multiplying the average price of cane by 
the average yield of cane per acre for tlic year in 
question by five and a half acres (the area likely to 
have been cropped). 
2. The dates taken by government on which to base the cost 
of living were August 1939, 3 June 1940, 27 June 1942 
and 12 June 1943. Up to and including June 1943 the 
figures were no more than rough estimates. 
vegetables, while their sons (or younger brothers) could obtain full-time 
employment in a variety of public works. Yet although this raised the 
living standards of the Indian community in this part of Fiji, it did 
little to reconcile growers to the fall in real incomes from their farms. 
As wages soared (the demand for labour outstripped supply), relative 
returns from cane farming compared with other activities declined. Since 
cane had been among the most lucrative occupations for an Indian, perhaps 
only surpassed by certain types of business and the legal profession in 
48 
which a very small number of Indians were engaged, it was understandable 
that growers should seek an increase in their returns so that cane farming 
could maintain its occupational status. This would have been particularly 
important because, for most growers, off-farm employment during the war 
provided no more than a supplementary income to their main source of 
livelihood, the farm. Above all, as many Indians grew more prosperous, if 
48 There were four Indian members of the legal profession in 1936 
and seven in 1946. Census reports for 1936 and 1946, C.P. 42/ 
1936, 35/1947. 
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only for a short time, there was a rise in the expectations of those who 
experienced, or witnessed, the higher standards of living involved. CSR 
predicted, quite accurately, that from this would come demands for an 
49 increase in the price of cane. 
The farmers' strike began in July 1943, and coincided with a very 
sharp increase in the cost of living due to the large quantity of money 
put into circulation by the Allied troops and the limited amount of imports 
on which it could be spent (see Table 7:9). The strike followed successful 
industrial action in July by workers in the Lautoka and Rarawai mills, who 
TABLE 7:9 
Changes in the cost of living, 27 June 1942 to 1 April 1950 
(1939 = 100) 
Date Cost of livin 
June 1942 128^ --
June 1943 156* 
Oct. 1943 215 
Jan. 1944 215 
April 1944 200 11 1945 186 II 1946 187 M 1947 211 11 1948 237 n 1949 239 II 1950 241 
Source: FSC Ltd, 'Industrial Statistics Summary', Table 7(a). 
* Rough estimate only. 
were awarded a generous pay increase by an arbitration tribunal one of 
whose members, representing employees, was A.D. Patel.^^ Perhaps it was 
Patel's experience on this tribunal which encouraged the Maha Sangh to 
demand a second one to rule on the cane gro\>7ers' dispute. The refusal to 
harvest cane was confined to Viti Levu, for Labasa had been hardly affected 
by the unionisation of growers. Infrequent communications between Fiji's 
two main islands was one reason for this. Another was the generally lower 
standard of education among Indians at Labasa, which hindered the dis-
49 H.O. to Nausori, 20 Jan. 1943, Private Ltbk. Out, 61 (1942-3), 
252-3. 
50 Mitchell to C.O., tel., 4 July 1943, C.O. 852/518 file 19666/56; 
confidential appendix. 
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semination of news from the rest of the group.^^ A third was that there 
was less dissatisfaction aniong farmers than in other cane districts 
because the cost of living at Labasa had risen less sharply during the 
war. Not many troops were stationed and fewer public works were under-
taken on Vanua Levu. 
Despite widespread refusal to harvest at the other mills, CSR 
refused to alter the contract signed in 1940. Yet as one of its future 
general managers, Dr R.W. Harman, later admitted, the company could have 
afforded to pay more for cane in 1942, and had it done so the strike would 
53 
probably have been averted. Equally, CSR could have passed on to growers 
the whole of an increase in the price of sugar announced in September 1943, 
and to take effect on 1 January 1944. Hoping to bring the strike to an 
end, the Colonial Office asked the company if it would do this, but it 
54 
refused. CSR feared, as it had during the First World War, that sugar 
prices would fall when world trade returned to normal after hostilities 
ceased. It did not want the industry made uneconomic by wage and cane 
price increases which could not be sustained after the war. The company 
feared, too, that if it gave way to grox^ers as a result of industrial 
action, it would encourage greater militancy in future.^^ A third, but 
not the major, consideration was CSR's view that the higher the price of 
cane the lower would be the output from each farm, since growers would be 
able to realize their limited money aspirations with less work.'^^ 
The company was well placed to resist the strike. At least at 
Lautoka, the largest mill, it was expected that even if the whole crop was 
harvested in 1943 the amount of cane crushed would be unusually small, 
perhaps because off-farm employment had led to the neglect of cane but 
also because the shortage of fertilizer during the war was likely to have 
51 I am grateful to Mr Brij Lai for this point. 
52 H.O. to Labasa, 2 July 1943, Private Ltbk. Out, 62 (1943),234. 
53 Dr Harman, 'Fiji Report', n.d., CSR F 1.0/13/25. 
54 Minute by Carstairs, 10 Sept. 1943; Rook to Carstairs, 24 Sept. 
1943, C.O. 852/518 file 19666/56. 
55 Rothe to Watson, tel., 20 Sept. 1943, C.O. 852/518 file 19666/56. 
56 H.O. to Watson, 15 Jan. 1943, London Out 1939-47, 2 (1941-3), 
362-3. 
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reduced yields.^^ The exclusion of Labasa from the dispute meant that 
even if the stoppage lasted all season, the company could be assured of 
enough income to cover the bulk of its overhead expenses. CSR was 
fortunate not only that the cost of the strike was limited in these ways, 
but that it had amortized its original investment several times and had 
amassed substantial reserves from its operations in the colony. Conse-
quently, the company was not under pressure to repay investment recently 
undertaken in Fiji, and had the financial resources to sit the strike out. 
Although it would be a major blow, the loss of a year's profits could be 
seen by CSR as a relatively small price to keep the industry viable and 
prevent a decline in the value of its assets. 
The company also benefited from the tacit support of government. 
Again as in 1921, officials differed with CSR on how the dispute could 
best be handled. Like many of his predecessors, Mitchell complained about 
the excessive secrecy of the company, while CSR lamented government's 
failure to deport the leaders of the strike - an impossible course because 
5 8 
of public opinion in Britain and India. Yet despite these differences, 
government acted on the assumption that the existing basis of the industry 
- the ownership of the mills by a private company - should be maintained. 
A suggestion by growers that the mills be nationalised was rejected. CSR 
was technologically an extremely efficient miller: if it could not operate 
profitably in the colony, then who could? Any resolution of the dispute, 
officials thought, must be on terms that would allow the company to 
continue in Fiji. Thus, as the Colonial Office pointed out, the price of 
cane could not be based on what was considered a desirable standard of 
living for growers, since without an appropriate rise in the sugar price 59 
this would prevent CSR from making a profit. The given elements in the 
equation were adequate returns to the company and the price of sugar: the 
income of farmers had to be adjusted to these. 
57 H.O. to Lautoka, 22 Feb. 1943, Private Ltbk. Out, 61 (1942-3), 
350. 
58 Mitchell to C.O., tel., secret, 28 Feb. 1944, quoted by Gillion, 
185-6; H.O. to Watson, tel., 29 Dec. 1943, London Out 1939-47, 
3 (1943-6), 106-7. 
59 'Note of a meeting in Mr. Gent's Room at 5.00 p.m. on Monday, 
6 December, 1943', C.O. 852/518 file 19666/56. 
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In this situation, an arbitration tribunal would not have 
settled the strike. Since the tribunal would have been composed of an 
equal number of company and growers' representatives, the casting vote 
would have lain with the government appointed chairman. Though in the 
millworkers' dispute the chairman had favoured the labourers, with cane as 
CSR's major item of cost it was unlikely that he would again side with 
those on strike. This was made clear in October when the Jenkins Commission 
advised against an increase in the price of cane. The problem for govern-
ment was that with CSR based in Sydney, the tribunal would have had no 
legal power to examine the company's books,^^ and so would have been unable 
effectively to question CSR's arguments in favour of the existing cane 
price. Yet if it rejected them, there was the possibility that the company 
would go ahead with its threat, made on several occasions, to close one or 
more of its mills. Since there was no way of telling whether the threat 
was real, the chairman could be expected to side mostly with CSR, leaving 
the possibility that growers would reject the tribunal's report. Because 
an arbitration award was legally binding, government would be faced with a 
major challenge to its authority if growers remained on strike. 
Rather than have to deal with this Mitchell favoured an altern-
ative solution, which was for Britain to raise the price of raw sugar 
substantially and to guarantee high prices to Commonwealth producers after 
the war by buying all her supplies from them.^^ Growers would then get an 
increase in the price of cane, which is what they wanted. Mitchell told 
the Colonial Office: 
Farmers here are seeing more and more clearly that real sub-
stance of their case is standard of living. Company takes 
its stand on the assumption that world price level is uncon-
trollable and omnipotent and would be a charge ranking prior 
to producers' standard of living. Unless I have misunderstood 
the papers your department makes the same assumption as the 
Company. Since officially the two conceptions are fundament-
ally opposite and irreconcilable, no solution can be expected 
from price fixing machinery or any other palliative, but only 
at the best a succession of armistices. 62 
60 'Fiji Sugar Dispute', memo., 6 Dec. 1943, C.O. 852/518 file 
19666/56. 
61 Confidential appendix. 
62 Quoted in Gillion, 181-2. 
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As part of a world-wide system of providing cheap tropical produce to the 
industrialised west, during the 1930s Fiji had sold sugar to Britain and 
Canada under an imperial preference which was designed to support sugar 
industries in the Commonwealth, but not at the cost of a large rise in 
prices. In 1943 post-war arrangements for marketing Commonwealth sugar were 
being discussed in London. It was recognized that prices could not be 
allowed to return to their pre-war levels, if only because the social un-
rest caused by falling living standards would impose on Britain an unaccept-
able cost in maintaining law and order. Mitchell's proposal, on the other 
hand, was equally unacceptable because of its cost to the consumer, and it 
was not seriously considered. Consequently, government had little room 
for manoeuvre. All it could do was in effect to support CSR by protecting 
from intimidation farmers who wanted to harvest cane, placing Patel and 
Rudrananda under house arrest, and trying to persuade growers to return 
6 3 
to work and await the report of a commission of inquiry. 
TABLE 7:10 
Output of mills on Vit'l Levu^ weeks ended 2S October to 20 November 1943 
Proport ion of capacity produced in week 
Approximate sugar ended -
Mills producing capacity 23 Oct. 30 Oct. 6 Nov. 13 Nov. 20 Nov. 
Nausori 600 tons 11% 14% 18% 24% 53% 
Rarawai 1,800 " 60% 81% 79% 79% 83% 
Lautoka 2,400 " 26% 33% 38% 39% 44% 
Penang 400 " 69% 85% 75% 76% 74% 
Source: Watson to Carstairs, 29 Nov. 19A3, C.O. 852/518, 
file 19666/56. 
The strike finally ended in January 1944, but well before then 
it had begun to crumble, as Table 7:10 shows. Growers returned to work 
without the promise of an arbitration tribunal and without securing an 
increase in the price of cane. Wiy had they been defeated? One reason 
was that in the face of what growers saw as the united front of government 
and CSR, they were divided. Farmers at Ba, where the Muslim-dominated 
63 For a chronology of the main developments during the strike 
see Gillion, 180-7. 
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right wing of the Kisan Sangh was strong, were among the first to start 
harvesting. Divisions were exacerbated by differences in the ability of 
growers to withstand a long strike. It was no accident that the return to 
work began at Penang and Rarawai, where growers had fewer opportunities 
than those elsewliere on. Viti Levu to find off—farm jobs and were less able 
than CSR to forego a year's income from sugar. The example of farmers 
harvesting discouraged others, so that as the season drew to an end there 
was a rush to cut cane before the mills closed. Finally, in January 194A, 
Ratu J.L.V. Sukuna at a meeting of farmers in Nadi urged growers to harvest 
their cane. He threatened that if they refused, those on Fijian land might 
have difficulty renewing their leases. Though this simply brought to 
an end a strike that had already virtually collapsed, the role of the 
Fijian community through Sukuna was reminiscent of the part played by 
Fijian labourers in ending the 1921 dispute. 
The 1943 strike was the most significant expression since 1921 
of growers' antagonism toward CSR. Yet although it demonstrated a height-
ened awareness among farmers of their common interest against the company, 
the dispute also revealed how limited this consciousness was. The inter-
union rivalry that preceded and accompanied the strike showed that for 
the majority of Indians cultural, personal and religious differences were 
more important. It was evident, too, that farmers still accepted the 
existing order of society. They were willing to co-operate with those 
whose economic interests were in direct conflict with their own. The 
demand for nationalisation, though made by a few growers, was not one of 
their priorities. The concern of Patel and Rudrananda was to make CSR 
more accountable to the public of Fiji, not to get rid of it. They 
objected not to the company making profits, but to the repatriation of 
what they believed to be excessive profits - defined by them as a return 
on assets of over seven and a half per cent. Though the Maha Sangh was 
decidedly more anti-CSR than the right wing of the Kisan, like its rival 
it sought reforms within the system rather than a radical change in the 
system itself. So it was natural that many growers should hail as a 
victory the immediate outcome of the strike, which was the appointment to 
inquire into the economics of the industry of C.Y. Shephard, Professor of 
64 Gillion, 184. 
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Economics at the Institute of Tropical Agriculture, Trinidad. Without 
jeopardising the company's operations, Shephard's report was designed to 
reconcile growers to the continued presence in Fiji of CSR. 
The Shephard Report 
The appointment of Professor Shephard followed proposals by Mitchell in 
late 1943 that to settle the strike, even if the solution was only one in 
a 'succession of armistices', either the Ministry of Food should send an 
official to investigate the profits being made by CSR, or some permanent 
machinery be established to fix the price of cane.^^ The Ministry of Food 
refused to be involved in a question that was the responsibility of the 
Fiji government, so in December the Colonial Office suggested that Shephard, 
who had made a similar enquiry into the Trinidad sugar industry, be asked 
to advise on the price of cane and the creation of price fixing machinery 
in Fiji.^^ Acting through the company's representative in Fiji, Mr H.R.F. 
Watson, officials persuaded CSR to provide Shephard with information about 
its costs and profits in the colony. This was the first time the company 
had made such a concession, and it arose perhaps from the need to maintain 
good relations with the British government. With arrangements for the 
marketing of Commonwealth sugar after the war being discussed in London, 
CSR was lobbying hard to prevent the interests of Australia, whose sugar 
it sold, and Fiji being sacrificed to those of the West Indies and 
Mauritius. Co-operation with Shephard might help the company achieve this. 
Having made this concession, CSR was dismayed to learn that 
Shephard not only wanted to know what profits it had been making, but 
intended to base the price of cane of these. The company felt he should 
68 
also take into account the returns from growing cane. Moreover, sxnce 
the bulk of farmers' demands were designed to raise their incomes, unless 
Shephard was convinced its profits were small CSR might be asked to pay 
67 
65 'Fiji Sugar Dispute', memo., 6 Dec. 1943, C.O. 852/518 file 19666/56. 
66 C.O. to Mitchell, tel.,13 Dec. 1943, C.O. 852/518 file 19666/56. 
67 For an account of discussions on the marketing of Commonwealth 
sugar see Michael Moynagh, 'The negotiation of the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement, 1949-51', Journal of Cormomealth & Comparative 
-Politics, 15 (1977), 172-7. 
68 H.O. to Watson, 1 June 1944, London Out 1939-47, 3 (1943-6), 
217-8. 
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more for cane as a way to satisfy growers. Apart from a significant 
increase in price, the demands put to Shephard in June 1944 by farmers' 
unions, which had agreed to co-operate during the inquiry, included requests 
that the value of molasses and begasse (a by-product of sugar manufacture) 
be added to that of sugar when calculating the price of cane; that CSR be 
obliged to extract the maximum sugar from cane, so as to ensure the high-
est possible return to growers if the cane price was related to the value 
of sugar sold; that farmers should control the varieties of cane planted, 
thereby enabling them to choose ones that were heavy but not necessarily 
sweet (so maximising their returns but not CSR's); that the cultivation 
of foodcrops be permitted on one quarter of the farm's area so that land 
not currently under cane could be put to productive use; that to police 
CSR's contract with growers a Board of one representative each from farmers 
69 
and government be established with full access to CSR's books. 
TABLE 7:11 
to C.l. Shephard 
% profit or 
Profit or Income Net profit Total assets (loss) on 
Year (loss)* tax or (loss) in £ '000s total assets 
£ £ £ 
1930-34 (298,052) 7,954 (306,006) 4,857 (1.3) 
1935 52,101 7,016 45,085 5,078 0.9 
1936 61,615 6,821 54,794 5,205 1.1 
1937 118,235 13,433 104,802 5,424 1.9 
1938 32,019 7,847 24,172 5,523 0.4 
1939 196,894 24,641 172,253 5,681 3.0 
1940 265,100 31,659 233,441 5,840 4.0 
1942 390,864 102,297 288,567 6,008 4.8 
1943 (85,555) Nil (85,555) 5,775 (1.5) 
Source: C.Y. Shephard, The Sugar Industry of Fiji, 49. 
* After depreciation, calculated at four per cent of 
fixed assets (except land). 
To avoid being forced to concede these demands, all of which it 
opposed, CSR compiled figures to show that it had made negligible profits 
69 Harman to H.O., tel., 10 June 1944, Private Ltbk. Out, 64 (1944), 
121. 
205 
in Fiji (see Table 7:11 above). The period taken was 1930 to 1943, long 
enough for the company to claim that the figures reflected the profit-
ability of its mills. But although the period included the worst years 
of the depression which were exceptionally bad, it excluded the rather 
better years of the late 1920s. 1941 was omitted on the grounds that part 
of the crop had been destroyed, though CSR was compensated for this by the 
British government and made a substantial profit that year. A loss was 
recorded for 1943, whereas the internal profit and loss accounts for the 
Fiji mills showed that the company earned a modest return that year; in 
any case the strike made 1943 a poor guide to what CSR could expect to earn 
in the colony, so if anything it should have been excluded. In addition, 
CSR based the value of its fixed assets (except land) on their replacement 
cost in 1939, with allowances for capital expenditure over the previous 
ten and following four years.^^ Since most of the mill equipment was over 
twenty-five years old, the valuations given to Shephard were considerably 
more than the assets were worth. The company justified this on the grounds 
that differences between figures given to Shephard and the historical cost 
values less depreciation represented the value of its replacement and 
depreciation reserves, which it could either use as working capital or 
invest in ways which increased its profits.^^ But there is no indication 
from the internal accounts that interest from the reserves was added to 
profits of the Fiji mills. In fact, it is more likely the reserves were 
used to finance the expansion of CSR's Australian activities during the 
late 1930s and '40s, returns from which were kept in separate accounts. 
Nor apparently were the reserves used as working capital, for the company 
included an additional figure of £500,000 for this when estimating the 
72 
total funds tied up in its Fiji business. By placing a high value on 
its assets CSR could show larger amounts for depreciation, so reducing its 
net profits. And of course, as a percentage return on investment these 
profits appeared lower still. 
Shephard concluded that the company had over-valued its assets 
70 H.O. to Watson, 20 June 1944, CSR F 5.0/9/-; 'FIJI: General 
Discussion on our case at the forthcoming investigation by 
Dr. Shephard', 13 April 1944, CSR F 5.0/12/-. 
71 Shephard, 30. 
72 Ibid., 44. 
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73 
and was charging too mucli lor depreciation. Tlie value of machinery and 
transport for a mill in Fiji had been put at almost twice that for a mill 
of equivalent size in Trinidad, while the amounts charged to depreciation 
74 
were coiisiderably higher too. He guessed that since 1930 CSR had earned 
an average return before income tax of about three per cent a year, which 
was an unattractive yield on investment.^^ In fact, returns were probably 
higher than Sliephard believed. ]iy relating figures from confidential 
profit and loss accounts to the value of assets in Fiji as sliown in the 
company's llalj'-Yearhj Reports (plus tlie estimated vaJue of working capital 
and stocks), average annual returns before tax can be put at about 5.6% 
for tlie period 3 924 to 1939, wliile those after 1939 were about 12.6%, or 
14% if 1943 is excluded because of the strike. For the whole period returns 
iiveraged 7.3%.^^ 
Now it might be said that this is misleading, since profits are 
being related to tlie liistorical cost of assets which were expressed noL in 
contemporary money terms, so allowing for price changes, but in currency 
values at the time the investment occurred. If account is taken of price 
increases since the assets were installed, as CSR argued it should, then 
the real value of capital would make returns on investment appear less. 
Yet it must be remembered that in May 1923 CSR had 'bought' the fixed 
assets in Fiji from its wholly owned subsidiary, the Colonial Sugar 
Refining Co. (Fiji and New Zealand) Ltd, for £1,139,000. Though the price 
was £1,625,000 less than the book value of the assets - the company had 
written this off to reinforce a political point at the Colonial Office -
it represented the then cost to CSR of its fixed assets in Fiji. As prices 
rose by a negligible amount before 1939, though they did rise significantly 
thereafter, the figures in the Halfearly Reports reflected quite 
accurately - at least up to 1939 - the value of the company's investments. 
By presenting Shephard with figures based on a revaluation of its assets, 
CSR sought to avoid the consequences of having reduced in 1923 the apparent 
profits it had made in Fiji during and after the First World War. 
73 Ibid., 29. 
74 H.O. to Watson, 31 July 1944, CSR F 5.0/9/-. 
75 Shephard, 30. 
76 Confidential appendix. Table 7:1. 
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The annual average return of 7.3% was only slightly above the 
Australian bank overdraft rates for the period.^^ Since sugar investments 
are more risky and more illiquid than bank overdrafts, it is likely that 
a return of at least ten per cent would have been needed to attract 
capital into the industry. However, as CSR's profits in Fiji had already 
paid (several times over) for its original investment in the colony, the 
company would probably have been content with a return of less than 7.3%, 
though this would have reduced the incentive to expand its operations. 
After all, if CSR withdrew on the grounds that its assets were no longer 
profitable, it would be hard to realize their book values by selling them. 
It was better to earn modest profits than to make a loss on the sale of 
its investments. Room for increasing the contract price of cane was even 
greater because of the relatively high sugar prices paid since 1939; they 
had enabled the company to make an average annual return on capital since 
then of 12.3%, despite the strike. Shephard acknowledged that if the war-
time price of sugar continued CSR could afford to pay more for cane, but 
argued that by curtailing output the strike had made it uneconomic to do 
this. Perhaps, like the company, he also doubted if high prices would 
last after the war, and feared that if farmers were given a better price 
now they would refuse to accept a lower one when circumstances had changed. 
Still, whatever the reason, Shephard recommended against an increase in 
the contract price of cane, though he did suggest - and this was reluctant-
ly accepted by the company - that the value of molasses be credited to 
78 
the proceeds from sugar when calculating the cane price. The growers' 
demand that the value of begasse also be added was rejected, even though 
begasse was worth something since it was used as fuel in the mills. So it 
was that CSR won the first round in a fight to retain exclusive control of 
its operations in Fiji. 
Unwilling to raise the cane price by much, Shephard tried to 
improve the farmers' lot in other ways. One of his major recommendations, 
reminiscent of Stockdale's report in 1937, was that a system of mixed 
farming be introduced in cane areas. Growers should be encouraged to use 
their livestock for the manufacture of manure; a bigger effort should be 
77 S.J. Butlin, A.R. Hall, R.C. White, Australian Banking and 
Monetary Statistics, 1817 to 1945, Table 51. 
78 Shephard, 30-31. 
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m a d e to find cash or subsistence crops which could be grown on land under 
long fallow. A Scientific Investigation Committee with representatives 
of g r o w e r s , company and government should be established to supervise 
experimental work along these lines. Shephard hoped that this would 
increase farm incomes, as also miglit alterations to the system of land 
tenure. Re suggested that the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) should 
encourage better soil conservation by sugar contractors on its land; specu-
lation in NLTB leases should be prohibited, so preventing the payment of 
large premiums which saddled incoming farmers with big debts at high rates 
of interest; there should be greater security of tenure for farmers on 
NLTB and also company land, so as to make them more willing to invest in 
long term improvements to the soil. Finally, Shephard recommended the 
appointment of a Sugar Board with three government representatives and two 
each of the farmers and C S R . It would protect and develop the welfare of 
the industry, advise the governor on important m a t t e r s , certify the price 
payable for cane and expend any cess it might levy on the industry. 
Shephard's recommendations were designed to improve company-grower relations 
by raising farm incomes without major cost to CSR, and by increasing 
growers' involvement in the organization of the industry without reducing 
79 
CSR's overall control. 
The company was strongly opposed to these ideas, except those 
relating to the N L T B , and did all in its power to prevent their implement-
ation. It felt its position in Fiji had already been weakened by the 
emergence o£ unions, and that its control over growers would be further 
reduced if they were allowed to share in the management of the industry, 
or if its leases w e r e to be for twenty-one years - instead of the existing 
ten - renewable after eleven, as Shephard proposed. Some field officers 
thought the latter suggestion would leave them with less influence over 
80 
farmers because the threat of eviction would not be so great. Only 
recently CSR had threatened fifty-six tenants and contractors with eviction 
or immediate cancellation of contracts to purchase cane following their 
involvement in the 19A3 strike, but fearing renewed trouble in the industry 
81 
government had intervened to prevent this. With this in m i n d , officials 
79 Ibid., 32-7. 
80 H . O . to H a r m a n , 6 June 1944, CSR F 5.0/7/-. 
81 G i l l i o n , 185. 
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were eager for Lhe company to amend its tenancy agreement on the lines 
suggested by Shephard, but CSR refused. A compromise was eventually 
reached whereby the company publicly undertook to renew leases when they 
expired provided their conditions had been fulfilled, which was no more 
82 than a statement of the existing position. 
Discussions on the Scientific Investigation Committee were more 
protracted. Seeing it as a vehicle for outside intervention in the industry 
and fearing requests for the company to undertake experiments with which it 
disagreed, CSR was utterly opposed to the committee and threatened to boy-
83 
cott its meetings if it was more than just an advisory body. Having 
been reassured on this last point the company then asked for, and received, 
an undertaking that government representatives would not side with growers 84 
in asking for experiments which CSR was against. During discussions the 
purpose of the committee was also changed. Instead of promoting mixed 
farming, it was to be a Cane Consultative Committee whose main function 
would be to receive reports on CSR's research into cane breeding and the 
like. CSR won these concessions partly because officials felt the Depart-
ment of Agriculture was so overworked already that it should not assume 
a new, major role in connection with the sugar industry, which official 85 
representation on a Scientific Investigation Committee would have involved. 
Since the company was well equipped to do research the answer, officials 
thought, was for government to rely on CSR and try to influence the type 
of work done. It would not be able to exert such influence, though, if 
good relations with the company were damaged by differences over the 
Shephard report. Yet by conceding CSR's most important demands officials 
were left with a committee which, in the view of cane growers, could serve 
no useful purpose. Motions to this effect were passed at meetings of 
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coiiLiiiucd Lo allow growers to plant: cerLaln food crops like dhall on fallow 
land, but it did not give priority to research into mixed farming, a matter 
in which the company felt it had little direct interest. This would be 
lamented in the 1950s by agricultural experts who visited Fiji.^^ 
An advisory Sugar Board was Shephard's third major proposal, and 
this too was opposed by CSR. The company feared it would become a forum 
in which rival unions would try to increase their support among growers. 
The result would be extreme demands which, in its own interests, CSR would 
have to refuse. This, in turn, might bring the company into renewed 
conflict with farmers, so that the net effect of the Board would be to 
worsen rather than improve relations in the industry thereby, perhaps, 
88 
providing a pretext for further government intervention. In advancing 
its view CSR was helped by the Kisan Sangh which on this question was once 
again, if unwittingly, collaborating with the company. As part of a 
campaign to discredit the Maha Sangh by claiming there had been no gains 
from the 1943 strike, the Kisan Sangh (whose two wings had reunited in 
1944) refused to co-operate with the proposed Sugar Board on the grounds 
that, because of the need to protect CSR's interests, it would be power-
less and would achieve nothing. Faced with opposition from CSR, this 
division among growers and also the difficulty of finding an acceptable 
method of selecting farmers' representatives, government shelved the idea 
of a Sugar Board in late 1947, though the scheme was revived - only to be 89 
rejected - on several occasions thereafter. Thus CSR had survived the 
1943 strike, the Shephard inquiry and discussions on the Shephard report 
without making any major concessions to growers. From the company's view, 
it was a remarkable achievement. 
Yet CSR could not avoid concessions indefinitely. This was 
largely because the effects of the war had caused a steady rise in sugar 
87 E.g. Burns et al., 'Commission of Enquiry into the Natural 
Resources and Population Trends of the Colony of Fiji', C.P. 
1/1960. 
88 H.O. to Nausori, 21 March 1947, Private Ltbk. Out, 69 (1946-7), 
268-77; H.O. to Watson, 16 Nov. 1951, CSR F 5.0/9/-. 
89 H.O. to Nausori, 9 Dec. 1949, Nausori Private Out, 1947-50, CSR 
mfm 242; H.O. to Watson, 12 March 1948, CSR F 5.0/9/-. This 
file also contains correspondence about proposals to establish 
a sugar board in the 1950s. 
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prices so that by 1950 the price was almost three times what it had been 
in the 1930s (Table 7:7). To replace war-time arrangements for the purchase 
of Commonwealth sugar by the British government and to ensure stable prices 
for exporters, the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA) was negotiated in 
London between late 1949 and late 1951. The CSA provided for specified 
quantities of Commonwealth sugar to be bought by Britain and New Zealand 
at a price 'reasonably remunerative to efficient producers', to be negotiat-
ed each year, and for maximum quantities to be exported to Britain, Canada 
and New Zealand under preferential tariffs. Amounts in excess of this 
could be sold on the world 'free' market. Fiji's quota for preferential 
markets was 170,000 long tons, of which 125,000 would be sold at the 
90 
negotiated price. The agreement was to run till the end of 1974, when 
it lapsed as a result of Britain's entry to the European Economic Community. 
In effect, the CSA was designed to prevent private sugar companies 
going out of business because of rising labour costs; it did this by 
increasing the consumer subsidy on sugar. But though not a formal condition 
of the agreement, as with the introduction of the imperial preference in 
1919, it was expected that the subsidy would be reciprocated. Britain's 
Board of Trade apparently saw the CSA as an opportunity to gain con-
cessions for British exports, and it is reasonable to suppose that - at 
least initially - removal of the preference on British imports would have 
been out of the question for a Fiji governor who wanted to reduce the 91 burden of imports in this way. 
90 These were subsequently raised to 236,000 and 140,000 long tons 
respectively. 
91 Moynagh, 170-90. From time to time it has been alleged in Fiji 
that during negotiations for the CSA, CSR's position as an 
exporter of sugar from both Fiji and Australia resulted in a 
conflict of interests that was to the disadvantage of the colony. 
In particular, it has been suggested that Fiji's overall agree-
ment quota was smaller than it might have been. Now it is true 
that there was a conflict of interest. The West Indies wanted 
the colonies to press for a larger quota, if need be at the 
expense of South Africa and Australia. CSR strenuously resisted 
the idea and used its influence on the Fiji delegation, which 
included the company's London representative, H.R.F. Watson, to 
ensure that Fiji remained non-committal on the question. This 
defeated West Indian attempts to persuade the delegation to side 
with other colonial producers. However, it is most unlikely 
that a different approach by the Fiji delegation would have 
[contd. over] 
212 
Even before the CSA negotiations began, CSR knew there would 
be some kind of arrangement to stabilise sugar prices in the 1950s. It 
also knew that since the Colonial Office intended the agreement, within 
limits, to enable higher wages and cane prices to be paid, if the company 
had another dispute with growers before significantly raising the contract 
price of cane, government intervention in the industry would be almost 
certain. Indeed, CSR feared that if negotiations for a contract to replace 
that signed in 1940 broke down, Shephard's proposed Sugar Board would be 
92 
set up. This encouraged the company to make substantial concessions 
over the price of cane during negotiations with growers in 1949-50, in the 
course of which the Kisan Sangh threatened to call a strike - the one 93 
period in its history when it took a more extreme stand than the Maha Sangh. 
The higher cane price raised farmers' shares of the proceeds from sugar 
from an average of about 45% in the 1940s to an average of just over 60% 94 over the next decade. CSR followed this in 1952 with a new tenancy 
agreement under which its tenants were given twenty-one year leases renew-
95 
able at the end of ten years, basically what Shephard had proposed. By 
making these concessions CSR hoped to forestall outside intervention in 
the industry, and to placate farmers so that they would not challenge the 
company's control over them. 
91 [contd.] 
altered the outcome of the discussions, for at the time Britain 
desperately needed the co-operation of the dominions in limiting 
the outflow of dollars from the sterling area. This in itself 
was enough to defeat the West Indian proposals. In the final 
allocation of overall agreement quotas, the 170,000 long tons 
for Fiji was proposed by the Colonial Office and strongly resisted 
by all members of the Fiji delegation who felt it was too small. 
At the suggestion of the Colonial Office, the Fiji government 
instructed the delegation to accept the Colonial Office proposal. 
92 H.O. to Nausori, 28 Nov. 1950, Nausori Private Out, 1950-4, CSR 
mfm 242. 
93 Negotiations for the new contract can be followed on CSR mfm 242. 
94 Transcripts of the public hearings of the Fiji Sugar Inquiry 
Commission,, 1961 j, 105-8. 
95 Carver, 'Memo to the General Manager. Fiji Tenancy Agreement. 
Tenure Proposal', 22 Oct. 1952, Inspectors Memos, to the General 
Manager 1951-7, CSR mfm 254. GSR's negotiations with growers on 
this question can be followed on mfm 242 and 254. 
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To retain absolute control of the industry had been the major 
preoccupation of CSR in the 1940s. Although the threat of government 
intervention remained, by the end of the decade the company appeared to 
have had considerable success. It had defeated the 1943 strike, the plan 
by Shephard to relate the price of cane to profits from milling and the 
implementation of the Shephard report. No doubt CSR would have argued 
that it had acted in the interests of the industry as a whole, and that 
this was to the advantage of Fiji. Yet there were disadvantages to the 
colony in what the company had done. There was the loss of sugar production 
caused by the strike - a strike which, as Dr Harman had admitted, CSR could 
have avoided since it could have paid more for cane. Shephard believed 
that because of its effect on output, over the three years 1943 to 1945 
the dispute would cost farmers well over £1 million in lost income.^^ To 
this must be added losses arising from CSR's refusal to raise the contract 
price of cane till 1950. If it had improved the contract price, the 
increase in cane prices during the 1940s (because of higher raw sugar 
prices) would have been much greater. 
Yet, following a dramatic rise in raw sugar prices in the late 
1940s, the company was able to increase its net profits in Fiji to over 
twice their 1942-3 level. If figures from confidential profit and loss 
accounts are related to the value of assets in Fiji as shown in CSR's Half-
Yeavly Reports (plus the estimated value of working capital and stocks), 
CSR's average annual return on investment from 31 March 1940 to 31 March 
1950 comes to 14.73%. The percentage would have been slightly larger if 
in 1949 the company had not increased the book value of its Fiji assets 
by £1,625,000, the amount by which they had been written down in 1923. 3 
Compared with bank overdraft rates, which ranged from per cent to 5 /4 
per cent,^^ CSR could have been well satisfied with its results. Equally 
significant was the income it was able to repatriate from the colony. 
Table 7:12 on the following page shows estimated net profits after tax 
from CSR's Fiji mills for the years ended 31 March 1941 to 31 March 1950. 
The net profit of £1,896,767 is expressed in 1939 prices to take account 
of changes in the general price level. No allowance has been made for 
96 Shephard, 28. 
97 Butlin et al. , Table 51. 
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TABLE 7:12 
Aggregate profits from CSR's sugar mills in Fiji for years 
ended 31 March 1941 to 31 March 1950 (at 1939 prices 
£F 
2 Sales of raw sugar 11 ,801,482 
Opera Ling costs: 
Direct costs - purchase of cane, etc. 8,545,092 
Overhead costs 278,850 8 ,823,942 
2 ,977,540 
Add miscellaneous profits from sale of molasses. 
operation of one of CSR 's stcamsliips, etc.3 175,797 
Gross profit 3 ,153,337 
Less charge for depreciat ion and replacement 609,377 
Net profit before tax 2 ,543,960 
Less income tax 647,193 
Net profit after tax 1 ,896,767 
Sources: Mill profit and loss accounts. Chief Accountant, 
CSR Ltd, Sydney; 'Profit on company's Fiji mill 
activities - Years 1939-1955', CSR F 5.0/2/-. 
Notes: 
]. Changes in the general price level were measured by the cost 
of living index for Viti Levu except Suva. It provides only 
an approximate guide, however. First, the C.O.L. figures up 
to and including 1 June 1943 were only rough estimates; 
secondly, the dates on which the C.O.L. was based changed from 
in August 1939 to in June 1940, 1942 and 1943, and 1 April of 
each year thereafter (the C.O.L. for June 1941 has been 
assumed to be halfway between that of June 1940 and June 1942); 
thirdly, the sample of goods and services on which the C.O.L. 
was based became Increasingly inaccurate as a guide to price 
changes of all goods and services in the colony. In 1960 it 
was abandoned in favour of a more accurate one. For all its 
defects, the index is better than nothing. Assumed is that 
all outgoings and receipts were paid at the end of the 
company's financial years, when the price levels have been 
taken. 
2. Excludes income from sale of stocks held on 31 March 1940 but 
includes income from sale of stocks held on 31 March 1950. 
3. Profits seem to exclude gains/losses from rents, the Yaqara 
cattle station, the dairies and butcheries, and the pineapple 
cannery. 
4. The charge appears to have been on a straight line basis 
four per cent each year on the original cost of fixed assets. 
Assumed is that gains/losses from disposal of fixed assets are 
treated as capital transactions and are excluded from mill 
profit and loss accounts. 
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factors like transfer pricing which might affect profits. Unfortunately, 
it is impossible to calculate very accurately capital expenditure over the 
period. From figures in the company's Half-Yearly Reportsj, the value of 
CSR's fixed assets in Fiji increased by only £373,623 (at approximate 1939 
98 
prices) from 31 March 1940 to 31 March 1950. (This excludes the re-
valuation of the Fiji assets in 1949.) Capital expenditure would have 
been greater than this because as an asset was replaced, on the straight 
line method of depreciation which the company seems to have used, the book 
value of fixed assets would have been written down by the original cost 
of the asset before being written up by the cost of the replacement. Since 
there is no information on the historical cost value of the assets re-
placed during these years, it is impossible to infer from changes in the 
value of fixed assets exactly what capital expenditure occurred. However, 
if we assume, to be generous to CSR, that it was twice the increase in the 
value of fixed assets, capital expenditure would have totalled £747,246 -
say £750,000. Adding back to net profit after tax the charge for deprec-
iation and replacement, £609,377, and deducting the £750,000, we are left 
with a net surplus from milling operations of £1,756,144 at 1939 prices 
(see Table 7:13 below). This is the surplus arising from milling during 
the years ended 31 March 1941 to 31 March 1950: not all the surplus would 
have been actually available during this period (see note 1 to Table 6:6). 
As most of the surplus was repatriated, it did not generate economic 
activity by boosting incomes in the colony. 
The third disadvantage was the defeat of Shephard's proposals. 
The failure to appoint a Scientific Investigation Committee left research 
on matters affecting cane farmers almost exclusively in the hands of CSR, 
which concentrated on ways to improve the yields and sugar content of cane. 
Since comparatively little work was done to develop mixed farming, growers 
were perhaps denied one means of raising their incomes. Furthermore, 
without this committee and the Sugar Board, the involvement of farmers 
98 It is the annual increment in the value of fixed assets which 
has been expressed in approximate 1939 prices and then totalled 
- approximate because the Cost of Living index at the end of 
each financial year has been used to express in 1939 prices the 
increments which resulted from capital expenditure throughout 
each year. See also note 1 to Table 7:12. 
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in the decision making process of the industry was limited. True, union 
representatives continued to meet with company officers, but the degree 
of participation by growers was less than it would have been if Shephard's 
recommendations'had borne fruit. The result was that the company continued 
to be seen as authoritarian and paternalistic, an image that would become 
increasingly repugnant to farmers and that would add bitterness to another 
strike by them in 1960. The 1943 dispute had shown that growers were 
becoming increasingly aware of how their interests conflicted with CSR. 
The Shephard inquiry and discussions on the Shephard report showed how 
great these differences were. 
TABLE 7:13 
Estimated aash flow arising from sugar milling activities for 
years ended 31 March 1941 to 31 March 1950 (at 1939 prices)'^ 
£F 
Net profit after tax 1,896,767 
Add back depreciation and replacement 609,377 
Total cash surplus ^ 2,506,144 
Less estimated capital expenditure 750,000 
Cash surplus 1,756,144 
Sources: Table 7:12; Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd, Half-
Yearly Reports, 1940 to 1950. 
Notes: 
1. Not all the cash flow would have occurred during this period 
(see note 1 to Table 6:6). 
2. Capital expenditure is assumed to be twice the increase in the 
value of fixed assets shown in the company's Half-Yearly 
Reports (but excluding the amount by which the assets were re-
valued in 1949). From Trade Reports (which were not published 
during the war except for an abbreviated and unhelpful report 
in 1941), imports of capital equipment connected with sugar 
production (milling machinery, railway materials, locomotives 
and spare parts, rolling stock and spare parts) totalled 
£676,038 (f.o.b.) for the calendar years 1944, 1945, 1947, 
1948, 1949 (the Trade Report for 1946 was not available). 
Increments in the value of fixed assets at current prices for 
periods 31 March 1944 to 31 March 1946, and 31 March 1947 to 
31 March 1950 totalled £579,232. When doubled this is £1,158,464 
- well in excess of the value of capital imports. So it is fair 
to assume that the estimate of capital expenditure is being 
generous to the company. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
The Eve Commission, 1961 
THE conflict of interest between growers and CSR remained after 1950, even 
though ill some ways it appears that cane fanners were more prosperous than 
they had ever been before. Table 8:1 shows that yields of cane were 
slightly higher in 1951-55 than during the 1940s, and significantly higher 
over the next five years following the introduction of new hybrid varieties 
which raised yields and increased the area of the farm cropped each year 
from about 54% of the land under cane in 1954-58 to 64% in 1959.^ There 
TABLE 8:1 
YieIds of cane (tons of cane per acre) 
Averages for periods of five seasons: 
(2) 1941/5*^^^ 1946/50 1951/55 1956/60 
Nausori 17.0 16.9 17.1 18.7 
Rarawai 17.9 21.6 21.6 22.7 
Labasa 18.1 16.9 17.4 18.4 
Lautoka 19.1 21.5 21.8 24.0 
Penang 17.0 18.4 18.3 20.6 
True average 18.2 20.1 20.2 21.6 
Sources: FSC Ltd, 'Industrial Statistics Summary', Table 18(a); 
CSR Ltd, 'General Report on Cane, 1972', Table 6. 
Notes: (1) 1943 strike depressed yields. 
(2) Excludes 1960 figures which were unavailable because 
of industrial trouble. 
was also a big rise in the price of cane, thanks to the contract signed 
in 1950 and to an increase in the price of raw sugar (see Table 8:2 below). 
In real terms, as measured by the cost of living index for Viti Levu 
except Suva, average farm incomes rose by 79% from 1950 to 1953, and then 
fluctuated at lower levels but considerably above those in the late 1940s, 
before rising sharply in 1959 (see Table 8:3 below). Population pressure 
was eased by an aereal expansion of the industry which helped increase the 
Information kindly supplied by the Agricultural Experimental 
Station, FSC Ltd. 
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TABLE 8:2 
Average price of raw sugar exports and of cane:, and 
price of cane as a % of price of raw sugar^ 1950-59 
Tons of cane 
Pricc of sugar to make one Price of cane as 
exports Price of ton of 94N.T. % of price of raw 
Season (£F per ton) cane sugar sugar 
1950 32.3 49s 2d 7.3 55.7 
1951 36.5 58s 7d 7.0 56.2 
1952 39.7 65s lOd 7.3 60.5 
1953 41.7 71s 6d 7.3 62.6 
195A 42.5 71s 6d 7.8 65.6 
1955 41.7 70s lOd 7.7 65.4 
1956 43.3 74s 9d 7.2 62.1 
1957 45.2 79s Id 7.4 64.7 
1958 40.9 69s Id 7.6 64.2 
1959 39.5 64s 4d 8.5 69.2 
Source: 'Average price per ton of 94 N.T. sugar and average 
price paid per ton of cane. Fiji mills including 
Nausori', CSR U 3.0/3; Transcripts of the public 
hearings of the Fiji Sugar Inquiry Commission, 1961, 
107. 
TABLE 8:3 




(to nearest £F) 
Average income 
at 1950 prices-^ 
(to nearest £) Change on 1950 
1950 223 223 100 
1951 287 247 111 
1952 342 283 127 
1953 504 400 179 
1954 350 285 128 
1955 411 334 150 
1956 333 258 116 
1957 478 373 167 
1958 380 299 134 
1959 540 425 191 
Source: FSC Ltd, 'Industrial Statistics Summary', Tables 7(a), 
19(c), 23. 
* General price level measured by Cost of Living Index 
for Viti Levu except Suva at the end of each year. 
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2 number of growers from 1,lh2 in 1950 to 14,200 in 1959. The expansion 
was made possible by the guarantee of a market for Fiji under the Common-
wealth Sugar Agreement - for 170,000 long tons against exports in 1950 of 
3 114,254 tons - and by the development of cane varieties which could be 
4 
grown on marginal land. It might seem, then, that fanners had little 
cause to be dissatisfied witli their position in the industry. 
Opposition to CSR 
Yet higher incomes and the bringing of new land under cane were not enough 
to reconcile growers to the company. The Indian community was becoming 
steadily more frustrated with its economic and political status in the 
colony,^ and the particular problems faced by cane farmers added greatly 
to the discontent. At Penang the involvement of new growers was at the 
expense of others in the industry. In the late 1950s a geographer, R.M. 
Frazer, found that expansion into wetter areas on the west and south of 
Viti Levu Bay had meant that a crop of lower sugar content had been milled, 
so reducing the average quality of cane at Penang to the same as the other 
mills. This caused resentment among old established growers because Ra 
cane was no longer purchased at a special rate to compensate for better-
than-average quality. They felt they were subsidising newcomers who 
should have been paid less for their crop. On the other hand new farmers 
often settled on plots which were smaller than those of growers who had 
been longer in the industry. The proportion of contractors' farms under 
eight acres rose from 40% in 1944 to 52% in 1960, while that of tenants 
went up from three per cent to 22%.^ Since these smaller holdings were 
2 FSC Ltd, 'Industrial Statistics Sunmiary', Table 19(a). 
3 J.C. Potts, 'The Sugar Industry of Fiji: Its Beginnings and 
Development', Transactions and Proceedings of the Fiji Society, 
1 (1958-9), 126. This was exports in the calendar year of 1950, 
not the 1950 crushing season. 
4 Transcripts of the public hearings of the Fiji Sugar Inquiry 
Commission, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Eye Inquzry), 57. 
5 During the 1950s Indian members of the Legislative Council period-
ically pressed for constitutional changes which would have in-
creased their influence on government. N. Meller and J. Anthony, 
Fiji Goes to the Polls: The Crucial Legislative Councvl Elect%on 
of 1963, 16-17. 
6 R.M. Frazer, ^  Fiji-Indian Rural Community, 20. 
7 'Size of Farms', CSR U 3.0/3/-. Part of the increase was also due 
to the fragmentation of holdings. 
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frequently located on marginal land which gave lower yields, the incomes 
of new growers were usually well below many of their longer established 
friends and relatives. 
Also, recent entrants were not normally served by CSR's tram-
lines and had to pay more for transport than those who were. All the 
latter had to meet were the wages of men who ran portable line into the 
fields, and the cost of bullocks or tractors used to haul the cane to the 
main line (and often even the bullocks or tractors were the farmers' own). 
Growers not close to a tramline had to face the capital expense of con-
structing roads and the cost of having their cane transported by lorry. 
In 1952 GSR estimated that the average cost of lorry transport to the 
nearest tramline was 7s 6d to 12s Id per ton. Usually it was cheaper for 
cane to be taken direct to the mill since it saved the expense of trans-
loading on to trucks. For growers at Barotu who were fifteen miles from 
g 
the Penang mill, the cost was as high as 18s a ton. Frazer reckoned that 
in 1959 a farmer near the maximum distance from Penang and transporting 
his cane direct to the mill by lorry would make a profit of about 17s a 
ton from a crop of 159 tons, a net return just over half that of a grower 9 
with similar costs but adjacent to the tramline. It was not surprising 
that lorry suppliers should start making unfavourable comparisons between 
their incomes and those of more established farmers, and that by the end 
of the decade there should be demands for GSR to pay a subsidy to cover 
the additional cost of transport.^^ Since over a third of all growers 
delivered by lorry in 1960, the number of discontented farmers was con-
siderable . ^ ^ 
8 Carver to H.O., 4 Nov. 1952, Fiji Inspector, corres. with 
General Manager 1952-62, GSR mfm 682. 
9 Frazer, 21. Higher transport costs were not always offset by 
lower rents, as might be expected given the unfavourable 
location of lorry suppliers' land. According to the NLTB, up 
to the early 1960s rents were based primarily on the quality 
of the soil, and took little account of factors like distance 
from the mill. Moreover, new growers often paid more than those 
with fixed rents which had not been brought into line with the 
NLTB's and GSR's revised scales of rent (see Table 8:6 below). 
10 H.O. to Nausori, 28 Jan. 1960, Nausori Private Out 1958-60, GSR 
mfm 697. 




Inarease in cane area and in number of Indians 
living in ruval areas, 1946-66 
Acreage under cane 
To Lai 
% increase on 
10 years before 
No. of Indians in rural areas* 
Total 
% increase on 
10 years before 
1946 90,816 100,943 
1956 115,654 27.3 136,826 35.5 
1966 160,732 39.0 193,464 41.4 
% increase 1946-66 77.0 91.7 
Source: Michael Moynagh, 'Land tenure in Fiji's sugar cane 
districts since the 1920s', Journal of Pacific History, 
forthcoming, Table 3. 
* Includes Indians in the vicinity of towns and not 
necessarily engaged in agriculture. 
TABLE 8:5 
Employment of adult male Indians, 1946-66 
not available 
% increase 
1946 1956 1966 1946-•66 
No. of male Indians engaged in • 
Cultivating sugar cane as 
principal crop 9,611 16,883 22,415 133. 2 
Primary industry (except where 
cane a principal crop) 10,798 6,082 7,242 
Secondary & tertiary sectors 11,476 15,917 23,310 
22,247 21,999 30,552 37. 3 
Unemployed Comparable figures 2,978 
Source: Census reports for 1946, 1956 and 1966, C.P. 35/1947; 
1/1958; 9/1968. 
Defined as those aged over 11 in 1946 Census report, and 
over 14 in 1956 and 1966 reports. Excluded are those at 
school, etc. 
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Moreover, population pressure on cane land intensified. Table 
8:4 shows that from 1946 to 1966 the Indian rural population grew at a 
faster rate than the 77% increase in land under cane. Yet employment 
opportunities were still limited. As Table 8:5 indicates, the number of 
adult male Indians engaged in activities other than tlie cultivation of cane 
rose by only 37.3%, while tliose employed on farms wlierc cnnc was the 
principal crop went up by 133.2%. Even after allowing for difficulties 
of comparison - the 1946 figures, for example, include persons aged over 
11 whereas the 1966 ones relate to those over 14 (so tending to under-
estimate the general trend) - it is clear that those engaged in cane 
farming had increased by a larger percentage than new land brought under 
cane. Underemployment among male Indians had increased, especially on 
cane farms. It has been estimated on a conservative basis that in 1966 
12 
about a third of the labour employed in cane farming was surplus. And 
the problem of underemployment in sugar districts was highlighted by the 
Burns Commission, which in I960 reported on the natural resources and 13 population trends of Fiji. 
The extent of the problem owed much to the limited spread effects 
of CSR's activities. The repatriation of profits meant that most of the 
cash surplus from milling was not invested locally in ways which might 
have created jobs. In the past, too, the company had positively obstructed 
attempts to diversify cane farming, so perhaps denying Indians an opport-
unity to grow additional crops which could have absorbed some of the excess 
labour available. In the 1950s CSR was far less opposed to diversi-
fication, rice and dhal being grown by many farmers. But because govern-
ment left agricultural research relating to cane districts to the company, 
before 1960 virtually no systematic effort was made to develop a form of 
mixed farming most suited to the sugar belt; research was concentrated on 
matters which would yield a direct return to CSR, like increasing the 
supply and sugar content of cane. The company also tied up land, such 
as the Yaqara cattle ranch, which might otherwise have been farmed by 
12 A.V. Desai, 'The unemployment problem in Fiji', Economic Bulletin 
for Asia S the Far East, 24 (1973), 28. 
13 Burns et al., 'Report on the Commission of Inquiry into the 
natural resources and population trends of the colony of Fiji, 
1959' , C.P., 1/1960. 
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Indians. In addition, there was the deliberately cautious programme of 
sugar expansion undertaken by CSR in the early 1950s. The company wanted 
to concentrate on a similar but overall more expensive programme in 
Australia, and to leave room for increased output in Fiji following 
14 
productivity improvements. The result was that areas suited to cane, 
notably the Seaqaqa region near Labasa, were not developed till much later. 
They were unable to absorb in the 1950s part of the growing Indian work 
force. 
The lack of employment opportunities for those aged 15 and over 
encouraged relatives to create jobs for them. They were sometimes paid 
to help with cultivation, so reducing the need for women and younger 
children to do the work.^^ There was an increase in the number of farmers' 
substitutes in harvesting gangs from 55% of the total gang strength in 
1950 to 71% in 1959; over a third of the substitutes in 1959 were growers' 
sons. Despite the labour surplus in cane districts, wages of farm 
employees rose during the 1950s, as was reflected on the handful of CSR 
estates where the rates for cutters who harvested twenty to twenty-five 
tons of cane per acre went up by nearly 300%, from 2s 6hd per ton in 1950 
to 7s Od in 1959.^^ Part of the pressure on wage levels may have come 
from trade union activity in other sectors of the economy, but part may 
also have been due to rising expectations which encouraged growers to 
share more of their wealth with relatives on the farm. There was also a 
boom in the number of tractors bought by growers, many of whom wanted to 
18 
provide business opportunities for underemployed relatives. Beside using 
14 Eve Inquiry, 55-6. From 1950 to 1955 CSR spent £A13 million 
on increasing the capacity of its Australian mills: total 
capital expenditure on its Fiji mills from 1950 to 1959 was 
around £F3.3 million. See Lowndes (ed.), South Pacific Enterprise, 
94 and Table 8:11. 
15 Carver to H.O., 8 Sept. 1956, Fiji Inspector, corres. with 
General Manager 1952-62, CSR mfm 682. Carver mentions the number 
of women and children working on the farms in 1956 as something 
that was exceptional 'in recent years'. 
16 'Industrial Statistics Summary', Table 16(e). 
17 'Industrial Statistics Summary', Table 16(c). 
18 In 1959 there were 724 tractors in sugar districts: the number 
in 1950 was negligible. Eve Inquiry, p. 39. During the hearings 
(230), A.D. Patel stressed the point that tractors were bought 
to provide employment for relatives. 
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a LracLor raLlier Llian bulioclcs to plough, say, his laLlier's iaiid, il was 
hoped a son could earn an income from ploughing oLher people's farms. But 
Frazer estimated that at the usual contract rate of £2 an acre, to cover 
running costs and depreciation each tractor would need to plough at least 
one hundred acres a year.^^ So in 1959, 72,400 acres would have had to 
be ploughed if all the tractors in caue areas were at least to break even. 
2 n Witli cane land totalling 134,126 acres, this was impossible. Since 33% 
21 
rotations had become common, little more than a third of the area would 
have been ploughed that year and a large part of it, lying on hillside, 
for example, would not have been suitable for tractor work. Although 
tractor owners had the great advantage of being able to plough their farms 
(or those of relations) when the weather was most favourable and to do the 
work more thoroughly and under more pleasant conditions than by tradition-
22 
al methods, it is hard to see how more than a few owners could have made 
a profit. The cost of tractor purchases must have been a continuing drain 
on farm incomes — but one that appealed because it lightened the work of 
cultivation. Whereas tractors had originally been purchased to provide 
employment for growers' sons (or relatives), they had now become a means 
by which farmers could distribute some of the profits from cane in a way 
that eased the burden of farm labour. 
One of the mechanisms, then, for supporting a growing population 
was for farmers to pay others to do much of the work they had previously 
done themselves; at the same time, to satisfy rising expectations they 
increased wages and made work more pleasant by investing in tractors. The 
result was that growers assumed a distinct managerial/investor role - a 
tendency which was apparent in the 1940s and which had become of major 
importance by the late 1950s. No figures are available for 1946, but in 
1956, 9,003 people engaged in the cultivation of cane as a principal crop 
considered themselves to be managers and proprietors: 8,086 were listed 
in the census as 'other workers'. In 1966 the respective figures had 
19 Frazer, 22, 
20 'Development of cane farming - areas cultivated', CSR U 3,0/3/-, 
This figure excludes the 2,739 acres cultivated by CSR. 
21 Frazer, 23, 
22 Ibid,, 22, 
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23 risen to 10,072 and 12,649. 'Other workers' had moved from a minority 
to a majority of those labouring on cane farms. This threatened the 
foundation of the smallfarm system which rested on the premise that profits 
from cane and the cost of labour should be indivisible - that one should 
be counted as zero. As CSR readily admitted, the existing price of cane 
was not enough both to pay separate incomes to labourers and managers 
2 A' and satisfy their rising expectations. 
In addition there were problems connected with land tenure. 
Population growth and better cane prices led to a rise in land values 
which was reflected in higher rents. As early as 1954 the NLTB increased 
the scale it had introduced in 1952 (see Table 8:6) and which had been 
higher than the rents paid before then. When CSR issued new leases in 
1953, the rents of company tenants were also raised so that they would be 
in line with NLTB rates. But because these rents could not be altered 
till after the first ten years of the lease, the revision of the NLTB 
25 
scale in 1954 did not affect CSR's tenants until the early 1960s. Nor, 
TABLE 8:6 
NLTB and CSR rent scales •k 
Soil classification: 
1st class land lA superior 
IB 1st class 
IC 1st class 
2nd class land 2A 2nd class 
2B 2nd class 
2C 2nd class 
3rd class land 3A 3rd class 
3B 3rd class 
1952 scale 1954 scale 
3C Exceptionally poor 
Source: Eve Inquiry^ 87. 
£2 15s Od £5 Os Od 
2 10 0 4 10 0 
2 5 0 4 0 0 
2 0 0 3 10 0 
1 15 0 3 0 0 
1 10 0 2 10 0 
1 5 0 2 0 0 
1 0 0 1 10 0 
15 0 1 0 0 
CSR did not introduce its revised scale till 1955. 
23 Census reports for 1956 and 1966, C.P. 1/1958; 9/1968. 
24 Eve Inquiry, 39-43. 
25 Ibid., 88. 
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till these leases expired, did the NLTB scales affect contractors on leases 
which dated from years back and contained no provision for the regular 
revision of rent. So more significant were the cases, involving up to 
7.5% of cane farmers, where Indian and European landlords charged rents 
well above those on Crown, CSR or NLTB land. Sometimes over a third of 
a grower's Income was paid in rent for a farm wliich could be held on one 
2 6 
of several tenurial arrangements. Tlie rise in land values also caused 
an increase in the premiums paid when farms were transferred, which 
apparently was quite often. CSR tried to prevent transfers but received 
little effective support from the NLTB. in 1960 it was claimed that 
premiums of around £2000 were not uncommon, and since they were usually 
financed by loans at high interest this represented a significant expense.' 
27 
Of wider impact was the failure of the Native Land Trust 
28 
Ordinance to provide farmers with security of tenure. In 1940 it had 
been hoped that the procedure for demarcating reserves would form a 
solution to the problem of land tenure. Reserves would guarantee Fijians 
enough land for their existing and future needs so enabling Indians, it 
was thought, to lease land outside reserves for an almost unlimited period. 
The Colonial Office expected that the declaration of reserves would take 29 
about two years and that cane lands would not be affected. Yet far from 
not touching sugar districts, when the proclamation of reserves was 
complete in 1967 the acreage of leases affected in 'Old Tikinas' where 30 
cane was grown either in part or throughout was 22,351 - about ten per 
cent of the 220,000 acres, roughly estimated in 1963, used for all types 
of farming but located within the boundaries of cane areas. In 1963 the 
NLTB reckoned that the number of growers affected by reserves would be 31 
ten per cent of all cane farmers on Fijian land. Once reserves had been 
26 Ibid., 92-6. 
27 Ibid., 88. Premiums were paid because fixed rents no longer 
reflected the market value of the land. 
28 This section is based on my article, 'Land tenure in Fiji's 
sugar cane districts since the 1920s', Journal of Paotfto H^story, 
f or tlicoming. 
29 Minute, 14 July 1939, C.O. 83/227 file 85044/39. 
30 Report of the Native Land Trust Board for the year 1967. 
31 Confidential appendix. 
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published tenants were expected to vacate their plots as leases expired. 
They were paid no compensation for improvements but, though they did not 
have the legal right, they were allowed to remain on the land till they 
had harvested all growing crops up to and including first ratoon cane -
a maximum period of two and a half years.^^ In 1949 when the first 
reserves were published, government became concerned about the fate of 
tenants and established Resettlement Committees to help them find altern-
ative land. These committees operated till the early 1960s and helped a 
number of farmers. Others already had land or found it on their own 
accord. Thanks to the expansion of sugar production, most displaced 
tenants acquired leases on new land coming into the industry, so that 
resettlement did not present the difficulties originally expected. 
Yet, although the actual cane area going into reserves was not 
large and the number of farmers made landless negligible, the demarcation 
of reserves had an immense adverse effect on Indian opinion. Farmers 
resented ejection from leases they had occupied for many years. Those 
with land outside as well as inside reserves received no help in finding 
3 A 
new farms to compensate for what they had lost, while those who obtained 
new land, often on surrounding hillsides, usually found it was less 
fertile than the rich areas they had left. Moreover, from vantage points 
on the hills they could often see their former leases being less efficient-
ly tended, and in many cases not cultivated at all, by their new occupants. 
Due to population pressure on the land, the number of Fijians in the 
industry increased significantly, from 6.8% of all growers in 1950 to 
35 
12.2% in 1959, but many of them tended cane for only short periods so 
that the sight of reserved land going out of use became highly provocative 
to Indians. More significant was the delay in finalizing reserves which 
took twenty-six years instead of the two originally envisaged. This was 
partly due to the amount of work involved. Recommendations by the 
Commissioner of Reserves, initially Ratu J.L.V. Sukuna, were based on the 
32 Confidential appendix. The NLTO had removed the obligation on 
landlords to compensate outgoing tenants for improvements. 
33 . Confidential appendix. 
34 Confidential appendix. 
35 'Industrial Statistics Summary', Table 17(c). 
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population trends of each landowning unit (mataqali) over as long a period 
as possible, the amount of land owned by each unit, and the quality as 
well as the location of the land owned. ® Especially with a shortage of 
staff, collection of this data took considerable time, but by 1959 the 
Commissioner had completed work on tlie whole of Viti Levu and part of 
Vanua Levu. Yet the NLTB had published or proclaimed as reserves only 
186,327 acres, against the 1,412,149 which would lie in reserves when 
o y 
demarcation was complete in 1967. As leases expired in districts where 
reserves had not been finalized, farmers were given short term leases or 
tenancies-at-will, which could not be replaced by tliirty-year leases till 
it was certain the land would lie outside reserves. Consequently, not 
only were displaced farmers and their relatives affected by reserves: 
involved were all occupants of native land, whether CSR or NLTB tenants, 
whose leases had or were about to expire. The result was a widespread 
feeling of insecurity which discouraged long term investment in the land, 
and produced a desire for higher returns from cane as compensation for 
the risk that leases might not be renewed. 
During the 1950s, then, the admission of new farmers to the 
industry, population growth and insecurity of tenure led to demands for 
a continuing increase in farm incomes. Unfortunately, though, the lack 
of appropriate statistical data adds to the difficulty of knowing whether 
returns from cane rose enough to meet these demands. Still, on the 
information available it is plain that from 1950 to 1953 there was a very 
substantial improvement in the standard of living of growers, and that 
this was in fact the economic heyday of Indians in Fiji. Never again 
would average real farm incomes rise by 79% over a four-year period. This 
was quite sufficient to absorb any rise in farm costs and any population 
growth that was likely to have occurred at that time. It was also enough 
to allow farmers to meet many of their higher expectations - indeed, it 
produced higher expectations. Yet, as Table 8:3 showed, average real 
farm incomes over the next five years were below, sometimes considerably 
below, the peak they had reached in 1953. Moreover, the very high incomes 
obtained in that year led not only to the repayment of existing debts. 
36 Report of the Native Land Trust Board for the year 1963. 
37 Report of the Native Land Trust Board for the year 1967. 
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but to the accumulation of even larger new ones as growers sought to 
maximise their expenditure. CSR noticed that indebtedness rose after the 
38 
exceptionally good season of 1953, and this was hardly surprising since 
the greater prosperity of farmers increased their apparent credit-worthi-
ness. The burden of debt must have caused problems when real incomes fell. 
Growers had relatively high levels of debt but smaller real incomes from 
which to service it. Then in 1957 and 1958 there was a severe credit 39 squeeze which hurt the many farmers who depended on credit. Perhaps 
it was no accident that at this time the Kisan Sangh revived its idea of 
40 
a co-operative store, though the venture made little headway. Lower 
real incomes plus the burden of debt would have made it very difficult for 
the average grower to enjoy the standard of living he had experienced in 
1953. Yet the population continued to rise and other problems like in-
security of land tenure remained. Further, to talk of the average farmer 
is misleading. Growers who delivered by lorry, or occupied marginal land, 
or had particularly small farms, or leased from Indian landlords at high 
rents, or held Fijian land which might be reserved, were likely to be in 41 
a worse position than, say, well established tenants on CSR freeholds. 
Thus in the mid-1950s even if some farmers had grounds to be satisfied -
and there were probably only a relatively few in that position - a large 
number must have had considerable difficulty in meeting the various demands 
placed on their resources, and satisfying the higher expectations caused 
by the big rise in farm incomes earlier in the decade. 
Against this background it was no wonder that there was mounting 
resentment against CSR, reflected in the suggestion that mills be taken 
over by an Indian firm.'^^ Since the company was foreign owned and thought 
38 H.O. to Nausori, 18 April 1957, Nausori Private Out, 1954-8, 
CSR mfm 242. 
39 Michael Ward, The Role of Investment in the Development of Fiji, 
65. 
40 Ayodhya Prasad Sharma, Kisan Sangh ka Itihas, Vol. II, 321-9. 
41 There is room for a study of economic differentiation among 
cane growers and its effects, if any, on political and social 
action. 
42 The proposal was favoured by A.D. Patel, but after first support-
ing the idea it was opposed by Ayodhya Prasad who feared the 
company would get into the hands of the Gujeratis. Ayodhya Prasad, 
359-64. 
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to repatriate the bulk of its profits, it was natural that the discontent 
of growers should focus on CSR. Nor was it surprising that when in 1959 
the company suggested measures to reduce the contract price of cane, and 
to control farm output so as to prevent exports exceeding Fiji's quota 
under the recently negotiated International Sugar Agreement, the proposals 
/ Q 
should meet witli strong opposition from fanners. During 1959 growers 
benefited from a sharp rise in farm incomes wliich was due to a bumper 
harvest of 2,353,080 tons of cane, the highest on r e c o r d . I f production 
was curtailed and the price of cane not increased, there would be no repeat 
of the large income achieved that year. Yet witliout earnings of at least 
that level, growers could hardly hope to realize their material expect-
ations, meet the costs of lorry transport, hired labour and rent increases, 
as well as receive compensation for insecurity of tenure. Many, there-
fore, were in no mood to compromise with CSR when negotiations for a new 
contract began. 
CSR's response 
During these talks CSR felt unable to offer major concessions as it had 
in 1949-50. Consistent with the general movement of wage levels in the 
colony which had been largely due to the unionisation of mill workers and 
the desire of CSR and government to avoid a major conflict with their 
employees, there had been a big rise in labour costs which, the company 
claimed, had squeezed its profits. The average cost of a non-salaried 
mill worker had gone up from 8s 8d a day in 1950 to 19s 7d in 1959, an 
increase of about 126%.'^^ Wages had risen particularly sharply in 1959, 
following the Honeyman inquiry into a dispute between CSR and the Fiji 
46 
Sugar Industry Employees Association, the mill workers' union. The 
company feared that the recommendations of the inquiry might set the 
pattern for further wage increases in future, especially since widespread 
industrial unrest in Fiji during 1959 seemed to herald a new period of 
union militancy.^^ The labour intensive nature of its operations made CSR 
43 Nausori Private Out, 1958-60, CSR mfm 697, passim. 
44 'Industrial Statistics Summary', Table 19(b). 
45 Ibid. , Table 3(a)(i). 
46 'Report of the Sugar Board of Inquiry, 1959', C.P. 26/1959. 
47 Eve Inquiry, 33. 
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particularly vulnerable to the effects of a large rise in wage levels. It 
employed four times as many people per unit of output in its Fiji mills 
as it did in its Queensland mills.^^ 
The company's ability to absorb these higher costs was limited 
by marketing arrangements for sugar. Uncertainties about the future of 
the International Sugar Agreement (ISA) encouraged CSR not to exceed Fiji's 
quota under the Commonwealth agreement. It was expected tliat the latter's 
overall agreement quotas would form the basis for restrictions under a 
renegotiated ISA, and in fact when an agreement was signed in 1959 the 
quota for total Commonwealth exports was only 125,000 long tons above the 
2,500,000 tons overall agreement quota. Fiji's exports under the ISA were 
limited to about 179,000 long tons in 1959, and about 184,000 in 1960 and 
49 
1961. The ISA was needed because of the depressive effect on the inter-
national 'free' price of world over-production, which in part was due to 
protection in north America of cane and in Europe of domestic beet 
industries which were unable to compete on open market terms with producers 
in many less developed areas; also protected under special marketing 
arrangements were commercial interests engaged in uncompetitive sugar 
milling in the third world but with political influence in Washington and 
London. The Fiji industry was probably more efficient than a number of 
Britain's colonial suppliers. With over 15,000 additional acres in 1959 
suitable for cane near the Labasa, Rarawai, Lautoka and Penang mills, 
it is possible that had less efficient producers not been protected, Fiji's 
competitive advantage would have allowed CSR to increase output more than 
it did in the 1950s, and so reduce unit costs. 
48 H.O. to Nausori, 12 June 1959, Nausori Private Out, 1958-60, 
CSR mfm 697. 
49 CSR Memo., 'Sugar in the Fiji Economy', 1959, CSR Library, 15-6; 
see also Prem K. Charan, 'The 1960 Fiji Sugar Dispute: the cane 
growers versus the company', unpublished M.A. thesis, 30-33. 
50 Because of the greater efficiency of its operations, not only 
in Australia but also in Fiji, CSR had been less fonward than 
other Commonwealth producers in pressing for an increase in the 
price of raw sugar during the late 1940s. Michael Moynagh, The 
Negotiation of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, 1949-51 , 
Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 15 (1977), 182-3, 
51 'Sugar in the Fiji Economy', 10. 
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At least to some extent, though, the inability to do this was 
offset by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA), under which Fiji sold 
125,000 long tons a year of negotiated price sugar at a price which covered 
S 9 
the costs of less efficient producers in the West Indies. Yet the 
benefits of this were limited because pricing arrangements under the CSA 
were designed mainly with British interests in mind. Though there had 
been altruistic concern in the Colonial Office about the low incomes of 
labourers and growers engaged in the colonial sugar industries, the contin-
uation of the imperial preference and the introduction of the negotiated 
price had almost certainly been agreed to by tlie Treasury largely to prevent 
a fall in real incomes leading to social unrest in the sugar islands. The 
cost to the consumer of the CSA was expected to be less than the cost to 
the taxpayer of maintaining order in the face of widespread economic 
distress. The negotiated price was fixed with this political objective 
in view, but also at a level that would minimise its expense to the 
consumer - a consideration which served as a break on increases in the 
price; nevertheless, it rose from £32 17s 6d a long ton in 1951 to £44 8s lOd 
in 1960. Not all sugar could be sold at the negotiated price, however -
indeed, Canada refused to buy any on these terms - because it was expected 
that in the long run the price would be substantially higher than the 
world 'free' price. The consumer would then suffer. Consequently, under 
the CSA,Commonwealth exporters to Britain and Canada were to sell some of 
their sugar - 45,000 tons in the case of Fiji - at the 'free' price plus 
the pre-war imperial preference. But as a result of increased world out-
put the 'free' price fell from about £49 12s Od in 1951 to about £28 10s Od 
in 1960, so negating part of the gains from the higher negotiated price 
and helping to prevent the average annual price of Fiji's exports rising 
at a rate commensurate with wage increases in the sugar industry. Against 
the 126% rise in wages, the price of the colony's sugar exports went up 
by only 22.3%, from about £32 4s Od a ton in 1950 to about £39 10s Od in 
1959.^^ Clearly the international market for sugar, which was arranged 
largely to serve the interests of industrial nations, made it harder for 
CSR to absorb the rise in mill labour costs. 
52 For a fuller account of the negotiation of the agreement, see 
Moynagh, 'The Negotiation of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, 
1949-51'. 
53 Table 8:2. 
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YGL Lhere were a number of things the company could, and did, 
do to meet the situation. One was to reduce the cost of expatriate staff, 
who received the much higher Australian wages than those paid to non-
Europeans in Fiji. In the early 1950s CSR began to replace some of its 
technical staff in the mills with part—Europeans, and at the end of the 
54 
decade it started to train Indians who were even less expensive. To 
reduce the size of its Australian field staff, in the late 1950s the 
number of farms for which each officer was responsible was increased from 
between 100 and 200 to between 400 and 600. Field officers were to be 
assisted by Indian and Fijian extension workers, initially responsible to 
the Agricultural Experimental Station in Lautoka. The mobility of field 
personnel was enhanced by the substitution of motor transport for horses, 
though this had the unexpected effect of reducing contact between growers 
and officers while the latter were travelling.^^ Apart from localization 
of staff, most of whose effects were not felt till the 1960s, CSR sought 
to limit cost increases by rationalizing its operations in the colony. 
It began to get rid of its non-sugar interests. The unprofitable pine-
apple cannery near Nadi was closed in 1956.^^ Butcheries at the mills, 
which had supplied meat to the company's staff, were gradually sold off. 
More important was the decision to close Nausori after the 1959 
season, and to concentrate production on the other more profitable mills. 
Table 8:7 below shows the losses made at Nausori from 1940 to 1958. 
Profits had always been comparatively small because too much rain and not 
enough light affected ripening, so that the sugar content of cane was low. 
But since the early 1940s there had been another problem: the supply of 
cane had dropped. From 1930 to 1939 the annual average quantity of cane 
crushed had been 132,290 tons; from 1940 to 1949 this fell to 91,689 tons 
and from 1950 to 1956, after which it was decided to close the mill, the 
average was down to as low as 83,924 tons.^^ Many of the company's staff 
54 H.O. to Nausori, 27 Aug. 1954, Nausori Private Out, 1950-4, 
CSR mfm 242; H.O. to Nausori, 11 Sept. 1958, Nausori Private 
Out, 1958-60, CSR mfm 697. 
55 Interview with Mr J.E. Twentyman, 29 Aug. 1977. 
56 Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd, Half-Yearly Report, 31 
March 1957. 
57 'Nausori mill - crop data', CSR F 1.0/3/24, with adjustments to 
allow for actual canc crushcd in 1956. 
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TABLl': 8:7 
Results of aotivities^^^ at Nausori mill, 1940-58^'^^ 
Profit or Profit or Profit or 
Season loss Season loss Season loss 
£ £ £ 
1940 5,743 1947 55,667 1954 -15,585 
1941 7,517 1948 5,922 1955 -75,230 
1942 22,334 1949 -10,837 1956 -113,858 
1943 -27,563 1950 -76,062 1957 -101,246 
1944 -17,004 1951 -25,369 1958 -20,377 
1945 -10,797 1952 -85,799^^) 
1946 26,249 1953 -73,681 Total -529,976 
Souracs: Tables in CSR F 1.0/3/24; F 1.0/3/26; F 2.0/A/19. 
Notes: (1) Includes non-sugar activities and molasses. 
(2) Comparable figures for 1959 not available. For 
the remaining years, no allowance made for 
changes in the general price level. 
(3) Anticipated rather than actual loss. 
blamed this on off-farm employment in Suva and the Nausori township, which 
caused farms to be neglected. It is still frequently said in Fiji that 
this was an important reason for the mill's closure. Yet a survey done 
by CSR in 1956 showed that of the 1,800 growers on the Rewa, only 300 had 
other employment and 230 of these had made satisfactory arrangements for 
the cultivation of their farms. Only about four per cent of growers were 
neglecting their land. CSR concluded that two factors were mainly 
responsible for the fall in production. One was that drainage had deterior-
ated since the early 1940s, largely because growers had refused to co-
operate with the company in keeping drains clean. In 1946 the Rewa unions 
had insisted on doing the work themselves, but had then neglected it 
presumably because, given inter-union rivalry, they were unwilling to levy 
members for the cost - a situation which pointed to the need for a single 
statutory association to look after the interests of farmers in such 
matters. The other reason was that to obtain cane with a high sugar 
content, CSR had encouraged the cultivation of Galba and Argus varieties 
in soils which should have grown Malabar. As the general manager, Dr 
Vernon, remarked in 1956, 'This has been to our interest under the present 
cane agreement but there is little doubt that it has had the effect of 
worsening the already depressed yields stemming from poor drainage' - an 
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excellent example of how conflict; of InteresL in the industry could work 
58 to the disadvantage of growers. 
It was out of the question for CSR to continue sustaining losses 
at Nausori when it knew that, because little had been recently spent on 
improvements compared to the other mills, substantial new Investment was 
needed by 1960. It seemed most unlikely there would be a return from the 
required expenditure of up to £400,000, including £250,000 for a new 
59 
boiler. Yet without this investment the mill could hardly be operated 
at all. There were various possibilities. The company could increase the 
cane supply by repairing the drains itself, but this might set a precedent 
for the other mills and CSR was not prepared to be saddled with the expense 
of maintaining drains in all the cane districts. Or it could reduce the 
price of cane on the Rewa, but this would invite opposition from the 
growers.^^ Instead, CSR decided to dismantle Nausori and transfer usable 
machinery to its other mills. Steps were taken to increase production 
elsewhere in Fiji so as to reduce the unit costs of milling. The company 
was particularly anxious that this expansion occur before Nausori was 
closed, lest part of Fiji's export quota under the CSA remain unfilled and 
growers demand that to meet the deficit they be allowed to run Nausori as 
a co-operative. This would have deprived CSR of the opportunity to increase 
output at its other mills, and might have encouraged demands that the 
latter also be made into co-operatives. Fear of this was one reason for 
the company's determination to find another crop for farmers after it had 
withdrawn from the Rewa. If they had an alternative source of income 
growers would be less likely to want Nausori kept open.^^ So a wholly 
owned subsidiary of CSR, the Rewa Rice Co., was established to provide 
milling facilities for growers who switched from cane to padi. It was 
planned that after taxation and an allowance for depreciation, this new 
58 Vernon, 'Memorandum to the General Manager. Nausori', 24 
Sept. 1956, CSR F 1.0/3/27. 
59 'Future of Nausori', 22 April 1955, CSR F 1.0/3/24; 'Nausori 
Overhead costs', 24 May 1956, CSR F 1.0/3/26. 
60 Vernon, 'Nausori Cane Price', 28 April 1955, CSR F 1.0/3/26. 
61 'Notes of a meeting held at Nausori, 21 Aug. 1956', CSR F 
1.0/3/24; Dixon, 'Memorandum to the General Manager. Nausori 
Mill', 31 Aug. 1956, CSR F 1.0/3/26; Vernon, 'Closure of Nausori, 
Notes'for discussion', 4 Feb. 1957, CSR F 1.0/3/27. 
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company would make an eight per cenL return on investment. To ensure this 
CSR insisted that competition be limited by raising duties on imported 
rice,and government, which feared social unrest in the district if the 
r Q 
rice scheme failed, readily agreed. Thus apart from reducing incomes 
on the Rewa because rice was less profitable than cane, closure of Nausori 
entailed a cost to the rest of the Indian community which had to pay more 
for rice. Those who gained were Indians able to enter the sugar industry 
following expansion on the west of Viti Levu and of Vanua Levu, while the 
main beneficiary - of course - was CSR. 
In the company's view these attempts to reduce costs were not 
enough to ensure adequate profits, though what return CSR would have 
regarded as satisfactory is hard to say. The company wanted to negotiate 
a more favourable cane contract when the existing one expired, but it 
knew that this might lead to a dispute with growers. As early as 1956 
head office had become apprehensive about the possibility of a farmers' 
strike. To make its profits as a percentage return on investment appear 
less, in 1957 the company revalued its Fiji assets - but not those in 
Australia - from £5,895,521 to £13,030,370. The Chief Manager was told: 
For your information, our main reason for acquiring this 
valuation is the ever-present possibility that some situation 
could arise in Fiji which would lead to an investigation, or 
some form of arbitration, in which it would be necessary to 
produce information regarding our assets, profits and relevant 
information. An up-to-date valuation would also be a con-
siderable advantage to us in future negotiations in connection 
with the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. 63 
Interestingly, the company had revalued its Fiji but not Australian assets 
64 
in 1949, when negotiations for the 1950-59 contract were about to begin. 
CSR also tried to appease growers by adopting a lower profile in the 
colony, this being one of the objects of its staff localization policy. 
In 1959 harvesting gangs were allowed to determine for themselves the 
order of cutting, instead of this being left to the field staff, and in 
62 'Rice Milling and Marketing Project, Nausori', C.P. 10/1959. 
63 H.O. to Nausori, 11 April 1956, Nausori Private Out, 1954-8, 
CSR mfm 242. 
64 Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd, Half-Yearly Report, 31 
March 1949. 
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keeping with Lhe company's new approach one of the effects of reducing 
the ratio of field officers to farmers was that the use of credit to 
control growers declined. Having less contact with each farmer, officers 
found it harder to relate advances to the quality of husbandry. To meet 
criticism, echoed in the lloneyman report, of Sydney's remote control over 
the company's Fiji activities, in 1959-60 CSR considered forming a wholly 
owned subsidiary to run its milling operations in the colony.^^ But no 
final decision was taken till 1961. Meanwhile, CSR began to reduce the 
extent of its landholdings in Fiji. It refused to renew a handful of NLTB 
leases whicli expired in tlie late 1950s, and in 1959 it offered to sell 
its freeholds to the Crown - an offer tliat was refused. It was thought 
that the refusal might have been due to a reluctance in the Colonial Office 
to finance what was imagined to be the start of the company's withdrawal 
from the colony.^^ Yet if this was so, it was based on a complete mis-
reading of the situation. There is no evidence that at this date CSR was 
planning to leave. Rather, the company was trying to strengthen its 
position by rationalizing its activities and making its presence less 
provocative. 
Wliile embarking on this strategy, in February 1959 CSR informed 
growers of its proposed changes to the cane contract. First, given recent 
expansion of the industry and the renegotiation of the ISA, the company 
wanted farmers to bear the risk of over-production. The need for restrict-
ion became a matter of urgency during the year. Output should have been 
limited to 217,000 tons of raw sugar, which would have been made up of 
179,000 tons for export under the ISA, 15,000 for sale within Fiji and 
to other Pacific islands, and 23,000 to bring its maximum stock tonnage 
under the ISA to 37,000 tons (there were 14,000 tons left from the 1958 
season). Yet because of exceptionally good weather, 283,000 tons of raw 
sugar were produced, making severe restriction necessary the following 
year. CSR favoured control by means of a tonnage quota on each farm, 
65 Interviews with J.E. Twentyman, 29 Aug. 1977, and J.C. Potts, 
9 Sept. 1977. 
66 H.O. to Nausori, 23 Sept. 1960, Nausori Private Out, 1958-60, 
CSR mfm 697; 'Aide Memoire for Chairman's first meeting with 
Sir Malcolm Eve', 5 April 1961, CSR U 3.0/3/-. 
67 Interview with J.C. Potts, 9 Sept. 1977. 
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since responsibiiiLy would Llien lie wiLh the indlvlclu;il grower to produce 
no more than the agreed amount. The alternative was to impose quotas on 
an acreage basis, the company buying all cane grown on a specified area. 
But this would mean that if yields were unusually high CSR would have to 
buy more cane than it needed, wliereas if yields were low there might be 
a shortfall. The company's other proposals were designed to boost profits 
from milling. Higher penalties were suggested for burnt and inferior 
cane so as to raise the average sugar content and lower costs. Certain 
expenses, like that of storage, were to be deducted from the proceeds of 
sugar sales before the latter were used to calculate tlie price of canc. 
The company requested, too, a reduction in the growers' share of proceeds 
when the price of sugar was high. It claimed that in 1950 no one had 
expected raw sugar prices to reach the levels they were now at, and that 
the existing contract was unduly favourable to farmers at high prices.^^ 
Needless to say, these suggestions were not likely to please the growers. 
The strike and its aftermath 
After CSR had presented growers with its proposed contract, negotiations 
were postponed till elections for the Legislative Council were over, so 
avoiding the possibility that Indian politicians would compete for votes 
by making steadily more extreme counter demands. Once the elections were 
finished the Federation of Cane Growers, which included representatives 
of all the farmers' unions, prepared a draft contract of its own which 
was submitted to CSR later in the year. Its terms were very different 
from those suggested by the company. Against the average 62.6% of proceeds 
obtained from 1950 to 1959 (see Table 8:2), growers demanded 70% of the 
sugar proceeds without any prior deductions for storage and the like. 
They opposed increases in penalties for burnt or inferior cane, and 
demanded the right to select their own varieties (so they could grow 
heavier rather than sweet cane). They reluctantly acknowledged the need 
for production control, but claimed that CSR had a moral obligation to 
buy all the cane harvested in 1960 since in 1957 and 1958 it had urged 
farmers to increase the area planted. After 1960 they wanted restrictions 
68 H.O. to Nausori, 6 March 1959; H.O. to Nausori, 30 Oct. 1959, 
Nausori Private Out, 1958-60, CSR mfm 697. 
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to be on an acrcage and not a tonnage basis, so placing the ultimate 
responsibility for control on CSR.^^ Negotiations between the company and 
growers were protracted, and when by March 1960 it had become clear that 
no breakthrough was likely, CSR started to collaborate with government to 
obtain a resolution of the dispute on terms acceptable Lo the company. On 
11 April 1960 CSR's head office remarked: 'It is gratifying that our 
views on the situation and method of handling it seem to be finding accept-
ance by Government 
Following discussions in Sydney between Sir Kenneth Haddocks 
(governor, 1958-64) and the company, in late May government intervened 
in the dispute. At the suggestion of CSR^^ Haddocks proposed that there 
be a wide-ranging economic inquiry into the industry, but this was rejected 
by growers on the grounds that a commission would be unable to get at the 
facts. A month later the governor suggested a compromise: that CSR buy 
the 1960 crop up to the quota level at a price based on scales in the 
1950-59 contract, and that negotiations for the 1961 harvest start 
immediately. If within a reasonable time no agreement had been reached, 
government would 'take such steps as it may then consider necessary'. 
This was accepted by the company, but growers wanted certain points 
clarified - especially whether quotas for 1960 were to be on an area or 
tonnage basis. On 24 July the Kisan Sangh and representatives of the 
Fijian farmers, who were assisted by J.N. Falvey, reached a separate 
agreement with CSR. Enough cane was to be harvested in 1960 to make 
199,000 tons of raw sugar, and cane left standing was to be added to the 
tonnage quota for 1961. Under a compromise arrangement for determining 
quotas, half the area of standing cane would be cut on the first round, 
whereas the second would be based on tonnage. Hills would close on 22 
January 1961. Other unions in the Federation, led by A.D. Patel and 
S.M. Koya, opposed the agreement. They wanted the second round based on 
69 H.O. to Nausori, 28 Jan. 1960, Nausori Private Out, 1958-60, 
CSR mfm 697; 'Brief on dispute in sugar industry', official 
paper prepared for Capt. Julien Amery, 3 Oct. 1960. 
70 H.O. to Nausori, 11 April 1960, Nausori Private Out, 1958-60, 
CSR mfm 697. 
71 H.O. to Nausori, 30 March 1960; H.O. to Nausori, 6 May 1960, 
Nausori Private Out, 1958-60, CSR mfm 697. 
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acreage, and the mills Lo keep crusliing till an equal proportion of every 
fanner's cane had been cut. Growers were urged not to harvest before 
72 these demands had been met. 
It has been alleged that as a prominent Gujerati, Patel was 
eager to provoke a strike so as to Increase farmers' indebtedness to 
Gujerati storekeepers, so enhancing the latter's economic and political 
influence by enabling them to further bind customers through debt. But 
since the real interest of storekeepers lay in the continuation of trade 
which would be disrupted by a strike, this seems a perverse explanation 
of Patel's motives. Alternatively, it has been suggested tliat Patel 
adopted a more extreme stand than the Kisan Sangh because on past exper-
ience this could be expected to win popular support and thereby aid his 
political career. It is, indeed, hard to believe that the desire to avoid 
accusations of betraying growers' interests was not a consideration. Yet 
it must also be noted that differences between Ayodhya Prasad and Patel 
after 24 July were consistent with the traditions of the unions they led. 
Except briefly around 1950, the Kisan Sangh has always tended to be more 
moderate than the Maha Sangh and its allies. Prasad believed not only 
that farmers could best be served by co-operating with GSR, but that their 
interests were as much threatened by storekeepers and moneylenders as by 
the company. According to GSR, although they represented only about 12% 
of all growers, the moderate stance of the Fijian associations in July 
73 
further increased the willingness of Prasad to compromise. In contrast 
was the Patel group which, perhaps recalling the experience of the Kisan 
Sangh from 1937 to 1942, believed tl)at through direct action more con-
cessions could be extracted from the company. It would be interesting to 
know whether these conflicting outlooks reflected socio/economic differ-
ences between the farmers to whom each union appealed. 
With the failure of subsequent attempts to bring about a 
reconciliation between growers' leaders, supporters of Patel went on strike, 
72 'Brief on dispute in sugar industry', op. cit. 
73 Nausori to H.O., 25 July 1960, Ghief Manager to H.O. Private 
Inwards, May-July 1960, GSR mfm 350. 
74 Patel's motives have also been discussed by Gharan, who believes 
he was inspired mainly by an altruistic desire to help farmers 
and felt that the 24 July agreement was not in the growers' best 
interests. Gharan, 65-70. 
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Yet their action achieved nothing. After a meeting with the Under-Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, Julien Amery, who was in Fiji as part of a 
world tour, on 15 October Patel and Koya advised growers to harvest the 
1960 crop under protest, but to plough in ratoons and harvest no more cane 
till a long term agreement with CSR had been reached. Harvesting there-
after continued as normal, though the advice to plough in ratoons was 
largely ignored. No concessions had been won on the tonnage question nor 
on the final date of harvesting. l^ fhy, then, had the strike failed? The 
reason was that CSR was in an exceptionally strong position to withstand 
a stoppage. The previous year's harvest meant that at the end of the 1959 
season the company had accumulated stocks of 89,000 tons of raw sugar, 
52,000 more than was permitted under the ISA. CSR had planned to ask for 
special permission from the International Sugar Council to reduce stocks 
gradually over a number of years,^^ but the strike provided an opportunity 
to do this at once. Of course, if a large number of growers were involved 
and the dispute lasted all season, the company would make a loss because 
existing stocks were not enough to meet the whole of Fiji's export quota. 
Yet CSR was prepared to accept this so as to avoid conceding Patel's 
demand for tonnage quotas in 1960, which by setting a precedent might 
force the company some time in the future, if not in 1960, to buy more 
cane than it could mill. CSR also knew that it had the support of govern-
ment which on 9 August called out the territorial army to maintain order. 
In a brief for Amery, officials claimed that security forces had limited 
the burning of non-strikers' farms and that 'those few acts which have 
occurred have done very little damage'. Though government denied it, 
farmers saw the troops as evidence of official backing for the company. 
Moreover, the Great Council of Chiefs urged government to do all it could 
to start the mills crushing, and offered Fijian help to maintain law and 
order if necessary. With these interests arrayed against them and the 
Kisan Sangh and Fijian growers eager to harvest cane, it seemed to farmers 
that the strike was bound to fail and that its only effect would be to 
reduce earnings from the 1960 crop. Consequently, although Patel's 
extreme stand was widely respected (in 1963 he won a seat in the'Legis-
75 Charan, 90. 
76 H.O. to Nausori, 28 Jan. 1960, Nausori Private Out, 1958-60, 
CSR mfm 697. 
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laCive Council), the position of the moderates was strengthened by the 
considerable number of growers who began to harvest their cane. On 11 
August the Labasa mill opened, by 9 September the other three mills had 
started to crush, and by mid-October it was clear that most growers were 
beginning to harvest.^^ Amery's visit, which the Patel faction wrongly 
claimed was designed to settle the dispute, provided an opportunity to 
call off the strike with a minimum loss of face. So it was that once 
again, as in 1921 and 1943, the strong position of CSR supported in effect 
by government and the Fijian chiefs, contrasted with the disunity of 
farmers. And once again, a strike by Indian cane growers was defeated. 
The dispute was followed by the appointment of an inquiry to 
report on tlie organization of tlic industry, and to recommend liow relations 
between all those engaged in it could be improved and how proceeds could 
be distributed in a fair and equitable way. Wlien the need for a commission 
had been first discussed with government in early 1960, CSR had urged 
that the inquiry be headed by an economist who would be qualified to 
estimate future costs and profits rather than an accountant who by train-
ing could judge only past results. The company suggested Professor E.H. 
Phelps Brown and J.R. Hicks, academics of high repute who were thought 
7 8 likely to be sympathetic to its case. It seems that CSR's proposals 
were welcomed by the Fiji government, but that the Colonial Office was 
79 
embarrassed by the forwardness of the company in suggesting names. 
Officials wanted an inquiry which would not greatly damage CSR's interests, 
but which would have the appearance of fairness - which might even decide 
against the company on matters of relative detail, like the value of 
molasses credited to the proceeds of sugar and the appointment of a sugar 
board. A change in the ownership of the mills, on co-operative lines as 
suggested by the Patel group or through nationalization, was out of the 
question because of the cost of reimbursing CSR®° and also, one suspects, 
because government found it convenient to keep the company as a buffer 
77 'Brief on dispute in sugar industry', op. cit. 
78 H.O. to Nausori, 30 March 1960, Nausori Private Out, 1958-60, 
CSR mfm 697. 
79 H.O. to Nausori, 6 May 1960, Nausori Private Out, 1958-60, 
CSR mfm 697. 
80 'Brief on dispute in sugar industry', op. cit. 
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between the Indians and itself. In March 1961 one of CSR's senior officers, 
J.M. Dixon, had a discussion with Haddocks during which this very point 
was made: 
We discussed our desire to stay in Fiji and what the balance 
of power position would be if we had to wltlidraw. . . including 
threat of communism, Indian domination, little Cubas and 
Congos etc. I said we were a power block that many people 
had an interest in sustaining, and we did not mind absorbing 
some of the shocks tliat would come from both sides in such a 
situation, but there were limits to what we could sustain, 
and we needed help and support. 81 
Basically, government needed a commission whose report would enable CSR 
to continue in the colony, but which by having the appearance of impartial-
ity would be accepted by the growers. The appointment of someone suggested 
by the company might defeat the second of the two aims. 
The Colonial Office asked Sir Malcolm Trustam Eve, later Lord 
Silsoe, to head the inquiry. It is hard to imagine a person more 
representative of the English 'establishment' than Eve. He was a Queen's 
Counsel, the First Church Estates Commissioner of the Church of England, 
a member of the Prime Minister's Committee on the administration of Crown 
lands, 1955, the Independent Chairman of the Cement Makers' Federation, 
82 
a director of the Yorkshire Insurance Co. Ltd, and so on. In the recent 
Windscale inquiry into the development of a nuclear reprocessing plant in 
Britain, Lord Silsoe was leading counsel for British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. 
Eve pointed out to CSR that just before coming to the colony he had had 
to defend the Cement Makers' Federation, which was a monopoly, before the 
Monopolies Commission, and that the Federation had revalued its assets 83 
just before proceedings started. Significantly, the revaluation of its 
assets by CSR, which also was a monopoly, and the effect of this on 
apparent profitability was expected to be a major issue during the forth-
coming inquiry in Fiji. Further, Eve gave CSR to understand that the 
company itself was not on trial - a point with which most growers would 
have disagreed - and that his task was simply to 'remove the bees from 
the bonnets'. The inquiry was to be a public relations exercise designed 
81 Dixon to Vernon, 3 March 1961, CSR U 3.0/3/-. 
82 Vho's Who 1960. 
83 Dixon to Vernon, 3 March 1961. 
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to improve relations between the growers and CSR.®^ Apart from J.S. 
^-Jheatley from the Colonial Office, Eve was assisted by an accountant, J.M. 
Bennett, who was a partner in the London firm of Barton, Mayhew and Co. 
When Bennett's appointment was made, it was not realized in the Colonial 
Office that he was also a partner in the Australian offshoot of Barton, 
Mayhew and Co., and that among his other partners in that firm were some 
of the partners in Hungerford, Spooner and Kirkhope which was advising 
CSR on material to be presented to the Eve Commission. As soon as this 
was discovered there was great consternation in the Colonial Office, as 
also in the companies concerned, but by then it was too late to revoke 
85 
the appointment. In fact, Bennett's professional association with CSR 
was so indirect that it seems not to have affected his attitude to the 
evidence presented by the company. Had the association become public 
knowledge, though, it would have undermined official arguments that the 
commission was impartial, and so a special effort was made in Fiji to 
keep the information secret. One can imagine the reaction of Indians to 
the inquiry had these efforts failed. Like Eve, Bennett saw the commiss-
ion's role as one of reconciling growers to CSR by persuading the company 
to grant those demands which would not greatly reduce its profits. He 
'nodded vigorously' when told privately by Dixon that whatever happened ,86 
the result of the inquiry must not be to let Patel come out on top 
though this was the eventual result. However impartial they tried to be, 
then, the natural inclination of Eve and Bennett would be to favour CSR. 
And this they did. 
Q -J 
The Eve Report 
The commission proposed ways of consolidating the smallfarm system, hoping 
that this would benefit farmers but also realizing, no doubt, that by 
reducing discontent among growers this would reinforce CSR's position in 
the colony. It recommended that smaller holdings should be gradually 
84 Chief Manager, Fiji to H.O., tel., 3 Feb. 1961, CSR U 3.0/3/-. 
85 Mutton to Bennett, 6 Jan. 1961; Bennett to Mutton, 18 Jan. 
1961, CSR U 3.0/3/-. 
86 Dixon to Vernon, 3 March 1961, op. cit. 
87 'Report of the Fiji Sugar Inquiry Commission', C.P. 20/1961. 
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reorganized into farms of ten to twelve acres, while the amalgamation of 
ten to twelve acre units should be stopped by preventing a grower from 
cultivating cane on more than one farm. Stabilizing the size of holdings 
should enable them to serve their original purpose of supporting a grower 
and his family. It was not for the sugar industry to solve the difficult-
ies caused by population pressure, though there was room for a diversifi-
cation of crops in cane districts which might help. As the commission 
noted, 'There is little mixed farming and every expert says there should 
be more.' It was suggested that sugar lands be planned, graded and 
licensed by government so as to remove least fertile areas from tlie 
industry. This would reduce demands from those on marginal land for an 
increase in the price of cane. Then there was the question of land tenure. 
The commission recommended that if CSR decided to sell its freeholds, they 
should not be sold to the occupants lest growers pledge their farms as 
security against debt. Land would be accumulated by creditors, who would 
be likely to sub-let to farmers on highly unfavourable terms. The need 
for security of tenure was emphasized. Instead of leases being for fixed 
terms which must eventually end, the English system of annual tenancies 
was commended since it gave strong statutory protection for rent and 
tenure to the normally good farmer throughout his life. 
This last recommendation, though, was rejected by government 
because Fijians would have opposed any arrangement which did not give 
them an automatic right to resume land after a fixed period, while annual 
leases would not have met Indian demands for security of tenure. So also, 
after some discussion, was rejected the idea of planning, grading and 
licensing cane lands, presumably because this would have threatened the 
livelihoods of growers on marginal soil.^® Enough insecurity had been 
caused among Indians by the system of land tenure: the last thing anyone 
wanted was for this to be increased as a result of the programme suggested 
by Eve. The plan to stabilise the size of holdings was partly implemented 
Up to 1973 new entrants were admitted to the industry only if they had 
cane growing contracts of between ten and fifteen acres; control was 
88 Growers were especially opposed to the planning, grading and_ 
licensing proposals. Minutes of Sugar Advisory Council meeting, 
27 April 1964. 
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subsequently relaxed to encourage an increase in cane production.^^ CSR 
also began to experiment with crops that might be grown with cane, hoping 
that this would make control over cane production more acceptable to 
farmers. Land made idle because of output restrictions might be able to 
support another crop. Yet the urgency with which CSR tackled the question 
declined nfter it bccnme clear in tlie earjy 1960s, wlicn ISA quotas wore 
suspended, that restrictions were no longer needed. 
There were more direct benefits to the company from other 
recommendations. The commission strongly advised against the introduction 
of co-operative mills. It endorsed tlie idea being considered by CSR of 
transferring the company's Fiji activities from the sugar division in 
Sydney to a wliolly owned subsidiary based in Suva or Lautoka. It suggested 
that eventually shares in the new company should be sold to Fiji residents, 
but not on a scale that would remove ultimate control from CSR. Following 
the commission's report, in 1962 the South Pacific Sugar Mills Ltd (SPSM) 
was formed with responsibility for all CSR's assets in Fiji except land. 
An attempt during the mid-1960s to sell shares in SPSM was not a success 
91 
because demand was small. Prospective buyers expected shares to yield 
seven and a half per cent, which was considerably less than could be 
earned by lending money to members of the Indian community, though of 
course risks were very different. The commission also recommended that 
the millers' power to prevent the delivery of burnt, stale or dirty cane 
be increased. Delivery of cane burnt without permission, or stale or 
dirty, was to be a breach of contract, punishable by loss of contract. 
There was to be a price reduction for burnt cane delivered two to seven 
89 In 1973 the minimum was increased to 15 acres because 10 acres 
was thought to be too small to support a farmer and his family. 
Since the end of 1975 there has been no minimum. Interview 
with B.J. Robertson, 8 Jan. 1976. 
90 Mill managers were divided as to whether it was CSR's responsi-
bility to encourage mixed farming. Potts was the most in favour, 
but thought it was the millers' responsibility only 'to a point'. 
'Report of the Fiji Sugar Inquiry Commission, Notes on Managers' 
Conference - Nausori. 14-16 Sept. 1961', Fiji Inspector, Corres. 
with General Manager 1952-62, CSR mfm 682. 
91 Only 2.2% of paid up capital was distributed as shares to Fiji 
residents after SPSM was converted to a public company in 1964: 
CSR had hoped that 40-50% of all shares would be held by people 
in Fiji. Transcripts of the Denning Arbitration Hearvngs, 755. 
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days after harvesting, all burnt; cane thereafter being rejected. As in 
the past, power would lie with the millers to determine what cane was fit 
for crushing. Despite opposition from growers, these recommendations were 
incorporated in the 1961-70 contract. 
The position of CSR was further strengthened by the commission's 
support of production control on a tonnage rather than acreage basis. It 
felt that tonnage quotas would be easier to enforce, noted that this was 
the practice of other sugar producers and pointed out that 'while growers 
are divided in their views both the millers and the mill workers strongly 
favour a tonnage system'; during the inquiry's public hearings in Fiji 
the Kisan Sangh and the Fijian growers had reluctantly agreed to tonnage 
quotas, while the Federation of Cane Growers had continued to argue for 
an acreage system. The commission proposed a national basic allotment of 
cane for the whole colony of 1,532,300 tons, to be divided among farmers 
according to past performance. This would give each grower his farm basic 
allotment. On or before 1 April each year the millers were to announce 
the national harvest quota of cane for the coming season, this being 
represented as a percentage of the national basic allotment. The announce-
ment was to be approved by a Sugar Board created for the purpose and 
composed of an Independent Chairman, Independent Vice-Chairman and 
Independent Accountant. After the announcement the national harvest quota 
was to be divided among growers according to their farm basic allotments. 
So if the national harvest quota was 25^1% above the national basic allot-
ment, as it was in 1961 under provisional arrangements agreed for that 
year, each farmer would be allowed to produce 25Ji% more cane than his farm 
basic allotment. Later in the year, say during harvesting when the size 
of the crop could be predicted more accurately, the national harvest quota 
could be varied so long as the Sugar Board gave consent; but the commission 
strongly advised against reducing the quota unless there were very except-
ional circumstances. This rather complicated procedure was designed to 
reconcile growers to a tonnage basis of control - the Sugar Board would 
be an independent check on the millers - and so help Fiji not to exceed 
her export quotas. But in 1961 the ISA quotas were lifted because of a 
world sugar shortage due to a fall in Cuba's production, with the result 
that the machinery devised by Eve was no longer required. Yet national 
harvest quotas each year have continued to be declared, largely so that if 
248 
production controls are again needed a well tried system will exist to 
enforce them. 
The conmiission also suggested ways to settle general disputes 
between the millers and the growers. In particular it recommended the 
appointment of a Sugar Advisory Council composed of the three members of 
the Sugar Board, two representatives of government, three representatives 
of the mill workers and five representatives each of the millers and the 
growers; farmers' representatives were to be elected by the gang sirdars. 
As a forum for discussion with power to advise - either government or the 
industry - on any matter of importance, the Council was reminiscent of 
the sugar board proposed by Shephard in 1944. Though it still opposed a 
92 
board of this kind, CSR's attitude had softened by the early 1960s since 
it recognized that continued strong resistance to such a body would only 
alienate the growers and government. The commission tried to accommodate 
the company's views. It rejected suggestions by the Patel group and the 
mill workers' union that a sugar board have power to impose a solution if 
93 
no voluntary agreement to a dispute could be reached. By going for an 
advisory council instead, the commission ensured that if, from CSR's view, 
the worst came to the worst the company would not be bound by the council's 
decisions. The Sugar Advisory Council was set up in 1961. It has met 
regularly ever since, and though there have been disagreements, apart 
from one meeting^^ discussions have been of a remarkably cordial nature. 
It has done much to improve relations in the industry. Coupled with other 
provisions in the Eve report for the settlement of disputes, this was one 
reason why disagreement over the terms of a new contract in 1969 did not 
lead to another strike. The interests of CSR were well served by the 
reduction of tension. There was less chance of production being disrupted 
by friction between the millers and the growers, though differences have 
continued to exist. 
The most important question before the commission was how to 
92 Eve Inquiry, 383-4. 
93 Ibid., 12-3; 20. 
94 On 25 September 1975, when some of the growers' representatives 
led by A.M. Koya withdrew. The meeting was called to discuss 
the Narborough report on proposed deductions to build up the 
price stabilization fund. 
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divide proceeds from the sale of raw sugar - an issue which has always 
been controversial. The commission was anxious to obtain, as far as it 
could, an accurate estimate of CSR's profits in Fiji. It knew that CSR, 
as any company, would try to minimise its returns so as to strengthen its 
case for a larger share of the proceeds. Yet the commission wanted to 
award growers the highest possible cane price consistent with reasonable 
profits for CSR. This would help reduce conflict in the industry and be 
to the long term advantage of the company. Tlie difficulty was to discover 
what profits CSR had made and whether they were reasonable. Growers 
alleged that the company had been making hidden profits in Fiji, notably 
from transfer pricing arrangements over the sale of molasses. Molasses 
was sold to CSR's Australian distilleries for conversion to industrial 
alcohol. By selling to itself the company could arrange the transfer at 
a price below that on the open market, so reducing the sum which had to 
be added to the proceeds of sugar sales for division with the growers. It 
was claimed that the value of West Indian molasses exports in 1959 were 
tF7 10s Od a ton, whereas the amount credited to Fiji under the 1950-59 
95 
contract had been only 22s 6d. While not doubting that CSR had acted 
in accord with the old contract, the commission recommended that the price 
of molasses be raised to £2 10s Od a ton, as offered by the company during 
the inquiry; but this was only half of what the farmers had demanded. 
Another question was the amount charged by CSR for depreciation. The 
company's practice was to charge four per cent on the original cost of 
fixed assets to cover both depreciation and a contribution to the cost of 
replacement. The argument centred on whether this was an excessive amount. 
Since it was treated as a cost, by maximising the charge for depreciation 
and replacement CSR could reduce its apparent profits. After persistent 
questioning in Sydney and some argument with the company, the commission 
decided that only three per cent should be charged to depreciation and 
the provision for replacement should be made after and not before arriving 
at profits. This was standard practice in the United Kingdom and best 
practice in Australia. During the inquiry CSR had been privately urged 
95 Eve Inquiry, 301-2. In 1952 CSR had estimated that the value of 
3000 tons of molasses from Nausori was worth £F21,375 at the 
distillery, but growers received only £2000. Carver, 'Memo to 
the General Manager. Nausori Mill', 10 April 1952, 'Inspectors' 
Memos, to the General Manager 1951-7', CSR mfm 254. 
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by its consultants, Hungerford, Spooner and Kirkhope, to adopt this course, 
and in Fiji it did so.^^ 
The matter of depreciation was connected with the revaluation in 
1957 of the company's fixed assets in Fiji, which growers rightly believed 
was designed to reduce its percentage returns on investment. During the 
public hearings, one of the colony's leading accountants who would later 
be the industry's Independent Accountant, R.S. Kay, appeared on behalf of 
the Kisan Sangh to argue against the revaluation. He pointed out that 
whereas three fifths of all the raw sugar produced by CSR came from its 
Australian mills, since 1957 these mills had represented only two flftlis 
of the capital tied up in the production of raws. If the Fiji mills had 
not been revalued, in 1959 they would have been worth about one sixth of 
the company's total assets and they would have contributed just over one 
sixth to the company's total profits. On figures presented to the comm-
ission, Kay estimated that if CSR had paid £5 a ton for molasses as the 
Kisan Sangh demanded in future it should, in 1959 the company could have 
afforded to pay 64% of the sugar proceeds to growers and charge to de-
preciation and replacement £560,000, the annual amount CSR thought would 
be necessary to cover replacement expenditure of £5,600,000 over the next 
ten years. Enough would have remained for CSR to make a profit before tax 
of about nine per cent on capital, assuming its assets had not been re-
valued. This was being generous to the company, since Kay felt that 
97 
£560,000 a year for depreciation and replacement was too high. The 
argument was rejected by the commission which accepted the principle of 
the revaluation, though it seems that Eve had some doubt as to the reliabil-
ity of the new values. He appears to have thought they were a good guide 
to replacement values, but that they were probably 'much too high' for 
depreciated present values. In other words, the figures showed what it 
would cost to replace the assets, but not what the assets were worth at 
96 A.R. Mutton told the company, 'I am obliged to repeat to C.S.R. 
that C.S.R.'s dep. and rep. concepts arc simply not acceptable 
to any school of accountancy thought. These schools range from 
dyed-in-the-wool historical cost to dyed-in-the-wool capital 
erosion of the Mutton type, with several schools in between. C.S.R. 
has set itself up as a special school which is not acceptable to 
any one of the other schools.' 'Note by A.R. Mutton , 6 Aprxl 
1961, CSR U 3.0/3/-. 
97 Eve Inquiry, 181-3; 327-30. 
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currcnt values after allowing for wear and tear. Yet as CSR's consultants 
privately admitted, it would have been extraordinarily difficult for Eve 
to reject the valuation on these grounds because he would then have been 
setting himself up as a better expert than the Brisbane firm, A.E. Axon 
98 
and Associates, which had done the work. Eve was not prepared to do 
this; nor did he have time to call for another valuation. 
On the basis of the revaluation, the commission judged that the 
1950-59 price formula gave CSR an unacceptably low return on investment. 
The company should be given a larger share of the proceeds. This conclusion 
was reached without making an independent survey of growers' costs. The 
commission had neither the time nor the resources to do this, and in any 
case seems not to have considered it very important. CSR was given the 
impression that the inquiry was more interested in the company's returns 
99 
than in the growers'. It was assumed that the industry s efficiency 
depended on CSR. Farmers would best be served by preventing the company 
from carrying out its veiled threat to wind down its operations in Fiji 
if the commission produced an unfavourable report. And after all, it 
was much easier for CSR to pull out of the industry than it was for the 
growers. If proceeds from cane were not enough to satisfy both parties, 
preference should be given to the millers. The commission devised a 
formula which favoured CSR. Instead of the company's proposal that before 
splitting the sugar proceeds a few costs like storage expenses be deducted, 
30% of net proceeds (gross proceeds less marketing and a few other 
expenses) were to be allocated to CSR to cover its 'basic sugar making 
costs'. The balance was to be divided, 8 25^ % to the growers and 17Jg% to 
the millers. It was suggested that approved sugar making costs be certi-
fied by the Independent Accountant each year. The formula contained 
incentives to reduce expenses, but also provided that if they should 
exceed 30% half the excess would be deducted from the growers' share and 
half from the millers'. This gave CSR some protection against a rise in 
costs, since its overall percentage of net proceeds would be increased. 
So, for example, if costs were 30% of net proceeds the company's share 
98 'Notes by A.R. Mutton', op. cit. 
99 Chief Manager, Fiji to H.O., tel., 3 Feb. 1961. 
100 'Aide Memoire for Chairman's first meeting with Sir Malcolm 
Eve', 5 April 1961, CSR U 3.0/3/-. 
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would be 42.25%, but if costs went up to 35% its share would rise to about 
44.3%. The price formula was widely misunderstood by farmers who thought 
it guaranteed CSR against loss. This was not strictly true. The company 
was protected to a large extent but not completely. The growers' basic 
share of 57.75% was closer to CSR's offer of 55.1% of net proceeds than 
2 
to the 64% requested by the Kisan Sangh and the 66 /3% of gross proceeds 
deiTianded by the Federation. It was also less than the average of 62.6% 
of gross proceeds farmers had received during the 1950-59 contract. More-
over, though the formula gave CSR some protection against rising costs, 
it provided no such protection for the growers. Understandably, many 
farmers felt aggrieved. 
The Eve inquiry had been an astute political exercise. Under 
the guise of impartiality, a report which was distinctly favourable to 
CSR had been produced. Despite opposition from leaders of the Federation, 
in early 1962 growers signed a new contract based on the commission's 
findings. Later there would be complaints that farmers had been forced 
to do this because there was no alternative.^^^ Growers were financially 
drained and thoroughly disheartened from the strike two years before, 
102 
which had cost them an estimated £850,000 to £900,000 in lost income 
(CSR had also suffered, making a loss on the 1960 season). They were in 
no mood to start industrial action again. The position of CSR, supported 
by government and the Fijians, seemed unassailable. The implementation 
of most of the Eve report was extremely important for the sugar industry. 
The method of production control, the Sugar Board and the Sugar Advisory 
Council still exist today. CSR's continued presence in the colony - for 
at least another ten years - was assured. 
Together with the Eve report, the company's efforts to keep its 
operations profitable brought certain benefits to Fiji. CSR was encouraged 
to increase milling capacity in the 1960s, and to use its exceptional 
marketing resources to secure for the colony access to the lucrative 
United States market, following the U.S. ban on imports of Cuban sugar. 
In 1961 the company's agent in Washington, Charles Brown, enlisted the 
101 The Award of the Rt. Eon. Lord Denning in the Fiji Sugar Cane 
Contract Dispute 1969, 4. 
102 'Report of the Fiji Sugar Inquiry Commission', 10. 
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support of Senator Hubert Humphrey, wlio told the Secretary of Agriculture 
that Fiji would purchase American wheat flour if it could sell 15,000 
short tons of raw sugar under the U.S. Sugar Act. 'This seems to make 
103 
sense. Wliat's being done about it?' In the event, Fiji was allocated 
a quota of 10,000 short tons, though this was subsequently raised. At 
the end of 1974 it stood at 51,820 sliort tons, so that as measured by the 
volume of sales that year the U.S. was Fiji's next most important market 
after Britain. ^ ' Yet thougli this enabled otlier people to enter the 
Industry the benefits were limited, for the colony's high propensity to 
import goods meant tliat there was .little spread eTfect in tlie economy from 
the higher earnings of the sugar industry. There was also some advantage 
from the localisat ion of staff which was continued by SPSM in the 1960s, 
and which reduced the outflow of income from the colony (in the form of 
savings). But against this was tliat SPSM relied heavily on administrative 
services from Sydney, the cost of which had to be met by Fiji. The exact 
size of the cost is not known, but it is likely to have been a significant 
proportion of the ten per cent of sugar making costs allowed under the 
Eve contract for 'head offices' expenses'. 
Offsetting the benefits from CSR's defence of its operations 
were some distinct disadvantages. For example, there was the reduction 
in the number of field staff which was continued by SPSM. Though one 
result was that growers became more independent of field officers, another 
was that the quality of extension work suffered. This may have been one 
reason for the trend toward multiple ratooning and poor fertilizer 
application which became apparent in the 1960s and depressed yields. And 
then, coming on top of the division of the industry between growers and 
the millers, CSR's desire to minimise expenditure made it refuse to assume 
responsibility for maintaining the drains. Drains which had begun to 
103 Hubert Humphrey to Orville Freeman, 12 June 1961, enc. with 
E.G. to Chief Manager Fiji, 1961-5, CSR mfm 697. 
104 Sugar Industry Ordinance, Annual Report for the 1974 Season, 10. 
105 The exact formula was 11^% of the certified costs of growers' 
services, cane transport, manufacture, sugar transport and 
storage, which was normally about 10% of 'sugar making costs'. 
106 In 1956 several growers contested the right of CSR to levy 
farmers for the cost of maintaining drains. They won their 
court case, and thereafter important drainage work virtually 
ceased. The government has recently taken up the problem. 
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silt up in the 1950s continued to do so, so that by the early 1970s this 
had become a rtiajor factor behind the fall in cane production which has 
recently been of such concern to those connected with the industry. Funds 
which might have been available for expenditure on drains if the mills had 
not been foreign owned were remitted abroad. The loss of this Income also 
deprived the colony of capital for use in a programme of public works 
designed to alleviate the problems of underemployment and growing unemploy-
ment. The need for many villages to have better communications with the 
outside world, better schools, housing and so on to encourage a higher 
rate of Fijian participation in the economy has l ) C o n stressed by Fisk.^*^^ 
The spread effects of this would benefit the Indian population as well. 
The size of the income CSR took out of Fiji as the result of its 
milling operations between 1 April 1950 and 31 March 1960 is shown, if 
only approximately, in Tables 8:8 and 8:9 below. Again no allowance has 
been made for the effects of transfer pricing arrangements. In particular, 
'head office' and 'general' expenses, at £352,654 for the year ended 31 
March 1960, seem to have been rather high; they had risen by 113% since 
108 
the 1955 season. The estimate for capital expenditure is liable to a 
significant margin of error. With these reservations, after operating 
costs, the payment of taxes and capital expenditure, the cash surplus from 
milling was probably around £3,037,397. If the cost of living index for 
Viti Levu except Suva is taken as a guide, and it is assumed that the 
annual rate of capital expenditure was constant and that all outgoings 
and receipts were paid at the end of the company's financial years when 
the price levels have been taken, at 1950 prices this was £2,451,325. 
Most of this was repatriated. So apart from 1960 when the strike distorted 
results and for which complete figures are not available, it is clear that 
in relation to CSR's capital expenditure and to the size of the economy 
the sums remitted were substantial. 
When related to the value of assets shown in the company's 
published reports (plus an allowance for working capital and stocks), 
figures in confidential profit and loss accounts indicate that from 1950 
107 Fisk, The Folitioal Eoonomy of Independent Fiji^ 64-6. 




Aggregate profit from CSR's sugar mills in Fi^i for 
years ended 31 March 1951 to 31 March 1960 (in IF) 
Sales of raw sugar^^^ 68,435,147 
Operating costs: 
Direct costs (purchase of cane, labour, etc.) 58,968,338 
Overhead costs(2) 2,069,962 61,038,300 
(3) 
Add miscellaneous profits from sale of molasses, etc. 
Cross profits Less charge for depreciation & replacement 
Net profit before tax 
Less income tax 








Sources: Mill profit and loss accounts. Chief Accountant, CSR 
Ltd, Sydney; Tables in CSR F 5.0/2 and CSR U 3.0/3. 
Notes: 
(1) Excludes income from the sale of stocks held on 31 March 
1950 but includes income from sale of stocks held on 31 
March 1960. Also excludes payments to the Price 
Stabilization Fund. 
(2) Includes hurricane and earthquake damage from 1952 to 
1955. 
(3) Seems also to have included profits from the CSR steam-
ship operating between Fiji and Australia. Excluded are 
profits from the rent of land, etc. 
(4) At 4% on the value of fixed assets, on a straight line 
basis. Assumed is that gains/losses from disposal of 
fixed assets are treated as capital transactions and are 
excluded from mill profit and loss accounts. 
to 1959 CSR's average annual return from its Fiji mills was about 7.5%. 
This compared with the maximum of 4.5% to 6.0% charged on overdrafts by 
Australian trading b a n k s . E x p r e s s e d in this way, the profits do not 
seem particularly large, but this was partly because the revaluation of 
assets made returns from 1957 on look unrealistically small. As R.S. Kay 
had pointed out, if the assets were written down by the amount they had 




Estimated cash flow arising from Fiji sugar milling 
activities^ years ended 31 March 1951 
to 31 March 1960(^) (in IF) 
Net profit after tax 3,849,397 
Add back allowance for depreciation & 
replacement 2,488,000 
Total cash surplus 
Less estimated capital expenditure 
Flow of cash from Fiji 
6, 337 ,397 
3, 300 ,000 
3, 037 ,397 
Sources: Table 8:8; CSR Memo., 'Sugar in the Fiji Economy', 1959, 
CSR Library, 8. 
Notes: 
(1) Not all the cash flow would have occurred during this period, 
(2) Estimate is based on CSR's statement to Burns Commission 
that from January 1949 to early 1959 the company had spent 
£F3.3 million on replacing equipment and increasing the 
capacity of the mills. It is assumed that capital expenditure 
for the calendar years 1949-58 was the same as for the 
financial years ended 31 March 1951 to 31 March 1960. The 
margin of error entailed in the assumption is unlikely to be 
great. Annual trade reports show that from 1950 to 1959 the 
f.o.b. value of imports of rails and accessories, locomotives 
and parts, rolling stock and parts and milling equipment was 
£3,086,502. Of course this does not include all capital 
imports connected with sugar, nor does it cover the cost of 
installing equipment. On the other hand, the category 
'Milling machinery other than timber' in the trade reports 
seems to include machinery for rice as well as sugar milling. 
So an estimate for capital expenditure of £3.3m does not seem 
too unrealistic. 
been revalued, in relation to CSR's other activities earnings from the 
colony in 1959 had made a reasonable contribution to the profits of the 
company as a whole. Moreover, the closure of Nausori and other economy 
measures made it likely that CSR would continue to obtain satisfactory 
results, even without the Eve report. There was no need to have reduced 
the farmers' share of gross proceeds from sugar. Yet under the Eve 
contract CSR would continue to do well in Fiji, while growers would receive 
a smaller share of the proceeds. The interests of the company had 
triumphed over those of the farmer. 
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CIlAl'TER IX 
The Withdrawal of CSR 
IN 1973 CSR sold its sugar interests to the newly independent government 
of Fiji, so ending a period of over ninety years during which the company 
had played a major role in the colonial history of the country. It had 
dominated the economy, wielded immense political influence and done much 
to shape the evolution of Fiji-Indian society. The decision to withdraw 
was greeted with disbelief at first, for it was hard to visualise a Fiji 
without CSR. Then as people got used to the idea, some alleged that in 
fact the decision had been taken as early as the late 1950s when the end 
of British rule in the colony was in sight. It was suggested that rather 
than face the uncertainties of dealing with an independent government, CSR 
wanted if possible to dispose of its assets. The problem was to do this 
without loss of face, in a way that would enhance its reputation for 
concern about the social responsibilities of business. The company had 
to await the right moment, and this finally came in 1970 with the findings 
of an arbitrator, the Rt. Hon. Lord Denning, into a dispute between SPSM 
and growers about the terms of a new contract. The award was so generous 
to farmers that CSR could argue - quite plausibly - that if it remained 
in Fiji it would make a loss. So, it has been said, the stage was set for 
the company to announce the withdrawal it had planned for the past ten 
years.^ The argument, however, does not fit the facts. Between 1961 and 
1969 SPSM invested about seven million pounds in the colony. Most of this 
was to replace assets, but a considerable amount was also used to increase 
milling capacity. Following the lifting of ISA quotas, the colony's 
exports rose from 220,000 tons of sugar in 1962 to a record 3A3,000 tons 
1 This point was made to me by several people in Fiji. 
2 Schedule 1, Documents submitted by SPSM (to the Denning arbi-
tration commission), vol. 4, CSR Library. In 1968 Fiji's 
currency was changed from denomination in £s to $s, the conversion 
rate being £1 = $2. In this chapter, when figures relate to the 
period before 1968 they will be expressed in £s, and when they 
relate to the years after 1968 (or to both periods) they will be 
expressed in $s with the old currency equivalent in parentheses. 
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3 
in 1968, This hardly suggests that CSR wanted to leave. Moreover, it 
is clear from correspondence that senior officers who prepared the company's 
case for the Denning inquiry were determined to convince the commission to 
make an award which would enable CSR to stay in Fiji."^ For the truth was 
that under the Eve contract SPSM had done very well, and if it could 
secure a new contract on similar lines CSR had no intention of withdrawing. 
Discontent among fanners 
The real problem f or the company was that a large section of the growers, 
represented by tlic Federation, remained utterly opposed to the Eve contract. 
This was not surprising, for during the 1960s there was little sustained 
improvement in the economic position of farmers. It is clear from data 
in the previous chapter that up to 1966 underemployment in cane areas 
increased, and this probably continued through the rest of the decade. The 
report of the 1976 census is not yet available,^ but in 1971 the Inter-
national Labour Office predicted that between 1965 and 1975 the labour 
force in Fiji would grow by an average of at least 5000 persons a year. 
It is unlikely that more than half found jobs in the late 1960s. The 
expansion of employment opportunities was greatest in the public sector, 
in service industries and in building and related industries. Yet between 
1966 and 1972 the number engaged in these activities rose by an annual 
average of only 1,881,*^ making it almost certain that not enough jobs were 
being created to absorb the underemployed in cane districts. If anything. 
3 SPSM, Annual Report for 1961; SPSM Ltd, Annual Report for the 
year ended 31 March 1969. The figures are for calendar years, 
not seasons, 
4 They seem to have been especially pleased when told confidentially 
by Mr Birch, Australian Commissioner in Fiji, that independence 
might lead to closer relations between Fiji and Australia. 'Mr 
Birch at one stage remarked that the Australian Government can 
hardly become involved in Fiji, in any substantial way, so long 
as Mother (the U.K,) remains here.' Managing Director at Lautoka 
to General Manager, Fiji Division, 11 Sept. 1969, 'Private corres. 
during the course of the Denning Arbitration, Aug/Sept. 1969 , 
Sugar Division, CSR Ltd, Sydney. 
5 Due to be published in August 1978. 
6 A.V. Desai, 'The unemployment problem in Fiji', Economic Bulletin 
for Asia & Far East, 24 (1973), 30, 35. 
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iindcreinploymont goL worse. Mcanwliilc, populaLion continued to grow despite 
a reduction in the crude birth rate among Indians from 43.75 births per 
1000 persons in 1960 to 30.47 ten years later.^ 
To some degree the problem was eased by the higher yields of cane 
obtained since the mid-1950s, which lifted the annual average income of 
growers from about £381 between 1950 and 1960 to around £543 over the 
following nine years. The increase, of course, would have been greater 
still if tliere had been a larger rise in the price of cane. In fact, the 
average price from 1961 to 1969 was only 2s 2d a ton more than the average 
price of 68s from 1950 to 1960. if the very exceptional :1963 price of 
98s is excluded, the average was actually Is 4d below tliat paid under the 
g 
previous contract. With an increase in the cost of living over the period 
of almost 30%, in real terms the difference was even greater.^ So it was 
easy to blame Eve for not allowing growers to realize the full benefits 
of higher yields. More significant was that as a result of low sugar 
prices and poor weather conditions, there was a steady fall in average 
real farm incomes between 1963 and 1968 (see Table 9:1 below). Though 
real earnings subsequently recovered they did not reach their 1962 and 
1963 levels, so that except for 1963 there was virtually no improvement 
in real incomes from cane over the period 1962 to 1969 as a whole.^^ Yet 
the average real wage of agricultural workers had risen from about 12s 7d 
a day to 13s lOd, an increase of just under ten per cent. Real wage rates 
overall had gone up by an average of about nine per cent.^^ Consequently, 
7 Reasons for the fall in the birth rate are discussed by Norma 
McArthur, 'Fertility and Marriage in Fiji', Evman Biology in 
Oceania, 1 (1971), 10-22. See also Tarence and Valerie Hull, 
'Fiji: A study in Ethnic Plurality and Family Planning', in 
T.E. Smith (ed.). The Politics of Family Planning in the Third 
World, 168-216. 
8 FSC Ltd, 'Industrial Statistics Summary', Tables 23 & 61. Sugar 
from the 1961 season was sold under the terms of the Eve contract, 
9 Of course, changes in the retail price index is not an accurate 
reflection of changes in farm costs. 
10 1961, when earnings were particularly low, is excluded because 
results were distorted by the depressive effect on yields of 
the 1960 strike, during which farms were neglected, some ratoons 
ploughed in and significant areas of cane left standing for 
harvesting the next year. 
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Source: FSC Ltd, 'Industrial Statistics Summary', Tables 19(c), 
23, 55, 61. 
by the end of the decade not only did farmers still have the problem of 
supporting a growing population, but since 1963 in real terms their gross 
receipts from cane had declined in relation to the incomes of wage earners. 
Efforts were made by government to reduce the discontent of 
farmers. The object was not simply to prevent another strike: it was 
also to maintain political stability as the colony prepared for independ-
ence, which came in 1970. Two areas of major concern to growers were 
12 
tackled, and the first was land tenure. Officials were greatly perturbed 
by the widespread insecurity among Indians caused by the declaration of 
reserves, yet they knew that any solution to the problem of land tenure 
must be accepted by the Fijians. Political stability, which was a pre-
requisite for economic development, depended as it always had on government 
retaining the support of the Fijian chiefs. This ruled out CSR's preferred 
solution which was for the Crown to take over all native leases in cane 13 areas and lease them to growers on secure terms. The company would have 
12 
13 
This section is based on my article, 'Land tenure in Fiji's 
sugar cane districts since the 1920s', Journal of Pacific 
History 3 forthcoming. 
Interview with J.C. Potts, 9 Sept. 1977. In 1966 SPSM asked 
government to do this, but by then the Agricultural Landlord 
and Tenant Ordinance had been drafted. 
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gained by an increase in the general contentment of farmers, but its long 
term interests Vsrould have suffered from the political instability caused 
by Fijian resentment at such a move. What was needed was a compromise. 
The Burns Commission, appointed in 1959 'to recommend how the development 
of the Colony and its resources should proceed', suggested that to remove 
Indian fears of displacement reserves should be declared as soon as 
possible. The length of the normal agricultural lease should be increased 
from thirty to sixty years, wliile leases for tree crops should be for 
ninety-nine years; rents should be revised regularly. 
Following the Burns Report, the NLTB hastened tlie declaration of 
reserves and decided in general to forego its right under the NLTO to 
declare additional reserves as new needs of the Fijian owners arose. 
Instead, to meet its obligations as a trust by ensuring that sufficient 
land was available for the rapidly growing Fijian population, the Board 
decided to act under Section Nine of the Ordinance which empowered it not 
to issue new leases or renew old ones if the land was likely 'to be 
required by the Fijian owners for their use, maintenance or support'.^^ 
The focus of Indian attention accordingly switched from land going into 
reserves to security of tenure for land lying outside. Throughout the 
1950s tenants had been concerned about the terms of their leases even 
though this had been overshadowed by the question of reserves, but once 
it was realized that the NLTB planned to rely on Section Nine where 
necessary, though the problem of reserves remained,^^ the length of leases 
became the overriding issue. It became clear that, contrary to hopes 
expressed in 1940, reserves would not necessarily ensure security of 
tenure on unreserved land. A number of leases were due to expire in the 
1960s, and the new policy of the NLTB raised very acutely the question of 
whether they would be renewed. 
After consideration of the Burns Report, government appointed in 
14 Burns et al., 'Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the 
Natural Resources and Population Trends of the Colony of Fiji 
1959', C.P. 1/1960, ch. 6. 
15 Report of the Native Land Trust Board for the year 1963. 
16 In 1969 the NLTB estimated that five per cent of all Indian-owned 
leases were on reserved land and could not be renewed when they 
expired. Confidential appendix. 
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196.1 nil AcriculLiiral Lnntllurd and TcMianL CoimuLLI.ec Lo advise on what new 
legislation was needed. The Committee discussed the recommendation of the 
Burns Commission that the length of new leases be for sixty or ninety-nine 
years - a proposal accepted by government in 1960 and supported in principle 
by tlic NLTB provided the land was not required for the support of its 
owners. Tlie problem was tliat the disadvantage of a termination date, 
however far off, would still remain. To overcome this, the Committee 
suggested that agricultural leases should normally be for thirty-year 
terms, with ten years as a statutory minimum. But they should also carry 
the auloinaLlc rjght of renownl unlc.ss, if llic .land was needed l)y Lhe owner 
for his ovm use, greater hardship would result if the lease was renewed 
than if it was not, or unless there were grounds relating to the quality 
of husbandry, the needs of good estate management, etc. Tenants would 
have the right of appeal against decisions not to renew. These conditions, 
though, were to apply only to new leases and not to existing ones.^^ 
The Committee reported in 1962. Despite dissatisfaction with 
some points, notably the recommendation that tribunals be appointed to 
arbitrate in disputes arising from the issue of non-renewal notices, its 
18 
report was accepted in principle by the NLTB. Since the recommendations 
were to apply merely to new leases, the Board would be left with ample 
opportunity to protect the interests of landowners as existing leases 
expired. An example of the need to do this occurred in 1963 when land-
owners at Koronubu, Ba, asked for the additional reservation of large 
areas lying outside reserves declared in the 1950s. The Board decided 
that its policy of demarcating no new reserves, but applying Section Nine 
of NLTO instead, should stand. Two leases - Koronubu and Veisaru -
totalling about 5000 acres and held by CSR which had sublet to Indian 
growers, were due to expire at the end of 1965. In co-operation with 
SPSM, the NLTB decided to reparcel the irregular holdings of existing 
tenants so as to make room for 187 members of the landowning units who 
wanted to grow cane themselves. Great care was taken to minimise the 
number of Indian growers who would have to be displaced. In the event 
about 77 of the 287 original tenants could not be accommodated on Koronubu/ 
17 'Report of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Committee, 
1961' , C.P. 30/1962. 
18 Confidential appendix. 
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Vclsaru Llioucli alLcrnaLivc, albclL Jnfcrjor, land was foniid for thcm.^^ 
Despite the care that was taken (according to the NLTB), the Koronubu/ 
Veisaru scheme aroused intense Indian mistrust. This was virtually the 
first application of the NLTB's decision to use Section Nine where 
necessary. A feeling of insecurity spread Lhrougliout tlie Indian community 
as tenants wondered how many more cases like Koronubu/Veisaru lay in the 
future, how many more Indian growers would lose their farms. 
Faced with this feeling, and concerned lest it be expressed in 
political or industrial agitation, government concluded that the report 
of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Commit Lee did not go far cnougli. 
Its recommendations should be made applicable to existing as well as new 
leases. Accordingly, in 1966 the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Ordi-
nance (ALTO) was introduced and hastily pushed through the Legislative 
20 
Council. Its main effect was to override Section Nine of the NLTO by 
giving tenants the right to two ten-year extensions of their lease, unless 
the owner could prove before a tribunal greater hardship if the lease was 
renewed than the tenant would suffer if it was not. Compensation for 
unexhausted improvements made in accordance with the Ordinance had to be 
paid on the reversion of a lease. As a concession to landowners, the NLTB 
was entitled to reassess rents every five years. ALTO was designed to 
provide greater security for lessees who, it was hoped, could look forward 
to an effective fifty year term - thirty years plus two ten-year 
extensions. But this increased security was not to be at the expense of 
owners who genuinely needed the land for their own use. Government thought 
that the Ordinance, which came into effect on 29 December 1967, would 
provide an acceptable compromise to the seemingly intractable problem of 
land tenure in Fiji. 
But government was wrong. Fijians resented the Ordinance because 
they found it extremely difficult to prove greater hardship. Indians 
disliked it because the NLTB, which had not been consulted about ALTO, 
reacted to the legislation by reducing the length of new leases on cane 
21 land from thirty to ten years. The Board argued that if thirty-year 
19 Annual Reports of the NLTB for the years 1963-1965. 
20 Ordinance 23 of 1966. 
21 Annual Report of the NLTB for the year 1966. 
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terms were granted and tenants managed to obtain two ten-year extensions, 
it would be fifty years before a lease could revert to its owner. ALTO 
stipulated that the minimum length of new leases should be ten years. If 
two extensions were then given, the total length of the lease would remain 
as before - thirty years. This defeated the main object of ALTO - to 
give tenants greater security of tenure. Indeed, tenants now had less 
security than before ALTO was introduced. As existing leases expired, 
instead of being able to hope for new ones of thirty years, tenants could 
anticipate terms of only ten years, while under the hardship clause there 
was no guarantee they would get the first, let alone a second extension. 
They also had to face the prospect of rent revisions every five years. 
Rents for some of the older leases had never been reassessed and had 
remained at ridiculously low levels. New rents, fixed at a maximum of 
six per cent of the Fair Market Value of the land, often represented a 
substantial increase on the previous rent. On one lease - admittedly 
? 9 unusual - rent was raised in one jump from £42 7s 6d to £504 2s Od a year. 
2 3 It was not surprising that Indians were very critical of the new law. 
Government was also concerned about the indebtedness of cane 
growers. Following a visit to Fiji by B.J. Surridge, an Adviser on co-
operatives in the Colonial Office, a survey of the problem was conducted 
in 1961. From interviews with 533 farmers, Shardha Nand found that on 
average they were indebted to the tune of 67.1% of their gross annual 
farm incomes; the percentage was higher if he excluded the 14.8% of 
24 
growers who were also lenders. Commenting on the survey, V.D. Stace of 
the South Pacific Commission told the Registrar of Co-operatives, F.E.M. 
Warner, 
I cannot help wondering whether hopeless indebtedness of a 
peasant farming community could be an important factor in 
turning natural 'conservatives' into willing 'revolutionaries' 
when provocation occurs as it did in Fiji during the campaign 
[in 1960] against the CSR Company. 25 
22 Confidential appendix. 
23 In 1976 ALTO was amended with the result that Indians have 
security of tenure till virtually the end of the century. 
24 Department of Cooperative Societies, Indian Credit Survey in 
Fiji, (1961), 8. 
25 Confidential appendix. 
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The desire to maintain stability in the sugar industry was a major reason 
for official interest in Indian indebtedness. It was thought that if 
money-lenders and storekeepers could be replaced by a cheaper source of 
credit the real incomes of growers would rise, so increasing their sense 
of well-being. 
The long term objective of the Co-operatives Department was to 
introduce a Debtors Relief Ordinance on the lines of legislation in Cyprus, 
This would involve the creation of a Debt Settlement Tribunal to decide 
the amounts owed by each debtor and to recommend the period over which 
debts be repaid. The Tribunal would be able to arrange for a fixed per-
centage of a grower's proceeds to be spent on farm and household require-
ments, the balance accruing to his creditors. Farmers would then have a 
procedure by which to escape from high cost debts. Yet before doing this, 
an alternative and cheaper supply of credit had to be made available to 
2 6 
prevent farmers again turning to traditional sources. So in the early 
1960s co-operative credit societies were formed to encourage thrift among 
their members and to make advances to those who had saved. At first 
members had unlimited liability and were expected to build up savings by 
regular monthly 'recurring' deposits, but this was hopeless for cane 
growers who were paid in three or four instalments at widely spaced 
intervals during the year. Instead, the Department encouraged credit 
societies of limited liability with savings based on shares rather than 
deposits. In 1968 legislation was passed to encourage farmers to make 
regular assignments of up to £20 a year for the purchase of shares. 
Except for sums owed to government or a landlord for rent, these assign-
ments were to have priority over any other securities which might have 
existed at the time of making the assignment. By 1969, 129 credit 
societies had been formed with 1,500 members, and at their apex had been 
established the Agricultural Credit Co-operative Association Ltd (ACCA). 
Beside supervising the societies, the ACCA was to obtain funds from 
outside institutions and on-lend to the co-operatives, using as security 
part of their members' assignments. However, credit societies alone were 
not enough. The provision of cheap credit had to go hand in hand with 
the provision of cheap goods, otherwise its benefits would be wasted. 
26 Ibid. 
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Consequently, in Lhc late 1960s the formation of consumer co-operatives 
was encouraged, the idea being that they would sell goods on credit 
advanced from the ACCA. It was expected that prices would be lower than 
at other retailers because credit would be cheaper. Profits would be 
distributed among members, who would also belong to credit societies.^^ 
In 1969 Vijay R. Singh, Minister of Commerce, Industries and 
Co-operatives, proposed a major assault on Indian indebtedness. As a 
member of the Alliance Party, which sought to win Indian support through 
the Kisan Sangh, it was natural that he should take up the question; for 
years the Kisan Sangh had blamed Gujerati storekeepers for the financial 
plight of growers. Singh proposed that the capital available to the ACCA 
be increased by transferring the assets of the Sugar Price Stabilization 
Fund Board, which had accumulated since 1947 and had never been used for 
their original purpose of stabilizing the price of sugar. Though after 
1962 part of the fund had been distributed in the form of capital grants 
to farmers and CSR, at the end of 1968 the Board's assets totalled 
28 
£3,242,473. At the same time as these assets were transferred to the 
ACCA, Debtors Relief legislation would be introduced to help growers repay 
their existing debts. Singh argued that low incomes between 1963 and 
1968 had forced growers to reduce their expenditure. Now, with the price 
of sugar rising, the price of cane would go up too. If they could be 
persuaded to limit their outgoings to levels in the mid-1960s, farmers 
would be able to liquidate their debts with relative ease. They could 
then turn to an expanded ACCA for cheaper credit and to consumer co-29 operatives for goods. In November 1969 the Council of Ministers 
30 
authorized Singh to approach the Secretary of State on these lines, but 
before discussions could reach an advanced stage the report of the 
Denning arbitration was published and accepted. It contained a recommend-
ation that the Sugar Price Stabilization Fund be used to stabilize the 
27 'Co-operatives Department, Report for two years 1969 and 1970', 
P.P. 5/1973. 
28 Sugar Price Stabilization Fund Board, Ninth Annual Report For 
The Year Ended 31st December 1968. 
29 Confidential appendix. 
30 Ibid. 
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31 prifp or (•.inc. WiCl, Lliis source of fin.inco no lonr.or nv/i i .1 .•,!> 1 o, Sinj-li's 
plan for dealing with Indian indebtedness was dropped. 
It is most unlikely that the scheme would have succeeded. The 
parochialism of credit societies was a big problem. They often wanted 
to use assignments for their own purposes rather than make tliem over to 
the ACCA. More important was the tlireat posed to vested interests. Store-
keepers and the like, who were well qualified from tlielr business experience 
to assume positions of leadership in the co-operative movement, were those 
who would suffer most if the movement succeeded. Their lack of involvement 
meant tliat co-operatives were hamstrung by a sliortage of good leaders, 
and were often badly managed. The failure of many credit societies was 
32 
attributed to poor leadership as much as to anything. In addition, 
there were cases - it is difficult to know how many - of storekeepers 33 
threatening to foreclose on debts if their clients joined co-operatives. 
Even if there was ho overt threat, heavily indebted farmers were unlikely 
to risk antagonising their creditors. The major problem, though, was 
that credit and consumer societies did not meet the needs of 'financially 
inefficient' farmers - those who were least able to convert the financial 
resources available to them (mainly from cane) into a cash surplus at the 
end of the year; they were normally growers whose annual receipts were 
34 low. There is some evidence that high income farmers tended to belong 
35 
to credit co-operatives, whereas those on low incomes did not. The real 
problem was not so much to increase the supply of credit which was already 
quite plentiful, as to improve the credit-worthiness of the financially 
inefficient farmer. A reduction in the cost of his credit would increase 
his cash surplus at the end of the year. In 1970 Barry Shaw found, not 
surprisingly, that the cost of credit to the financially efficient grower 
was considerably lower than for the one who was less efficient and there-
31 The Award of The Rt. Hon. Lord Denning in the Fiji Sugar Cane 
Contract Dispute, 1969 (hereinafter Denning Award), 33-4. 
32 Confidential appendix. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Barry D. Shaw, 'Rural credit for seasonal cash crops: Indian 
cane farmers in Fiji', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (ANU, 1973), 286-90. 
35 Ibid., 186-8. 
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fore less able to repay. Thus the financially inefficient farmer was faced 
with the rather vicious circle whereby the expense of borrowing reduced 
his annual cash surplus from cane, which reduced his credit-worthiness 
still further, so increasing the cost of credit for the following year, 
3 6 
reducing liis annual cash surplus and so on. Sliaw suggested ways to 
minimise the expenditure of such persons so as to increase their surplus. 
They should be encouraged, for example, to grow more food instead of 37 relying on purchases at the market or the store. lie might also liave 
added, as growers have often argued, that an increase in the real price 
38 
of cane would l)e likely to heJp farmers lieavily in debt. The point, of 
course, is that by concentrating on the supply of credit the Co-operatives 
Department was ignoring the main problem, which was the price paid for 
cane. 
By the late 1960s, then, government efforts to appease growers 
by tackling the questions of land tenure and indebtedness had failed. And 
since 1963 there had been little overall improvement, if any, in the 
economic position of farmers. So as negotiations began for a new contract 
to run from 1970 to 1979, it seemed that once again there might be a 
confrontation between the growers and the millers. 
The withdrcodal of CSR 
Yet though eager as ever to win concessions for their members, union 
leaders were reluctant to call a strike. Perhaps one reason for this was 
the failure of past stoppages. Growers had won virtually nothing from 
their actions in 1943 and 1960. A.D. Patel had been involved on both 
occasions, and it is possible that this influenced him in 1968-69. True, 
the adoption of a relatively extreme position in the past had advanced 
his political career, but the situation in the late 1960s was different. 
Patel was now a mature, well established politician, and widely respected. 
The Federation Party, headed by him and based on the Federation of Cane 
36 Ibid., 293. 
37 Ibid., 310-11. 
38 This point was made on several occasions during the public 
hearings held by Lord Denning in 1969. See Transcripts of the 
Denning Arbitration Hearings. 
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Growers minus the Kisan Sangh and the Fijian larmers, had won a victory in 
the 1968 by-elections for nine Indian communal seats. It had won all the 
seats against its Alliance opponents with an increased share of the vote. 
With the party's ascendancy in the Indian community beyond doubt, there 
was little political mileage to be gained from a militant approach to 
negotiations for a new cane contract. Indeed, given its immediate political 
objectives such an approach would have been counter-productive. The 
Federation was campaigning for a rapid transfer of power with one man one 
vote on a common electoral role. Fearing Indian domination, many Fijians 
were opposed to early independence on any terms, while the overwhelming 
majority of them, as well as of Europeans, wanted the retention of the 
communal voting system. In three centres the outcome of the by-elections 
had led to mass meetings at which Fijians had called for the deportation 
of Indians and the use of violence to protect Fijian rights. In one area, 
twenty-one Fijians had been charged with rioting and assaulting Indians. 
If the Federation was to get independence soon and a common roll system, 
it needed to allay the fears of the Fijian and European communities. A 
39 strike in the sugar industry would have had the exact opposite effect. 
The Sugar Industry Ordinance of 1961, based on the Eve Report, 
had laid down a procedure for negotiating a new contract when the existing 
one expired. Accordingly, in 1968 discussions began under the auspices 
of the Sugar Advisory Council. The Kisan Sangh and the Federation sub-
mitted separate draft contracts which, though different in important 
respects, were mainly designed to increase growers' income from cane. 
The key question was the price. The Kisan Sangh suggested that gross 
proceeds from sugar be split 70%/30% in favour of the growers. The 
Federation came up with a more radical proposal - that farmers be guaran-
teed £5 a ton of cane with a bonus of 2s 6d for every £1 by which the 
average price of raw sugar (including molasses) exceeded £49; the average 
cane price from 1961 to 1969 had been £3 10s Talks continued into 
1969 but without much progress. Then in late March or early April the 
Independent Chairman, Mr Justice C.C. Marsack, was approached by two 
39 For an account of the 1968 by-elections see J.M. Anthony 'The 
1968 Fiji By-Elections', Journal of Pacific Hvstory, 4 (1969), 
132-5. 
40 'Comparison of contracts'. Documents submitted by SPSM, Vol. 1, 1-9. 
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rcpresenLatives of the growers quite separately and apparently without 
prior contact between them. They said that what worried farmers was the 
nature of the Eve price formula which seemed to guarantee the millers 
against loss but not the growers. If the formula could be reduced to 
simple terms, say a straight percentage split of the proceeds, and a few 
minor concessions be made on other points, it might be possible to produce 
a contract acceptable to farmers. Marsack urged SPSM to consider a per-
centage arrangement based on the results of the Eve formula since 1962, 
which had worked out at about 60% to the growers and 40% to the millers. 
Because of the growers' insistence that provision be made for the payment 
of their expenses, the split might have to be 'camouflaged' by giving the 
millers, say, 30% of the proceeds to cover their expenses, growers 30% 
to cover theirs', and dividing the rest 75% to farmers and 25% to SPSM. 
'The very positive individual opinions expressed by the two growers' 
41 representatives' convinced Marsack that this was an idea worth pursuing. 
The suggestion was rejected by SPSM which refused to make any 
major concessions during the negotiations. Apart from incentives to 
reduce costs built into the Eve contract, under the price formula an 
increase in certified sugar making costs above 30% of sugar proceeds was 
to be deducted equally from the millers' income and the growers', so 
giving the company some insurance against a rise in costs. The straight 
percentage split suggested by Marsack, however well disguised, would have 
removed this insurance at a time when its importance to the company was 
greater than ever. Labour costs had gone up considerably, from a daily 
42 
average of 19s 4d per employee in 1961 to 27s 7d in 1968. Only part 
of the increase was offset by an expansion of output which might other-/ Q 
wise have reduced unit costs. With the signing of a new International 
Sugar Agreement in 1968, there was no guarantee that another similar 
expansion would be possible in future. Yet it seemed likely that wages 
would continue to rise, especially if an independent government had to 
use higher wages to maintain political stability. Unit costs might 
escalate more sharply than ever before. In short, uncertainty about the 
41 Marsack to SPSM, 12 April 1969, records of the Sugar Advisory 
Council, Suva. 
42 'Industrial Statistics Summary', Tables 3(a)(i) and 5. 
43 Transcripts of the Denning Arbitration Hearings, 415. 
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future incrcasGcl the risks of operaLiu}; in Fiji, and the Eve formula 
provided a measure of security against these risks. 
The rigid stand of SPSM, acting on instructions from CSR, ruled 
out a negotiated settlement. The alternative was to go to arbitration, 
as provided for in the 1961 Ordinance. The result of arbitration would 
be considered a triumph for tlie growers. Tliis was because government did 
not keep control of the situation as it had in 1960-61. Instead of 
appointing a man like Eve, who could be relied upon to produce a report 
reasonably favourable to the company, the Rt. Hon. Lord Denning, Master 
of the Rolls, was asked to adjudicate. Now Denning's reputation is that 
of a judge who is more willing to create law, perhaps almost irrespective 
of precedent, than are many of his colleagues. In a collection of addresses 
delivered in 1954 and 1955, Denning criticised judges and advocates who 
were 'not concerned with the morality or justice of the law but only with 
the interpretation of it and its enforcement'. He pointed out: 
It is the lawyers who have made the law what it is. Most of 
our law, as they will tell you, is judge-made law. The rest 
of it is Statute law but that is drafted by lawyers and 
interpreted by lawyers, and, as often as not, it is in the 
lawyers' part of it that injustices occur. They cannot there-
fore escape their responsibility. The legal profession, by 
its exponents in days past or in days present, must account 
for every injustice done in the name of the law. Yet they do 
not let it trouble them over-much. 44 
Except for a few matters of detail, the sugar industry dispute did not 
entail questions of law. But Denning's inclination as a judge to give 
priority to justice over legal precedent made it likely that in drafting 
his award, he would not feel bound by the results of previous inquiries. 
If he felt it was unfair, he would be more willing, perhaps, than many 
other lawyers to abandon the Eve contract. 
And his understanding of what was just in the Fiji context was 
not likely to be sympathetic to CSR. In the same collection of addresses. 
Denning gave examples of the way that freedom of contract had come to be 
abused. 'The thing to notice in all these cases is that it is all a very 
one-sided affair. The companies impose terms which the customer has no 
opportunity of accepting or rejecting. He is bound whether he likes it 
44 Sir Alfred Denning, The Road to Justice, 1-2. 
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or not.''^^ DesplLc supcrfici;)! clirfercnccs - growers were suppliers ratlier 
than customers of SPSM - the examples were similar to the situation in Fiji, 
If growers wanted to sell cane, they had to accept the conditions laid 
down by SPSM; there was no other miller to whom they could turn. Denning 
also discussed freedom of association. Tliougli ho emphasized LhaL trade 
unions ought not to infringe fundamental rights of the individual, he said: 
If men are over to bo able to break the bonds of oppression 
or servitude, they must be free to meet and discuss their 
grievances and to work out in unison a plan of action to set 
things right... men must be able to form themselves into trade 
unions to protect their working conditions. 46 
Employers should also have the right of association, but this right was 
often abused. Denning liighlighted ways in which companies combine to 
manipulate prices to their advantage but not to that of the public. He 
was more severe in his criticism of such practices than of the public ill 
effects of trade union a c t i v i t i e s . S o it was clear that if Denning came 
to Fiji his sympathies would not automatically lie with CSR which had a 
monopoly of milling in the colony. His outlook was in stark contrast to 
Eve who, as chairman of the Cement Makers' Federation, was involved in a 
type of organization that Denning disliked. 
Why, then, was Denning selected? After all, his views were well 
known in legal circles, and under the Ordinance the appointment of an 
arbitrator was in the hands of the Chief Justice. Some have said that 
CSR engineered Denning's selection, knowing that he would be likely to 
decide against the company and so providing the long awaited chance to 
withdraw. The suggestion would have delighted Machiavelli, but is hard 
to square with the time and money SPSM spent on trying to persuade 
Denning to accept its case. What actually happened was that the Chief 
Justice offered growers a selection of names and A.D. Patel, in the belief 
48 
that Denning would be the most sympathetic to farmers, chose him. SPSM 
could hardly have opposed the choice, for what more prestigious person 
45 Ibid., 91. 
46 Ibid., 98-9. 
47 Ibid., 104-9. 
Interviews with Swami Rudrananda, 18 May 1976, and R.D. Patel, 
18 May 1976. 
48 
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was there Lo arbitrate than the Master of the Rolls? The decision to offer 
growers a choice, including Denning, was in some ways surprising, as the 
last thing officials wanted was that tlie award of the arbitrator should 
force CSR to leave the colony. Government was trying to promote economic 
development through the attraction of private capital;'^^ the departure of 
CSR would work in the exact opposite direction. Yet it seems that 
officials misjudged the position. They overrated the possibility of dis-
ruption in the industry, and in an attempt to prevent it by persuading 
growers to accept arbitration, decided to offer them a choice of names. 
It would be hard for growers to reject the award of their own nominee. 
But in doing this, and including Denning on the list, government took a 
risk. Though no one could have predicted it for sure, there was the 
possibility that Denning would side with the growers. In allowing this 
risk to be taken, government made a big political mistake. 
Perhaps officials hoped that the appointment of Mr Robert McNeil, 
former President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, as the account-
ant advising Denning would help prevent the judge from making an award 
which would be unacceptable to CSR. McNeil's role - or lack of it - may 
have been crucial, for Denning does not seem to have had time to examine 
in detail the extensive financial evidence presented by SPSM. After 
arriving in Fiji, Denning told advocates of the main parties to the 
dispute that he was in the colony during his holidays, and that he wanted 
to complete the hearings in about three weeks because he had to get back 
to London where work was piling up.^ *^  He left much of the detailed 
discussions on the company's financial statements to McNeil who produced 
two provisional reports, dated 11 and 13 September, while still in Fiji. 
The final report was to be prepared when he returned home. But within a 
month of leaving the colony, McNeil died. In his award Denning said of 
McNeil, 'Before his death he made a full report which has been of great 
value to me.'^^ Yet it is hard to know how McNeil could have had time to 
49 'Fiji's Sixth Development Plan, 1971-5', C.P. 25/1970. The-
plan was in preparation during 1969. 
50 'Notes prepared by Mr. Kermode following meeting with Lord 
Denning on Mon. 18 Aug., 1969', in 'Private corres. during the 
course of the Denning Arbitration, Aug./Sept. 1969 , op. cit. 
51 Denning Awards 2. 
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do this. Hcforc his departure lie told several people in Fiji that as soon 
as he reached Europe he had about one week's work to do in Brussels, 
followed by ' some days' work' in Sussex, after which he would be working 
for a fortnight on the continent. It was at the end of this fortnight 
52 
that he died. There was very little time for him to have produced a 
full, final report for Denning. 
The errors contained in the award, which were more numerous tlian 
one would expect from a judge of such standing, suggest that Denning was 
handicapped by not being able to discuss more fully his conclusions with 
McNeil. For example. Denning stated that in certifying sugar making costs 
the Independent Accountant had made 'no check on whether a particular item 
of work was entered as slack season maintenance, or as capital expansion'. 
The result was that 'costs were certified at a higher figure than they 
c o 
should have been'. This was wrong. The Independent Accountant had paid 
close attention to this very question. He had been told by McNeil that 
the millers' books were admirably kept and were not open to question. No 
criticism of the way sugar making costs had been certified had been made 
in McNeil's provisional reports to Denning. Denning made other mistakes 
and they have been fully set out by CSR. They might not have been made 
if McNeil had been alive when Denning wrote his award. More important, 
the award might not have been so generous to growers. From what he said 
in F i j i , CSR is convinced that McNeil was far more sympathetic to the 
u 56 
company than Denning proved to be. 
Unlike the Eve report, Denning's award was not designed to help 
the existing structure of the industry - foreign owned mills versus 
growers - work more smoothly. Rather, it was an expression of his view 
of justice as it applied to Fiji. Toward the end of his award Denning 
wrote: 
52 Confidential appendix. 
53 Denning Award, 9. 
54 Memo., 'Denning Report', 2 Feb. 1970, Sugar Advisory Council 
file entitled 'Denning Report', 
55 Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd, Lord Denning 's Award 
LnS^rnin^ the Fiji Sugar Cane Contract Dispute: Observat^ons 
on its Consequences and Mistakes. 
56 Confidential appendix. 
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ir I have erred aL a i l , J Lliink :i L will be l)ecau,se 1 have been 
too favourable to the g r o w e r s . So much so that the millers 
may say that their share does not leave them enough to maintain 
and modernise the mills and the transport system as they ought, 
or to give a reasonable return upon capital. But 1 would 
remind them that they have had a good innings over the last 
eiglit y e a r s . . . they have had a good reward. They have not gone 
short. But the growers h a v e . 57 
Denning sensed that growers had had a raw deal, and he wanted to right the 
situation despite CSR's prediction, which formed the bulk of its evidence, 
that it would be unable to operate profitably in Fiji if he did. This 
contrasted witli Eve who had felt that CSR was liaving a bad time, and had 
tried to do justice to the millers despite growers' claims that they would 
suffer an injustice as a result. Evidently there was not enough room to 
accommodate the interests of both parties. Denning may have realized 
this, as some officials later suspected. Instead of adding another short 
term answer to the ones that had gone b e f o r e , perhaps Denning preferred 
58 
to promote the conflict so as to hasten a long term solution. Whatever 
the m o t i v a t i o n , just as the Eve report had been an expression of support 
for private enterprise, so Denning's award reflected a sympathy for the 
individual when faced by powerful monopoly concerns. 
Denning had been appointed on 22 July 1969, and had held public 
hearings during August and September. Apart from the m i l l e r s , the 
Federation of Cane Growers had appeared before h i m , as had the Alliance 
Cane Contract Committee representing the Kisan Sangh and the Fijian 
farmers. The Alliance had wanted a better deal for growers, but not one 
that would be unfair to SPSM. The Federation, which was less concerned 
about the future of SPSM, had demanded an even greater improvement in the 
farmers' lot than had the A l l i a n c e . The award was published in January 
1 9 7 0 . Its chief provision was that the gross proceeds of sugar should be 
divided 65%/35% in favour of the growers. This was about five per cent 
more than the weighted average split from the operation of the Eve 
formula over the period 1962 to 1968. Denning also declared that the 
millers should guarantee farmers a minimum price of $7.75 (£3 17s 6d) per 
ton of cane. The weighted average price for the 1962 to 1969 seasons had 
57 Denning Award, 39. 
58 Fiji Times, 23 March 1970, 
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59 been $7.08 (abouL £3 10s lOd) . IC in a parLicular year Llie dlvLsioii of 
proceeds meant that growers would receive less than $7.75, assets of the 
Sugar Price Stabilization Fund Board should be used to make up the 
difference. Ultimately, though, it was the millers who would guarantee 
tlie minimum price. ^ ^ CSR was dismayed by the award - not only by the price 
formula, but by criticisms of the company contained in it. CSR judged 
that on the basis of the award and the existing price of raw sugar, SPSM 
would not be able to make a profit. The sharp rise in sugar prices in 
the early 1970s was not expected. The company had various alternatives. 
It could refuse to accept the award, but tliis might lead to a major con-
frontation with growers and sour its relationship with them for years to 
come.^^ Or SPSM could accept the award and apply immediately under the 
1961 Ordinance for a variation in the contract. But under the terms of 
the Ordinance, SPSM would need to show that there had been a material 
change in circumstances since the award had been made. This would be very 
difficult to prove.^^ Instead, CSR adopted the third course. It accepted 
the award, but announced that after two years it would dispose of SPSM's 
assets. 
Since no private interests were willing to buy, it was up to the 
newly independent government of Fiji to acquire SPSM. After prolonged 
negotiations, government agreed to take over all CSR's sugar assets in 
Fiji, including land, on 1 April 1973, after which CSR would supply 
managerial and technical staff pending localization and arrange the sale 
of sugar and molasses till Fiji took this over herself. The cost of these 
services, which represented a continuing though probably a relatively 
small income drain on the country, was to be met by SPSM's successor. 
Most have now been phased out." The sticking point in negotiations was 
the price to be paid for the mills and transport equipment. CSR was at a 
disadvantage. Having said it could not make an adequate profit in Fiji, 
59 'Industrial Statistics Summary', Tables 23 and 61. 
60 Denning Awards 33-6. 
61 Memo, on possible future actions of SPSM, n.d.. Sugar Advisory 
Council file on 'Denning Report'. 
62 Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd, 1. 
63 Responsibility for marketing Fiji sugar and molasses was taken 
over on 1 April 1977 by the Suva-based Fiji Sugar Marketing 
Company Ltd. 
277 
and in the absence of a second-hand market for most of its assets, it was 
hard to show that they were worth more than their scrap value. On the 
other hand, government was also at a disadvantage. Since it was seeking 
private capital from abroad, it dared not risk scaring investors by an 
arrangement that CSR might later dub as unfair. Eventually it was agreed 
that SPSM should be bought for $10 million (£5 million) and GSR's land-
holdings for million (£1 /4 million). Half the cost was to be financed 
by a loan from CSR in the form of debentures which were later sold to some 
of the Australian banks, and half was paid for out of general revenue. At 
one point Fiji asked the Australian government for a loan, but this was 
refused on the grounds that it might set a precedent if an independent 
64 Papua New Guinea was to acquire the assets of Australian companies. 
$10 million for fixed assets except land was much less than the 
$18 million CSR had originally asked for. It was also less than the $11 
to $12 million valuation put on the assets by Naha Singh Jain, an 
independent assessor hired by the Fiji government.Still, it was more 
than the company might have received if there had been less concern about 
the effect of the negotiations on private investors. GSR did not do too 
badly. In fact, when taken with the results of its milling operations 
in Fiji since 1960, the company had done quite well. Its anticipated 
losses in the early 1970s did not materialize because raw sugar prices 
were higher than expected. From SPSM's Annual Reports, for the years 
ended 31 December 1962 to 31 March 1970 the company's net profits after 
tax represented an annual average return of 11.02% on the paid up value 
of its shares. Over the next three years, when the Denning award was in 
force, the return fell to 6.19%. Overall, though, from 1962 to 1973 
annual returns averaged 9.7%. This was more than the Australian banks' 
overdraft rate, which averaged around 7.5%.^^ Table 9:2 below shows that 
GSR's surplus of receipts over expenditure for the years ended 31 December 
1961 to 31 March 1973 was an estimated £10,672,486 (about $21 million). 
64 Confidential appendix. 
65 
66 
One informant told me that the valuation was on the basis of 
replacement cost less depreciation, another thatit was based 
on the earning capacity of the mills. Confidential appendix. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Banking and Currency, Bulletin 
No. 11 (1972-3), Table 76. 
TABLE 9:2 
Estimated cash flow arising from Fiji sugar milling 
activities for years ended 31 December 1961 
to 31 March 1973'^ 
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Net pro Tits after tax 
Add back depreciation 
Total income ^ 
Add proceeds from sale of assets except land 
Less capital expenditure'^ 
Cash surplus available for repatriation 
9,943,294 
5,613,374 
15 ,556 ,668 
5 ,000 ,000 
20 ,556 ,668 
9 ,884 ,182 
10 ,672 ,486 
Sources: Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd, Fiji Sugar Milling Division^ 
Fro fit & Loss Statement For year ended 31 December, 1961; 
South Pacific Sugar Mills, Annual Report of Directors For 
year ended 31 December 1962; South Pacific Sugar Mills Ltd, 
Directors ' Reports for years ended 31 March 1964 to 31 March 
1973; Schedule 1, Documents submitted by SPSM, vol. 4; 
United Nations Development Advisory Team, Report to The 





Not all the cash flow would have occurred during this period. 
Because of changes in methods of presenting SPSM's accounts, 
it is impossible to show manufacturing costs, etc. as separate 
items. No allowance has been made for any transfer pricing 
arrangements. 
3. Calculated at three per cent of fixed assets (less land) shown 
in the company's annual statements. 
4. Land is excluded because profits from the leasing of land, 
yaqara etc. are excluded. 
5. Capital expenditure in the year ended 31 December 1961 is 
estimated at the average of capital expenditure over the rest 
of the period for which figures are available. 
Assuming away the 1969 change in the method of calculating the consumer 
price index, and assuming that the annual rate of capital expenditure from 
1962 to 1967 was constant^^ and that all outgoings and receipts were paid 
67 In January 1969 the Retail Price Index which had operated since 
1960 was replaced by the Consumer Price Index which was calculated 
on a different basis. Only an aggregate figure for capital 
expenditure from 1962 to 1967 is available. 
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at the end of the company's financial years wlien price levels have been 
taken, at M a r c h 1960 prices this was £7,372,554 (about $15 million). No 
allowance has been made for any transfer pricing arrangements, nor for the 
6 8 
profits - which apparently were quite large - on non sugar activities. 
But just taking the cash surplus from sugar production and from the sale 
of fixed assets except l a n d , it is clear that CSR's net receipts were 
considerable. Though the size of its returns in the early 1960s encouraged 
an expansion of milling capacity to the benefit of tliose who became farmers 
for the first time, the repatriation of profits meant that the surplus was 
not available for investment locally. 
The Eve and Denning reports could not have been more different. 
Yet both had advantages for C S R . Eve enabled the company to accumulate a 
large surplus from Fiji: Denning precipitated a withdrawal that proved 
to be on quite favourable terms. It is likely that had CSR stayed in Fiji 
the political climate would have made life increasingly hard for the 
c o m p a n y , that it would have found itself in conflict not only with the 
growers but more frequently than in the past also with government, and 
that eventually it would have been forced to leave on terms less favourable 
than those obtained in 1973. Many in CSR now look back with relief, mixed 
with some regret, that the company pulled out when it did, enabling 
proceeds from the sale to be invested in Australia where risks are less. 
From CSR's v i e w , there could have been few better moments to leave. 
The Fiji Sugar Corporation 
SPSM was replaced by the Fiji Sugar Corporation Ltd (FSC), whose first 
Chief Executive was Mr Gwyn Bowen-Jones, former Managing Director of 
Bookers M c C o n n e l l Ltd in G u y a n a . Naturally there are contrasts between 
SPSM and F S C . The localization of staff has been speeded up despite a 
shortage of experienced m e n , and management techniques current in Europe 
and North America have been introduced. Bowen-Jones's experience in 
overseas management was valued by C S R , which on several occasions sought 
his advice on the administrative reorganization of the company initiated 
by its General M a n a g e r , Mr Gordon Jackson^^ - a neat reversal of Fiji's 
68 Confidential appendix. 
69 Interview with Gwyn Bowen-Jones, 10 June 1976. 
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normally clcpcndenL- relnLlonslilp witli AusLralln. The influcncc of Rowen-
Jones was especially apparent in the decision taken in late 1973 to embark 
on a major expansion of sugar production at Labasa, which required an 
extension of cane cultivation into the Seaqaqa region. It was hoped that 
by 1979 an additional 200,000 tons of canc would be harvested, making this 
the largest single attempt to increase sugar production since before the 
First World War.^^ Though he has not always been credited with it, the 
decision was taken very much on the initiative of Bowen-Jones, who saw 
the expansion as a means to reduce unit costs at Labasa and reverse the 
overall decline in Fiji's output of sugar, a decline which was feared 
might lead to a loss of overseas markets. It was expected that the project 
would enable more Fijians to become cane growers, with important socio/ 
political advantages. An econometric study of the Seaqaqa scheme is at 
present under way;^^ there is also room for research into causes of the 
general decline, now possibly reversed, in sugar production since the late 
1960s. It is believed by many in Fiji that had CSR remained there would 
have been no development at Seaqaqa, or else the expansion would have been 
on a much smaller scale. 
Yet whatever the differences between SPSM and FSC, it is the 
similarities between the two that are most striking. There was a deliberate 
attempt by government and leaders of the Federation of Cane Growers to 
maintain continuity, lest the transition from one organization to another 
'rock the boat' and lead to inefficiencies. This may have been due to 
the premium placed on experience by CSR which, as Bowen-Jones found, 
influenced others in Fiji to think likewise; past experience should be 
preserved. There was also the widespread desire for stability, seen as a 
prerequisite for more rapid economic development than had previously been 
achieved. The general attitude was reinforced by the existence of an 
Alliance government drawing support from the Fijians and only a minority 
of Indians, whereas the opposition National Federation Party obtained its 
support almost exclusively from Indians. Reflecting its political base, 
government has regarded sugar as a national industry whose benefits should 
70 Fiji Sugar Corporation Ltd, Directors' Report and Statement of 
Accounts For Year Ended 31st March, 1975. 
71 By Mr David Evans, a Ph.D. scholar at the Australian National 
University. 
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not bo JiniiLcd l:o Llic Iiulinii c.omiiiuni Ly. This moniiL lli.u oven i C it had 
had the resources, it was out of the question for government to provide 
growers with funds to buy a majority of shares in the mills. Yet without 
such help, it is unlikely that if a share offer had been made in the early 
1970s, it would liave had more succcss than it had liad in the mid-1960s; 
the anticipated return on FSC shares would have been less than could 
normally be earned from advances to fellow Indians. So it was that no 
moves were made to introduce co-operativc ownership of the mills. Tliere 
was some talk in the Federation of pushing for this. Swami Rudrananda 
was particularly keen on tlie idea, but in the interests of stability he 
72 was dissuaded from making it an immediate issue. Instead, following 
73 
reports of experts from London, FSC was set up as an almost wholly 
owned government corporation registered under the Companies Act. It was to 
operate on the lines of a private company. Recognizing this, each year 
FSC has paid seven and a half per cent on the value of the capital in its 
books, $18Jg million. This represents about 13^% on the original purchase 
price of $10 million - a very respectable return. Had there been co-
operative ownership and the dividend been distributed to the 16,300-odd 
growers in the industry, it would have been worth an average of about 
$85 (£40 2s 6d) to each farmer a year - just under five per cent of the 
average profits from cane in the exceptionally good season of 1974. 
Given the high propensity to import consumer goods, this would have been 
unlikely to contribute as much to the economy as the availability of the 
dividend to finance certain development projects. 
72 Interview with R.D. Patel, 18 May 1976. 
73 R.G.R. Wall, 'Future structure of the sugar industry in Fiji', 
1972; R. Lallah and R.H. Goode, 'Administrative structure of the 
sugar industry', 1972. Copies are in the library. University of 
the South Pacific, Suva. 
74 Fiji Sugar Corporation Ltd, Directors Reports and Statements of 
Accounts, 1973-6. 
75 The average price received for cane in the 1974 season was about 
$20.9 per ton (Sugar Industry Ordinance 1961, Annual Reporl; for 
1975 Season). Farm costs in 1974 were estimated to be $7.50 per 
ton of cane (see United Nations Development Advisory Team, Report 
to the Independent Chairman on a study of the Fiji Sugar Industry 
1974 ch 3) Profit per ton of cane therefore was $13.40. With 
average farm output at 132 tons ('Industrial Statistics Summary', 
Table 55), average profit per farm was $1,768.80 (approx. £884). 
But this was an exceptionally good year for growers. 
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The important point, though, is that the division of interest 
between growers and the millers has remained. This causes disputes between 
farmers and the FSC on questions like the burning of cane and the avail-
ability of trucks to transport the cane. It encourages FSC to concentrate 
research on areas that will increase its profits, rather than areas like 
the development of mixed fanning (though some work has been done on this) 
which will almost exclusively benefit the growers. It encourages FSC to 
insist that farm advisers (extension workers) be responsible to field 
officers, instead of the Agricultural Experimental Station as was recommend-
ed in the UNDAT report on the sugar industry in 1974. FSC argues tliat 
apart from milling its main activity is organizing the harvesting and 
transport of cane; its subordinate function is to improve cane cultivation. 
Since field officers manage the harvesting and transport processes, they 
should occupy a more senior position to farm advisers. If the latter were 
responsible to the Experimental Station there would be two lines of 
management and divided control.^^ The trouble with this is that growers 
have a high regard for the work of the Experimental Station, and would 
be more likely to accept advice on matters like fertilizer application if 
it came through men responsible to the station rather than through field 
officers who are less respected; the latter are sometimes - unjustifiably 
- identified with officers who treated growers harshly in CSR's day-
Government ownership also reduces the interest of farmers in the profit-
ability of the mills, so that as growers seek to increase their incomes 
there is less of a check on demands for a larger share of the proceeds. 
Following a request by farmers for a revision of the Denning contract to 
give them an 80% instead of 65% share, on the recommendation of the UNDAT 
team they were awarded about 70%.^^ Though FSC has made reasonable 
profits because of high sugar prices in 1974-75, it fears that in the long 
term the new price formula will not leave a sufficient margin to maintain 
desired capital expenditure. Were the mills co-operatively owned, it is 
likely that growers' leaders would be more sensitive to such matters. 
Conflict within the industry, then, not only between growers and the 
76 Interview with Gwyn Bowen-Jones, 10 June 1976. 
77 This was 70% of total proceeds after deducting $360,000 as a _ 
contribution to the cost of the Agricultural Experimental Station, 
The UNDAT team had recommended a deduction of $250,000. Minutes 
of Sugar Advisory Council meeting, 7 March 1975. 
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millers buL also - and of groat importance - between mill-workers and 
7 8 
F S C , limits the potential contribution the industry can make to economic 
development in F i j i . 
In the absence of co-operative ownership, discussions are being 
held on how to rationalize the existing structure of the industry. It is 
possible that there will be moves toward a statutory cane growers' assoc-
iation to which all farmers would belong, though government has previously 
said that this should come through the voluntary efforts of growers rather 
than through government imposed legislation. A cane growers' association, 
possibly financed at first by the Sugar Price Stabilization Fund, might 
assume responsibility for the provision of growers' services, research 
into areas of concern to farmers, and the organization of the harvesting 
and transport of cane. This would leave FSC in the more economically 
rational position of being responsible solely for milling, which is where 
its main expertise lies. If growers organized extension work, the trans-
port system, etc. it might be easier to solve the many niggling arguments 
which occur during harvesting. Farmers would have a direct interest in 
improving the efficiency of the transport system and farm advisory 
services; they have frequently complained that the millers do not spend 
enough on these. Coming from their own organization, growers might be 
more willing to listen to advice on farm management, especially on multiple 
ratooning and burning. If they were more responsible for research and 
the application of its results, more attention might be paid to mixed 
farming which is standard practice in many other producing countries. 
A l l this would require that, instead of arguing among themselves, growers 
work together in such an organization. Many doubt that this is possible. 
The harmonious relations that have usually existed' in the Sugar Advisory 
Council suggest that it is. Yet however successful, such a scheme would 
78 
79 
Though the conflict between mill-workers and millers has not 
been dealt with here, it has been - and still is - of great 
importance and warrants proper treatment. 
In Bangladesh tobacco, potatoes, quinine and other spices are 
grown In a system of mixed farming with cane. In Taxwan rice 
L e t potatoes, peanuts, tomatoes, soya beans, cotton and flax 
are grown interrow with cane when the plant cane is young 
R e c e L l y , research on mixed farming has been u n d e r t a k e n ^ Fijx, 
b " the Ipplication of its results is still not gxven hxgh 
priority. 
284 
not eliminate the basic conflict between growers and FSC. It might 
actually increase it, since differences between the farmers and the millers 
could take the form of an open struggle between the Alliance-owned (in 
effect) FSC, and a Federation-dominated growers' association. Political, 
perhaps racial conflict in Fiji might then be increased, adding to the 
insecurity which already exists among Indians, and so deterring capital 
investment. 
FSC's potential contribution to economic development is further 
limited by its dependence on overseas markets. The minute size of her 
exports in relation to the world supply of sugar means that Fiji has little 
control over prices. She can collaborate with other producers, but even 
acting together their room for manoeuvre is limited. If prices reach very 
high levels as they did in 1974, it can be expected that demand will drop, 
the substitution of artificial sweeteners in place of sugar will occur 
and new producers will enter world trade; the world price will then fall, 
as happened in 1975 and 1976. This can be expected eventually to affect 
prices under long term agreements - witness the recent reduction in the 
80 
price of Australian sugar sold to Japan. Of special importance is the 
recent development of fructose glucose syrups which are manufactured from 
starch (almost exclusively maize). The syrups have comparable sweetness 
to sucrose and are cost competitive when the price of raw sugar is high. 
Modern technology makes it possible to produce starch sweetener at short 
notice, if necessary. In the medium term the availability of this sub-
stitute limits the potential rise in the price of raw sugar, though in the 
long term the position is not so clear since cane sugar processing meets 
many of its energy needs by using fibre in the cane. It is comparatively 
less energy intensive than the manufacture of starch sweeteners, and this 
would be of advantage if energy costs continue to rise in real terms. 
80 In 1977 the terms of Australia's five-year contract with Japan, 
beginning 1 July 1975 and ending 30 June 1980, were renegotiated. 
The 1.8 million tonnes of sugar remaining to be shipped under 
the contract are to be shipped over four years rather than three, 
at an annual rate of 450,000 tonnes p.a. instead of 600,000 tonnes 
p.a. At exchange rates prevailing at the time of settlement, the 
effective price of this sugar was to be seven per cent lower than 
the previous price. In return, Japanese buyers agreed to purchase 
an additional 150,000 tonnes p.a. over the four years 1978 to 1981 
at prices related to movements in the world market price. 
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Nevertheless, the long term level of demand for sugar is expected to rise 
at a slower rate than in the past, largely because the world's largest 
importers are the industrialised countries where per capita consumption 
is tending to fall as a result of health factors and increased competition 
from substitutes. The market in developing countries is not growing 
81 sufficiently fast to create a rapid growth in world demand overall. 
Beside access to the United States and Canadian markets, Fiji 
has long term agreements for the sale of sugar to New Zealand, Malaysia 
and Singapore. By far the most important agreement is with the European 
Economic Community. Under the Lome Convention, whose sugar provisions 
supersede the CSA and which came into force on 1 April 1975, Fiji can sell 
to the EEC for an indefinite period about 166,000 metric tons of raw sugar 
a year, at an annually negotiated price in the range of that paid to EEC 
beet producers. This is very different from the negotiated price formula 
under the CSA, which for specified quantities of sugar virtually allowed 
automatic price rises in line with increases in production costs. Since 
1975 prices under the Lome Convention have gone up by much less than the 
production costs of ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific - exporters 
covered by it. This has partly been because inflation rates in ACP 
countries have generally been higher than in the EEC. But it has also 
been because the Community has become a major exporter of raw sugar, 
following the world shortage in 1974-75. This has meant that the 'natural' 
market in Britain for Commonwealth producers has disappeared. Under the 
CSA Britain reserved about two-thirds of her market for Commonwealth 
sugar. This market can now be supplied entirely from within the EEC, with 
the Community still having a surplus for export. The Lome Convention's 
obligation on the EEC to import each year 1.4 million metric tons from ACP 
producers has forced the Community to export large quantities of domestic 
beet sugar. In gross terms, the EEC is now the largest exporter of raw 
sugar in the world. The presence of a sugar 'mountain' has encouraged 
the EEC to grant minimal price rises to beet growers, and hence ACP 
producers, while the end of the natural British market for Commonwealth 
exporters has weakened their bargaining position. Moreover, with the EEC 
81 This is based on papers prepared for the National Agricultural 
Outlook Conference, Canberra, 24 to 26 January 1978. 
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now a large exporter, its participation is probably essential if the 
International Sugar Agreement (ISA), negotiated in 1977, is to stabilise 
at higher levels the current world free price of sugar. And given the 
deficiencies of the Lome Convention (in the view of ACP producers), an 
effective ISA is especially important for Fiji as well as for other ACP 
countries. Yet because of its sugar surplus the EEC has refused to sign 
the ISA.®^ 
Q O 
Dependence on overseas markets brings other problems. Tariff 
barriers deny Fiji the opportunity to increase its earnings by exporting 
high quality sugar - say plantation white of 99° polarisation. Industrial-
ized nations have also imposed tariffs to keep out imports of refined 
sugar. Perhaps Fiji could produce industrial alcohol. But again the 
country would be at a disadvantage because, with part of the molasses from 
sugar being extracted during the refining stage, it would be more difficult 
to provide the distillery with a large enough supply to obtain economies 
of scale. Furthermore, to be viable the plant would need to produce for 
export as well as for the home market. Yet potential markets overseas 
are dominated by distilling companies which have an interest in preventing 
the import of a competitive product. In any case, their economies from 
producing on a larger scale make it unlikely that Fiji could compete. In 
1974 a Japanese company considered building a distillery in Fiji, because 
Japan was tightening up on anti-pollution laws and the company wanted to 
export pollution to Fiji instead. Negotiations with government broke down 
on this issue and partly because the bottom fell out of the industrial 
alcohol market.^^ If the market improves, it still seems unlikely that a 
distillery would be built in the country unless the waste-disposal problem 
was solved. Yet if technology was to make a solution possible the 
incentive for the Japanese to invest in Fiji would be reduced; they would 
be likely to prefer the economies of scale from producing industrial 
alcohol in Japan. The amount of value, then, which Fiji can add to the 
sugar she already makes is limited. And so, although the industry will 
82 Andrew McGregor, 'The Lome Convention and the ACP Sugar Exporters; 
the political economy of conflicting policies', unpublished Ph. 
D. thesis (Cornell, 1978), passim. 
83 This section is based on Charlotte Leubuscher, The Processing 
of Colonial Raw Materials^ 110-18. 
84 Confidential appendix. 
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continue to earn valuable foreign exchange and will provide a livelihood 
for a large number of people in the country, there are severe restrictions 




CSR's contribution or otherwise to economic development has always been 
a controversial matter In Fiji. Sir John Thurston, who did so much to 
encourage the company to build Nausorl, soon had doubts as to how far the 
colony would actually benefit from CSR's activities. Since then others 
have had similar reservations. In the 1950s and '60s the question of CSR's 
contribution to the economy became a major Issue. 
In fact the gains to Fiji from the sugar Industry have been 
quite considerable. The establishment of plantations led to the creation 
of substantial social and overhead capital In the form of transport 
facilities, telecommunications, electricity and water supplies, schools, 
clinics, etc. Previously Idle land was brought Into productive use, and 
employment - albeit under dreadful conditions - was provided for Indians, 
many of whom were destitute before they migrated. To some degree these 
benefits would have existed Irrespective of the plantation crop. But the 
fact that sugar was grown was of great advantage to Fiji, since sugar Is 
thought to give higher net returns to land and labour than many other 
tropical crops. The long term survival of the Industry depended on a 
substantial Inflow of capital. This might have been supplied by Australian 
and New Zealand banks, which in the late nineteenth century were financing 
some of the smaller mills in Fiji. Instead, large scale investment was 
undertaken by CSR, which already had expertise in sugar and was developing 
a large milling capacity in Australia. 
This benefited Fiji. The number and size of CSR's mills in 
Australia and Fiji reduced the unit costs of research, perhaps helping the 
company to be more innovative than If it had been operating in Fiji alone. 
Gradually, CSR acquired an expertise in the manufacturing process which 
has put it at the forefront of milling technology. Though its cultivation 
In 1960 the value of CSR's assets outside the mills in Fiji were 
far greater than in Queensland. 'Report of the Fiji Sugar 
Inquiry Commission', C.P. 20/1961. 
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work was not always so advanced,^ the company's research Into cane breeding, 
disease control and the like was helped by the exchange of results between 
its Fiji and Queensland establishments. In 1973 the company bequeathed 
to FSC an extensive collection of cane seedlings which are invaluable for 
research, and which apparently have been the envy of places like Hawaii.^ 
The high quality of Fiji's sugar has been one reason why she has obtained 
a foothold in the important United States market, as well as being able 
to sell elsewhere. Another has been the extent of CSR's marketing 
resources. Beside selling Fiji's sugar, as agent of the Queensland govern-
ment since 1923 the company has marketed all the sugar produced in Australia. 
By the Second World War Australia had become the largest single exporter 
of raw sugar in the Commonwealth and one of the largest in the world. The 
result was economies of scale in marketing which had advantages for Fiji. 
The unit cost of paying relatively high salaries to attract top quality 
staff was lower, while the acquisition of markets for Fiji owed something 
to the experience gained, and the extensive network of contacts made, by 
the company from marketing exceptionally large quantities of sugar. Thus 
one of the legacies of CSR has been an industry capable of producing 
excellent sugar with markets in which to sell that sugar. It is possible 
that one or several companies operating exclusively in Fiji would not 
have done so well. 
The structure of the sugar industry since the 1920s has brought 
particular benefits to Fiji. Indeed, the introduction of the smallfarm 
system has been regarded as one of CSR's major achievements. The scheme's 
success depended on the company providing growers with certain external 
economies of supervision, research, etc. As a result, at virtually no 
cost to CSR, growers received higher incomes than if they had remained as 
In 1953 CSR's Dr Harman noted that unlike sugar companies in 
Hawaii CSR had no agronomist on its Fiji staff, though one was 
appointed soon after. He also commented, 'I cannot help feeling 
that field work does not get the detailed supervision that the 
Inspecting Chemists and Inspecting Engineers give to our mills 
If we are to keep problems connected with the cane growing 
industry away from the Department of Agriculture in Fiji, there 
is no doubt in my mind that we must do more than what we are 
doing now.' R.W. Harman, 'Visit to Fiji 27th August to 19th 
September, 1953', CSR F 2.0/7/-. 
Interview with Mr M. Krishnamurthi, 11 May 1976. 
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labourers, and to some extent these incomes have had a multiplier effect 
through the rest of the economy. Moreover, it seems that since the 1930s 
costs of production have risen less rapidly under the smallfarm system than 
they would if cane had been grown on estates with wage labour. Between 
1939 and 1973 average cane prices went up by 647%: in the same period the 
average unit cost of non-salaried mill workers rose by almost twice that 
- by over 1,163%. Making the comparison on a different basis, from 1950 
to 1973, the years for which figures are available, average farm incomes 
increased by about 347% whereas the unit cost of non-salaried mill-workers 
4 
rose by 481%. The slower rise in growers' incomes can be partly attrib-
uted to the relation of cane prices since 1940 to the price of raw sugar. 
Movements in the wages of mill workers on the other hand have been much 
less affected by changes in the sugar price. It is likely that if cane 
had been grown on estates, as in the mills there would have been strong 
pressure for the wages of labourers to increase at a faster rate before 
1973 than did the earnings of cane farmers. This is because estate workers 
are more easily mobilized by union leaders than scattered, and relatively 
conservative, peasant farmers. The brake on labour cost increases which 
has been imposed under the smallfarm system is one reason why the cost of 
producing raw sugar in Fiji, estimated at about £50 a ton in 1974, was well 
under half the average cost in the Commonwealth Caribbean where cane is 
groxm mostly on estates.^ This cost-competitiveness has been of great 
benefit to Fiji in the past since it has made possible an expansion of 
sugar production. Given in particular the uncertain outlook for sugar 
markets, it will be of great advantage in the future as well, if the 
competitiveness is maintained. 
Clearly, the sugar industry has had an important development 
impact on the economy. Yet in view of Fiji's concern with the problems 
of economic development, the question is why this impact has not been 
greater. Apart from price constraints imposed by the nature of the world 
market, one reason is that most of the value in the final product has 
been added outside Fiji. George Beckford has emphasized how plantation 
FSC Ltd, 'Industrial Statistics Summary', Tables 3(a)(i), 5, 
19(c), 23, 55, 61. 
Andrew McGregor, 'The Lome Convention and the^ACP sugar exporters: 
the political economy of conflicting policies , 74-8/. 
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enterprise is of L e a verLicully integrated into t l i G rest of a company's 
operations.^ This was not so much the case with CSR's interests in Fiji 
after the 1920s, for apart from the sale of molasses to its Australian 
distilleries and sugar to its Auckland refinery, most of its Fiji output 
was transported in non-CSR ships to non-CSR refineries. It was left to 
other firms to profit from handling and processing sugar once CSR had 
finished with it, and these companies were foreign owned. Profits from 
transporting sugar to markets in Europe, North America and elsewhere have 
been made by Elder Smith Goldsbrough Mort Ltd, the Australian shipping 
brokers used by CSR; they are still used by the Fiji Sugar Marketing Co. 
Ltd, which has been responsible for selling Fiji's sugar since 1 April 
1977. Then, of course, returns from refining sugar and producing con-
fectionary, etc., as well as the gains to CSR from distilling molasses, 
have not accrued to Fiji either. Similarly, inputs of machinery, fertilizer 
and, to some degree, fuel for the mills have come from abroad. Thus, as 
is so often the case with plantation enterprise, many of the forward and 
backward linkages from sugar production have occurred largely outside the 
Fiji economy. 
Also important have been other limits placed on the amount of 
income created within Fiji by the sugar industry. They include efforts 
by millers and plantation owners to keep down labour costs so as to 
maximise profits. The need for cheap labour explains largely the main 
developments in the history of the industry - the introduction of indent-
ured labour, the transition to smallfarming and the disputes between 
growers and CSR. The indenture system enabled planters to keep wages 
below their free market rate. On plenty of occasions, especially in the 
1920s and '30s, CSR used its dominant position in the labour market to 
hold down the wages of free Indian labourers; before 1940 it extracted 
forced labour at wages below the market level. The company tried to pay 
the minimum price for cane, doubtless thinking this was necessary for the 
success of its operations, but it seems that in the 1940s CSR could have 
afforded a higher price. One result of low wages and cane prices was 
that, till fairly recently, there was little incentive for Fijians to 
become involved in the cash economy either as plantation labourers or 
6 George L. Beckford, Persistent Poverty, 117-21, 
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cane growers. Many were left on the periphery of a peripheral economy. 
Another was that the purchasing power of Indians, and hence the general 
level of economic activity, was limited. The conflict of interest between 
CSR which wanted to maximise its earnings, and growers who wanted to maxi-
mise their's, caused income to be lost through strikes and the many small 
disputes which impeded the efficient harvesting and transport of cane. 
Finally, the size of the Indian population today stems ultimately from 
the industry's demand for cheap labour. Yet the conditions on which 
plantation agriculture was allowed to flourish in Fiji - namely, that 
Fijians retain control of most of the land - has made it more difficult 
for Indians to feel they belong to the country which is now their home. 
The insecurity which results has encouraged many, especially Gujerati 
storekeepers, to repatriate some of their incomes to India or (of recent 
importance) to relatives in Canada. The amount available for expenditure 
within Fiji has been correspondingly reduced. There is the possibility, 
too, of mounting tension between the Fijians and Indians. If this 
happens, it will undermine the political stability which is necessary for 
economic development. 
Sugar's contribution to income growth has been further limited 
by Fiji's dependence on imports, which has been partly due to the unequal 
distribution of income.^ The sugar industry has contributed to this by 
minimising the cost of labour while at the same time, especially before 
the 1960s, it relied on skilled expatriate staff who were attracted to 
Fiji at salaries comparable to the high rates in Australia. In 1936 about 
12.5% of Europeans employed in the colony were directly engaged in the g 
sugar industry; in 1956 the proportion was about ten per cent. To this 
should be added the Europeans employed in other activities like whole-
saling and retailing, which depended heavily on the income created by the 
sugar industry. Accustomed to consumer articles produced abroad, the 
European elite (which is now outnumbered by well-to-do Indians and Fijians) 
imported foodstuffs and clothing,for example, instead of buying items 
produced locally. The demonstration effect of imports may have increased 
resistance among Fijians and Indians to goods of lower quality but produced 
It has also been due to the small size of the population which 
has limited the development of import substitute industries. 
Census reports for 1936 and 1956, C.P. 42/1936, 1/1958. 
293 
wiLhin Fiji. The fairly recenL development of ImporL substiLuLe industries, 
like beer and cigarettes, might have occurred sooner if income had been 
more equally distributed. The demand for high quality imports might then 
have b een less, while that for lower quality domestic products might have 
been greater. 
Not only has there been a leakage of funds abroad through the 
purchase of imports, but there has also been leakage caused by the repat-
riation of CSR's prof its. From 1887 to 1910 the company's annual average 
return before tax in Fiji was 6.00%, which compared unfavourably with the 
six to nine per cent charged on overdrafts by Australian trading banks in 
the period. From 1915 to 1923 the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. (Fiji and 
New Zealand) Ltd yielded an annual average return of 14.7%, 
which was twice the Australian overdraft rates. Assuming no revaluation 
of CSR's assets in 1941, from 1924 to 1943 returns before tax averaged 
about 7.3% a year, compared with the interest on Australian bank over-
drafts of between 4.25% and 8.00%. From 1939 to 1950 average annual 
returns before tax were 14.73%, whereas Australian overdraft rates ranged 
from 4.25% to 5.00%. Between 1950 and 1960 returns averaged about 7.5% 
and Australian overdraft rates were between 4.5% and 6.00%. From 1962 
to 1970 average returns after tax on paid up capital in SPSM were 11.02%, 
which was well above the maximum overdraft rate in Australia. But because 
of the effect of the Denning award, from 1971 to 1973 the average return 
fell to 6.19% which was slightly below the maximum overdraft rate. 
However, the figures have to be treated with care. Profits 
since 1923 have been measured against the value of assets (plus an allow-
ance for working capital and stocks) shown in CSR's half-yearly reports 
to 1960, and against the paid up value of SPSM's shares after 1962. In 
judging how accurate these asset valuations were, ideally the historian 
would calculate the amount CSR invested in the industry each year, and 
convert this into real values by using a price index. But no price index 
exists for the years before 1939 (though one could be constructed), while 
figures for CSR's investment in Fiji before 1943 are incomplete. There-
after, trade reports show the value of imports of sugar milling machinery, 
rails, locomotives and parts, and rolling stock and parts, though the 
values are expressed in f.o.b. terms which underestimate total capital 
expenditure. Before 1943 figures for some of the years are unavailable. 
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while there are no figu res for rolling stock and parts (which was an 
important component of total investment). Thus CSR's annual capital 
expenditure can only be estimated very approximately, which makes it 
impossible to calculate accurately the value of assets at the end of each 
financial year. Moreover, the profit figures do not allow for transfer 
pricing arrangements. For a long period Fiji's molasses was sold for less 
than its value on the open market, so reducing the returns from milling. 
At times, head office expenses may have been too high. Furthermore, CSR's 
allowance for depreciation and replacement seems to have been excessive. 
Though total capital expenditure since 1940 appears to have exceeded the 
sums charged to depreciation, much of the expenditure was designed to 
increase the capacity of the mills. Expenditure on replacing old machinery 
was probably about equal to, or less than, amounts put aside over the 
period to cover depreciation. From 1924 to 1940 the depreciation allowance 
was more than total capital expenditure, which included the purchase and 
the enlargement of the Penang mill. No doubt before 1924, when machinery 
was relatively new, depreciation charges would have exceeded replacement 
expenditure by an even larger amount. It may well be, then, that profits 
were bigger than the quoted figures suggest. 
In terms of their significance for the Fiji economy, what counts 
is not profits shown as a percentage return on investment but the total 
cash surpluses which CSR could remit abroad. The surpluses were consider-
able. By 1911 the company had been able to repatriate in profits at least 
as much as it had invested in the colony. The return of over 118% from 
1915 to 1923 implies that during those years CSR again could have re-
patriated an amount equal to, or more than, its original investment in 
Fiji. Thereafter, as Tables 6:6, 7:13, 8:9 and 9:2 have shown, CSR was 
able to take out of Fiji in profits over twice as much as it put in as 
investment. If anything, the surplus was larger still, since estimates 
of capital expenditure before 1950 have been designed to over- rather than 
under-state the true position. In relation to the size of the Fiji 
economy, the amounts available for repatriation were pretty large. They 
might have added substantially to national income if they had been re-
invested in Fiji. 
The sugar industry's contribution to economic development was 
further limited by CSR's failure to encourage the maximum use of land - a 
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failure which stemmed from the company's specialization in sugar. In 1959 
the Burns commission noticed large areas of CSR controlled grazing land 
lying adjacent to Indian cane farms, particularly in the provinces of Ba 
and Ra. Much of the land was overstocked with growers' cattle, a tendency 
of little concern to CSR since it was not reflected in the company's 
profit and loss accounts. CSR was criticized for taking less care of 
these areas than land which it had leased for cane farming. The commission 
also noted that Stockdale in 1936, Shephard in 1945 and Sir Geoffrey Clay 
in 1954 had all emphasized the need for research into ways that cane might 
be integrated into a system of mixed farming which would increase growers' 
9 
incomes; yet nothing had been done about it. In the 1930s CSR had feared 
that the development of alternative crops would draw labour away from the 
sugar industry: but it made little effort to see if crops whose labour 
inputs were complementary to cane could be grown. As underemployment 
increased after the 1930s, the danger that new crops would compete for 
labour was much less. There was every reason to think that Indians would 
adopt a system of mixed farming if it could be devised. Depending on 
labour requirements, the opportunity cost to the farmer of growing 
additional crops would be low since for much of the year cane demands 
relatively little attention. Markets were not necessarily a constraint; 
in 1947 there were complaints from New Zealand that Fiji's supply of pea-
nuts, which can be grown with cane, was not large and reliable enough. 
Many Indians grow rice and dhal, among other crops, on plots adjacent to 
their farms, or on their farms. Wliat was needed was to extend the oppor-
tunities for mixed farming, but CSR's dominant position in the economy 
encouraged government to leave research on such questions to the company. 
And CSR gave it low priority since mixed farming would not have contributed 
directly to profits (though it might have increased the sense of well-
being among growers which would have been to the company's advantage). 
Consequently, Indians were deprived of the opportunity to employ some of 
their surplus labour. 
Finally, the industry which has always been risky has been made 
even more high risk by the current uncertainties over the future markets 
Burns et al., 'Commission of Enquiry into the Natural Resources 
and Population Trends of the Colony of Fiji , C.P. 1/1960. 
10 C.S.O. 2/226. 
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for sugar. Unlike the CSA, the Lome Convention does not offer the prospect 
of automatic price rises to meet increases in the average unit production 
costs of sugar exporters covered by the agreement. And with the end of 
a 'natural market' in Britain for Fiji's sugar, the industry is more 
dependent than ever on political forces overseas. Moreover, now that the 
EEC has become a large exporter of sugar and has not signed the Internation-
al Sugar Agreement, the medium term outlook for the free world market is 
not bright. If the market remains depressed, when the time comes it will 
be hard to negotiate with New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore new long 
term marketing arrangements as favourable to Fiji as the existing ones. 
Together with limits on the contribution of sugar to economic development, 
this could create a situation where it would have been desirable to shift 
resources - to a greater or lesser extent - away from sugar to the 
production of exports whose markets are more secure and perhaps more 
remunerative, or to the production of goods for domestic consumption. Yet 
the cost of this would be high because of the amount of capital committed 
to sugar production. Since the plant (apart from the rail system) is 
highly specific to the industry, for the most part it cannot be used for 
the production of other goods; nor can it be easily sold. Thus most of 
the investment in mill machinery, for example, would have to be written 
off, thereby largely - or totally - negating the gains from diverting 
resources away from sugar. So it is that there are few choices open to 
Fiji on how to combine factors of production presently engaged in sugar. 
There is little alternative but to allow a large sector of the economy to 
remain dependent on a crop which is high risk, and of which the potential 
contribution to economic development is relatively small. 
It is clear, then, that although sugar has helped to develop 
the Fiji economy, the very nature of production has imposed severe limits 
on the extent of its contribution. The question remains as to how 
benefits from sugar have been distributed within Fiji. This is difficult 
to answer, yet a tentative assessment can be made. What counts is not 
total gains, but net gains - i.e. total gains less any costs. Now there 
can be no doubt that the owners of capital have done well. Even if CSR 
did not make super profits, the earnings it could repatriate from Fiji 
were pretty large - at least, they were large enough to persuade the 
company to invest periodically in an expansion of the industry. Repatri-
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ated profits were available for investment in the Australian sugar industry, 
and since the 1930s in the diversification of CSR's activities. Merchant 
capital also benefited since the income generated by the industry through 
salaries, wages and payments for cane created a demand for merchandise. 
Money-lenders made profits on advances to growers. Though the limited 
spread effects of the industry placed restrictions on the expansion of 
trade, the net gains to merchant capital - as well as to CSR - were very 
considerable. 
Government benefited from the revenue contributed by sugar not 
only directly, but indirectly through the industry's stimulus to trade. 
Customs duties accounted for 58% of total revenue in 1913, 54% in 1939 
and A4% in 1974.^^ Though the industry created new problems for officials, 
especially in governing the Indian population, it also helped the adminis-
tration maintain political control. Investment by sugar companies in the 
late nineteenth century strengthened government's hand against critics 
who thought the native policy was hindering trade. Much later CSR acted 
as a buffer between the administration and Indians, deflecting some of 
the latter's anti-European sentiment away from government towards the 
company. The chiefs in cane districts have obtained a large share of the 
rents from land. Thirty per cent of rents from areas under their authority 
are paid to the heads of the vanua (or confederation of yavusa), the heads 
of the yavusa and the heads of the mataqali, the land-owning units who 
comprise the yavusa. In 1959 it was not uncommon for the head of the 
12 
vanua to receive £200 to £300 a year in rent. The sums would have been 
larger if the terms on which land was originally leased had permitted 
reassessments of rent, so as to maintain its real value. Reassessments 
during the lease have occurred only since the late 1960s. Nevertheless 
for the chiefs, and also for government, gains from the sugar industry 
have far outweighed the costs. 
For the great majority of Indians and for Fijian commoners net 
gains were probably not so large. True, they have benefited from govern-
ment expenditure financed by the revenue raised as a result of the sugar 
Trade Reports for 1913, 1939 and 1974, C.P. 53/1914 and 36/1940, 
P.P. 10/1975. 
12 O.H.K. Spate, 'The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects', 
C.P. 13/1959. 
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industry. Expenditure on health, ior example, lias led to a sharp fall in 
the infant mortality rate from thirty-nine deaths per 1000 in 1958 to 
13 
twenty-five in 1967. It would be interesting, though, to examine the 
distribution of government expenditure between Indians and Fijians on the 
one hand, and Europeans on the other: the distribution between Indians 
and Fijians would also be interesting. It is likely that for many years 
per capita expenditure favoured Europeans. Gillion notes that in 1928 
over all those aged five to 14, government spent £8 per head on educating 
Europeans, 12s on Fijians and five shillings on Indians.^^ Yet even if 
it was found that in general Indians benefited least from government 
expenditure, no one can deny that materially most are far better off now 
than if their parents or grandparents had stayed in India. This higher 
standard of living has been attained at considerable cost, though. The 
humiliating circumstances under which indentured labourers were brought 
to Fiji is still a source of resentment today. Of course, a number of 
Indian businessmen are also descended from indentured labourers, but the 
majority are either 'free' migrants themselves or the descendants of free 
migrants. Thus, most of the cost of the indenture system has to be set 
against the gains to Indian farmers rather than against the gains to 
merchant capital. Moreover, instead of owning the land, growers are 
tenants occupying leases whose terms have never exceeded thirty years. 
Insecurity of tenure has made it very difficult for farmers to feel that 
they belong to Fiji: yet unlike recent Gujerati migrants who dominate 
much of the business and have close ties with India, they have no other 
home. And then there is the underutilization of land and labour associated 
with the spread of plantation enterprise, and which prevents the sugar 
industry making a bigger contribution to solving the problem of under-
employment in cane areas. Although the gains from sugar production out-
weigh these costs, it is likely that attention will focus increasingly on 
the ways the sugar industry has limited - and still limits - Indian 
economic advancement. 
Fijian commoners have also benefited from sugar. Some have 
obtained casual and off-farm employment in the sugar mills and cane 
harvesting gangs. A growing number are becoming cane farmers as well. At 
13 Michael Ward, The Role of Investment in the Development of Fiji, 28. 
lA K.L. Gillion, The Fiji Indians, 122. 
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the 1966 census 5,269 Fijians were engaged in the sugar industry, mostly 
in the cultivation of cane.^^ Those in sugar districts have received rents 
which would not have been available but for plantation agriculture Yet 
the size of this income has been small, partly because of the failure to 
reassess rents till recently, and partly because of the 30% share paid to 
the chiefs and the further 25% which goes to the NLTB to cover its expenses. 
After these deductions, in 1958 the average annual rent received per head 
of the Fijian population in Ba and Macuata, both cane provinces, was only 
£1.78 and £1.81 respectively. Nor has the chiefs' portion usually been 
invested so as to increase village incomes. As Spate put it in 1959, 
'the chiefs, the natural leaders of society, have often in sober truth 
been debauched by easy money, while most people receive a pittance scarcely 
worth saving*.^^ Like Indians, many Fijians are also suffering from the 
limited spread effects of sugar which makes it harder to find jobs. As 
the population grows and the spread effects of the industry (and other 
sectors of the economy)^^ remain comparatively small, the shortage of land 
already evident in some districts will become steadily more acute. Yet 
the price Fijians must pay to reoccupy areas which are leased is racial 
conflict on a scale that the vast majority wish to avoid. To many Fijians, 
it must seem that the problems connected with land outweigh much of the 
benefits received from sugar. 
So it is that while the owners of capital, government and many 
of the Fijian chiefs have done quite well from sugar, net gains to the 
mass of the Indian population have not been so great, while for commoners 
net gains have been comparatively small. In 1879 Thurston had promised 
Gordon with reference to potential sugar investors, 'I shall do all I can 
to induce them to embark their money without making any sacrifices.' 
After nearly one hundred years, it seems that Fiji has made larger sacri-
^ 18 fices than Thurston expected. 
15 Census report for 1966, C.P. 9/1968. 
16 C.P. 13/1959. 
17 For example, the spread effects of tourism seem to be small. A 
study of the tourist industry is being undertaken by Mr Stephen 
Britton, a Ph.D. scholar at the Australian National University. 
18 Thurston to Gordon, 3 March 1879, in Stanmore, 1st Baron, 
Records of Private and of Public Life 1875-1880. Ill, 533. I _ 
am grateful to Dr Scarr for drawing my attention to thxs quotatxon. 
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